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REV. CHARLES G. FINNEY.

C. G. Finney

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LECTURES

ON

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY;

EMBRACING

LECTURES ON MORAL GOVERNMENT,

TOGETHER WITH

**ATONEMENT, MORAL AND PHYSICAL DEPRAVITY,
REGENERATION, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES, AND EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.**

BY

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PREFACE.

1. **THE** truths of the blessed gospel have been hidden under a false Philosophy. Of this I have been long convinced. Nearly all the practical doctrines of Christianity have been embarrassed and perverted by assuming as true the dogma of (a Necessitated Will.) This has been a leaven of error that, as we shall see, has "leavened nearly the whole lump" of gospel truth. In the present work I have in brief attempted to prove, and have every where assumed the (freedom of the Will.)

2. My principal design in publishing on Systematic Theology at the present time is, to furnish my pupils with a class or text book, where many points and questions are discussed of great practical importance, but which have not, to my knowledge, been discussed in any system of theological instruction extant. I have also hoped to benefit other studious and pious minds.

3. I have written for those who are willing to take the trouble of thinking and of forming opinions of their own on theological questions. It has been no part of my aim to spare my pupils or any one else the trouble of (intense thought.) Had I desired to do so, the subjects discussed would have rendered such an attempt abortive.

4. There are many questions of great practical importance, and questions in which multitudes are taking a deep interest at present, that can not be intelligently settled without insti-

tuting fundamental inquiries involving the discussion of those questions that lie at the foundation of morality and religion.

5. I am too well acquainted with the prejudices of the great mass of professing Christians, and with their unwillingness to be at the pains of studying elementary truths and of judging for themselves, to expect that this book will soon find favor with the majority of them. Still I am aware that a spirit of inquiry into the fundamental and elementary truths of religion and of all science, is abroad, and is waking up more and more in the Church. There is a deep and growing demand for explanation in regard to the subjects discussed in this work. Especially is this true of ministers and of leading laymen and women. This book is a humble attempt to meet this demand. My object has been to simplify and explain. The book has no literary merit and claims none.

6. I fear that the book will not be understood even by some who are willing to read and are desirous of understanding it. The reasons are,

(1.) The book is highly metaphysical. This, however, is owing to the nature of the subject. The subject is, *mind in its relations to moral law*. Hence, the discussion, to be any thing to the purpose, must be metaphysical. To avoid metaphysics in such a discussion were to waive *my subject*, and to write about something else.

(2.) There is a good deal of repetition in the work. This I judged to be indispensable to perspicuity. Perhaps the reader will not agree with me in this, and may think he should have understood me just as well if I had repeated less. But my experience upon this subject after having taught these truths for years has ripened the conviction that there is no other way of being understood upon such a subject.

(3.) I fear that with all my painstaking the book will not be understood even by many who desire to understand it, on account of my inability to simplify and explain so profound a subject. With this thought I have been much oppressed.

(4.) Notwithstanding the repetition alluded to, I fear it is

condensed too much to be understood by some. The book to be understood must be *studied* and not merely read.

7. This volume is much more difficult to understand than any of the remaining volumes will be. I have begun with the second volume, as this was to be on subjects so distinct from what will appear in the first volume that this volume might as well appear first, and because it seemed especially called for just now, to meet a demand of the Church and of my classes.

8. Most of the subjects of dispute among Christians at the present day are founded in misconceptions upon the subjects discussed in this volume. If I have succeeded in settling the questions which I have discussed, we shall see that in future volumes most of the subjects of disagreement among Christians at the present day can be satisfactorily adjusted with comparative ease.

9. What I have said on the "Foundation of Moral Obligation" is the key to the whole subject. Whoever masters and understands that can readily understand all the rest. But he who will not possess himself of my meaning upon this subject will not, can not understand the rest.

10. Let no one despair in commencing the book, nor stumble at the definitions, thinking that he can never understand so abstruse a subject. Remember that what follows is an expansion and an explanation by way of application of what you find so condensed in the first pages of the book. My brother, sister, friend—read, study, think, and read again. (You were made to think.) It will do you good to think; to develop your powers by study. God designed that religion should require thought, intense thought, and should thoroughly develop our powers of thought. (The Bible itself is written in a style so condensed as to require much intense study.) Many know nothing of the Bible or of religion because they will not think and study. I do not pretend to so explain theology as to dispense with the labor of thinking. I have no ability and no wish to do so.

11. I suppose that faults will be discovered in the book by others that I have not seen myself. If so, I hope to be able to see them and to correct them before I die.

12. But I hope if any of my brethren think to convince me of error that they will first understand me, and show that they have *read the book through, and that they understand it*, and are candidly inquiring after truth and not "striving for masteries." If my brother is inquiring after truth, I will, by the grace of God, "hear with both ears and then judge." But I will not promise to attend to all that cavilers may say, nor to notice what those impertinent talkers and writers may say or write who *must have controversy*. But to all honest inquirers after truth I would say, hail my brother! Let us be thorough. Truth shall do us good.

13. This volume is designed to supercede my published *Skeletons* upon the subject of Moral Government. There has been much demand for an amplification of this subject. I have for brevity's sake, in some few instances, quoted from my *Skeletons*, but in general I have written altogether without reference to that work, until I come to the Atonement and Human Government. I should have expanded these subjects much more than I have, had there been room in this volume for such an amplification. Upon these questions I have transferred most of what was written in my *Skeletons* to the present volume, making such changes in the arrangement and discussion as I supposed would render so brief a statement perspicuous.

14. I perceive that the Publisher has put forth a prospectus of this work in which he has spoken of it in terms, I fear, decidedly too high. I knew nothing of this until some time after the prospectus was out. All I can honestly say of the work is, that I have intended to do good, and have done the best that I could under the circumstances. I submit the work to the prayerful study of my Christian brethren, and if it shall meet the end for which it was intended, I have not labored in vain.

C. G. FINNEY.

Oberlin, July 15, 1846.

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
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FINNEY'S LECTURES

ON

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY,

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

LECTURE I.

I. DEFINITION OF LAW.

II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND MORAL LAW.

III. ATTRIBUTES OF MORAL LAW.

I. In discussing the subject, I must begin with *defining the term LAW*.

Law, in a sense of the term both sufficiently popular and scientific for my purpose, is A RULE OF ACTION. In its *generic* signification, it is applicable to every kind of action, whether of matter or of mind—whether intelligent or unintelligent—whether free or necessary action.

II. I must distinguish between *Physical and Moral Law*.

Physical law is a term that represents the order of sequence, in all the changes that occur under the law of necessity, whether in matter or mind. I mean all changes, whether of state or action, that do not consist in the voluntary states or actions of free will. Physical law is the law of force, or necessity, as opposed to the law of liberty. Physical law is the law of the material universe. It is also the law of mind, so far as its states and changes are involuntary. All changes of mental state or action, which do not consist in free and sovereign changes or actions of will, must occur under, and be subject to Physical Law. They cannot possibly be accounted

for, except as they are ascribed to the law of necessity or force. In one word, then, Physical Law is the law of necessity or force, and controls all changes and actions, whether of matter or mind, except the actions of free will.

Moral Law is a rule of moral action with sanctions. It is that rule of action to which moral beings are under a moral obligation to conform all their voluntary actions, and is enforced by sanctions equal to the value of the precept. It is the rule for the government of free and intelligent action, as opposed to necessary and unintelligent action. It is the law of *liberty*, as opposed to the law of *necessity*—of *motive* and free choice, as opposed to *force* of every kind that renders action necessary, or unavoidable. Moral Law is a rule for the direction of the action of free will, *and strictly of free will only*. But less strictly, it is the rule for the direction of the actions of free will, and of all those actions and states of mind and body, that are connected with the free actions of will by a Physical Law, or by a law of necessity. Thus, Moral Law controls involuntary mental states and outward action, only by securing conformity of the actions of free will to its precept.

III. I must point out *the essential attributes of Moral Law*.

1. *Subjectively*. It is, and must be, an idea of the Reason, developed in the mind of the *subject*. It is an idea, or conception of that state of will, or course of action which is obligatory upon a moral agent. No one can be a moral agent, or the subject of Moral Law, unless he has this idea developed; for this idea is identical with the law. It is the law developed, or revealed within himself; and thus he becomes "a law to himself," his own reason affirming his obligation to conform to this idea, or law.

2. A second attribute is *Liberty, as opposed to Necessity*. Its precept must lie developed in the Reason, as a rule of duty—a law of moral obligation—a rule of choice, or of ultimate intention, declaring that which a moral agent ought to choose, will, intend. But it *does not, must not, can not* possess the attribute of necessity in its relations to the actions of free will. It must not, cannot, possess an element or attribute of force, in any such sense as to render conformity of will to its precept unavoidable and necessary. This would confound it with *Physical Law*.

3. A third attribute of Moral Law, is *adaptability, or adaptation*. It must be the Law of *Nature*, that is, its precept must prescribe and require just that state of the will, and that course of

action which is demanded by the nature and relations of moral beings, and nothing more or less.

Moral Law, *subjectively* considered, is simply an idea of that state of the voluntary power, that is befitting to moral agents upon condition of their nature and relations. Their nature and relations being perceived, the reason hereupon necessarily affirms that they ought to will, intend, the highest good of being for its own intrinsic value. This is what is meant by the law of *nature*. It is a law, or rule, necessarily imposed upon us by our own nature. It is nothing more or less than that which reason spontaneously and necessarily affirms to be *fit, proper, right*, in view of our nature and relations, and the intrinsic value of the highest well being of God and the universe. Those being given, *this* is affirmed to be duty. It is an *idea* of that state of the heart, and that course of life, that from their nature and relations, is indispensable to the highest good of all. By Moral Law being the Law of *Nature*, is intended, that the nature and relations of moral agents being what they are, a certain course of willing and acting is indispensable to, and will result in their highest well being; that their highest well being is valuable in itself, and should be willed for that reason.

4. A fourth attribute of Moral Law is *Universality*. The conditions being the same, it requires, and must require, of all moral agents, the same things, in whatever world they may be found.

5. A fifth attribute of Moral Law, is *Uniformity*. All the conditions and circumstances being the same, its claims are uniformly the same. This follows from the very nature of Moral Law.

6. A sixth attribute of Moral Law is, and must be, *Impartiality*. Moral Law is no respecter of persons—knows no privileged classes. It demands one thing of all, without regard to any thing, except the fact that they are moral agents. By this it is not intended, that the same course of outward conduct is required of all—but the same state of heart in all—that all shall have one ultimate intention—that all shall consecrate themselves to one end—that all shall entirely conform in heart and life to their nature and relations.

7. A seventh attribute of Moral Law is, and must be, *Justice*. That which is unjust cannot be Law.

Justice, as an attribute of Moral Law, must respect both the precept and the sanction. *Justice*, as an attribute of the precept, consists in the requisition of just that, and no more, which

is in exact accordance with the nature and relations of the subject.

Justice, as an attribute of the sanction, consists in the promise of just such rewards and punishments as are equal to the guilt of disobedience, on the one hand, and to the value of obedience on the other.

Sanctions belong to the very essence and nature of Moral Law. A law without sanctions is no *law*; it is only counsel, or advice. Sanctions are—in a certain sense, to be explained in a future lecture—the motives which the Law presents, with design to secure obedience to the precept. Consequently, they should always be graduated by the importance of the precept; and that is not properly *law* which does not promise, expressly or impliedly, a reward proportionate to the value of obedience, and threaten punishment equal to the evil or guilt of disobedience. *Law* cannot be unjust, either in precept or sanction: and it should always be remembered, that what is unjust, is *not law*, cannot be *law*. It is contrary to the true definition of law. *Moral Law is a rule of action, founded in, and suited to, the nature and relations of moral beings, sustained by sanctions equal to the value of obedience, and the guilt of disobedience.*

8. An eighth attribute of Moral Law is *Practicability*. That which the precept demands, must be possible to the subject. That which demands a natural impossibility, is not, and cannot be *Moral Law*. The true definition of law excludes the supposition that it can, under any circumstances, demand an absolute impossibility. Such a demand could not be in accordance with the *nature and relations* of moral agents, and therefore *practicability* must always be an attribute of Moral Law. To talk of inability to obey *Moral Law*, is to talk sheer nonsense.

9. A ninth attribute of Moral Law is *Independence*. It is founded in the self-existent nature of God. It is an eternal and necessary idea of the Divine Reason. It is the unalterable and eternal self-existent rule of the Divine conduct, the law which the intelligence of God imposes on Himself. *He is a law to Himself*. Moral Law, as we shall see hereafter more fully, does not, and cannot originate in the will of God. It originates, or rather, is founded in his eternal, immutable, self-existent nature. It eternally existed in the Divine Reason. It is the idea of that state of will which is obligatory upon God upon condition of his natural attributes, or in other words, upon condition of his nature. As a *law*, it is entirely independent

of his will, just as his own existence is. It is obligatory also upon every moral agent, entirely independent of the will of God. Their nature and relations being given, and their intelligence being developed, Moral Law must be obligatory upon them, and it lies not in the option of any being to make it otherwise. To pursue a course of conduct suited to their nature and relations, is necessarily and self-evidently obligatory, the willing or nilling of any being to the contrary notwithstanding.

10. A tenth attribute of moral law is *Immutability*. Moral Law can never change, or be changed. Moral Law always requires of every moral agent a state of heart and course of conduct precisely suited to his nature and relations. Nothing more nor less. Whatever his nature is, his capacity and relations are, entire conformity to just that nature, those capacities and relations, is required at every moment, and nothing more or less. If capacity is *enlarged*, the subject is not thereby rendered capable of works of supererogation—of doing more than the Law demands; for the Law still, as always, requires the full consecration of his whole being to the public interests. If by any means whatever, his ability is *abridged*, Moral Law, always and necessarily consistent with itself, still requires that *what is left*—nothing more or less—shall be consecrated to the same end as before. Whatever demands more or less than *entire, universal, and constant conformity of heart and life, to the nature, capacity and relations of moral agents, be they what they may, is not, and cannot be, Moral Law*. To suppose that it could be otherwise, would be to contradict the true definition of Moral Law. If therefore, the capacity is by any means abridged, the subject does not thereby become incapable of rendering full obedience; for the Law still demands and urges, that the heart and life shall be fully conformed to the *present existing* nature, capacity, and relations. Any thing that requires more or less than this, whatever else it is, is not, and cannot be Moral Law. To affirm that it can, is to talk nonsense. Nay, it is to blaspheme against the immaculate majesty of Moral Law. Moral Law invariably holds one language. It never changes the spirit of its requirement. “Thou shalt love,” or be *perfectly benevolent*, is its uniform, and its only demand. This demand it never varies, and never can vary. It is as immutable as God is, and for the same reason. To talk of letting down, or altering Moral Law, is to talk absurdly. The thing is naturally impossible. No being has the right or the power to do so. The supposition overlooks the very nature of Moral Law.

Should the natural capability of the mind, by any means whatever, be enlarged or abridged, it is perfectly absurd and a contradiction of the nature of Moral Law, to say, that the claims of the law are either elevated or lowered. Moral Law is not a statute, an enactment, that has its origin or its foundation in the will of any being. It is the Law of *Nature*, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on himself. It is the unalterable demand of the Reason, that the whole being, *whatever there is of it at any time*, shall be entirely consecrated to the highest good of universal being. In other words, it is the soul's idea or conception of that state of heart and course of life, which is exactly suited to its nature and relations. It cannot be too distinctly understood, that Moral Law is nothing more or less, than the Law of Nature, that is, it is the rule imposed on us, not by the arbitrary will of any being, but by our own intelligence. It is an idea of that which is *fit, suitable, agreeable* to our nature and relations for the time being, that which it is reasonable for us to will and do, at any and every moment, in view of all the circumstances of our present existence,—just what the Reason affirms to be suited to our nature and relations, under all the circumstances of the case.

It has been said, that if we dwarf, or abridge our powers, we do not thereby abridge the claims of God; that if we render it impossible to perform so high a service as we might have done, the Lawgiver, nevertheless, requires the same as before, that is, that under such circumstances He requires of us an impossibility;—that should we dwarf, or completely derange, or stultify our powers, He would still hold us under obligation to perform all that we might have performed, had our powers remained in their integrity. To this I reply,

[That this affirmation assumes, that Moral Law and moral obligation, are founded in the will of God;—that His mere will makes law. This is a fundamental mistake. God cannot legislate in the sense of *making* Law. He declares and enforces the *common law* of the universe, or, in other words, the Law of Nature. This law, I repeat it, is nothing else than that rule of conduct which is in accordance with the nature and relations of moral beings. The totality of its requisitions are, both in its letter and its spirit, “thou shalt love, &c., with all *thy* heart, *thy* soul, *thy* might, *thy* strength.” That is, whatever there is of us, at any moment, is to be wholly consecrated to God, and the good of being, and nothing more or less. If our nature or relations are changed, no matter by what

means, or to what extent, provided we are still moral agents, its language and spirit are the same as before,—“thou shalt love with all *thy strength*,” &c.

I will here quote from the Oberlin Evangelist, an extract of a letter from an esteemed brother, embodying the substance of the above objection, together with my reply.

“One point is what you say of the claims of the law, in the Oberlin Evangelist, Vol. 2, p. 50:—‘The question is, What does the law of God require of Christians of the present generation, in all respects in our circumstances, with all the ignorance and debility of body and mind which have resulted from the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution through so many generations?’ But if this be so, then the more ignorant and debilitated a person is in body and mind, in consequence of his own or ancestors’ sins and follies, the less the law would require of him, and the less would it be for him to become perfectly holy—and, the nearer this ignorance and debility came to being perfect, the nearer would he be to being perfectly holy, for the less would be required of him to make him so. But is this so? Can a person be perfectly sanctified while particularly that ‘ignorance of mind,’ which is the effect of the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution, remains? Yea, can he be sanctified at all, only as *this* ignorance is removed by the truth and Spirit of God; it being a moral and not a physical effect of sinning? I say it kindly; here appears to me at least, a very serious entering wedge of error. Were the effect of human depravity upon man simply to disable him, like taking from the body a limb, or destroying in part, or in whole, a faculty of the mind, I would not object; but to say, this effect is ignorance, a moral effect wholly, and then say, having this ignorance, the Law levels its claims according to it, and that with it, a man can be entirely sanctified, looks not to me like the teachings of the Bible.”

(1.) I have seen the passage from my lecture here alluded to, quoted and commented upon, in different periodicals, and uniformly with entire disapprobation.

(2.) It has always been separated entirely from the exposition which I have given of the Law of God in the same lectures; with which exposition, no one, so far as I know, has seen fit to grapple.

(3.) I believe, in every instance, the objections that have been made to this paragraph, were made by those who profess to believe in the present natural ability of sinners to do all their duty.

(4.) I would most earnestly and respectfully inquire, what consistency there is, in denominating this paragraph a dangerous heresy, and still maintaining that men are at present naturally able to do all that God requires of them?

(5.) I put the inquiry back to those brethren,—by what authority do you affirm, that God requires any more of any moral agent in the universe, and of man in his present condition, than he is at present able to perform?

(6.) I inquire, does not the very language of the law of God prove to a demonstration, that God requires no more of man than, in his present state, he is able to perform? Let us hear its language: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all *thy strength*. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” Now here, God so completely levels his claims, by the very wording of these commandments, to the present capacity of every human being, however young or old, however maimed, debilitated, or idiotic, as, to use the language or sentiment of Prof. Hickok, of Auburn Seminary, uttered in my hearing that, “if it were possible to conceive of a *moral pigmy*, the Law requires of him nothing more, than to use whatever strength he has, in the service and for the glory of God.”

(7.) I most respectfully but earnestly inquire of my brethren, if they believe that God requires as much of men as of angels, of a child as a man, of a half-idiot as of a Newton? I mean not to ask whether God requires an equally perfect consecration of all the powers actually possessed by each of these classes; but whether in degree, He really requires the same, irrespective of their present natural ability?

(8.) I wish to inquire, whether my brethren do not admit that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that every abuse of the physical system has abridged the capacity of the mind, while it remains connected with this tenement of clay? And I would also ask, whether my brethren mean to maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of present natural ability to comply with all the requirements of God, and also the fact that God now requires of man just the same degree of service that he might have rendered if he had never sinned, or in any way violated the laws of his being? And if they maintain these two positions at the same time, I farther inquire, whether they believe that man has natural ability at the present moment to bring all his faculties and powers, together with his knowledge, on to as high ground and into the same state in which they might have been, had he never sinned? My brethren, is there not some inconsistency here?

(9.) In the paragraph from the letter above quoted, the brother admits, that if a man by his own act had deprived himself of any of his corporeal faculties, he would not thenceforth be under an obligation to use those faculties. But he thinks this principle does not hold true, in respect to the ignorance of man; because he esteems his ignorance a moral, and not a natural defect. Here I beg leave to make a few inquiries:

[1.] Should a man wickedly deprive himself of the use of a hand, would not this act be a moral act? No doubt it would.

[2.] Suppose a man by his own act, should make himself an idiot, would not this act be a moral act?

[3.] Would he not in both these cases render himself naturally unable, in the one case, to use his hand, and in the other, his reason? Undoubtedly he would. But how can it be affirmed, with any show of reason, that in the one case his natural inability discharges him from the obligation to use his hand, and that in the other case, his natural ability does not affect his obligation—that he is still bound to use his reason, of which he has voluntarily deprived himself, but not his hand? Now the fact is, that in both these cases the inability is a natural one.

[4.] I ask, if a man has willingly remained in ignorance of God, whether his ignorance is a moral or natural inability? If it is a moral inability, he can instantly overcome it, by the right exercise of his own will. And nothing can be a moral inability that cannot be instantaneously removed by our own volition. Do my brethren believe, that the present ignorance of mankind can be instantaneously removed, and their knowledge become as perfect as it might have been had they never sinned, by an act of volition on the part of men? If they do not, why do they call this a moral inability, or ignorance a moral effect? The fact is, that ignorance is often the natural effect of moral delinquency. Neglect of duty occasions ignorance; and this ignorance constitutes a natural inability to do that of which a man is utterly ignorant—just as the loss of a hand, in the case supposed, is the natural effect of a moral act, but in itself constitutes a natural inability to perform those duties that might have been performed but for the loss of this hand. The truth is, that this ignorance does constitute, while it remains, a natural inability to perform those duties of which the mind is ignorant; and all that can be required is, that from the present moment, the mind should be diligently and perfectly engaged in acquiring what knowledge it can, and in perfectly

obeying, as fast as it can obtain the light. If this is not true, it is utter nonsense to talk about natural ability as being a *sine qua non* of moral obligation. And I would kindly, but most earnestly ask my brethren, by what rule of consistency they maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of a natural ability to do whatever God requires, and also insist that He requires men to know as much, and in all respects to render Him the same kind and *degree* of service as if they never had sinned, or rendered themselves in any respect naturally incapable of doing and being, at the present moment, all that they might have done and been, had they never in any instance neglected their duty?

(10.) The brother, in the above paragraph, seems to feel pressed with the consideration, that if it be true that a man's ignorance can be any excuse for his not at present doing what he might have done but for this ignorance, it will follow, that the less he knows the less is required of him, and should he become a perfect idiot, he would be entirely discharged from moral obligation. To this I answer: Yes, or the doctrine of natural ability, and the entire Government of God, are a mere farce. If a man should annihilate himself, would he not thereby set aside his moral obligation to obey God? Yes, truly. Should he make himself an idiot, has he not thereby *annihilated his moral agency*; and of course his natural ability to obey God? And will my New School brethren adopt the position of Dr. Wilson of Cincinnati, as maintained on the trial of Dr. Beecher, that "moral obligation does not imply ability of any kind?" The truth is, that for the time being, a man may destroy his moral agency, by rendering himself a lunatic or an idiot; and while this lunacy or idiocy continues, obedience to God is naturally impossible, and therefore not required.

But it is also true, that no human being and no moral agent can deprive himself of reason and moral agency, but for a limited time. There is no reason to believe, that the soul can be deranged or idiotic, when separated from the body. And therefore moral agency will in all cases be renewed in a future, if not in the present state of existence, when God will hold men fully responsible for having deprived themselves of power to render Him all that service which they might otherwise have rendered. But do let me inquire again, can my dear brethren maintain that an idiot or lunatic can be a moral agent? Can they maintain, that a moral being is the subject of moral obligation any farther than he is in a state

of sanity? Can they maintain, that an infant is the subject of moral obligation, previous to all knowledge? And can they maintain, that moral obligation can, in any case, exceed knowledge? If they can and do—then, to be consistent, they must flatly deny that natural ability is a *sine qua non* of moral obligation, and adopt the absurd dogma of Dr. Wilson, that ‘moral obligation does not imply any ability whatever.’ When my brethren will take this ground, I shall then understand and know where to meet them. But I beseech you, brethren, not to complain of inconsistency in me, nor accuse me of teaching dangerous heresy, while I teach nothing more than you must admit to be true, or unequivocally admit, *in extenso*, the very dogma of Dr. Wilson, quoted above.

I wish to be distinctly understood. I maintain, that present ignorance is present natural inability, as absolutely as the present want of a hand is present natural inability to use it. And I also maintain, that the Law of God requires nothing more of any human being, than that which he is at present naturally able to perform, under the present circumstances of his being. Do my brethren deny this? If they do, then they have gone back to Dr. Wilson’s ground. If they do not, why am I accounted a heretic by them, for teaching what they themselves maintain?

(11.) In my treatise upon the subject of entire sanctification, I have shown from the Bible, that actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation, and that the legal maxim, “ignorance of the law excuses no one,” is not good in morals.

(12.) Professor Stuart, in a recent number of the Biblical Repository, takes precisely the same ground that I have taken, and fully maintains, that sin is the voluntary transgression of a known law. And he further abundantly shows, that this is no new or heterodox opinion. Now Prof. Stuart, in the article alluded to, takes exactly the same position in regard to what constitutes sin that I have done in the paragraph upon which so much has been said. And may I be permitted to inquire, why the same sentiment is orthodox at Andover, and sound theology in the Biblical Repository, but highly heterodox and dangerous at Oberlin?

(13.) Will my brethren of the New School, to avoid the conclusiveness of my reasonings in respect to the requirements of the Law of God, go back to Old Schoolism, physical depravity, and accountability based upon natural inability, and all the host of absurdities belonging to its particular views of orthodoxy? I recollect that Dr. Beecher expressed his surprise

at the position taken by Dr. Wilson, to which I have alluded, and said he did not believe that "many men could be found, who could march up without winking to the maintenance of such a proposition as that." But to be consistent, I do not see but that my brethren, with or "without winking," are driven to the necessity, either of "marching up" to maintaining the same proposition, or they must admit, that this objectionable paragraph in my lecture is the truth of God.

11. An eleventh attribute of Moral Law is *Unity*. Moral Law proposes but one ultimate end of pursuit to God, and to all moral agents. The whole of its requisitions in their spirit and last analysis, are summed up and expressed in one word, *love* or *benevolence*. This I only announce here. It will more fully appear hereafter. *Law* is a pure and simple idea of the reason. It is the idea of perfect, universal and constant consecration of the whole being, to the highest good of being. Just this is, and nothing more nor less, can be Moral Law; for just this, and nothing more nor less, is a state of heart and a course of life exactly suited to the nature and relations of moral agents, which is the only true definition of Moral Law.

To suppose, that under any possible or conceivable circumstances, the Moral Law should require any thing more or less, were to make a supposition contrary to the very nature of Moral Law. It were to overlook the proper definition of *Moral Law*, as has been said before.

12. *Equity* is another attribute of Moral Law. *Equity* is *equality*. That only is equitable which is *equal*. The interest and well-being of every sentient existence and especially of every moral agent, is of *some* value in comparison with the interests of others and of the whole universe of creatures. *Moral Law*, by a necessity of its own nature, demands that the interest and well-being of every member of the universal family shall be regarded according to its relative or comparative value, and that in no case shall it be sacrificed or wholly neglected without his forfeiture to whom it belongs. The distinction allowed by human tribunals between law and equity does not pertain to Moral Law, nor does or can it *strictly* pertain to *any law*. For it is impossible that that should be *law*, in the sense of imposing obligation to obey, of which *equity* is not an attribute. An *inequitable law* cannot be. The requirements of *law* must be *equal*. A moral agent may, by transgression, forfeit the protection of law and may come into such governmental relations by trampling on the Law, that Moral Law may demand that he be made a public example—that his interest

and well-being be laid upon the altar, and that he be offered a sacrifice to public justice as a preventive of crime in others. It may happen also that sacrifices may be demanded by Moral Law of *innocent* beings for the promotion of a greater amount of good than that sacrificed by the innocent. Such was the case with the atonement of Christ, and such is the case with the missionary and with all who are called by the Law of Love to practice self-denial for the good of others. But let it be remembered that Moral Law never requires or allows any degree of self-denial and self-sacrifice that relinquishes a good of greater value than that gained by the sacrifice. Nor does it in any case demand or permit that any interest not forfeited by its possessor, shall be relinquished or finally neglected without adequate ultimate compensation. As has been said, every interest is of some comparative value; and ought to be esteemed just in proportion to its comparative value. Moral Law demands and must demand that it shall be so regarded by all moral agents to whom it is known. "THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOR AS THYSELF" is its unalterable language. It can absolutely utter no other language than this, and nothing can be *Moral Law* or *LAW* in any sense that ought to be obeyed, or that can *innocently* be obeyed which holds any other language. *Law* is not and cannot be an arbitrary enactment of any being or number of beings. *Unequal LAW is a misnomer*. That is, that which is unequal in its demands is not and cannot be *Law*. *Law* must respect the interests and the rights of all and of each member of the universal family. It is impossible that it should be otherwise, and still be *Law*.

13. *Expediency* is another attribute of Moral Law.


That which is upon whole *wise*, is *expedient*,—that which is upon the whole expedient is demanded by *Moral Law*. True expediency and the spirit of Moral Law are always identical. Expediency may be inconsistent with the letter, but never with the spirit of Moral Law. Law in the form of commandment is a revelation or declaration of that course which is expedient. It is expediency revealed, as in the case of the commandments of the decalogue, and the same is true of every precept of the Bible, it reveals to us what is expedient. A revealed law or commandment is never to be set aside by any considerations of expediency. We may know with certainty that what is required is *expedient*. The command is the expressed judgment of God in the case and reveals with unerring certainty the true path of expediency. When Paul says, "All things are lawful unto me but all things

are not expedient," we must not understand him as meaning that all things in the absolute sense were lawful to him, or that any thing was in this sense lawful to him that was not expedient. But he doubtless intended that many things were *inexpedient* that are not expressly prohibited by the letter of the law,—that the spirit of the law prohibited many things not expressly forbidden by the letter. It should never be forgotten that that which is plainly demanded by the highest good of the universe is *Law*. It is expedient. It is wise. The true spirit of the Moral Law does and must demand it. So, on the other hand, whatever is plainly inconsistent with the highest good of the universe is illegal, unwise, inexpedient, and must be prohibited by the spirit of Moral Law. But let the thought be repeated, that the Bible precepts always reveal that which is truly expedient, and in no case are we at liberty to set aside the spirit of any commandment upon the supposition that expediency requires it. Some have denounced the doctrine of expediency altogether as at all times inconsistent with the *Law of Right*. These philosophers proceed upon the assumption that the Law of Right and the Law of Benevolence are not identical but inconsistent with each other. This is a common but fundamental mistake, which leads me to remark that,

14. *Exclusiveness* is another attribute of Moral Law. That is, Moral Law is the *only possible rule* of Moral Obligation. A distinction is usually made between Moral, Ceremonial, Civil, and Positive Laws. This distinction is in some respects *convenient*, but is liable to mislead and to create an impression that a law can be obligatory, or in other words that that can be *Law* that has not the attributes of *Moral Law*. Nothing can be *Law* in any proper sense of the term that is not and would not be universally obligatory upon moral agents under the same circumstances. It is *Law* because and only because that under all the circumstances of the case the course prescribed is *fit, proper, suitable* to their natures, relations and circumstances. There can be no *Law* as a rule of action for moral agents but Moral Law, or the Law of Benevolence. Every other rule is absolutely excluded by the very nature of Moral Law. Surely there can be no Law that is or can be obligatory upon moral agents but one suited to and founded in their nature, relations and circumstances. This is and must be the Law of Love or Benevolence. This is the *Law of Right* and nothing else is or can be. Every thing else that claims to be Law and to impose obligation upon moral agents, from what-

ever source it emanates, is not and cannot be a Law, but must be an imposition and "a thing of nought."

15. *Utility* is also an attribute of Moral Law. Law proposes the highest good of universal being as its end and requires all moral agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this end. Consequently *Utility* must be one of its attributes. That which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful to the universe must be demanded by Moral Law. Moral Law must, from its own nature, require just that course of willing and acting that is upon the whole in the highest degree promotive of the public good,—in other words, that which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful. It has been strangely and absurdly maintained that right would be obligatory if it necessarily tended to and resulted in universal and perfect misery. Than which a more nonsensical affirmation was never made. The affirmation assumes that the Law of *Right* and of *Good-Will* are not only distinct, but may be antagonistic. It also assumes that that can be *Law* that is not suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. Certainly it will not be pretended that that course of willing and acting that *necessarily tends to* and results in universal *misery* can be consistent with the nature and relations of moral agents. Nothing is or can be suited to their nature and relations that is not upon the whole promotive of their highest well-being. *Utility* and *Right* are always and necessarily at one. They can never be inconsistent. That which is upon the whole most useful is right, and that which is right is upon the whole useful.



LECTURE II.

I. TERM GOVERNMENT DEFINED.

II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL AND PHYSICAL GOVERNMENT.

III. FUNDAMENTAL REASON OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.

IV. WHOSE RIGHT IT IS TO GOVERN.

V. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN THE RIGHT TO GOVERN.

VI. LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO GOVERN.

VII. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT.

VIII. MORAL OBLIGATION DEFINED.

IX. CONDITIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

I. Define the term government.

The primary idea of government, is that of direction, guidance, control, by, or in accordance with rule, or law. This seems to be the generic signification of the term government; but it appears not to be sufficiently broad in its meaning, to express all that properly belongs to *moral* government, as we shall see. This leads me,

II. To distinguish between moral and physical government.

All government, as we shall see, is, and must be either moral or physical; that is, all guidance and control must be exercised in accordance with either moral or physical Law; for there can be no *Laws* that are not either moral or physical. Physical government, is control, exercised by a law of necessity or force, as distinguished from the law of free will, or liberty. It is the control of *substance*, as opposed to Free Will. The only government of which substance, as distinguished from free will, is capable, is and must be physical. This is true, whether the substance be material or immaterial, whether matter or mind. States and changes, whether of matter or mind, that do not consist in the actions of free will, must be subject to the law of necessity. In no other way can they be accounted for. They must therefore belong to the department of physical government. Physical government, then, is the administration of physical law, or the law of force.

Thus, the states and changes of our Intellect and Sensibility, come under the department of physical government. These states and changes are effected by a law of necessity, as opposed to the law of liberty, or free will. The Intellect and Sensibility, as we shall abundantly see hereafter, are so correlated to the will, that its free actions produce certain changes in them, by a law of force, or necessity. Thoughts and feelings are not, strictly moral actions, for the reason that

they are not voluntary, and must therefore belong to the department of physical, as opposed to moral government. There is a secondary sense in which thoughts and feelings, as also outward actions, may be regarded as belonging to the department of moral government, and consequently, as possessing moral character. As thoughts, feelings and outward actions, are connected with, and result from free actions of the will by a law of necessity, a moral agent must be responsible for them in a certain sense. But in such cases, the character of the agent belongs strictly to the intention that caused them, and not to those involuntary and necessary states and actions themselves. They cannot strictly come under the category of moral actions, as we shall more fully see hereafter, for the reason, that being the result of a law of necessity, they do not, cannot, with strict propriety, be said to belong to the department of moral government.

Moral Government consists in the declaration and administration of Moral Law. It is the government of free will as distinguished from substance. Physical government presides over and controls physical states and changes of substance or constitution, and all involuntary states and changes. *Moral Government* presides over and controls, or seeks to control the actions of Free Will: it presides over intelligent and voluntary states and changes of mind. It is a government of motive, as opposed to a government of force—control exercised, or sought to be exercised, in accordance with the Law of Liberty, as opposed to the Law of Necessity. It is the administration of moral as opposed to Physical Law.

Moral Government includes the dispensation of rewards and punishments.

Moral Government is administered by means as complicated and vast, as the whole of the works, and providence, and ways, and grace of God.

III. I am to inquire into the fundamental reason of Moral Government.

Government must be founded in a good and sufficient reason, or it is not right. No one has a right to prescribe rules for, and control the conduct of another, unless there is some good reason for his doing so. There must be a necessity for moral government, or the administration of it is tyranny. Is there any necessity for moral government? And if so, wherein? I answer, that from the nature and relations of moral beings, virtue, or holiness, is indispensable to happiness. But holiness cannot exist without Moral Law, and Moral Gov-

ernment; for holiness is nothing else than conformity to Moral law and Moral Government. Moral Government then, is indispensable to the highest well being of the universe of Moral agents, and therefore ought to, and must exist. The universe is dependent upon this as a means of securing the highest good. This dependence is a good and sufficient reason for the existence of Moral Government. Let it be understood, then, that Moral Government is a necessity of moral beings, and therefore right.—When it is said, that the right to govern is founded in the relation of dependence, it is not, or ought not to be intended, that this relation *itself* confers the right to govern, irrespective of the *necessity* of Government. The mere fact, that one being is dependent on another, does not confer on one the right to govern, and impose upon the other obligation to obey, unless the dependent one needs to be governed, and consequently, that the one upon whom the other is dependent, cannot fulfil to him the duties of benevolence, without governing or controlling him. The right to govern, implies the duty to govern. Obligation, and consequently, the right to govern, implies, that government is a condition of fulfilling to the dependent party the duties of benevolence. Strictly speaking, the right to govern, is *founded* in the *intrinsic* value of the interests to be secured by government; and the right is conditioned upon the necessity of Government as a means to secure those interests. I will briefly sum up the argument under this head, as follows:

1. It is impossible that government should not exist.
2. Every thing must be governed by Laws suited to its nature.
3. Matter must be governed by Physical Laws.
4. The free actions of Will must be governed by motives, and moral agents must be governed by moral considerations.
5. We are conscious of moral agency, and can be governed only by a Moral Government.
6. Our nature and circumstances demand that we should be under a Moral Government; because—
 - (1.) Moral happiness depends upon moral order.
 - (2.) Moral order depends upon the harmonious action of all our powers, as individuals and members of society.
 - (3.) No community can perfectly harmonize in all their views and feelings, without perfect knowledge, or, to say the least, the same degree of knowledge on all subjects on which they are called to act.
 - (4.) But no community ever existed, or will exist, in which every individual possesses exactly the same amount of know-

ledge, and where the members are, therefore, entirely agreed in all their thoughts, views and opinions.

(5.) But if they are not agreed in opinion, or have not exactly the same amount of knowledge, they will not in every thing harmonize, as it respects their courses of conduct.

(6.) There must therefore be in every community some standard or rule of duty, to which all the subjects of the community are to conform themselves.

(7.) There must be some head or controlling mind, whose will shall be law, and whose decisions shall be regarded as infallible by all the subjects of the government.

(8.) However diverse their intellectual attainments are, in this they must all agree, that the will of the lawgiver is right, and universally the rule of duty.

(9.) This will must be authoritative and not merely advisory.

(10.) There must of necessity be a penalty attached to, and incurred by every act of disobedience to this will.

(11.) If disobedience be persisted in, exclusion from the privileges of the government is the lowest penalty that can consistently be inflicted.

(12.) The good then, of the universe imperiously requires, that there should be a Moral Governor.

IV. Whose right it is to govern.

We have just seen, that necessity is a condition of the right and duty to govern—that the highest well being of the universe demands, and is the end of Moral Government. It must therefore, be his right and duty to govern, whose attributes, physical and moral, best qualify him to secure the end of government. To him all eyes and hearts should be directed, to fill this station, to exercise this control, to administer all just and necessary rewards and punishments. It is both his right and duty to govern. I will here introduce from my *Skeletons*, a brief argument, to show that God has a right, and that therefore it is his duty, to govern, and that he is a Moral Governor.

That God is a Moral Governor, we infer—

1. From our own consciousness. From the very laws of our being we naturally affirm our responsibility to him for our conduct. As God is our Creator, we are naturally responsible to Him for the right exercise of our powers. And as our good and his glory depend upon our conformity to the same rule, to which He conforms his whole being, he is under a moral obligation to require us to be holy as he is holy.

2. His natural attributes qualify Him to sustain the relation of a Moral Governor to the universe.

3. His moral character, also, qualifies him to sustain this relation.

4. His relation to the universe as Creator and Preserver, when considered in connection with his nature and attributes, confers on Him the right of universal government.

5. His relation to the universe, and our relations to Him and to each other, render it obligatory upon him to establish and administer a Moral Government over the universe.

6. The honor of God demands that he should administer such a government.

7. His conscience must demand it. He must know that it would be wrong for Him to create a universe of moral beings, and then refuse or neglect to administer over them a Moral Government.

8. His happiness must demand it, as he could not be happy unless he acted in accordance with his conscience.

9. If God is not a Moral Governor he is not wise. Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and in the use of the most appropriate means to accomplish those ends. If God is not a Moral Governor, it is inconceivable that He should have had any important end in view in the creation of moral beings, or that he should have chosen the best or any suitable means for the accomplishment of the most desirable end.

10. The conduct or providence of God plainly indicates a design to exert a moral influence over moral agents.

11. His providence plainly indicates that the universe of mind is governed by Moral Laws, or by laws suited to the nature of moral agents.

12. Consciousness recognizes the existence of an inward law, or knowledge of the moral quality of actions.

13. This inward moral consciousness or conscience implies the existence of a rule of duty which is obligatory upon us. This rule implies a ruler, and this ruler must be God.

14. If God is not a Moral Governor, our very nature deceives us.

15. If God is not a Moral Governor, the whole universe, so far as we have the means of knowing it, is calculated to mislead mankind in respect to this fundamental truth.

16. If there is no such thing as Moral Government, there is, in reality, no such thing as moral character.

17. All nations have believed that God is a Moral Governor.

18. Our nature is such, that we must believe it. The conviction of our moral accountability to God, is in such a sense the dictate of our moral nature, that we cannot escape from it.

19. We must abhor God, if we ever come to a knowledge of the fact that he created moral agents, and then exercised over them no Moral Government.

20. The connection between moral delinquency and suffering is such as to render it certain that Moral Government does, as a matter of fact, exist.

21. The Bible, which has been proved to be a revelation from God, contains a most simple and yet comprehensive system of Moral Government.

22. If we are deceived in respect to our being subjects of Moral Government, we are sure of nothing.

V. What is implied in the right to govern.

1. From what has just been said, it must be evident, that the right to govern, *implies* the *necessity* of government as a means of securing an intrinsically valuable end.

2. Also that the *right* to govern, implies the *duty*, or obligation to govern. There can be no right in this case, without corresponding obligation; for the right to govern is founded in the obligation to govern.

3. The right to govern implies obligation on the part of the subject to obey. It cannot be the right or duty of the governor to govern, unless it is the duty of the subject to obey. The governor and subject are alike dependent upon government, as the indispensable means of promoting the highest good. The governor and the subject must, therefore, be under reciprocal obligation, the one to govern, and the other to be governed, or to obey. The one must seek to govern, the other must seek to be governed.

4. The right to govern implies the right and duty to dispense just and necessary rewards and punishments—to distribute rewards proportioned to merit, and penalties proportioned to demerit, whenever the public interests demand their execution.

5. It implies the right and duty to use all necessary means to secure the end of government as far as possible.

6. It implies obligation on the part of the subject cheerfully to acquiesce in any measure that may be necessary to secure the end of government—in case of disobedience, to submit to merited punishment, and if necessary, to aid in the infliction of the penalty of Law.

7. It implies the right and obligation of both ruler and ruled,

to consecrate themselves to the promotion of the great end of government, with a single and steady aim.

8. It implies obligation, both on the part of the ruler and ruled, to be always ready, and when occasion offers, actually to make any personal and private sacrifice demanded by the higher public good—to cheerfully meet any emergency, and exercise any degree of self-denial that can and will result in a good of greater value to the public, than that sacrificed by the individual, or by any number of individuals, it always being understood, that present voluntary sacrifices shall have an ultimate reward.

9. It implies the right and duty to employ any degree of force which is indispensable to the maintenance of order, the execution of wholesome laws, the suppression of insurrections, the punishment of rebels and disorganizers, and sustaining the supremacy of Moral Law. It is impossible that the right to govern should not imply this; and to deny this right is to deny the right to govern. Should an emergency occur, in which a ruler had no right to use the indispensable means of securing order, and the supremacy of Law, the moment this emergency occurred, his right to govern would, and must cease: for it is impossible that it should be his right to govern, unless it be at the same time, and for the same reason, his duty to govern: but it is absurd to say, that it is his right and duty to govern, and yet at the same time, that he has not a right to use the indispensable means of government. It is the same absurdity, as to say, that he has, and has not the right to govern at the same time. If it be asked, whether an emergency like the one under consideration is possible, and if so, what might justly be regarded as such an emergency, I answer, that should circumstances occur under which the sacrifice necessary to sustain, would overbalance the good to be derived from the prevalence of government, this would create the emergency under consideration, in which the right to govern would cease.

VI. Point out the limits of this right.

The right to govern is, and must be, just co-extensive with the necessity of government. We have seen, that the right to govern is founded in the necessities of moral beings. In other words, the right to govern, is founded upon the fact, that the highest good of moral agents cannot be secured, but by means of government.

It is a first truth of Reason, that what is good or valuable in itself, should be chosen for its own sake, and that it must therefore be the duty of moral agents to aim at securing, and so far

as in them lies, to use the means of securing the highest good of the universe for its own sake, or on account of its intrinsic value. If moral government is the only means by which this end can be secured, then government is a necessity of the universe, thence a duty. But under this head, to avoid mistake, and to correct erroneous impressions which are sometimes entertained, I must show what is not the foundation of the right to govern. The boundary of the right must, as will be seen, depend upon the foundation of the right. The right must be as broad as the reason for it. If the reason of the right be mistaken, then the limits of the right cannot be ascertained, and must necessarily be mistaken also.

1. Hence the right to govern the universe, for instance, cannot be found in the fact, that God sustains to it the relation of Creator. This is by itself no reason why He should govern it, unless it needs to be governed—unless some good will result from government. Unless there is some necessity for government, the fact that God created the universe, can give Him no right to govern it.

2. The fact that God is the Owner and Sole Proprietor of the universe, is no reason why he should govern it. Unless either his own good, or the good of the universe, or of both together, demands government, the relation of Owner cannot confer the right to govern. Neither God, nor any other being, can own moral beings, in such a sense as to have a right to govern them, when government is wholly unnecessary, and can result in no good whatever to God, or to his creatures. Government, in such a case, would be perfectly arbitrary and unreasonable, and consequently an unjust, tyrannical and wicked act. God has no such right. No such right can, by possibility in any case exist.

3. The right to govern cannot be founded in the fact, that God possesses all the attributes, natural and moral, that are requisite to the administration of Moral Government. This fact is no doubt a condition of the right; for without these qualifications He could have no right, however necessary government might be. But the possession of these attributes cannot confer the right independently of the necessity of government: for however well qualified He may be to govern, still, unless government is necessary to securing his own glory and the highest well-being of the universe, he has no right to govern it. Possessing the requisite qualifications is the *condition*, and the *necessity* of government is the *foundation* of the right to govern. More strictly, the right is *founded* in the *intrinsic*

value of the interests to be secured by government, and conditioned upon the fact, that government is the necessary means or condition of securing the end.

4. Nor is the right to govern conferred by the value of the interests to be secured, nor by the circumstance of the necessity of government merely, without respect to the condition just above mentioned. Did not God's natural and moral attributes qualify Him to sustain that relation better than any one else, the right could not be conferred on Him by any other fact or relation.

5. The right to govern is not, and cannot be an abstract right based on no reason whatever. The idea of this right is not an ultimate idea in such a sense, that our intelligence affirms the right without assigning any reason on which it is founded. The human intelligence cannot say that God has a right to govern, because he has such a right; and that this is reason enough, and all the reason that can be given. Our Reason does not affirm that government is right, because it is right, and that this is a first truth, and an ultimate idea. If this were so, then God's arbitrary will would be law, and no bounds possibly could be assigned to the right to govern. If God's right to govern be a first truth, an ultimate truth, fact and idea, founded in no assignable reason, then He has the right to legislate as little, and as much, and as arbitrarily, as unnecessarily, as absurdly, and injuriously as possible; and no injustice is, or can be done; for he has, by the supposition, a right to govern, founded in no reason, and of course without any end. Assign any other reason as the foundation of the right to govern than the value of the interests to be secured and conditioned upon the necessity of government, and you may search in vain for any limit to the right. But the moment the foundation and the condition of the right are discovered, we see instantly, that the right must be co-extensive with the reason upon which it is founded, or in other words, must be limited by, and only by the fact, that thus far, and no farther, government is necessary to the highest good of the universe. No legislation can be valid in heaven or earth—no enactments can impose obligation, except upon the condition, that such legislation is demanded by the highest good of the Governor and the Governed. Unnecessary legislation is invalid legislation. Unnecessary government is tyranny. It can in no case be founded in right. It should, however, be observed, that it is often, and in the government of God, universally true, that the Sovereign, and not the subject, is to be the Judge

of what is necessary legislation and government. Under no government, therefore, are laws to be despised or rejected because we are unable to see at once their necessity, and hence their wisdom. Unless they are palpably unnecessary, and therefore unwise and unjust, they are to be respected and obeyed as a less evil than contempt and disobedience, though at present we are unable to see their wisdom. Under the government of God there can never be any doubt, and of course any ground for distrust and hesitancy, as it respects the duty of obedience.

VII. What is implied in Moral Government.

1. Moral Government implies a Moral Governor.
2. It implies the existence of Moral Law.
3. It implies the existence of Moral Agents as the subjects of Moral Government.
4. It implies the existence of Moral Obligation to obey Moral Law.
5. It implies the fact of Moral Character, that is, of praise or blame-worthiness in the subjects of Moral Government. A Moral Agent must be under Moral Obligation, and one who is under Moral Obligation, must have Moral Character. If he complies with obligation, he must be holy and praise-worthy; if he refuse to comply with Moral Obligation, he must be sinful and blame-worthy.

VIII. Definition of Moral Obligation.

Obligation is a bond, or that which binds. Moral Obligation is the bond, ligament, or tie that binds a moral agent to Moral Law. Moral Obligation is oughtness. It is a responsibility imposed on the moral agent by his own reason. It is a first truth of Reason that he ought to will the valuable for its own sake.

Moral Law is the rule in conformity with which he ought to act, or more strictly, to will.

Obligation we express by the term *ought*, and say that a moral agent ought to obey Moral Law, or that he ought to choose that which Moral Law requires him to will.

IX. The conditions of Moral Obligation.

1. *Moral Agency.* The conditions of *Moral Agency* are the attributes of *Intelligence*, *Sensibility*, and *Free Will*; or in other words power or capacity to know, to feel, and to will in conformity or disconformity with knowledge or with moral obligation. There must be Intelligence or the faculty of knowing the valuable or the good, and that the valuable or the good exists or is possible, that something exists or

may exist which is a good in itself, or valuable on its own account. There must be reason to affirm Moral Obligation, to will the valuable because it is valuable. Moral Obligation cannot exist where there is no knowledge of moral relations, of the valuable, the good, where there is no Intellect to affirm Oughtness or Moral Obligation—to affirm the rightness of willing good or the valuable, and the wrongness of willing evil or of selfish willing.

It is generally agreed that Moral Obligation respects strictly only the ultimate intention or choice of an end for its own sake. Hence it follows that the idea of this end must be developed as a condition of Moral Obligation. The end must be first known or perceived. This perception must develop the idea or affirmation of obligation to choose or will it. The development of the idea of obligation necessitates the development of the ideas of right and wrong as its correlatives. The development of these last must necessitate the affirmation of praise and blame-worthiness as their correlatives.

The *conditions* of moral obligation, strictly speaking, are the powers of moral agency with the development of the ideas of the intrinsically valuable, of moral obligation and of right and wrong. It implies the development also of the ideas of praise and blame-worthiness.

2. *Sensibility*, or the power or susceptibility of feeling. Without this faculty the knowledge of the good or the valuable would not be possible. This faculty supplies the chronological condition of the idea of the good or valuable. Feeling pleasure or pain in the sensibility suggests and develops the idea of the good or the valuable in the intelligence, just as the perception of body suggests and develops the idea of space, or just as beholding succession suggests and develops the idea of time. Perceiving body or succession, is the chronological condition of the idea of space or time. So the feeling of pleasure in like manner suggests or develops the idea of the valuable. The existence then of the Sensibility or of a susceptibility to pleasure or pain must be a condition of Moral Agency and hence of Moral Obligation.

3. Moral Agency implies the possession of Free Will. By Free Will is intended the power of choosing or refusing to choose in compliance with moral obligation in every instance. Free Will implies the power of originating and deciding our own choices and of exercising our own sovereignty in every instance of choice upon moral questions—of deciding or choosing in conformity with duty or otherwise in all cases of moral

obligation. That man can not be under a moral obligation to perform an absolute impossibility is a first truth of reason. But man's causality, his whole power of causality to perform or do any thing, lies in his Will. If he cannot will, he can do nothing. His whole liberty or freedom must consist in his power to will. His outward actions and his mental states are connected with the actions of his Will by a law of necessity. If I will to move my muscles, they must move unless there be a paralysis of the nerves of voluntary motion, or unless some resistance be opposed that overcomes the power of my volitions. The sequences of choice or volition are always under the law of necessity, and unless the Will is free man has no freedom. And if he has no freedom he is not a moral agent, that is, he is incapable of moral action and also of moral character. Free Will then in the above defined sense must be a condition of moral agency and of course of moral obligation.

4. Moral Agency implies as has been said the actual development of the idea of good, or the valuable, of obligation and of oughtness or duty. The mind must know that there is such a thing as the good or valuable as a condition of the obligation to will it. Mind is so constituted that it cannot but affirm obligation to will the good or the valuable as soon as the idea of the good or valuable is developed; but the development of this idea is the indispensable condition of moral obligation. When the faculties of a moral being are possessed, with sufficient light on moral subjects to develop the idea of the good or the valuable together with the idea of right and wrong, the mind instantly affirms and must affirm moral obligation or oughtness. Moral Agency commences at the instant of the development of those ideas, and with them also commences moral obligation and of course moral character.

REMARKS.

1. If God's government is moral, it is easy to see how sin came to exist; that a want of experience in the universe, in regard to the nature and natural tendencies and results of sin, prevented the due influence of sanctions.

2. If God's government is moral, we see that all the developments of sin are enlarging the experience of the universe in regard to its nature and tendencies, and thus confirming the influence of moral government over virtuous minds.

3. If God's government is moral, we can understand the design and tendency of the Atonement; that it is designed, and that it tends to reconcile the exercise of mercy, with a due administration of law.

4. If God's government is moral, we can understand the philosophy of the Spirit's influences in convicting and sanctifying the soul; that this influence is moral, persuasive, and not physical.

5. If the government of God is moral, we can understand the influence and necessity of faith. *Confidence* is indispensable to *heart obedience* in any government. This is emphatically true under the Divine Government.

6. If God's government is moral, we can see the necessity and power of Christian example. Example is the highest moral influence.

7. If God's government is moral, his natural or physical omnipotence is no proof that all men will be saved; for salvation is not effected by physical power.

8. If God's government is moral, we see the importance of watchfulness, and girding up the loins of our minds.

9. If God's government is moral, we see the necessity of a well instructed ministry, able to wield the motives necessary to sway mind.

12. If God's government is moral, we see the philosophical bearings, tendencies, and power of the Providence, Law, and Gospel of God, in the great work of man's salvation.

LECTURE III.

I. MAN A SUBJECT OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

II. EXTENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

I. *Man is a Subject of Moral Obligation.*

This is a first truth of reason. A first truth has this invariable characteristic, namely, all *moral agents* know it by a necessity of nature and assume its truth in all their practical judgments, whatever their philosophical theories may be.

Now who does not know that men possess the attributes of moral agents: to wit, *Intellect*, (including *reason*, *conscience*, and *consciousness*,) *Sensibility*, and *Free Will*. Every moral agent does know and cannot but know this. That man has *Intellect* and *Sensibility*, or the powers of knowing and feeling, has not to my knowledge been doubted. *In theory*, the freedom of the will in man has been denied. Yet the very deniers have, in their *practical judgments*, assumed the freedom of the human will as well and as fully as the most staunch defenders of human liberty of will. Indeed no body ever did or can in practice call in question the freedom of the human will without justly incurring the charge of insanity. By a necessity of his nature every moral agent knows himself to be free. He can no more hide this fact from himself, or reason himself out of the conviction of its truth, than he can speculate himself into a disbelief of his own existence. He may in speculation deny either, but in fact he *knows* both. That he *is*, that he is *free*, that he is a *subject of moral obligation* are truths equally well known, and known precisely in the same way, namely, he intuits them—sees them in their own light by virtue of the constitution of his being. I have said that man is conscious of possessing the powers of a moral agent. He has also the idea of the valuable, of right and of wrong: of this he is conscious. But nothing else is necessary to constitute man or any other being a subject of moral obligation than the possession of these powers together with sufficient light on moral subjects to develop the ideas just mentioned.

Again. Man, by a law of necessity, affirms himself to be under moral obligation. He cannot doubt it. He affirms absolutely and necessarily that he is praise or blame-worthy as he is benevolent or selfish. Every man assumes this of himself and of all other men of sound mind. This assumption is irresistible as well as universal.

The truth assumed then is a *first truth* and not to be called in question. But if it be called in question in theory, it still

remains and must remain, while reason remains, a truth of *certain knowledge* from the presence of which there is and can be no escape. The spontaneous, universal, and irresistible affirmation that men of sound mind are praise or blame-worthy as they are selfish or benevolent, shows beyond contradiction that all men regard themselves and others as the subjects of moral obligation.

II. *Extent of Moral Obligation.*

By this is intended, to what acts and states of mind does moral obligation extend? This certainly is a solemn and a fundamentally important question.

In the examination of this question I shall,

1. State again the *conditions* of moral obligation.
2. Show by an appeal to reason or to natural theology, to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot *directly* extend.
3. To what acts or states of mind moral obligation must *directly* extend.
4. To what acts and mental states moral obligation must *indirectly* extend.

5. Examine the question in the light of the oracles of God.

1. State again the conditions of moral obligation. These must of necessity be introduced here if we would understand this subject, although they have been examined in a former Lecture at considerable length. These conditions are,

(1.) The powers and susceptibilities of moral agency. *Intellect*, including *Reason*, *Conscience*, and *Self-consciousness*. *Reason* is the intuitive faculty or function of the intellect. It gives by direct intuition the following among other truths: the *absolute*—for example, *right* and *wrong*; the *necessary*—space exists; the *infinite*—space is infinite; the *perfect*—God is perfect—God's law is perfect, &c. In short it is the faculty that intuits moral relations and affirms moral obligation to act in conformity with perceived moral relations. It is that faculty that postulates all the *a priori* truths of science whether *mathematical*, *philosophical*, *theological*, or *logical*.

Conscience is the faculty or function of the Intelligence that recognizes the conformity or disconformity of the heart and life to the Moral Law as it lies revealed in the reason, and also awards praise to conformity and blame to disconformity to that law. It also affirms that conformity to the moral law deserves reward and that disconformity deserves punishment. It also possesses a propelling or impulsive power by which it urges

the conformity of Will to Moral Law. It does, in a certain sense, seem to possess the power of retribution.

Consciousness is the faculty or function of self-knowledge. It is the faculty that recognizes our own existence, mental actions, and states, together with the attributes of liberty or necessity, belonging to those actions or states.

"Consciousness is the mind in the act of knowing itself." By consciousness I know that I am—that I affirm that space *is*,—that I also affirm that the whole is equal to all its parts—that every event must have a cause, and many such like truths. I am conscious not only of these affirmations, but also that *necessity is the law* of these affirmations, that I cannot affirm otherwise than I do in respect to this class of truths. I am also conscious of choosing to sit at my desk and write, and I am just as conscious that *liberty* is the law of this choice. That is, I am conscious of *necessarily* regarding myself as entirely *free* in this choice, and of affirming my own ability to have chosen not to sit at my desk and of being now able to choose not to sit and write. I am just as conscious of affirming the liberty or necessity of my mental states as I am of the states themselves. *Consciousness* gives us our existence and attributes, our mental acts and states, and all the attributes and phenomena of our being of which we have any knowledge. In short all our knowledge is given to us by consciousness. The *Intellect* is a *receptivity* as distinguished from a voluntary power. All the acts and states of the intelligence are under the law of *necessity* or *physical* law. The will can command the attention of the intellect. Its thoughts, perceptions, affirmations, and all its phenomena are involuntary and under a law of necessity. Of this we are conscious. Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is,

(2.) *Sensibility*. This is the faculty or susceptibility of *feeling*. All sensation, desire, emotion, passion, pain, pleasure, and in short every kind and degree of feeling as the term feeling is commonly used, is a phenomenon of this faculty. This faculty supplies the chronological condition of the idea of the valuable, and hence of right and wrong and of moral obligation. The experience of pleasure or happiness develops the idea of the valuable just as the perception of body develops the idea of space. But for this faculty the mind could have no idea of the valuable and hence of moral obligation to will the valuable, nor of right and wrong, nor of praise and blame-worthiness.

This faculty like the intellect is a *receptivity* or purely a

passive as distinguished from a voluntary faculty. All its phenomena are under the law of necessity. I am conscious that I cannot, by any direct effort, feel when and as I will. This faculty is so correlated to the intelligence that when the intellect is intensely occupied with certain considerations, the Sensibility is affected in a certain manner, and certain feelings exist in the Sensibility by a law of necessity. I am conscious that when certain conditions are fulfilled, I can not but have certain feelings, and that when these conditions are not fulfilled, I can not have those feelings. I know by consciousness that my feelings and all the states and phenomena of the Sensibility are only indirectly under the control of my Will. By willing I can direct my Intelligence to the consideration of certain subjects, and in this way alone affect my Sensibility, and produce a given state of feeling. So on the other hand if certain feelings exist in the Sensibility which I wish to suppress, I know that I can not annihilate them by directly willing them out of existence, but by diverting my attention from the cause of them, they cease to exist of course and of necessity. Thus feeling is only indirectly under the control of the Will.

Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is,

(3.) *Free Will.* By Free Will is intended the power to choose, in every instance, in accordance with moral obligation, or to refuse so to choose. This much must be implied in Free Will, and I am not concerned to affirm any thing more. The Will is the voluntary power. In it resides the power of causality. As consciousness gives the affirmation that *necessity* is an attribute of the phenomena of the Intellect and of the Sensibility, so it just as unequivocally gives the affirmation that *Liberty* is an attribute of the phenomena of the Will. I am as conscious of affirming that I could will differently from what I do in every instance of moral obligation, as I am of the affirmation that I can *not affirm*, in regard to truths of intuition, otherwise than I do. I am as conscious of being *free in willing* as I am of *not being free* or voluntary in my feelings and intuitions.

Consciousness of affirming the Freedom of the Will, that is, of power to will in accordance with moral obligation, or to refuse thus to will, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of moral obligation. For example: No man affirms, or can affirm, his moral obligation to undo all the acts of his past life, and to live his life over again. He can not affirm himself to be under this obligation, simply because he cannot but affirm the impossibility of it. He can affirm, and indeed can

not but affirm his obligation to repent and obey God in future, because he is conscious of affirming his ability to do this. Consciousness of the affirmation of ability to comply with any requisition, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation to comply with that requisition. Then no moral agent can affirm himself to be under moral obligation to perform an impossibility.

(4.) A fourth condition of moral obligation is **LIGHT**, or so much knowledge of our *moral relations* as to develop the idea of *oughtness*. This implies,

[1.] The perception or idea of the intrinsically valuable.

[2.] The affirmation of obligation to will the valuable for its own sake.

[3.] The development of the idea that it is right to will the good or the valuable and wrong not to will it for its own sake or disinterestedly.

Before I can affirm my obligation to will, I must perceive something in that which I am required to will as an ultimate end, that renders it worthy of being chosen. I must have an object of choice. That object must possess in itself that which commends itself to my Intelligence as worthy of being chosen.

All choice must respect *means* or *ends*. That is, every thing must be willed either as an end or a means. I can not be under obligation to will the *means* until I know the end. I can not know an end, or that which can possibly be chosen as an ultimate end, until I know that something is intrinsically valuable. I can not know that it is right or wrong to choose or refuse a certain end, until I know whether the proposed object of choice is intrinsically valuable or not. It is impossible for me to choose it as an ultimate end, unless I perceive it to be intrinsically valuable. This is self-evident; for choosing it as an end is nothing else than choosing it for its intrinsic value. Moral obligation, therefore, always and necessarily implies the knowledge that the well being of God and of the Universe is valuable in itself, and the affirmation that it ought to be chosen for its own sake, that is, impartially and on account of its intrinsic value. It is impossible that the ideas of right and wrong should be developed until the idea of the valuable is developed. Right and wrong respect intentions, and strictly nothing else, as we shall see. Intention implies an end intended. Now that which is chosen as an ultimate end, is and must be chosen for its own sake or for its intrinsic value. Until the *end* is apprehended

no idea or affirmation of obligation can exist respecting it. Consequently no idea of right or wrong in respect to that end can exist. The end must first be perceived. The idea of the intrinsically valuable must be developed. Simultaneously with the development of the idea of the valuable the Intelligence affirms, and must affirm obligation to will it, or, which is the same thing, that it is right to will it, and wrong not to will it.

It is impossible that the idea of moral obligation and of right and wrong should be developed upon any other conditions than those just specified. To affirm the contrary were absurd. Suppose, for instance, it should be said that the idea of the intrinsically valuable is not necessary to the development of the idea of moral obligation, and of right and wrong. Let us look at it. It is agreed that moral obligation, and the ideas of right and wrong, respect, directly, intentions only. It is also admitted that all intentions must respect either means or ends. It is also admitted that obligation to will means, can not exist until the end is known. It is also admitted that the choice of an *ultimate* end implies the choice of a thing for its own sake, or because it is intrinsically valuable. Now, from these admissions, it follows that the *idea* of the intrinsically valuable is the condition of moral obligation, and also of the *idea of moral obligation*. It must follow also that the idea of the valuable must be the condition of the idea that it would be right to choose or wrong not to choose the valuable. When I come to the discussion of the subject of moral depravity, I shall endeavor to show that the idea of the valuable is very early developed, and is among the earliest, if not the very first, of human intellections. I have here only to insist that the development of this idea is a *sine qua non* of moral obligation. It is, then, nonsense to affirm that the ideas of right and wrong are developed antecedently to the idea of the valuable. It is the same as to say that I affirm it to be right to will *an end*, before I have the idea of *an end*, or which is the same thing, of the *intrinsically valuable*, or wrong *not to will an end* when as yet I have no idea or knowledge of any reason why it should be willed, or in other words, while I have no idea of *an ultimate end*. This is absurd.

Let it be distinctly understood then, that the conditions of moral obligation are,

1. The possession of the powers, or faculties, and susceptibilities of a moral agent.

2. *Light*, or the development of the ideas of the valuable, of moral obligation, of right and wrong.

It has been absurdly contended that Sensibility is not necessary to moral agency. This assertion overlooks the fact that Moral Law is the Law of Nature; that, therefore, were the powers and susceptibilities radically different from what they are, or were the correlation of these powers radically otherwise than it is they could not still be moral agents in the sense of being under the same law that moral agents now are. Possessing a different nature, they must of necessity be subject to a different law. The law of *their* nature must be *their* law, and no other could by any possibility be obligatory upon them.

II. *I am to show by an appeal to reason, or to natural theology, to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend.*

1. Not to external or muscular action. These actions are connected with the actions of the Will by a law of *necessity*. If I will to move my muscles they *must* move, unless the nerves of voluntary motion are paralyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular motion that overpowers the strength of my Will, or, if you please, of my muscles. It is generally understood and agreed that moral obligation does not directly extend to bodily or outward action.

2. Not to the states of the *Sensibility*. I have already remarked that we are conscious that our feelings are not voluntary but involuntary states of mind. Moral obligation can not, therefore, directly extend to them.

3. Not to states of the *Intelligence*. The phenomena of this faculty we also know by consciousness to be under the law of *necessity*. It is impossible that moral obligation should extend *directly* to any involuntary act or state of mind.

4. Not to unintelligent acts of Will. There are many unintelligent volitions or acts of Will, to which moral obligation can not extend, for example, the volitions of maniacs, or of infants, before the reason is at all developed. They must at birth be the subjects of volition, as they have motion or muscular action. The volitions of somnambulists are also of this character. Purely instinctive volitions must also come under the category of unintelligent actions of Will. For example: A bee lights on my hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off. I tread on a hot iron, and instinctively move my foot. Indeed there are many actions of will which are put forth under the influence of pure instinct, and before the

Intelligence can affirm obligation to will or not to will. These surely can not have moral character, and of course moral obligation cannot extend to them.

III. To what acts and states of mind Moral Obligation must directly extend.

1. To all *intelligent* acts of will. These are and must be free.

2. All intelligent acts of will must consist, either in the choice of ends or means. The mind does not act intelligently, except as it acts in reference to some end or object of choice.

3. The choice of an ultimate end is an ultimate intention.

4. The choice of the means to secure an ultimate end, is but an endeavor of the will to secure it, and is therefore, but an exertion of the ultimate intention. It is choosing *this* as a means to *that*, that is, it is the choice of the end and of the means for *its* sake. Choosing the means is sometimes, though I think improperly, denominated subordinate choice, or the choice of subordinate ends.

5. All intelligent willing, choosing, intending, must consist, either in the choice of an end, or in volitions or efforts to secure an end. In other words, all choosing must consist in choosing an end, or something for its own sake, or in choosing means to compass the end. This must be, or there is really no object of choice.

6. I have said, that Moral Obligation respects the ultimate intention only. I am now prepared to say still further, that *this is a first truth of Reason*. It is a truth universally and necessarily assumed by all Moral Agents, their speculations to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding. This is evident from the following considerations.

(1.) Very young children know and assume this truth universally. They always deem it a sufficient vindication of themselves, when accused of any delinquency, to say, "I did not mean to," or if accused of short coming, to say, "I meant or intended to have done it—I designed it." This, if true, they assume as an all-sufficient vindication of themselves. They know that this, if believed, *must be regarded* as a sufficient excuse to justify them in every case.

(2.) Every Moral Agent necessarily regards such an excuse as a perfect justification, in case it be sincerely and truly made.

(3.) It is a saying as common as men are, and as true as common, that men are to be judged by their motives, that is, by their designs, intentions. It is impossible for us not to assent

to this truth. If a man intend evil, though perchance he may do us good, we do not excuse him, but hold him guilty of the crime which he intended. So if he intend to do us good, and perchance do us evil, we do not, and cannot condemn him. For this intention and endeavor to do us good, we cannot blame him, although it has resulted in evil to us. He may be to blame for other things connected with the affair. He may have come to our help too late, and may have been to blame for not coming when a different result would have followed; or he may have been blamable for not being better qualified for doing us good. He may have been to blame for many things connected with the transaction, but for a sincere, and of course hearty endeavor to do us good, he is not culpable, nor can he be, however it may result. If he honestly intended to do us good, it is impossible that he should not have used the best means in his power at the time: this is implied in honesty of intention. And if he did this, reason cannot pronounce him guilty, for *it* must judge him by his intentions.

(4.) Courts of Criminal Law have always in every enlightened country assumed this as a first truth. They always inquire into the *quo animo*, that is, the intention, and judge accordingly.

(5.) The universally acknowledged truth that lunatics are not moral agents and responsible for their conduct, is but an illustration of the fact that the truth we are considering is regarded and assumed as a *first truth of Reason*.

7. Again if it be true, which certainly it must be, that all choices respect ends or means, and that the choice of means to effect an end is only an endeavor to secure the intended end, it must also be true that Moral Obligation extends directly only to ultimate intention.

8. But the Bible every where, either expressly or impliedly recognizes this truth. "If there be a willing mind, that is, a *right willing* or *intention*, it is accepted," &c.

9. Again. All the Law is fulfilled in one word, *love*. Now this can not be true if the spirit of the whole Law does not directly respect intentions only. If it extends directly to thoughts, emotions, and outward actions, it can not be truly said that love is the fulfilling of the Law. This love must be good will, for how could involuntary love be obligatory?

10. Again. The spirit of the Bible every where respects the intention. If the intention is right, or if there be a willing mind it is accepted as obedience. But if there be not a will-

ing mind; that is, right intention, no outward act is regarded as obedience. The willing is always regarded by the Scriptures as the doing. If a man look on a woman to lust after her, that is, with licentious intention or willing, he hath committed adultery with her already, &c. So on the other hand, if one intends to perform a service for God which after all he is unable to perform, he is regarded as having virtually done it, and is rewarded accordingly.

This is too obviously the doctrine of the Bible to need further elucidation.

IV. To what Acts and Mental States Moral Obligation indirectly extends.

Under this head I remark,

That it has been already said that outward action together with the states of the Intelligence and Sensibility are connected with the actions of the Will by a Law of Necessity.

(1.) The muscles of the body are directly under the control of the Will. I will to move, and my muscles must move, unless there be a paralysis of the nerves of voluntary motion, or unless some opposing power of sufficient magnitude to overcome the strength of my Will be interposed.

(2.) The Intellect is also directly under the control of the Will. I am conscious that I can control and direct my attention as I please, and think upon one subject or another.

(3.) The Sensibility, I am conscious, is only indirectly controlled by the Will. Feeling can be produced only by directing the attention and thoughts to those subjects that excite Feeling by a Law of Necessity.

The way is now prepared to say,

1. That Moral Obligation extends indirectly to outward or bodily actions. These are often required in the Word of God. The reason is that being connected with the actions of the Will by a Law of Necessity, if the Will is right the outward action must follow, except upon the contingencies just named, and therefore such actions may reasonably be required. But if the contingencies just named intervene so that outward action does not follow the choice or intention, the Bible accepts the Will for the deed invariably. "If there be a willing mind it is accepted according" &c.

2. Moral Obligation extends indirectly to the states of the Sensibility, so that certain emotions or feelings are required as outward actions are, and for the same reason, namely, the states of the Sensibility are connected with the actions of the

Will by a Law of Necessity. But when the Sensibility is exhausted, or when for any reason the right action of the Will does not produce the required feelings, it is accepted upon the principle just named.

3. Moral Obligation indirectly extends also to the states of the Intellect; consequently the Bible, to a certain extent, and in a certain sense, holds men responsible for their Thoughts and Opinions. It every where assumes that if the heart be *constantly* right the Thoughts and Opinions will correspond with the state of the Heart or Will; "If any man will do his will he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God." It is, however, manifest that the Word of God every where assumes that, strictly speaking, all virtue and vice belong to the heart or intention. Where this is right, all is regarded as right; and where this is wrong, all is regarded as wrong. It is upon this assumption that the doctrine of total depravity rests. It is undeniable that the veriest sinners do many things outwardly which the Law of God requires. Now unless the intention decides the character of these acts, they must be regarded as really virtuous. But when the intention is found to be selfish, then it is ascertained that they are sinful notwithstanding their literal conformity to the Law of God.

The fact is that Moral Agents are so constituted that it is impossible for them not to judge themselves and others by their motives and intentions. They cannot but assume it as a first truth that a man's character is as his intention is, and consequently that Moral Obligation respects directly only intention.

4. Moral Obligation then indirectly extends to every thing about us, over which the Will has direct or indirect control. The Moral Law, while, strictly, it legislates over intention only, yet in fact legislates over the whole being, inasmuch as all our powers are directly or indirectly connected with intention by a Law of Necessity. Strictly speaking, however, Moral Character belongs alone to the intention. In strict propriety of speech, it can not be said that either outward action or any state of the Intellect or the Sensibility has a moral element or quality belonging to it. Yet in common language, which is sufficiently accurate for most practical purposes, we speak of thought, feeling, and outward action as holy or unholy.

LECTURE IV.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

In discussing this subject I will,

I. REPEAT THE DEFINITION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

II. REMIND YOU OF THE CONDITIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

III. SHOW WHAT IS INTENDED BY THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

IV. POINT OUT AGAIN THE EXTENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

V. NOTICE THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES IN THIS DISCUSSION.

VI. SHOW WHEREIN THEY DISAGREE.

VII. SHOW FROM REASON AND REVELATION WHAT MUST BE THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

VIII. SHOW WHEREIN THAT CONSISTS WHICH CONSTITUTES THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

IX. EXAMINE THE CLAIMS OF THE PRINCIPAL THEORIES THAT HAVE BEEN ADVOCATED ON THIS SUBJECT.

Before I enter directly upon the discussion I would observe that this question, like most Theological questions, is both Psychological and Theological. It is common, and as absurd and vain as it is common, to object to Metaphysical discussions in the examination of Theological questions. The fact is that there is no such thing as holding Theological opinions without assuming the truth of some system of Mental Philosophy. Metaphysical Theology is only Bible Theology explained; and to object to Metaphysics in Theology is only to object to the application of Reason in the explanation of the facts of Revealed Theology. It has, however, been too common to discuss this question without suitable reference to the Bible, that is, it has been common to treat it as a purely Psychological Question. But this mode of procedure can never be satisfactory to a Christian Mind. I shall therefore discuss it both as a Biblical and as a Psychological Question.

I. *I am to repeat the Definition of Moral Obligation.*

Obligation is that which binds. *Moral Obligation* is the bond or ligament that binds a Moral Agent to Moral Law. The idea, however, is too plain to be defined by the use of other language. It is a pure idea of the Reason, and better understood than explained by any term except that of Moral Obligation itself.

II. *I am to call attention again to the Conditions of Moral Obligation.*

These have been so fully discussed in a preceding lecture that it is only necessary to observe that these conditions are the powers of moral agency, together with so much light on moral relations as to develop the idea of Oughtness or Moral Obligation.

III. I am to show what is intended by the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

The *Foundation of Moral Obligation is the Reason or Consideration* that imposes obligation on a moral agent to obey moral law. Should the question be asked, why does the moral law require what it does? the true answer to this question would also answer the question, what is the Foundation of Moral Obligation? There must be some good and sufficient reason for the law requiring what it does, or it cannot be Moral Law or impose Moral Obligation. The question then is, why does the Moral Law require what it does? The reason that justifies and demands the requisition must be the reason why it ought to be obeyed. The reason for the command must be identical with the reason for obedience—the reason why the law should require what it does, is the reason why we should do what it requires. This reason, whatever it is, is the Foundation of Moral Obligation, that is, of the obligation to obey Moral Law. To ascertain what this reason is, is the object of the discussion upon which we have entered.

IV. I am to remind you of the Extent of Moral Obligation.

In a former Lecture, it has been shown that moral obligation extends, strictly speaking, to the ultimate intention only, that the Law of God requires only entire consecration to the right end.

V. I am to notice the points of Agreement among the principal parties in this discussion.

1. They agree in their definition of Moral Obligation.
2. They also agree in respect to the conditions of moral obligation—that they are, as has just been stated, the powers of moral agency with so much light respecting moral relations as to develop the idea of oughtness or obligation.
3. They agree also in respect to what is intended by the foundation of moral obligation—namely, that the foundation of moral obligation is the fundamental reason or consideration on which the obligation rests or is founded.
4. They agree also in respect to the extent of moral obligation, that strictly speaking, it extends only to the ultimate action or choice of the Will; or in other words, that it ex-

tends to the ultimate intention only, or to the choice of an ultimate end, or of something for its own sake.

5. They agree in holding that an ultimate end is one chosen for what it is in and of itself, or for its own intrinsic value, and not as a condition or means of securing any other end.

6. They hold in common that the moral law as revealed in the Bible covers the whole ground of moral obligation—that is, that the Law of God as revealed in the Bible requires all that is obligatory on moral agents.

7. They agree also that the sum of the requirements of the Moral Law is expressed in one word, LOVE; that the term love is comprehensive of all that the true spirit of the Moral Law requires.

8. They agree also that this love is not an emotion or mere involuntary feeling of any kind, but that it consists in ultimate choice, preference, intention, or in the choice of an ultimate end, that is, of something for its own sake, or for what it is in and of itself.

9. They agree that the *fundamental* reason of the obligation to choose an ultimate end must be found *in the end itself*, and that this reason, or that in the end which imposes obligation to choose it as an end, must be identical with the end itself. The fundamental reason for choosing a thing, is that in the thing which renders it obligatory to choose it. This reason is the end on which the choice ought to and must terminate, or the true end is not chosen. This brings me,

VI. To show wherein they differ.

From the foregoing it must be plain that they must differ only in respect to the end on which choice, preference, intention, ought to terminate; that is, they differ in respect to that which moral agents ought to choose as an ultimate end. This is the true point of difference. The question on which they differ is this: What is the ultimate end to which moral agents are under obligation to consecrate their whole being?

VII. I am to show from Reason and Revelation what must be the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

This inquiry, as will be seen, resolves itself into an inquiry concerning the true spirit and meaning of the Law of God. What does the Moral Law mean? What does it require? What is the end which it commands moral agents to choose, will, intend, for its own sake? Let it be remembered that it is agreed that moral obligation cannot exist in respect to the choice of an ultimate end, unless there be something in the end itself that renders it worthy or deserving of being chosen

for its own sake. It is plainly impossible to choose any thing as an ultimate end or for its own sake, except as it is chosen for what it is *in and of itself*. And it is just as plain that there can be no obligation to choose it for what it is in and of itself except there be in it that which renders it worthy of choice. This brings me to lay down the following proposition:

The highest Well Being of God and of the Universe of sentient existences is the end on which ultimate preference, choice, intention, ought to terminate. In other words, the Well Being of God and of the Universe is the absolute and ultimate good, and therefore it should be chosen by every moral agent.

It is certain that the highest well being of God and of the Universe of sentient existences must be *intrinsically and infinitely valuable in itself*. It is a first truth of reason that whatever is *intrinsically valuable* should be chosen for that reason, or as an end. It is and must be a first truth of reason, that whatever is *intrinsically and infinitely valuable* ought to be chosen as the *ultimate end of existence* by every moral agent. To say that a thing is *intrinsically and infinitely valuable*, is the same as to say that it is intrinsically and infinitely worthy or deserving of being chosen for what it is in and of itself. Therefore to admit or affirm that a thing is intrinsically and infinitely valuable, is the same as to affirm that every moral agent who has the knowledge of this intrinsically and infinitely valuable thing, is under an obligation of infinite weight to choose it for the reason that it is intrinsically and infinitely valuable, or, in other words to choose it as an ultimate end. It is then the intrinsic and infinite value of the highest good or well being of God and of the Universe that constitutes the true foundation of Moral Obligation. The Moral Law then must require moral agents to will good or that which is intrinsically valuable to God and the Universe of sentient existences for its own sake or as an ultimate end. Be it remembered that Moral Obligation respects, strictly speaking, the ultimate intention only. It must follow that the highest well being of God and of the Universe, is the intrinsically valuable end on which ultimate choice ought to terminate.

And here let it be observed that good may be willed for its own sake; that is, because it is good or valuable *on condition that it belongs to or can be enjoyed by self*. This may be the condition on which a moral agent chooses its existence. He may refuse to choose it because it is valuable, *except on the condition that it belongs to self*. Its relation to self may with him be the condition on which he will choose it. To choose thus is *Selfishness*.

Good may be chosen *disinterestedly*, that is, for its own intrinsic value to *being in general*, that is, the highest well being of being in general may be chosen for its own sake or on account of its intrinsic value. This is what is called *disinterested benevolence*.

It should be observed that all the actions of the Will consist in choices or willings. These actions are generally regarded as consisting in *Choice* and *Volition*. By *choice* is intended the selection or choice of an *end*. By *volition* is intended the executive efforts of the Will to secure the end intended.

The *Nilling* or *refusing* of the will is only choice in an opposite direction. In Nilling, the will as really chooses as in any other acts of will. If it refuses one end, it in the very act chooses another. If it refuses one means, it is only because it seeks another.

It should further be observed in this place that all intelligent choices or actions of the Will, must consist either in the choice of an *end* or of means to secure an *end*. To deny this is the *same as* to deny that there is any object of choice. If the Will acts at all, it wills, chooses. If it chooses, it chooses something—there is some object of choice. In other words, it chooses something for some reason, and that reason is truly the object of the choice. Or at least, the *fundamental reason* for choosing a thing is the *object chosen*. Now whenever the Will chooses, it chooses something for its own sake or for what it is in and of itself, or as a means or condition of securing that which is chosen for its own sake. To say that there can be an intelligent action of the Will that does not consist either in the choice of an end or of means to secure an end, is the same thing as to say that there is an action of the Will, when nothing whatever is willed, or chosen; which is absurd.

It should further be observed that the choice of an end implies the choice of all the known, necessary conditions and means of securing that end; that the choice of an end, secures and even *necessitates*, while the choice of the end continues, the choice of the known necessary conditions and means.

VIII. *I am to show wherein that consists which constitutes the true Foundation of Moral Obligation; in other words, in what the highest Well-Being or Ultimate Good of sentient beings consists?*

In discussing this question I will endeavor to show,

1. Wherein it can not consist.
2. Show wherein it must consist.

But first I must define the different sense of the term good. Good may be *natural* or *moral*. Natural good is synonymous with *valuable*. Moral good is synonymous with *virtue*. Moral good may be a natural good in the sense that it may be a means or condition of *natural good*. Good may be *Absolute* and *Relative*. *Absolute* good is that which is valuable *in itself* or *intrinsically* valuable. *Relative* good is that which is valuable as a means. *Absolute* good may also be a relative good, that is, it may be a means of perpetuating and augmenting itself. Good may also be *Ultimate*. *Ultimate* good is that absolute good in which all relative good terminates or results. It is that absolute good to which all relative good sustains the relation of conditions or means.

I would here remark also that there is a broad distinction between the *conditions* and *means* of the highest good of being and that which *constitutes* the *absolute* and *ultimate* good of being.

1. Wherein the ultimate and absolute good can not consist.

By an ultimate good is intended that which is *intrinsically* valuable. Relative good is that which is valuable as a means of ultimate good. I here remark,

(1.) That the *ultimate* and *absolute* good must belong to being or to sentient existences. It must be inseparable from beings that have a conscious existence. It is nonsense to speak of an insentient or unconscious existence as being capable of or as being a subject of the absolute and ultimate good. Nothing can be a good or intrinsically valuable to such a being. A block of marble can not be the subject of good. To it nothing is good or evil. Let it be distinctly understood that none but a sentient being can know or possibly be a subject of good in the sense of the valuable. I remark,

(2.) That with moral agents at least the ultimate good must consist in a *state of mind*. It must consist in something that must be sought and found, if found at all, within the field of consciousness.

[1.] The ultimate and absolute good in the sense of the *intrinsically* valuable, can not be identical with *Moral Law*. Moral Law as we have seen, is an *Idea of the Reason*. Moral Law and Moral Government must propose some end to be secured by means of law. Law can not be its own end. It can not require the subject to seek itself as an ultimate end. This were absurd. The Moral Law is nothing else than the Reason's Idea, or Conception of that course of willing and acting that is fit, proper, suitable to, and demanded by the nature, rela-

tions, necessities, and circumstances of moral agents. Their nature, relations, circumstances and wants being perceived, the Reason necessarily affirms that they *ought* to propose to themselves a certain end, and to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this end for its own sake, or for its own intrinsic value. This end can not be law itself. The law is a simple and pure idea of the Reason and can never be in itself the supreme, intrinsic, absolute and ultimate good.

[2.] Nor can obedience, or the course of acting or willing required by the law, be the ultimate end aimed at by the law or the lawgiver. The law requires *action in reference to an end*, or that an end should be willed; but the *willing* and the *end* to be willed can not be identical. The action required and the end to which it is to be directed can not be the same. To affirm that it can, is absurd. It is to affirm that *obedience to law* is the ultimate end proposed by Law or Government. The *obedience* is one thing, the *end* to be secured by obedience is and must be another. *Obedience* must be a *means or condition*, and that which law and obedience are intended to secure, *is and must be the ultimate end* of obedience. The law or the lawgiver aims to promote the highest good or blessedness of the universe. This must be the *end* of Moral Law and Moral Government. Law and obedience must be the means or conditions of this end. It is absurd to deny this. To deny this is to deny the very nature of *Moral Law* and to lose sight of the true and only *end* of Moral Government. Nothing can be *Moral Law* and nothing can be Moral Government that does not propose the highest good of moral beings as its ultimate end. But if this is the end of law and the end of government it must be the end to be *aimed at* or *intended* by the ruler and the subject. And this end must be the foundation of moral obligation. The end proposed to be secured must be *intrinsically valuable* or that would not be *Moral Law* that proposed to secure it. The end must be *good* or *valuable, per se*, or there can be no *Moral Law* requiring it to be sought or chosen as an ultimate end, nor any obligation to choose it as an ultimate end.

It must be true, then, that the end proposed by Moral Law can neither be the law itself nor obedience to law. Obedience consists in the choice of an end. It is impossible that choice should be an ultimate end. To make choice an ultimate end were to choose choice, and to intend intention as an ultimate end—this is plainly impossible.

[3.] The absolute and ultimate good of being can not con-

sist in *moral worth* or *good desert*. Moral worth or good desert is a result of obedience to law. It is not a state of mind—it is *merit*. It is a quality or attribute of character. As it is not a state of mind, it can not be the ultimate and absolute good of being. It is *good desert*, and is not identical with the *good deserved*. It is a *good* and an indispensable condition of the ultimate and absolute good, but can not be identical with it. As it does not consist in a state of mind, it is impossible that it should be the ultimate good. It is intrinsically *meritorious* or *deserving of good*, but not identical with the ultimate good. It is that to which the law and the lawgiver promise the ultimate good, but it is not *the good promised*.

Moral worth, merit, and good desert, can never have been the end proposed by the lawgiver. The law proposes to secure moral worth, not as an *ultimate end*, not as the ultimate and absolute good of the subject, but as a condition of his being rewarded with absolute good. The Lawgiver and the law propose ultimate and perfect *satisfaction and blessedness* as a result of virtue and of moral worth. This result must be the ultimate and absolute good.

The reason why virtue and moral excellence or worth have been supposed to be a good in themselves, and *intrinsically* and absolutely valuable, is, that the mind necessarily regards them with *satisfaction*. They meet a demand of the Reason and Conscience; they are the archetypes of the Ideas of the Reason and are therefore naturally and necessarily regarded with satisfaction, just as when we behold natural beauty, we necessarily enjoy it. We naturally experience a mental satisfaction in the contemplation of beauty, and this is true whether the beauty be physical or moral. Both meet a demand of our nature, and therefore we experience satisfaction in their contemplation. Now it has been said that this satisfaction, is itself proof that we pronounced the beauty a good *in itself*. But ultimate good must, as we have said, consist in a state of mind. But neither physical nor moral beauty is a state of mind. Aside from the satisfaction produced by their contemplation, to whom or to what can they be a good? Take *physical beauty* for example, aside from *every beholder*, to whom or to what is it a good? Is it a good to *itself*? But it can not be a *subject of good*. It must be a good only as and because it meets a demand of our being and produces satisfaction in its contemplation. It is a relative good. The satisfaction experienced by contemplating it, is an ultimate good. It is only a condition of ultimate

good. So virtue or holiness is morally beautiful. Moral worth or excellence is morally beautiful. *Beauty* is an attribute or element of holiness, virtue, and of moral worth, or right character. But the beauty is not identical with holiness nor moral worth any more than the *beauty* of a rose and the rose are identical. The rose is *beautiful*. Beauty is one of its attributes. So virtue is *morally beautiful*. Beauty is one of its attributes. But the beauty in neither case is a state of mind, and can not be an ultimate good. The contemplation of either and of both naturally begets mental satisfaction because of the relation of the archetype to the idea of our Reason. We are so constituted that beholding the archetypes of certain ideas of our Reason produces mental satisfaction. Not because we affirm the archetypes to be good in themselves; for often, to say the least, as for instance in the case of physical beauty, this cannot be, but because these archetypes meet a demand of our nature. They meet this demand, and thus produce satisfaction. This satisfaction is an ultimate good, but that which produces it, is only a relative good. Apart from the *satisfaction* produced by the contemplation of moral worth, of what value can it be? Can the worthiness of good, or the moral beauty be the *end* proposed by the lawgiver? Or must we seek to secure *moral worth* in moral agents for the sake of the good in which it results? If neither the subject of moral excellence or worth nor any one else *experienced the least satisfaction* in contemplating it—if it did not so meet a demand of *our* being or of *any* being as to afford the least satisfaction to any sentient existence, to whom or to what would it be a good? If it meets a demand of the nature of a moral agent, it must produce satisfaction. It does meet a demand of our being, and therefore produces satisfaction to the Intelligence, the Conscience, the Sensibility. It is therefore necessarily pronounced by us to be *a good*. We are apt to say it is an ultimate good; but it is only a relative good. It meets a demand of our being and thus produces satisfaction. This satisfaction is the ultimate good of being. At the very moment we pronounce it a good in itself, it is only because we experience such a satisfaction in contemplating it. At the very time we say that we consider it a good *in itself* wholly independent of its *results*, we only say so the more positively because we are so gratified at the time by thinking of it. It is its experienced results that is the ground of the affirmation.

[4.] It cannot be too distinctly understood that *Right Char-*

acter, Moral Worth, Good Desert, Meritoriousness, or whatever you call it, can not be or consist in a *state of Mind*, and therefore it is impossible that it should be an ultimate good or intrinsically valuable. By *Right Character, Moral Worth, Good Desert, Meritoriousness, &c.*, as distinguished from virtue, we can mean nothing more than that it is fit and proper and suitable to the nature and relation of things, that a virtuous person should be blessed. The Intelligence is gratified when this character is perceived to exist. This perception produces intellectual satisfaction. This *satisfaction is a good in itself*. But that which produces this satisfaction, is in no proper sense a good in itself. Were it not for the fact that it meets a demand of the Intelligence and thus produces *satisfaction*, it could not so much as be thought of as a good in itself any more than any thing else that is a pure conception of the Reason, such, for instance, as a mathematical line.

It is impossible that the Lawgiver or the Law should make *obedience* or the *worthiness* resulting from obedience, an *ultimate end*. God requires the highest good of the universe to be willed as an ultimate end. Now he requires the *willing* for the sake of the *good willed*. He aims and must aim at securing the *good* and not merely the *willing*. He must aim at securing the *good*, and not merely securing the willing or the worthiness resulting from willing. It is the *end* He aims at. The *willing* and the *worthiness of willing* are valuable only as the end *willed* is valuable. Were it not that the end is *intrinsically* valuable, the willing would not be so much as *relatively* valuable. It would have no value whatever. And but for the intrinsic value of the end willed, *Good Desert* would not result from willing it. Both the virtuousness and the meritoriousness of willing the end depends altogether upon the *intrinsic value* of the end. But for this, I say again, neither Virtue nor Merit could exist. Now it is absurd to make that an *ultimate good* and to affirm that to be *intrinsically and ultimately* valuable, whose whole value consists in its relations to an ultimate good.

[5.] The *ultimate or absolute good* can not consist in any thing external to *Mind itself*. Moral Agents are so constituted as to sustain certain correlations to things external to themselves, many of which things are necessary means and conditions of their well being. But none of these can be good or valuable in themselves. That is, nothing without the consciousness of being can be a good *per se*.

The Constitution of Moral Agents has three primary De-

partments or Faculties as we have formerly seen, namely, the *Intellect*, the *Sensibility*, and the *Will*. All the demands of our being may be and must be made by one of these Faculties. The Intellect has its demands or wants. The Sensibility has its objects of desire, or its demands and wants. Our whole being is comprised in these three departments, and they sustain such correlations to each other and to the universe that the objects demanded by these powers or susceptibilities are indispensable conditions of our well-being or being *satisfied*. For instance, the Intellect demands knowledge of Truth; the Conscience demands obedience to Moral Law; the Sensibility demands those objects that excite its desires. These are only specimens of the demands or wants of our being. ((Our well-being or our highest good is, from the constitution of our Nature, conditioned upon the demands of our Nature being met and our wants supplied. These wants are numerous. Now the objects that are so correlated to us as to be the conditions of our blessedness, are not the ultimate and absolute good. Truth, for example, is a condition or means of our ultimate good, but it is not itself an ultimate good. To whom or what would it be a good were there no Intelligence to apprehend it? It meets a demand of the Intelligence, and is therefore a *relative good*. The same is and must be true of every thing that is so correlated to us as to meet a demand of our Constitution. The meeting of these demands, the supply of these wants produces mental *satisfaction*. This satisfaction is an *ultimate good*. But the things that produce it are only *relative good*.

It is possible that an ultimate good may be also a relative good. Thus the satisfaction or blessedness that constitutes the ultimate good may and does tend to perpetuate and increase itself. The contemplation by us of the joy of others may be, and often is, a means of increasing our own. In this case the ultimate good is both an ultimate and a relative good; that is, it is both an ultimate end and a means.

It is true also that a thing may meet a demand of our being and be at the same time a means and an ultimate end. Our Nature demands *Satisfaction, Blessedness, Enjoyment*. This is an *ultimate demand*. That which supplies or meets *this* demand is an ultimate good. The universal *satisfaction* of all the powers and susceptibilities of our Nature *is the ultimate good of our being*. This demand is only met by the ultimate and absolute good. All other demands are met by their appropriate objects, not one of which is an ultimate or absolute good,

but only a relative good. As these objects meet the demands of our Constitution they produce satisfaction; this satisfaction is an ultimate good. Did they not produce satisfaction they would not be a good in any sense. The Intelligence is met and the Reason is satisfied, that is, the things which it demanded, it has obtained, or they are accomplished.

Virtue, then, or obedience to Moral Law is in some sense a good to a Moral Agent, that is, it meets a demand of his Reason or Conscience. Moral Worth, also, or Right Character, is demanded by the Intelligence of every Moral Agent, and where Moral Worth is seen to exist, this demand of the Intelligence is met. So far that exists which it demanded; so that in this sense Moral Worth is valuable to a Moral Agent inasmuch as it meets a demand of his being. So all the objects of *desire* are valuable in the sense that they meet a demand of the Constitution.

But here an inquiry arises. Are these the ultimate good? I answer no, for this reason, that they are not, and cannot be regarded by the mind as ultimate. The universal intelligence demands Virtue or obedience to moral law, and when this is seen to exist the Intelligence is satisfied. For example; when the mind perceives any thing to which it sustains such a correlation that the thing is demanded by the mind, in other words, that it is a necessity of nature, the possession of the object satisfies the demand. When the Intelligence acquires the knowledge that it demands, it is satisfied. When the Conscience has that which it demands, or when that exists which the conscience demands, the conscience is satisfied. When the Sensibility possesses those objects of desire which it craved, the Sensibility is satisfied. Whenever the Intelligence perceives the concrete realization of those ideas of the Reason whose realization was demanded by the Intelligence, the Intelligence is satisfied. The mind continues to struggle after all the objects that are so correlated to it as to be demanded by any power of the mind, and it does not rest until that demand is met. As soon as the demand is met the mind *rests* and is *satisfied*. Now observe, those things after which the mind is struggling to meet its demands, are not the ultimate good of the mind that is thus struggling. When the mind has obtained the objects after which it struggles, and which it demands, it then rests—it is satisfied. And it matters not which of the powers of the mind makes the demand, the power is not satisfied until the end is gained. And when the end is gained, thus far the mind is satisfied. A

benevolent mind is not seeking *merely self-satisfaction*, for this is not what Reason demands. But it seeks the satisfaction of being in general, including its own, and in willing the general good is sure to secure its own.

This brings me to remark again, that those objects external to the mind itself after which the mind struggles and which, when obtained, meet the demands of the constitution and satisfy the mind are not the *ultimate good* of the mind, but the *satisfaction* resulting from the possession of those objects is the *ultimate good*.

It appears to me that this *must* be *self-evident*. If the mind is *perfectly satisfied*, the *satisfaction itself* is to the mind a *perfect*, an *ultimate*, and an *absolute good*. For example, God possesses a self-existent and infinite nature. Certain things were demanded by the constitution and laws of his own being; such as that his will should be conformed to the Law of his Intelligence, or in other words that he should be virtuous. Now when this demand was met, and the heart or Will was conformed to the law of the Intelligence, which was from eternity with him, this demand of his Being was met—his Conscience, and his Intelligence were satisfied. They are so. His Intelligence is in a state of infinite and eternal satisfaction, or in other words, he possesses necessarily what we call an intellectual pleasure or delight or satisfaction in the state of his Will, or in other words, in the Will's conformity to the law of his Intelligence. Now *mark*: the virtue that meets this demand is to Him *a good*, because it meets a demand of his Being. But it is not the *ultimate good*, but the *satisfaction* which he has in that state of his Will is the *ultimate good*. So there were many other ideas of the Divine Reason, such as the idea of the Just, of the Right, the Beautiful, the Useful, the Merciful, and such like. Now the Intelligence demanded that these ideas should be realized, and the Sensibility also *desires* the realization of these ideas. In other words still, the realization of these ideas was not only demanded by the Intelligence, but their realization was an object of *rational desire*.

When creative power went forth for the realization of these ideas, when the universe sprang into existence as the archetype or living expression and exemplification of these ideas, the Divine Mind was *satisfied*. He is represented as having looked upon all that He had made, and pronounced it "*very good*." That is, He was *satisfied* with the work of his hands. He beheld the realization of the ideas of his own Reason, and saw that these demands of his being were met. Now

observe : from eternity these things were present to God in such a sense that He was from eternity satisfied with or enjoyed the realization of all these ideas. In other words, every demand of his Being was from eternity met—since from eternity all things that are or will be have been present to the Divine Omniscience.

Now I inquire what must be the *ultimate good of God*? Certainly not these created things, not any thing created or uncreated that is so correlated to Him as to meet a demand of his Being with the exception of this one thing—the *infinite satisfaction of the Divine Mind*. God can say, I have no want. All the demands of his infinite mind are fully met. The ideas of his Reason are realized. His desires are, upon the whole, fulfilled, and every power and susceptibility is full. His satisfaction is perfect and infinite. When I say all the demands of his nature are met, I mean that his Omniscience embraces all events, and to Him all things that *will be, are already* to Him in such a sense as to satisfy the Divine Mind. He pronounces it all *very good*, in the sense that, upon the whole, *he is satisfied*.

That state of mind, the *Satisfaction*, the perfect and infinite *Rest* of the Divine Mind, in having every demand of His being met, is His *ultimate good*. ✓

Now, it is self-evident, that this must also be the *ultimate good* of every being in existence. That *which meets* the demands of His being is not its *ultimate good*, with the single exception of the *satisfaction* that results from having all the other demands of every department of the being fully met and satisfied. This satisfaction is the ultimate demand of our being. That is, it is that which is ultimately demanded, and for the sake of which all the other things are demanded. This is an ultimate good. But that which meets no other demand of our being, can be the ultimate good; for all these things, whatever they are, only *result in satisfaction*, but do not constitute it. *Satisfaction* is, and must be, the ultimate good; and whatever produces this result must be only a relative good. ✓ The highest well-being of God and of the universe, then, or the highest good of universal being must consist in a *state of entire satisfaction*. Whenever a mind is in a state in which it can affirm, I have no wants that are unsupplied, my whole being is satisfied—that state of satisfaction that results from the meeting of all the demands of the constitution, is, and it seems to me must be, the ultimate good of the being.

Here let it be observed, that *Satisfaction* of mind, in the

sense in which I have explained it, is the ultimate good of being, whether any one possesses it or not. The Reason affirms, that it is *an ultimate* and an *absolute good*, for any mind to be perfectly and universally satisfied. This is the thing which ought to be willed for its own sake, whether any one ever possesses it or not. Every Moral Agent ought to will the perfect satisfaction of God and of all beings, for the sake of the intrinsic value of that state of mind.

They only, of Moral Agents, will possess this ultimate Good, whose heart and life are conformed to the dictates of their Intelligence, and every want or demand of whose being is met and fully satisfied.

Just so far as any mind is entirely satisfied, just so far it possesses that which belongs to or constitutes the ultimate good. Suppose my heart to be entirely conformed to the Law of my Intelligence—thus far my Conscience, my Intelligence and my Sensibility are satisfied. My Sensibility is satisfied thus far, for the conformity of my Will to the Law of my Intelligence is not only a demand of my Intelligence, but of my Sensibility. So that if I am virtuous, thus far I am satisfied whether any body else is virtuous or not. Thus far I possess that satisfaction which constitutes the ultimate good. But as yet, I may not possess this in perfection. All the demands of my being, in respect to myself and others, may not be met, and consequently my satisfaction may not be perfect and universal. But so far as I have it, it is in kind of the ultimate good. I shall never possess it in a perfect degree, until every demand of my constitution is met—until I can say, I have no want that is not supplied.

By the term satisfaction, I mean more than is generally understood by the term happiness. This term is generally used to express merely the satisfaction of the *Sensibility*. There is, however, such a thing as *intellectual satisfaction*, the *satisfaction of Conscience*. In other words, there is a natural, and if I may so speak, a moral satisfaction. The demands of the Intelligence and of the Heart and of the Sensibility, are all fully met. This results in a state of universal and entire *mental satisfaction*. It is a state perhaps well and fully expressed by the term **BLESSEDNESS**. Every power and susceptibility is full, is satisfied. The mind can say, it is enough,—I have no want. This state must be the ultimate and the absolute good. Whatever conduces to this state, whatever meets any demand of any power or susceptibility, is a means, or condition of this

state, and is in this sense a good. It is not an absolute, but a relative good. This appears to be self-evident. When I can say that every demand of my being is met, then I possess the ultimate good in a degree that is unmixed with any alloy. If the demands of my Intelligence, or of any power of my being are enlarged, if I come into relations where my constitution demands more, when these demands are all met, my satisfaction will increase. But so long as my satisfaction is universal and complete, my blessedness is perfect in the sense that I have no want that is not fully met. This satisfaction, let it be repeated, is, and must be the ultimate good of being. ✓

The Intelligence of a Moral Agent demands moral order. But Moral Order itself is not the ultimate good. But the *satisfaction* which the mind has in contemplating a state of Moral Order is an ultimate good. ✓

Here again let me observe that it has been insisted that those things demanded by the Intelligence must be affirmed to be a good *in themselves*, or we should not have pleasure in them, or in other words, we should not be *satisfied* with them. I perceive beauty. Now it is said that unless I affirm that beauty is a good in itself it would afford me no satisfaction to behold it. But this is certainly a mistake. As I have observed before, the *ultimate good* belongs to sentient beings and must certainly be inseparable from them; that is, none but a sentient being can be the subject of *ultimate good*. The ultimate good of all beings must of necessity be *subjective*; that is, it must belong to themselves. As moral agents the ultimate good *must consist in a state of mind*. This should always be borne in mind. Now if it be objected that when we behold beauty for example, the Intelligence must pronounce it to be a good *in itself* as a condition of its producing satisfaction in us, I answer: *To whom or what* is beauty, as separate from sentient existences a good? I behold this archetype of my idea of beauty. Now in what sense can it be a good *in itself*? Can it be a good *to itself*? If not in what sense can it be a good *in itself*? Good as I have said, *belongs to sentient beings*. But in the case supposed, this beauty does not belong to any sentient existence. It is an object of contemplation distinct from all being. It is not a *state of mind*. *To whom or to what* then is it a good in itself? It is and must be a *relative* good to every beholder that has the idea of beauty. But it can by no means be a good in itself. The same is and must be true of all those archetypes of the Reason that do not *consist in a state of mind*.

They belong to no being. They can be in no sense a good *in themselves*, unless they are a good *to themselves*, which is absurd. They are good only *relatively to those* who have the *idea* whose archetype they are. This class of beings are *satisfied* or *gratified* with beholding them, not because they are good in themselves, but because being archetypes of the ideas of their own Reason, they necessarily take pleasure in them. Now it is not the *archetype itself* which I affirm to be an ultimate good, but I am so constituted that beholding the archetype of my idea affords me *satisfaction*, and this *satisfaction* is an ultimate good. It is a state of *blessedness*.

That which remains at present, is to examine this Philosophy in the light of Revelation; to see whether it recognizes the highest well being, blessedness, or satisfaction of God and of the Universe as the Foundation of Moral Obligation. And here I observe that it is agreed that the Law of God demands that that should be chosen which ought to be chosen; that the identical end which Moral Agents are required to choose is proposed as the ultimate end on which choice ought to terminate, by the Law of God. We will inquire then,

What is the true spirit and meaning of the Moral Law as revealed in the Bible? Its two great precepts are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, with all thy Soul, with all thy Mind, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbor as thyself." Now it is agreed that this love is not a mere emotion or feeling, but that it consists in willing, choosing, intending an end. I observe again that it requires that something should be willed *to God and our neighbor*, or which is the same, *to God and the universe of creatures*. But what is this *something* that is to be willed to them? What is this *love* but good will, willing the good of God and of the Universe? What is of equal value to this? Nay what is of any intrinsic value but this? The highest well being of God and of the Universe must be that which we ought to will. And this must be the love which we are commanded to exercise. This implies the willing of the universal satisfaction of the Divine Mind with all the necessary means and conditions of this result; this satisfaction being the ultimate end both in respect to God and our neighbor, and the conditions and means as relatively valuable.

And here let me remark that it is very plain that the *Law* recognizes but one Foundation of Moral Obligation.

"The whole law" it is said "*is fulfilled in one word—LOVE.*" "*Therefore love is the fulfilling of the Law.*" And this love

must be the love of *God and our neighbor*, and not of other things. The law does not say, Thou shalt love *right—truth—beauty* or any thing else, with all thy heart and with all thy soul, but *God and thy neighbor*. This then is the *End*. Truth, beauty, virtue, and a multitude of things are *relative goods and conditions* of the *ultimate good* or of the universal satisfaction that results from all the demands of the being of God and of our neighbor being fully *satisfied*.

Whoever contends that there is more than one foundation of Moral Obligation should be reminded that *one word* expresses all that is required by the Moral Law. That word is *LOVE*, and this love respects God and our neighbor *only*. In other words whoever loves *God* with all his heart and soul, and mind, and strength, and his *neighbor* as himself, fulfils the whole law. This is the *Ultimate End*—the good of *God and our neighbor*. That this love, if it consists in *willing* any thing to *God* and our *neighbor*, must consist in willing their *highest well-being* with all the necessary conditions and means thereof must be self-evident; for as I have said, these are the only things that are valuable to God or our neighbor, and to be under obligation to will any thing else than these to God and to our neighbor were absurd. When we have willed the highest well-being of God and our neighbor as an ultimate end, we have willed to them every good of which they are capable; and what more can we will to them? and if we refuse to will this, of what use is it to will any thing else?

Let this theory again be viewed in the light of some of the precepts of the gospel.—“Whether therefore ye eat or drink or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.” By this language, as it is used in the Scriptures, we are to understand that God requires of us to aim at *pleasing* Him in all that we do. That is, we are to *aim at satisfying* God and meeting the demands of His Conscience, His Intelligence, His Sensibility and in short, so to demean ourselves as that He shall be perfectly *satisfied with us*. This *satisfaction* is *His ultimate good*. At this we should aim—at *pleasing* God, at *satisfying* God, so that He shall say, all that I want in respect to *you*, I have. This is what God requires us to will. He requires that we should live to *please or gratify* Him for the sake of the *intrinsic value of his well-being* or of His *satisfaction*. To love God—to consecrate ourselves to God—to do all to the glory of God, is to choose or intend in all our ways to *please* God; that is, to choose the pleasure, the gratification or satisfaction or well-being of God as the ultimate end to which we consecrate ourselves.

Let this question again be brought into the light of the example of God and of Christ. God no doubt has the same end in view which He requires us to have. Christ has also the same end in view that his Father has and that He requires us to have. But what end have they in view? God says, "I have created all things for myself." That is, He has exerted his almighty power in the creation of objects to realize the ideas of his own Reason for the *sake of the satisfaction which necessarily results to Himself and to the universe from their realization*. He pronounces the works of his hands "*very good*," that is, they are *satisfactory to Him*, they are good in such a sense that He is *satisfied* with them as the archetypes of his own ideas. In the contemplation of these archetypes He is *satisfied*. This *satisfaction* must be to Him an infinite good. Christ must have the same end in view.

The whole Moral Government of God as well as his providential government—in short, all creation, and providence, and government, physical and moral, show that God and Christ are endeavoring to realize the ideas of the good, the just, the merciful, the beautiful, the useful, the right, the perfect, and all those ideas in the realization of which they have so much satisfaction.

The *good of creatures* must enter into the end at which they aim. This is manifest from creation, and providence, and the Bible. To meet the demands of the nature and constitution of every being, is manifestly the tendency of things so far as we can understand them. These things are means of producing *satisfaction* in the minds of *Moral Agents*, and in "satisfying the wants of every living thing." Thus it is said, "Thou openest thy hand and satisfyest the wants of every living thing." This satisfaction of creatures is an ultimate good. Their virtue and every thing else but this satisfaction itself, is a condition and means of promoting it. The highest good then of the universe must be that at which God and all holy beings ought to aim and really do aim. Unless they aim at this, their aim can never meet the demands of the Intelligence of Moral Agents. If they do aim at this, the Intelligence cannot but be satisfied.

But to this philosophy it is objected,

1. That if the highest good or well-being of God and of the Universe be the sole Foundation of Moral Obligation, it follows that we are not under obligation to will any thing except this end with the necessary conditions and means thereof. That every thing but this *end*, which we are bound to will

must be willed as a means to this end or because of its tendency to promote this end. And this it is said is the doctrine of Utility.

To this I answer; The doctrine of Utility is, that the *foundation* of the *obligation* to will both the *end* and the *means* is the *tendency* of the willing to promote the end. But this is absurd. The doctrine of this discourse is not, as Utilitarians say, that the *foundation* of the obligation to will the *End* or the *Means* is the *tendency* of the willing to promote that end, but that the *foundation* of the obligation to will both the end and the means, is the intrinsic value of the end. And the *condition* of the obligation to will the *means* is the perceived tendency of the means to promote the *end*.

The *end* is to be willed for *its own sake*. The *conditions* and means of this end are to be willed for the sake of the *end*; that is, it is the *intrinsic value of the end*, that is the *foundation* of the obligation to will the *conditions* and *means*. The *tendency* of the means to promote the end is not, as Utilitarians say, the *Foundation* of the Obligation to will the means, but both the *end* and the *means* are to be willed for the *same reason*, to wit, the intrinsic value of the end. The obligation to will the *means* being only *conditioned* upon, but not *found* in their *tendency* to promote the end. This then is not the doctrine of Utility.

2. It is objected that if the good of being be the only Foundation of Moral Obligation, we should be indifferent in respect to the means, if the end could be obtained. But this, it is said, contradicts human consciousness. To this I answer, the *end* to be obtained is the *satisfaction* of *universal mind*, that results from having every demand of the being fully met. Now it is impossible that this *satisfaction* should exist unless these demands are met. To suppose then that the end can be obtained without these demands being met, is the same as to suppose that the end can be obtained without the natural and *necessary conditions* and *means*. This supposition is therefore an impossible supposition, and consequently inadmissible.

Again; if universal mind were perfectly satisfied so that there were no demand or want of any being that was not fully met, we should of course be *satisfied*, and *well satisfied*, and *perfectly satisfied*, on this supposition.

The philosophy to which this objection is opposed teaches that the highest well being of God and of the universe is the ultimate, the absolute good of moral agents and

therefore that it is the foundation of Moral Obligation. It further teaches that the absolute and ultimate good of moral agents in its last analysis consists in mental *satisfaction, enjoyment, blessedness, happiness*, and that this state of mind is conditioned upon the fact that *every demand of every power of our being is fully met and satisfied*. The objection is this, that if mental satisfaction, enjoyment, blessedness or happiness were but complete and universal, we should be indifferent, that is, that we should be satisfied as it respects the means and conditions of this satisfaction. That if the universal mind were satisfied it would be satisfied by whatever means. This is, to be sure, a truism. Or the objection amounts to this. If the highest well-being of God and of the universe of moral agents be the foundation of Moral Obligation, it follows that if this end is obtained and the highest well-being of God and of the universe be secured, we should be indifferent as it respects the conditions and means. In other words we should be indifferent whether it was accomplished by possible or impossible means. If the mental satisfaction do but universally exist it matters not whether the Intelligence, the Conscience or the Sensibility be satisfied. If that state of mind which can alone result from the fact that every demand of every power and susceptibility of our nature be fully met and satisfied, do but exist, it matters not whether any demand of our being is met, whether we are at all satisfied. Or again: If our nature is such that it can not be satisfied unless virtue be connected with happiness; and sin with misery, that is, unless misery exist in connection with sin, and happiness in connection with holiness, did happiness but exist it would be indifferent to us and we should be just as well satisfied did happiness exist in connection with sin and misery in connection with holiness as we now are. The objection is an absurdity and a contradiction. It overlooks that which is implied in the well being of God and of the universe.

3. "It is said that if the sole Foundation of Moral Obligation be the highest good of Universal Being, all obligation pertaining to God would respect his *susceptibilities* and the means necessary to this result. When we have willed God's highest well-being with the means necessary to that result we have fulfilled all our duty to Him."

To this I reply; certainly, when we have willed the highest well-being of God and of the universe with the necessary conditions and means thereof, we have done our whole duty to him: for this is *loving Him with all our heart and our neighbor*

as ourselves. The necessary conditions of the highest well-being of the universe, are that every moral being should be perfectly *virtuous* and that every demand of the Intelligence and of the whole being of God and of the universe of creatures be perfectly met, so that universal mind shall be in a state of perfect and universal satisfaction. To will this is all that the Law of God does or can require.

4. It is said that "If the highest good of being be the Foundation of Moral Obligation, it would follow that if God's character were the opposite of what it is, we should be under the same obligation to Him that we are now." To this I answer:—

(1.) It is not true. We are to will the highest well-being of God. This results from the meeting of every demand of his being. We are to will his perfect satisfaction as a good in itself. But it is impossible that we should will that He should be actually and perfectly satisfied except on the condition that He obeys the laws of his being. If He should not fulfill the laws of his being—if, for example, He should not conform his Will to the law of his Intelligence it would be impossible for us to will or be under an obligation to will that He should be actually and perfectly satisfied with Himself. (We can not, therefore, be under an obligation to will the perfect and universal *satisfaction* or *blessedness* of God, except on condition that He is *perfectly virtuous*.) We should not be under an obligation to will his *actual* well being and *satisfaction* were his character otherwise than what it is. But the demands of his being being met, He being perfectly virtuous and meeting every demand of his Intelligence, we are under an obligation, in view of this consideration, to will his *actual, perfect, universal, eternal, infinite blessedness* or *satisfaction*. It is not true, then, as the objection affirms, that our obligation would be the same to God that it now is, whether his character were what it now is or not.

(2.) As a possible good we should be under obligation to will his highest well being with all the conditions and means thereof. But we should not be under obligation to will his highest well being as an actual good without the necessary conditions and means thereof; and therefore if He refused to fulfill the necessary conditions we should not be under obligation to will his actual satisfaction or blessedness. In one sense we should be under obligation to *love God* let his character be what it might, just as we are under obligation to love

wicked men. We should be under obligation to regard and will his and their highest well being as a *possible* good of infinite value in itself. But as an *actually existing good*, we should not be under an obligation to will it, but upon the condition that they deserve it, by fulfilling on their part the indispensable conditions.

5. It is objected, "That if the good of being be the sole Foundation of Moral Obligation, right and wrong would be contingent and not fixed, that is, the same intention or choice would possess a character according as it is contemplated relatively to the good of Being."

To this I reply,—That *right* and *wrong* are not contingent but fixed. To will the highest good of being is right in itself, and nothing else is in *itself* right. To will any thing else than this as an ultimate end is wrong in itself, and therefore unalterably and invariably wrong. An intention is right or wrong as it terminates on the good of being or on some thing else as an ultimate end. This must be, and every thing else in the only sense in which it has moral character at all, is right or wrong as it proceeds from the choice of the highest well-being of God and the Universe as an ultimate end or from some other choice.

6. It is objected, "That if this be the sole Foundation of Moral Obligation, it follows that if all the good now in existence were connected with sin and all the misery connected with holiness, we should be just as well *satisfied* as we now are."

To this I answer, We are *satisfied* only when the demands of our being are met. One demand of our being is, that all moral agents should be holy, and that they should be actually and perfectly happy only on the condition that they are holy. Now if our constitution only demanded their happiness irrespective of their holiness, then were they perfectly happy we should be satisfied whether they were holy or not. But our constitution being what it is, we should not be and can not be satisfied with their happiness unless they are holy: for their holiness, as a condition of their actual blessedness, is an unalterable demand of our Intelligence. Now, therefore, although we are to regard their universal satisfaction as the ultimate good, yet we also know, and can not but affirm that their universal satisfaction or blessedness is naturally impossible, and that it ought to be, except on condition of their perfect holiness. Therefore the supposition is impossible and inadmissible.

Let it be understood that the highest well being of God

and of the Universe of Moral Agents is conditioned on the fact that every demand of every power of their being is satisfied. Therefore as the Intelligence and Conscience of every Moral Agent demands that actual happiness should be connected with holiness and actual misery should be connected with sin, we should not be *satisfied* with happiness in Moral Agents unless it were connected with holiness, nor with misery unless it were connected with sin—such being the laws of our being that nothing else than this can meet the demands of our being in respect to Moral Agents.

7. It is said, "If any moral act can be conceived of, which has not the element of willing the highest good of being in it, this theory is false!" To this I reply, That strictly speaking it is agreed on all hands by the parties in this discussion, that no act is a *moral* act, but an ultimate act, choice, or intention of the Will. Now if any ultimate choice can be conceived of that does not terminate on the good of universal being which after all is morally right or virtuous, then this theory is false. But no such moral act or ultimate choice can be found. But an example is brought forward of moral obligation to do that which does not imply the choice of the highest good of being. It is said we are under obligation to esteem and treat as worthy of confidence those whose known veracity entitles them to our confidence. This, let it be observed, is an example or an instance in which it is said that we are under obligation where no reference is had to the good of being. Now, let it be remembered, that the theory to overthrow which this example is brought forward is that the *satisfaction* of the mind arising from the fact that *every demand* of his *being* is met, is that in which the ultimate good of being consists. Now it is a demand of the Intelligence of every moral being that we should esteem and treat as worthy of confidence those whose character entitles them to this confidence. Thus, then, to esteem and treat all that are truthful, is one of the demands of the universal Intelligence of Moral Agents. Unless this demand be met by a being he cannot be satisfied with himself. His Intelligence and Conscience are not satisfied.

We are under obligation, therefore, to treat every individual of known veracity as worthy of confidence; for this is an unalterable condition of our being satisfied, or of the demands of our nature being met. We are under obligation also to will that every Moral Agent in the Universe should meet this demand of his being as an unalterable condition of his highest well-

being. So we see that this example is not one in which no reference is had to the highest good of being. For in this very example the highest good of being is the ultimate end, and treating the individual according to his nature, relations, and character for veracity, is one of the indispensable conditions and means of realizing this end. It is not only a demand of *my* being that I should treat one who is worthy of confidence as worthy, but it also is a demand of *his* being and Intelligence that I should thus treat *him*. If I would aim, therefore, at his highest good, or at meeting the demands of his being for the sake of promoting his entire and perfect satisfaction, I must treat him as worthy of confidence. So that his highest good and my highest good and the highest good of all beings demand that I should thus treat him. For the Intelligence of God and of every intelligent being in the universe demands that I should treat a being with confidence who is worthy of confidence. So that I do not really meet the demands of my own being, nor of the Intelligence of any being unless I do thus treat him. Therefore, thus esteeming and treating him is indispensable to the highest good of being. And if I am under an obligation to choose the highest satisfaction or good of Universal Being as an end, I must be under an obligation to treat every being so as to meet the demands of my own Intelligence and the Intelligence of the Universe. This I cannot do without esteeming the holy as holy, the truthful as truthful, &c.

8. It is objected again that we are all conscious of often affirming ourselves to be under moral obligation when no reference is had by us to the good of being as an end. Example—To love God because he is good. This affirmation, it is said, has no reference to the good of God. To this I answer,

Such an affirmation, if it be made, is most nonsensical. What is it to love God? Why, as is agreed, it is not to exercise a mere emotion of complacency in Him. It is to *will* something to Him. But what ought I to will to Him in view of his goodness? Why surely I ought to will *good* to Him. But why ought I to will good rather than evil to God? Surely, first and fundamentally, because good is good or valuable to Him, and secondarily, because and upon condition that He is holy or good. The fact is, there is in all such cases a mistake in supposing that we affirm moral obligation when no reference is had to the good of being as an ultimate end. It is a *first* truth of reason that the good of being is valuable in itself, and that it ought to be chosen for its own sake.

This truth is every where and at all times and by all moral agents *assumed* and *known*. While this is a first truth that the good of being is valuable and ought to be willed as a *possible* good for its own sake entirely irrespective of moral character, yet it is also a first truth of reason that the highest good or the actual blessedness of moral agents is necessarily conditioned upon their holiness, and that this ought to be so. Therefore, every moral agent while he assumes his obligation to will the well being of all moral agents as a possible good whether they are holy or unholy, at the same time affirms, and assumes, his obligation to will the actual blessedness of God and of every moral agent only upon the *condition* that He is holy. Thus necessarily stand the assumptions of every mind. Now when we perceive that a being is holy, we thereupon affirm our obligation to will his actual blessedness. And being assured that God is holy we irresistibly affirm that we are under infinite obligation to love Him. And being consciously affected at the time by a consideration of his goodness, and overlooking the assumption at the bottom of our minds, that his good is of infinite value, we loosely suppose ourselves to have no reference to his good or to the intrinsic value of his good. Now in every case of this kind we do and must have respect to his good, or we really make no intelligent affirmation at all in respect to moral obligation. If I do not affirm myself under obligation to *will good* to God, I in fact make no intelligent and just affirmation about it. This in fact is and must be my duty; and nothing else, more or less, is. My whole duty to God and my neighbor is to love the one with all my heart, and the other as myself. This God himself has expressly asserted, and whoever makes the assertion that He requires more of me than this, let him look to it. There is not, there can not be moral obligation when no reference is had to the good of God and of being, for to love God and our neighbor is not and can not be any thing else than to will their highest good. The fact is that those who make such objections as this to the philosophy and theology of this lecture, either do not mean what they say, or they must assume the existence of some other law and of some other rule of duty than the law of love revealed in the Bible. What! can it be possible that they have in mind the fact that the whole law is fulfilled in one word *love* or *good will* to God and our neighbor, when they make such assertions? This law allows of no obligation but to love God and our neighbor, that is to will their

good, for surely this love can be nothing else. But here comes an objector and says that we often affirm moral obligation when no reference is had to the good of God and our neighbor. To such an one I only reply, if this affirmation of obligation is ever really made by any one, "he knows not what he says nor whereof he affirms."

9. But it is said that a moral agent may sometimes be under obligation to will evil instead of good to others. I answer:—

It can never be the duty of a moral agent to will evil to any being for its own sake or as an *ultimate end*. The character and governmental relations of a being may be such that it may be duty to will the execution of law upon him to meet a demand of the public conscience and intelligence and thus promote the public good. But in this case good is the *end* willed and misery only a means. So it may be the duty of a moral agent to will the temporary misery of even a holy being to promote the public interests. Such was the case with the sufferings of Christ. The Father willed his temporary misery to promote the public good. But in all cases when it is duty to will misery, it is only as a means or condition of good to the public or to the individual and not as an ultimate end.

There are several other objections to this theory. But as each of the other theories stand opposed to this and are of course so many objections to it, I will consider them in their proper place, and proceed to remove objections to the truth as I go forward.

LECTURE V.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

FALSE THEORIES.

I. THE WILL OF GOD.

II. SELF INTEREST.

III. UTILITARIANISM.

I will now proceed to the examination of various other Theories of the Foundation of Moral Obligation, for the purpose of showing that they all involve the most palpable contradiction of their own admitted principles, of the plainest intuitions of Reason, and of Divine Revelation. I will commence with the Theory,

I. That the *Sovereign Will of God* is the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

By the Will of God I suppose is intended *his willing* that we should will, choose, intend some end. For Moral Obligation, let it be remembered, respects the choice of an end, or the ultimate intention. This theory, then, makes God's willing, commanding, the foundation of the obligation to choose or intend an ultimate end. If this is so, then the willing of God is the end to be intended. For the end to be intended and the reason of the obligation to intend it, are identical. But it is impossible to will or choose the Divine willing or requirement as an ultimate end. God's willing reveals a Law, a rule of choice, or of intention. It requires something to be intended as an ultimate end for its own intrinsic value. This end can not be the willing, commandment, law itself. This is absurd and impossible. Does God will that I should choose his willing as an ultimate end? This is ridiculously absurd. It is a plain contradiction to say that Moral Obligation respects directly ultimate intention only, or the choice of an end for its own intrinsic value, and yet that the Will of God is the foundation or reason of the obligation. This is affirming at the same breath that the intrinsic value of the end which God requires me to choose, is the reason or foundation of the obligation to choose it, and yet that this is not the reason, but that the Will of God is the reason.

Willing can never be an end. God can not will our willing as an end. Nor can he will his willing as an end. Willing, choosing, always and necessarily implies an end willed.

entirely distinct from the willing or choice itself. Willing can not be regarded or willed as an ultimate end for two reasons:

(1.) Because that on which choice or willing terminates, and not the choice itself, must be regarded as the end.

(2.) Because choice or willing is of no *intrinsic value* and of no relative value aside from the end willed or chosen.

2. The will of God can not be the foundation of Moral Obligation in created moral agents. It is admitted that God is himself the subject of Moral Obligation. If so, there is some reason, independent of his own will, why he wills as he does, some reason that imposes obligation upon him to will as he does will. His will, then, respecting the conduct of moral agents, is not the fundamental reason of their obligation; but the foundation of their obligation must be the reason which induces God or makes it obligatory on him to will in respect to the conduct of moral agents, just what he does.

3. If the will of God were the foundation of Moral Obligation, he could, by willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice.

4. If the will of God were the foundation of Moral Obligation, he not only can change the nature of virtue and vice, but has a right to do so; for if there is nothing back of his will that is as binding upon him as upon his creatures, he could at any time, by willing it, make malevolence a virtue, and benevolence a vice.

5. If the will of God be the foundation of Moral Obligation, we have no standard by which to judge of the moral character of His actions, and cannot know whether he is worthy of praise or blame.

6. If the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, he has no standard by which to judge of his own character, as he has no rule with which to compare his own actions.

7. If the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, he is not himself a subject of Moral obligation. But,

8. If God is not a subject of Moral Obligation, he has no moral character; for virtue and vice are nothing else but conformity or non-conformity to Moral Obligation. The will of God, as expressed in his law, is the rule of duty to moral agents. It defines and marks out the path of duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents ought to act in conformity to the will of God, is plainly not the will of God itself.

9. The Will of no being can be law. Moral Law is an

idea of the Reason and not the willing of any being. If the Will of any being were law, that being could not by natural possibility will wrong, for whatever he willed would be right, simply and only because he willed it. This is absurd.

10. But let us bring this Philosophy into the light of Divine Revelation. "To the Law and to the Testimony: if it agree not therewith, it is because it hath no light in it."

The Law of God, or the Moral Law, requires that God shall be loved with all the heart and our neighbor as ourselves. Now it is agreed by the parties in this discussion, that the love required is not mere emotion, but that it consists in choice, willing, intention—i. e., in the choice of something on account of its own intrinsic value, or in the choice of an ultimate end. Now what is this end? What is that which we are to choose for its own intrinsic value? Is it the will or command of God? Are we to will as an ultimate end, that God should will that we should thus will? What can be more absurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous than this? But again: what is this love, willing, choosing, intending, required by the Law? We are commanded to love God and our neighbor. What is this—what can it be, but to will the highest good or well-being of God and our neighbor? This is intrinsically and infinitely valuable. This must be the end required, and nothing can possibly be *Law* that requires the choice of any other ultimate end. Nor can that by any possibility be true Philosophy that makes any thing else the Reason or Foundation of Moral Obligation.

But it is said that we are conscious of affirming our obligation to obey the will of God without reference to any other reason than his will; and this, it is said, proves that His will is the Foundation of the Obligation.

To this I reply, the Reason does indeed affirm that we ought to will that which God commands, but it does not and can not assign His will as the foundation of the obligation to will it. His whole will respecting our duty is summed up in the two precepts of the Law. These as we have seen, require universal good will to being, or the Supreme Love of God and the Equal Love of our neighbor—that we should will the highest well-being of God and of the Universe for its own sake, or for its own intrinsic value. Reason affirms that we ought thus to will. And can it be so self-contradictory as to affirm that we ought to will the good of God and of the Universe for its own intrinsic value; yet not for this reason, but because God wills that we should will it? *Impossible!* But in this ob-

jection or assertion, the objector has reference to some outward act, some condition or means of the end to be chosen, and not to the end itself. But even in respect to any act whatever, his objection does not hold good. For example, God requires me to labor and pray for the salvation of souls, or to do any thing else. Now his command is necessarily regarded by me as obligatory, not as an arbitrary requirement, but as revealing infallibly the true means or conditions of securing the great and ultimate end which I am to will for its intrinsic value. I necessarily regard his commandment as wise and benevolent, and it is only because I so regard it that I affirm or can affirm my obligation to obey Him. Should He command me to choose as an ultimate end, or for its own intrinsic value, that which my Reason affirmed to be of no intrinsic value, I could not possibly affirm my obligation to obey Him. Should He command me to do that which my Reason affirmed to be unwise and malevolent, it were impossible for me to affirm my obligation to obey Him. This proves beyond controversy that Reason does not regard His command as the foundation of the obligation to obey, but only as infallible proof that that which He commands is wise and benevolent in itself, and commanded by Him for that reason.

If the will of God were the Foundation of Moral Obligation, He might command me to violate and trample down all the laws of my being, and to be the enemy of all good, and I should not only be under obligation, but affirm my obligation to obey him. But this is absurd. This brings us to the conclusion that he who asserts that Moral Obligation respects the choice of an end for its intrinsic value, and still affirms the will of God to be the Foundation of Moral Obligation, contradicts his own admissions, the plainest intuitions of Reason, and Divine Revelation. His theory is grossly inconsistent and nonsensical. It overlooks the very nature of Moral Law as an idea of Reason, and makes it to consist in arbitrary willing. This is nonsense.

II. I now proceed to state and examine a second Theory.

For convenience sake I shall call it the theory of Paley. His theory, as every reader of Paley knows, makes self-interest the Ground of Moral Obligation. Upon this theory I remark,

1. That if self-interest be the ground of Moral Obligation, then *self-interest* is the end to be chosen for its own sake. To be virtuous I must in every instance intend my own interest as the supreme good.

2. Upon this hypothesis, I am to treat my own interest as supremely valuable, when it is infinitely less valuable than the interests of God. Thus I am under a moral obligation to prefer an infinitely less good, because it is my own, to one of infinitely greater value that belongs to another. This is precisely what every sinner in earth and hell does.

3. But this theory would impose on me a moral obligation to choose contrary to the nature and relations of things, and, therefore, contrary to Moral Law. But this is absurd.

4. But let us examine this theory in the light of the revealed law. If this Philosophy be correct, the Law should read, "Thou shalt love thyself supremely, and God and thy neighbor not at all." For Dr. Paley holds the only reason of the obligation to be self-interest. If this is so, then I am under an obligation to love myself alone, and never do my duty when I at all love God or my neighbor. He says it is the utility of any rule *alone* which constitutes the obligation of it. (*Paley's Moral Philo., Book 2, chap. 6.*) Again he says, "And let it be asked why I am obliged, (obligated) to keep my word? and the answer will be: Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive, namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do so, or punished if I do not."—(*Paley's Moral Philo. Book 2, chap 3.*) Thus it would seem that it is the utility of a rule to *myself only* that constitutes the ground of obligation to obey it.

But should this be denied, still it can not be denied that Dr. Paley maintains that self-interest is the ground of Moral Obligation. If this is so, i. e., if this be the foundation of Moral Obligation, whether Paley or any one else holds it to be true, then, undeniably, the Moral Law should read, "thou shalt love thyself supremely, and God and thy neighbor subordinately;" or, more strictly, Thou shalt love thyself as an end, and God and your neighbor only as a means of promoting your own interest.

5. If this theory be true, all the precepts in the Bible need to be altered. Instead of the injunction, "*Whatever you do, do it heartily unto the Lord,*" it should read: Whatever you do, do it heartily unto *yourself*. Instead of the injunction, "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God," it should read: Do all to secure your own interest. Should it be said that this school would say that the meaning of these precepts is, do all to the glory of God to secure your own interest thereby, I answer: This is a contradiction. To do it to or for the glory of God is one

thing, to do it to secure my own interest is an entirely different and opposite thing. To do it for the glory of God, is to make his glory my *end*. But to do it to secure my own interest, is to *make my own interest* the end.

6. But let us look at this theory in the light of the revealed conditions of salvation. "*Except a man forsake all that he hath he can not be my disciple.*" If the theory under consideration be true, it should read: Except a man make his own interest the supreme end of pursuit, he can not be my disciple. Again; "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross," &c. This, in conformity with the theory in question, should read: "If any man will come after me let him not deny himself, but cherish and supremely seek his own interest. A multitude of such passages might be quoted, as every reader of the Bible knows.

7. But let us examine this theory in the light of Scripture declarations. "It is more blessed to give than to receive." This, according to the theory we are opposing, should read: It is more blessed to *receive* than to give. "Charity, (love) seeketh *not her own*." This should read: Charity *seeketh her own*. "No man (that is no righteous man,) liveth to himself." This should read: *Every* (righteous man) liveth to himself.

8. Let this theory be examined in the light of the spirit and example of Christ. "Even Christ pleased not himself." This should read, if Christ was holy and did his duty: Even Christ pleased himself, or which is the same thing, sought his own interest.

"I seek not mine own glory but the glory of Him who sent me." This should read: I seek not the glory of Him who sent me, but mine own glory.

But enough; you can not fail to see that this is a selfish Philosophy, and the exact opposite of the truth of God.

But let us examine this Philosophy in the light of the admission that Moral Obligation respects ultimate intention only. I ought to choose the good of God and my neighbor for its own *intrinsic value*; That is, as an ultimate end, and yet not as an ultimate end for its intrinsic value, but only as a means of promoting my own interest! This is a plain contradiction. What! I am to love, that is, will good to God and my neighbor as an *ultimate end* or *for its own sake*, merely to promote my own happiness!

III. I will in the next place consider the *Utilitarian Philosophy*.

This maintains that the *utility* of an act or choice renders

it *obligatory*. That is, Utility is the Foundation of Moral Obligation—that the *tendency* of an act, choice, or intention, to secure a good or valuable end is the foundation of the obligation to put forth that choice or intention. Upon this theory I remark,

1. That it is absurd to say the foundation of the obligation to choose a certain *end* is to be found *not in the value of the end itself*, but in the *tendency* of the intention to secure the *end*. The *tendency* is valuable or otherwise, as the end is valuable or otherwise. It is and must be the *value of the end* and not the *tendency* of an intention to *secure the end*, that constitutes the *foundation* of the obligation to intend.

2. We have seen that the foundation of obligation to will or choose *any end* as such, that is, on its own account, must consist in the intrinsic value of the end, and that nothing else whatever can impose obligation to choose any thing as an ultimate end, but its intrinsic value. To affirm the contrary is to affirm a contradiction. It is the same as to say that I *ought* to choose a thing as an *end*, and yet not as an *end*, that is, *for its own sake*, but for some other reason, to wit, the *tendency* of my choice to secure that end. Here I affirm at the same breath that the thing intended is to be an *end*, that is, chosen for its own *intrinsic value*, and yet *not as an end* or for its intrinsic value, but for entirely a different reason, to wit, the *tendency* of the choice to secure it.

3. But we have also seen that the *end* chosen and the *reason* for the choice are identical. If Utility be the foundation of Moral Obligation, then Utility is the end to be chosen. That is, the *tendency* of the choice to secure its end *is the end to be chosen*. This is absurd.

4. But the very announcement of this theory implies its absurdity. A choice is obligatory because it tends to secure good. But why secure good rather than evil? The answer is because good is valuable. Ah! here then we have another reason, and one which must be the true reason, to wit, the value of the good which the choice tends to secure. Obligation *to use means* to do good may and must be *conditioned* upon the tendency of those means to secure the end, but the obligation to use them is *founded* solely in the value of the end.

But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God. What say the Scriptures?

1. The Law. Does this require us to love God and our neighbor because loving God and our neighbor tends to the

well-being either of God, our neighbor, or ourselves? Is it the tendency or utility of love that makes it obligatory upon us to exercise it? What! will good, not from regard to its value, but because willing good will do good! But why do good? What is this love? Here let it be distinctly remembered that the love required by the law of God is not a mere emotion or feeling, but willing, choosing, intending, in a word, that this love is nothing else than ultimate intention. What, then, is to be intended as an end or for its own sake? Is it the tendency of love or the utility of ultimate intention that is the end to be intended? It must be the latter if Utilitarianism is true.

According to this theory, when the law requires supreme love to God, and equal love to our neighbor, the meaning is, not that we are to will, choose, intend the well-being of God and our neighbor *for its own sake* or *because of its intrinsic value*, but because of the *tendency* of the intention to promote the good of God, our neighbor and ourselves. But suppose the tendency of love or intention to be what it may, the *utility* of it depends upon the intrinsic value of that which it tends to promote. Suppose love or intention *tends* to promote *its end*, this is a useful tendency only because the end is valuable in itself. It is nonsense then to say that love to God and man, or an intention to promote their good is required, not because of the value of their well-being, but because love tends to promote their well-being.

But the supposition that the Law of God requires love to God and man or the choice of their good on account of the tendency of love to promote their well-being, is absurd. It is to represent the law as requiring love, not to God and our neighbor as an end, but to *tendency* as an end. The law in this case should read thus: Thou shalt love the *utility* or tendency of Love with all thy heart, &c.

If the theory under consideration is true, this is the spirit and meaning of the Law: Thou shalt love the Lord and thy neighbor, that is, thou shalt choose their good, not for its own sake or as an end, but because choosing it tends to promote it. This is absurd; for I ask again, why promote it but for its own value?

Again this theory is absurd, because if the Law of God requires ultimate intention, it is a contradiction to affirm that the intention ought to terminate on its *own tendency as an end*.

2. Again, let us examine this theory in the light of the precepts of the gospel. "Do all to the glory of God." The

spirit of this requirement, as is admitted, is, intend, choose the glory of God. But why choose the glory of God? Why, if Utilitarianism be true, *not* because of the value of God's glory, but because choosing it tends to promote it. But again, I ask why promote it if it be not valuable? And if it be valuable, why not will it for that reason?

3. But it is said that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do many things on the ground that those things are useful or tend to promote good.

I answer that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do many things upon *condition* of their tendency to promote good, but that we never affirm obligation to be *founded* on this tendency. Such an affirmation would be a down-right absurdity. I am under an obligation to use the means to promote good, not for the sake of *its intrinsic value*, but for the sake of the *tendency* of the means to promote it! This is absurd.

I say again, the obligation to outward action or to use means may and must be *conditionated* upon perceived tendency, but never *founded* in this tendency. Ultimate intention has no such *condition*. The perceived intrinsic value imposes obligation without any reference to the tendency of the intention.

4. But suppose any utilitarian should deny that moral obligation respects ultimate intention only, and maintain that it also respects those volitions and actions that sustain to the ultimate end the relation of means, and therefore assert that the foundation of moral obligation in respect to all those volitions and actions, is their tendency to secure a valuable end. This would not at all relieve the difficulty of Utilitarianism, for in this case tendency could only be a condition of the obligation, while the fundamental reason of the obligation would and must be the intrinsic value of the end which these may have a tendency to promote. Tendency to promote *an* end can impose no obligation. The end must be *intrinsically* valuable and this *alone* imposes obligation to choose the end, and to use the means to promote it. Upon *condition* that any thing is perceived to sustain to this end the relation of a necessary means, we are *for the sake of the end alone* under obligation to use the means.

LECTURE VI.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

IV. RIGHTARIANISM.

IV. I now pass to the consideration of the theory that regards RIGHT as the foundation of Moral Obligation.

In the examination of this Philosophy I must begin by defining terms. What is Right? The primary signification of the term is *straight*. When used in a moral sense it means *fit, suitable, agreeable* to the nature and relations of moral agents. Right is *objective* and *subjective*. Objective right is an *idea* of the fit, the suitable, the agreeable to the nature and relations of moral beings. It is an *idea* of that choice or ultimate intention, and of the consequent course of life which is befitting to or obligatory upon moral agents. *Objective* right is *moral law*. It is the rule of moral action as it lies revealed in the ideas of the reason of every moral agent. Thus, strictly speaking, *objective right* is *subjective law*. This idea or law of reason is *subjective* as it lies in the mind of the subject of it. But as a rule of action or rather of ultimate intention, in other words, regarded as a rule or law of *right*, it is *objective right* and *subjective law*.

Subjective right is synonymous with righteousness, uprightness, virtue. It consists in or is an attribute of that state of the will which is conformed to *objective* right, or to moral law. It is a term that expresses the *moral quality, element, or attribute* of that ultimate intention which the law of God requires. In other words still, it is conformity of heart to the law of objective right, or, as I just said, it is more strictly the term that designates the *moral character* of that state of heart. Some choose to regard subjective right as *consisting in this state of heart*, and others insist that it is only an *element, attribute, or quality* of this state of heart, or of this ultimate intention. I shall not contend about words, but shall show that it matters not, so far as the question we are about to examine is concerned, in which of these lights subjective right is regarded, whether as *consisting in* ultimate intention conformed to law, or, as an attribute, element, or quality of this intention.

I would here repeat a remark made on a former occasion, that since moral obligation respects the ultimate intention, that is, the choice of an end for its intrinsic value, moral obligation must imply the perception or idea of the valuable. Until the mind perceives or has the idea of the valuable developed, it cannot have the idea of

moral obligation and consequently of right and wrong developed. If moral obligation respects the choice of an end, the obligation cannot exist until the end is apprehended. When the end is apprehended the affirmation of moral obligation to choose it, and of the rightness of compliance, and the wrongness of noncompliance with the obligation, is made by a law of necessity. The mind is so constituted that when the idea of the intrinsically valuable is developed, the correlated ideas of moral obligation, of right and wrong, of praise and blameworthiness, of justice and injustice, &c., are developed by a law of necessity.

The theory under consideration was held by the ancient Greek and Roman Philosophers. It was the theory of Kant, and is now the theory of the transcendental school in Europe and America. Cousin, in manifest accordance with the views of Kant, states the theory in these words; "Do right for the sake of the right, or rather, will the right for the sake of the right. Morality has to do with the intentions."—(*Enunciation of moral law—Elements of Psychology* p. 162.) Those who follow Kant, Cousin and Coleridge state the theory either in the same words, or in words that amount to the same thing. They regard right as the foundation of moral obligation. "Will the right for the sake of the right." This, if it has any meaning, means, Will the right as an ultimate end, that is, for its own sake. Let us examine this very popular philosophy, first, in the light of its own principles, and secondly in the light of Revelation.

1. In the light of its own principles. And,

(1.) This philosophy strenuously maintains that Moral Obligation respects the ultimate intention only, that is, that it respects the choice of an ultimate end. It also maintains that to choose an ultimate end is to choose something for its own intrinsic value, either to self or being in general, and not as a means or condition of any other end. This, it will be seen, is the same as to say that the choice of an ultimate end is the choice of the intrinsically valuable to being, that is, to self or to the universe. This, again, it will be seen, is the same as to say that ultimate intention is and must be synonymous either with good will to being in general or identical with disinterested benevolence, or with willing good to self in particular. But how does this teaching consist with choosing the *right* for the sake of the *right*? Are the good of being, the intrinsically valuable to being, and the *right* the same thing? Are the *right* and the intrinsically valuable the

same thing? Are the right, and the highest well being of God and of the universe *identical*? To choose, will, intend the *highest good of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, or for its own value, is right*. For this is choosing the proper, fit, suitable, right *end*. But to will the *right* for the sake of the *right* is to will another end, and this is not right. To will the good for the sake of the good, that is, to will it disinterestedly, *is right*. But to will the *right* for the sake of the *right*, is *not right*.

But does this philosophy mean that right is the supreme and ultimate good upon which intention ought to terminate? If so, in what sense of the term *right* does this theory regard it as the intrinsically and supremely valuable? Is it in the sense of *Objective Right*? But Objective Right is a mere abstract *idea* or *law*. It is impossible that this should possess any *intrinsic value*. It may be and is a condition or means of virtue, and hence of ultimate satisfaction or good, and therefore may be *relatively valuable*. But to make a *mere idea* of the reason, an *abstract idea* or *law* the intrinsically valuable thing which all moral agents are bound to choose as the supreme good, and to which they are bound to consecrate themselves for its own sake, is absurd. To prefer this to the highest well being of God and the universe is *not right*. It can not be right.

(2.) It is absurd to talk of making *objective* right an ultimate end. Make *law* an *ultimate end*! *Law* is a rule of choice or willing, as this philosophy maintains. But what does law require a moral agent to will, choose, intend? Why, according to this philosophy, it requires him to will, choose, intend no end whatever but itself. A very important law surely that requires its subject to will only *its* own existence and nothing else! And what is its own existence or self that it should make itself the supreme good? Why, forsooth, it is a mere abstract *idea*. But it is impossible for the mind to choose this as the supreme good, or as an ultimate end, for the plain reason that it can not be regarded as intrinsically valuable.

(3.) It is absurd to represent the moral law as requiring its subjects to make *itself* the end to which they ought to consecrate themselves. The law must require the choice of some intrinsically and supremely valuable end. This *must be the highest good or well-being of God and of the universe*, and can not be a mere abstract law or idea. What, a mere idea of greater intrinsic value than the infinite and eternal happiness or well being of God and of the universe! Impossible.

But does this philosophy teach that *subjective* right is the foundation of moral obligation? *Subjective* right is a *compliance* with moral obligation, and can not therefore be the *foundation* of the obligation. *Subjective* right, is virtue, righteousness. It must, as has been said, consist either in *ultimate intention*, or it must be a quality or attribute of that intention. If it be regarded as identical with that ultimate choice or intention which the moral law requires, then, according to this philosophy, moral agents are bound to choose their own choice or to intend their own intention as an ultimate end, that is, to intend their own intention for its own intrinsic value. This is absurd and nonsensical.

If *subjective* right is to be regarded, not as identical with ultimate choice or intention, but as a quality, element, or attribute of the choice or intention, then moral agents, if this philosophy be true, are under a moral obligation to choose, will, intend nothing out of their choice or intention, but to choose or intend an element, attribute or quality of their intention as an ultimate end. Upon one supposition ultimate intention must terminate upon itself as an end; upon the other it must terminate upon a quality or attribute of itself. Either supposition is a gross absurdity and an impossibility. What! choose my own choice as an end! This is a natural impossibility. Choose an attribute of my own choice as an end or object of the very choice of which it is an attribute! This is equally a natural impossibility. Choice must of necessity terminate on some object out of itself, else there is no object of choice. Thus we see that subjective right cannot be chosen as an ultimate end, because it is not an ultimate. In what possible or conceivable sense, then, can right be the foundation of moral obligation? I answer in no possible or conceivable sense. It is grossly inconsistent and self contradictory for this philosophy to maintain at the same breath, that moral obligation respects the choice of an ultimate end, and that right is the foundation of moral obligation. Why, right, as we have just seen, consists either in the law or idea of obligation, or in obedience to this law or obligation. It is therefore stark nonsense to affirm that right is the foundation of the obligation. *Obedience to law can not be identical with the reason for this obedience. Compliance with an obligation, can not be identical with the reason or foundation of the obligation. In other words, intending in accordance with obligation, can not be identical with the thing or end intended. If objective right be the end to be intended, then obedience to*

the law is identical with choosing the law as an ultimate end. Choosing the law as an ultimate end is obedience to the law!

(4.) But here it is objected that we really affirm our obligation to love God *because of his moral excellence*. To this I reply—That this objection *in the mouth of a Rightarian* must mean that it is *right* to love God for or because of his moral excellence and that we are, bound to love Him because it is *right*? But to love Him *because it is right*, and to love Him for his moral excellence are not identical. The objection involves a contradiction. This love, let it be remembered, is willing, intending an end. But what am I bound to will or intend to God in view of his moral excellence. Am I bound to will his goodness as an end? This must be, if his goodness is the foundation of the obligation, for as we have repeatedly seen the *reason for choosing any thing as an ultimate end and the end chosen are identical*. But to will the divine goodness, which consists in benevolence, as an ultimate end is absurd. But am I to will the right for the sake of the right? Is this loving God or willing any thing to Him? Or am I to will good to God *because it is right to will good to Him*? This is absurd and a contradiction. To will good to God as an ultimate end, is to will it for its own sake or because of its own intrinsic value. It is impossible to will good to God for its own sake, because it is right. It is the same as to will good to God for its intrinsic value, yet not for its intrinsic value, but because it is right. This is willing the right and not the good as an end. The assumption, that we affirm our obligation to love God to be founded in his moral excellence, will be fully considered in its proper place, I would only here remark that it is not very consistent in a rightarian to urge this objection.

(5.) But right here it will be well to inquire into the ground of the mistake of rightarians. Kant, and if consistent, all rightarians, consider the law itself as imposing obligation, and therefore of course as being the foundation of obligation. Hence Kant affirms that ethics or morality or virtue does not imply any religion, but only the adoption into the will of a maxim, "at all times fit for law universal." He holds that the mind needs no end upon which to fix, nothing at which to aim beside or out of the law itself; nothing to intend, no motive out of the precept or maxim itself, but simply the adoption of the maxim just named, and which Cousin expresses thus, "Do right for the sake of the right," or "Will the right for the sake of the right." Now it is a fundamen-

tal mistake to represent the law itself, as imposing obligation, and therefore as the foundation of the obligation. Law is a rule according to which moral agents are bound to will. God and reason affirm their obligation to will in accordance with law, or in other words, to will that which the law requires. But the law requires that something shall be willed for its own sake, and this is the same as to say that the end to be willed deserves to be willed on its own account, which again, is the same as to affirm that the obligation is founded, not in the law, but in the end which the law requires us to seek. The law requires us to seek the end simply and only because of its intrinsic value, and not because the law can of itself impose obligation. Now the idea that right or law can impose obligation is founded in a radical misapprehension of the nature of law. It is a rule of willing or a rule that declares how moral agents ought to will or what they ought to choose. But it is not the foundation of the obligation to choose that which the law requires to be chosen as an end. For the reason for choosing this is and must be its intrinsic value, and were it not intrinsically valuable, the law could not require it to be chosen as an ultimate end. But for its intrinsic value, a requirement to choose it as an ultimate end could not be law. Objective right and law, as we have before seen, are identical. If right is the foundation of obligation, then law is the foundation of obligation. This is and must be Rightarianism. (But it is a gross absurdity and a contradiction to make the law requiring the choice of an ultimate end or of something for its own intrinsic value, the reason, or foundation of the obligation instead of the intrinsic value of that which is to be chosen for its value. Nothing can by any possibility impose obligation to choose an ultimate end but the intrinsic value of the end. Neither law nor any lawgiver in earth or heaven can impose such an obligation. This philosophy represents the moral law as requiring its subjects to will the right for the sake of the right or to will the right as an ultimate end. Of course it must represent subjective right or virtue as consisting in willing objective right or as an ultimate end. This we have seen is absurd.

2. But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God.

(1.) In the light of the Moral Law. The whole Law is expressed by the Great Teacher thus: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, with

all thy might, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbor as thyself." Paul says "All the Law is fulfilled in one word—love:" "therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." Now it is admitted by this philosophy, that the love required by the Law is not a mere emotion, but that it consists in willing, choice, intention; that it consists in the choice of an ultimate end, or in the choice of some thing for its own sake, or which is the same thing, for its intrinsic value. What is this which the Law requires us to will to *God and our neighbor*? Is it to will the *right* for the *sake of the right*? But what has this to do with *loving God and our neighbor*? To will the *right* for the sake of the *right*, is not the same as to love God and our neighbor, as it is not willing any thing to them. Suppose it be said, that the Law requires us to will the good, or highest blessedness of God and our neighbor, *because it is right*. This, as has been shown, is a contradiction and an impossibility. To will the blessedness of God and our neighbor in any proper sense, is to will it for its own sake, or as an ultimate end. But this is not to will it because it is right. To will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake, or for its intrinsic value, *is right*. But to will the right for the sake of the right, is *not right*. To will the good because it is good, or the valuable because it is valuable, is right, because it is willing it for the right reason. But to will the right because it is right, is not right, because it is not willing the right end. To will the *good* because it is *right*, is not to will the *good* as an end, but the *right* as an end, which is *not right*. The Law of God does not, can not require us to love right more than God and our neighbor. What! *right* of greater value than the highest well-being of God and of the universe? Impossible. It is impossible that the Moral Law should require any thing else than to will the highest good of universal being as an ultimate end. It is a first truth of Reason, that this is the most valuable thing possible or conceivable; and that could by no possibility be law, that should require any thing else to be chosen as an ultimate end. According to this philosophy, the revealed law should read: "Thou shalt love the right for its own sake, with all thy heart and with all thy soul." The fact is, the Law requires the supreme love of God, and the equal love of our neighbor. It says nothing, and implies nothing about doing right for the sake of the right. Rightarianism is a rejection of the Divine Revealed Law, and a substituting in its stead an entirely different rule of Moral Obligation, a rule that deifies right, that rejects the claims of God, and exalts right to the throne.

(2.) "Whether therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." Does this precept require us to will the *right* for the sake of the *right*, or is it in spirit the same as the Law? The same as the Law, beyond a doubt.

(3.) "Do good unto all men, as ye have opportunity." Here again, are we required to will the *right* for the sake of the *right*, or to will the *good* of our neighbor because of its own intrinsic value? The latter, most certainly.

(4.) Take the commands to pray and labor for the salvation of souls. Do such commandments require us to go forth to *will* or do the *right* for the sake of the *right*, or to *will* the salvation of souls for the intrinsic value of their salvation? When we pray and preach and converse, must we aim at *right*, must the love of *right*, and not the love of God and of souls influence us? When I am engaged in prayer, and travail day and night for souls, and have an eye so single to the good of souls and to the glory of God, and am so swallowed up with my subject as not so much as to think of the *right*, am I all wrong? Must I pray because it is *right*, and do all I do and suffer all I suffer, not from good will to God and man, but because it is *right*? Who does not know, that to intend the right for the sake of the right in all these things instead of having an eye single to the good of being, would and must be any thing rather than true religion?

(5.) Examine this philosophy in the light of Scripture declarations. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him, might not perish, but have everlasting life." Now, are we to understand that God gave his Son, not from any regard to the *good of souls* for its own sake, but for the sake of the *right*? Did He will the *right* for the sake of the *right*? Did He give His Son to die for the right for the sake of the right, or to die to render the salvation of souls possible, and for the sake of the souls?

(6.) Did Christ give Himself to die and labor for the right for the sake of the right, or for souls from love to souls? Did prophets, and apostles, and martyrs, and have the saints in all ages, willed the right for the sake of the right, or have they labored and suffered and died for God and souls from love to them?

(7.) How infinitely strange would the Bible read, if it adopted this philosophy. The Law, as has been said, would read thus: "Thou shalt love the *right* with all thy heart;" "Whatsoever ye do, do all for the sake of the *right*;" "Do the *right* unto all men for the sake of the right;" "God so loved the *right*

for the sake of the *right* that he gave his only begotten Son, to do the *right* for the sake of the *right*." Should we interrogate the holy men of all ages, and ask why they do and suffer as they do, with this philosophy, they must answer, We are willing and doing the *right* for the sake of the *right*. We have no ultimate regard to God or to the good of any being, but only to the *right*.

(8.) But take another passage which is quoted in support of this philosophy: "Children obey your parents in the Lord, for this is *right*." Now what is the spirit of this requirement? What is it to obey parents? Why, if, as this philosophy holds, it must resolve itself into Ultimate Intention, what must the child intend for its own sake? Must he will good to God and his parents, and obey his parents as a means of securing the highest good, or must he will the *right* as an end for the sake of the *right*, regardless of the good of God or of the universe? Would it be *right* to will the *right* for the sake of the *right*, rather than to will the good of the universe for the sake of the good, and obey his parents as a means of securing the highest good?

It is *right* to will the highest good of God and of the universe, and to use all the necessary means, and fulfill all the necessary conditions of this highest well-being. For children to obey their parents is one of the means, and for this reason it is *right*, and upon no other condition can it be required. But it is said that children affirm their obligation to obey their parents entirely irrespective of the obedience having any reference to or sustaining any relation to the good of being. This is a mistake. The child, if he is a Moral Agent, and does really affirm Moral Obligation, not only does, but must perceive the end upon which his choice or intention ought to terminate. If he really makes an intelligent affirmation, it is and must be, that he ought to will an end, that this end is not, and can not be the *right*, as has been shown. He knows that he ought to will his parents' happiness, and his own happiness, and the happiness of the world, and of God; and he knows that obedience to his parents sustains the relation of a means to this end. The fact is, it is a first truth of Reason, that he ought to will the good of his parents and the good of every body. He also knows that obedience to his parents is a necessary means to this end. If he does not know these things, it is impossible for him to be a Moral Agent, or to make any intelligent affirmation at all; and if he has any idea of obedience, it is, and must be only such as animals

have who are actuated wholly by hope, fear and instinct. As well might we say, that an ox or a dog, who gives indication of knowing in some sense, that he ought to obey us, affirms Moral Obligation of himself, as to say this of a child in whose mind the idea of the good, or valuable to being is not developed. What! does Moral Obligation respect ultimate intention only; and does ultimate intention consist in the choice of something for its own intrinsic value, and yet is it true that children affirm Moral Obligation before the idea of the intrinsically valuable, is at all developed? Impossible! But this objection assumes that children have the idea of *right* developed before the idea of the *valuable*. This can not be. The *end* to be chosen, must be apprehended by the mind before the mind can have the idea of *Moral Obligation* to choose an end, or of the right or wrong of choosing or not choosing it. The development of the idea of the good or valuable, must precede the development of the ideas of right and of Moral Obligation.

But here again, I must bring into view the fundamental error of this philosophy, to wit, that right is the end to be willed. Right, as we have seen, is objective or subjective. Objective right is an idea, a law. Subjective right is virtue. But virtue, as it consists in love, or willing, can not be an end. Objective right, or law, can not be an end. To will objective right as an end, would be to will the idea, or law, as an end. This is absurd, as we have seen. What sort of a law would that be that required that nothing should be willed as an end but itself? This could, by no possibility, be *Law*. Law is that which declares what ought to be willed as an end, or for its own intrinsic value; and what law would that be, which instead of requiring the highest good of God and the universe to be chosen as an end, should require the rule, law or idea itself to be willed as the ultimate and supreme good? Surely this would not, could not be *law*. The law of God, then, is not, and can not be developed in the mind of a child who has no knowledge or idea of the valuable, and who has and can have no reference to the good of any being, in obedience to his parents.

It is one thing to intend *that which is right*, and quite another to intend *the right* as an end. For example, to choose my own gratification as an end, *is wrong*. But this is not choosing *the wrong* as an end. A drunkard chooses to gratify his appetite for strong drink as an end, that is, for its own sake. This is wrong. But the choice does not terminate on

the *wrong*, but, on the *gratification*. The thing intended is not the wrong. The liquor is not chosen, the gratification is not intended, *because it is wrong*, but *notwithstanding* it is wrong. To love God is *right*, but to suppose that God is loved because it is *right*, is absurd. It is to suppose that God is loved, not from any regard to God, but from a regard to *right*. This is an absurdity and a contradiction. To love or will the good of my neighbor, is *right*. But to will the right, instead of the good of my neighbor, is *not right*. It is loving right instead of my neighbor; but this is *not right*.

(9.) But it is said that I am conscious of affirming to myself that I ought to will *the right*. This a mistake. I am conscious of affirming to myself, that I ought to will *that the willing of which is right*, to wit, to will the good of God and of being. This is *right*. But this is not choosing *the right* as an end.

(10.) But it is said again, "I am conscious of affirming to myself, that I ought to will the good of being, *because it is right*." That is, to will the good of being, as a means, and the right as an end! which is making right the supreme good and the good of being a means to that end. This is absurd. But to say, that I am conscious of affirming to myself my obligation to love or will the good of God and my neighbor, because it is right, is a contradiction. It is the same as to say, I ought to love, or intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an ultimate end, and yet, not to intend the good of God and my neighbor, but intend the *right*.

(11.) But it is said, that "I ought to love God in compliance with, and out of respect to my obligation; that I ought to will it, because and for the reason that I am *bound to will it*." That is, that in loving God and my neighbor, I must intend to discharge or comply with my obligation; and this, it is said, is identical with intending *the right*. But ought my supreme object to be to *discharge my duty*—to meet obligation instead of willing the well-being of God and my neighbor for its own sake? If my *end* is to do my duty, *I do not do it*. For what is my obligation? Why, to love, or will the good of God and my neighbor, that is, as an end, or for its own value. To discharge my obligation, then, I must intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an end. That is, I must intend that which I am under an obligation to intend. But I am not under an obligation to intend the *right*, because it is *right*, nor to do my duty because it is duty, but to intend the *good* of God and of my neighbor, because it is *good*. Therefore, to

discharge my obligation, I must intend the good, and not the *right*—the good of God and my neighbor, and not to do my duty. I say again, to intend the good, or valuable, is *right*; but to intend the *right* is *not right*.

(12.) But it is said, that in very many instances, at least, I am conscious of affirming my Moral Obligation to do the *right*, without any reference to the good of being, when I can assign no other reason for the affirmation of obligation, than the *right*. For example, I behold virtue, I affirm spontaneously and necessarily, that I ought to love that virtue. And this, it is said, has no reference to the good of being. Are willing the right for the sake of the right and loving virtue, the same thing? But what is it to love virtue? Not a mere feeling of delight or complacency in it? But it is agreed, that Moral Obligation respects the ultimate intention only. What, then, do I mean by the affirmation, that I *ought* to love virtue? What is virtue? It is ultimate intention, or an attribute of ultimate intention. But what is *loving virtue*? It consists in willing its existence. But it is said, that I affirm my obligation to love virtue *as an end*, or for its own sake, and not from any regard to the good of being. This is absurd, and a contradiction. To love virtue, it is said, is to will its existence *as an end*. But virtue consists in intending an end. Now, to love virtue, it is said, is to will, intend its existence *as an end*, for its own sake. Then, according to this theory, I affirm my obligation to intend the intention of a virtuous being as an end, instead of intending the same end that he does. This is absurd. His intention is of *no value*, is neither naturally good nor morally good, irrespective of the *end* intended. It is neither right nor wrong, irrespective of the end chosen. It is therefore, impossible to will, choose, intend the intention as an end, without reference to the end intended. To love virtue, then, is to love or will the end upon which virtuous intention terminates, namely, the good of being, or, in other words, to love virtue, is to will its existence, *for the sake of the end it has in view*, which is the same thing as to will the same end. Virtue is intending, choosing an end. Loving virtue is willing that the virtuous intention should exist *for the sake of its end*. Take away the end, and who would or could will the intention? Without the *end*, the virtue, or intention, would not, and could not exist. It is not true, therefore, that in the case supposed, I affirm my obligation to will, or intend, *without any reference to the good of being*.

(13.) But again, it is said, that when I contemplate the

Moral Excellence of God, I affirm my obligation to love him *solely for his goodness*, without any reference to the good of being, and for no other reason than because it is *right*. But to love God *because of his moral excellence*, and because it is *right*, are not the same thing. It is a gross contradiction, to talk of loving God *for his Moral Excellence, because it is right*. It is the same as to say, I love God for the reason that he is morally excellent, or worthy, yet not at all for this reason, but for the reason that it is right. To love God for his Moral Worth, is to will good to him for its own sake, upon condition that he deserves it. But to will his Moral Worth because it is right, is to will the right as an ultimate end, to have supreme regard to right, instead of the Moral Worth, or the well-being of God.

But it may reasonably be asked, why should Rightarians bring forward these objections? They all assume that Moral Obligation may respect something else than ultimate intention. Why, I repeat it, should Rightarians affirm that the Moral Excellence of God, is the foundation of Moral Obligation, since they hold that *right* is the foundation of Moral Obligation? Why should the advocates of the theory, that the Moral Excellence of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, affirm that *right* is the foundation, or that we are bound to love God *for his Moral Excellence, because this is right*? These are gross contradictions. There is no end to the absurdities in which error involves its advocates, and it is singular to see the advocates of the different theories, each in his turn, abandon his own, and affirm some other, as an objection to the true theory. It has also been, and still is common for writers to confound different theories with each other, and to affirm, in the compass of a few pages, several different theories. At least this has been done in some instances.

Consistent Rightarianism is a Godless, Christless, loveless philosophy. This Kant saw, and acknowledged. He calls it *pure legality*, that is, he understands the law as imposing obligation by virtue of its own nature, instead of the intrinsic value of the end, which the law requires Moral Agents to choose. He loses sight of the end, and does not recognize any end whatever. He makes a broad distinction between morality and religion. Morality consists, according to him in the adoption of the maxim, "Do right for the sake of the right," or "Act at all times upon a maxim fit for law universal." The adoption of this maxim is morality. But now, having adopted this maxim, the mind goes abroad to carry its maxim into practice. It finds God and being to exist, and sees

it to be right to intend their good. This intending the good is religion, according to him. Thus, he says, ethics lead to, or result in religion. (See Kant on Religion.) But who does not feel prompted to inquire, whether, when we apprehend God and being, we are to will their well-being as an end, or for its own sake, or because it is right? If for its own sake, where then is the maxim, "Will the right for the sake of the right?" for if we are to will the good, not as an ultimate end but for the sake of the right, then right is the end that is preferred to the highest well-being of God and of the universe. It is impossible that this should be religion. Indeed Kant himself admits that this is not religion.

But enough of this cold and loveless philosophy. As it exalts right above all that is called God and subverts all the teachings of the Bible, it can not be a light thing to be deluded by it. But it is remarkable and interesting to see Christian Rightarians, without being sensible of their inconsistency, so often confound this philosophy with that which teaches that good will to being constitutes virtue. Numerous examples of it occur every where in their writings, which demonstrate that Rightarianism is with them only a theory that "plays round the head but comes not near the heart."



LECTURE VII.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

DIVINE MORAL EXCELLENCE THEORY.

V. I NOW ENTER UPON THE DISCUSSION OF THE THEORY, THAT THE GOODNESS, OR MORAL EXCELLENCE OF GOD IS THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

To this philosophy I reply,

1. That its absurdity may be shown in several ways.

(1.) Let it be remembered, that Moral Obligation respects the choice of an ultimate end.

(2.) That the reason of the obligation, or that which imposes obligation, is identical with the end on which the intention ought to terminate. If, therefore, the goodness of God be the reason, or foundation of Moral Obligation, then the goodness of God is the ultimate end to be intended. But as this goodness consists in love, or benevolence, it is impossible that it should be regarded or chosen, as an ultimate end; and to choose it were to choose the Divine choice, to intend the Divine intention as an ultimate end, instead of choosing what God chooses, and intending what he intends.

Or if the goodness or moral excellence of God is to be regarded, not as identical with, but as an attribute or moral quality of benevolence, then, upon the theory under consideration, a moral agent ought to choose a quality or attribute of the Divine choice or intention as an ultimate end, instead of the end upon which the Divine intention terminates. This is absurd.

2. It is impossible that virtue should be the foundation of Moral Obligation. Virtue consists in a compliance with Moral Obligation. But obligation must exist before it can be complied with. Now, upon this theory, obligation can not exist until virtue exists as its foundation. Then this theory amounts to this: Virtue is the foundation of Moral Obligation; therefore Virtue must exist before Moral Obligation can exist. But as Virtue consists in a conformity to Moral Obligation, Moral Obligation must exist before Virtue can exist. Therefore neither Moral Obligation nor Virtue, can ever, by any possibility, exist. God's Virtue must have existed prior to his obligation, as its foundation. But as Virtue consists in compliance with Moral Obligation, and as obligation could not exist until Virtue existed as its foundation; in other

words, as obligation could not exist without the previous existence of Virtue, as its foundation, and as Virtue could not exist without the previous existence of obligation, it follows, that neither God, nor any other being, could ever be virtuous for the reason that he could never be the subject of Moral Obligation. Should it be said, that God's holiness is the foundation of our obligation to love Him, I ask in what sense it can be so? What is the nature or form of that love, which his Virtue lays us under an obligation to exercise? It can not be a mere emotion of complacency, for emotions being involuntary states of mind and mere phenomena of the Sensibility, are without the pale of legislation and morality. Is this love resolvable into benevolence, or good will? But why will good to God rather than evil? Why, surely, because good is valuable in itself. But if it is valuable in itself, this must be the fundamental reason for willing it as a possible good; and his Virtue must be only a secondary reason or condition of the obligation, to will his actual blessedness. But again, the foundation of Moral Obligation must be the same in all worlds, and with all Moral Agents, for the simple reason, that Moral Law is one and identical in all worlds. If God's Virtue is not the foundation of Moral Obligation in Him, which it can not be, it can not be the foundation of obligation in us, as Moral Law must require Him to choose the same end that it requires us to choose. His Virtue must be a secondary reason of his obligation to will his own actual blessedness, and the condition of our obligation to will his actual and highest blessedness, but can not be the fundamental reason, that always being the intrinsic value of his well-being.

But for the sake of a somewhat systematic examination of this subject, I will,

1. Show what Virtue, or Moral Excellence is.
2. That it can not be the Foundation of Moral Obligation.
3. Show what Moral Worth or Good Desert is.
4. That it can not be the Foundation of Moral Obligation.
5. Show what relation Virtue, Merit, and Moral Worth sustain to Moral Obligation.
6. Answer objections.

1. Show what Virtue, or Moral Excellence is.

Virtue, or Moral Excellence, consists in conformity of will to Moral Law. It must either be identical with love or good will, or it must be the moral attribute or element of good will or benevolence.

2. It can not be the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

It is agreed, that the Moral Law requires love; and that this term expresses all that it requires. It is also agreed, that this love is good will, or that it resolves itself into choice, or ultimate intention. It must, then, consist in the choice of an ultimate end. But since Virtue either consists in choice, or is an attribute of choice, or benevolence, it is impossible to will it as an ultimate end. For this would involve the absurdity of choosing choice, or intending intention, as an end, instead of choosing that as an end upon which virtuous choice terminates. Or if Virtue be regarded as the Moral Attribute of love or benevolence, to make it an ultimate end, would be to make an attribute of choice an ultimate end, instead of that on which choice terminates, or ought to terminate. This is absurd.

3. Show what Moral Worth, or Good Desert is.

Moral Worth, or Good Desert is not identical with Virtue, or obedience to Moral Law, but is an attribute of character, resulting from obedience. Virtue, or Holiness, is a state of mind. It is an active and benevolent state of the Will. Moral Worth is not a state of mind, but is the result of a state of mind. We say that a man's obedience to Moral Law, is valuable in such a sense that a holy being is worthy, or deserving of good, because of his Virtue, or Holiness. But this Worthiness, this Good Desert, is not a state of mind, but, as I said, it is a result of benevolence. It is an attribute or quality of character, and not a state of mind.

4. Moral Worth, or Good Desert, can not be the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

(1.) It is admitted, that good, or the intrinsically valuable to being, must be the foundation of Moral Obligation. The law of God requires the choice of an ultimate end. This end must be intrinsically valuable, for it is its intrinsic value that imposes obligation to will it. Nothing, then, can be the Foundation of Moral Obligation but that which is a good, or intrinsically valuable in itself.

We have seen in a former Lecture, and here repeat, that ultimate good, or the intrinsically valuable, must belong to, and be inseparable from sentient existences. A block of marble can not enjoy, or be the subject of good. It has also been said, that that which is intrinsically good to Moral Agents, must consist in a state of mind. It must be something that is found within the field of consciousness. Nothing can be to them an intrinsic good, but that of which they can be conscious. By this, it is not intended, that every thing of which

they are conscious, is to them an ultimate good, or a good in any sense; but it is intended, that that can not be to them an ultimate, or intrinsic good, of which they are not conscious. Ultimate good must consist in a conscious state of mind. Whatever conduces to the state of mind that is necessarily regarded by us as intrinsically good or valuable, is to us a relative good; but the state of mind alone, is the ultimate good. From this it is plain, that Moral Worth, or Good Desert, can not be the foundation of Moral Obligation, because it is not a state of mind, and can not be an ultimate good. The consciousness of Good Desert, that is, the consciousness of affirming of ourselves Good Desert, is an ultimate good. Or, more strictly, the satisfaction which the mind experiences, upon occasion of affirming its Good Desert, is an ultimate good. But neither the conscious affirmation of Good Desert, nor the satisfaction occasioned by the affirmation, is identical with Moral Worth or Good Desert. Merit, Moral Worth, Good Desert, is the condition, or occasion of the affirmation, and of the resulting conscious satisfaction, and is therefore a good, but it is not, and can not be an ultimate, or intrinsic good. It is valuable, but not intrinsically valuable. Were it not that Moral Beings are so constituted, that it meets a demand of the Intelligence, and therefore produces satisfaction in its contemplation, it would not be, and could not reasonably be regarded as a good in any sense. But since it meets a demand of the Intelligence, it is a relative good, and results in ultimate good.

5. Show what relation Moral Excellence, Worth, Merit, Desert, sustain to Moral Obligation.

(1.) We have seen, that neither of them can be the foundation of Moral Obligation; that neither of them has in it the element of the intrinsic, or ultimate good, or valuable; and that therefore a Moral Agent can never be under obligation to will or choose them as an ultimate end.

(2.) Worth, Merit, Good Desert, can not be a distinct ground, or foundation of Moral Obligation, in such a sense as to impose obligation, irrespective of the intrinsic value of good. All obligation must respect, strictly, the choice of an end, with the necessary conditions and means. The intrinsic value of the end is the foundation of the obligation to choose both it and the necessary conditions and means of securing it. But for the intrinsic value of the end there could be no obligation to will the conditions and means. Whenever a thing is seen to be a necessary condition or means of securing an intrinsi-

cally valuable end, this perceived relation is the condition of our obligation to will it. The obligation is, and must be founded in the intrinsic value of the end, and conditioned upon the perceived relation of the object to the end. The Intelligence of every Moral Agent, from its nature and laws affirms, that the ultimate good and blessedness of Moral Beings is, and ought to be conditioned upon their Holiness and Good Desert. This being a demand of Reason, Reason can never affirm Moral Obligation to will the actual blessedness of Moral Agents, but upon condition of their Virtue, and consequent Good Desert, or Merit. The Intelligence affirms, that it is fit, suitable, proper, that Virtue, Good Desert, Merit, Holiness, should be rewarded with Blessedness. Blessedness is a good in itself, and ought to be willed for that reason, and Moral Agents are under obligation to will that all beings capable of good may be worthy to enjoy, and may therefore actually enjoy blessedness. But they are not under obligation to will that every Moral Being should actually enjoy blessedness, but upon condition of Holiness and Good Desert. The relation that Holiness, Merit, Good Desert, &c. sustain to Moral Obligation, is this: they supply the condition of the obligation to will the actual blessedness of the being or beings who are holy. The obligation must be founded in the intrinsic value of the good we are to will to them. For it is absurd to say, that we are, or can be under obligation to will good to them, for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, and yet that the obligation should not be founded in the intrinsic value of the good. Were it not for the intrinsic value of their good, we should no sooner affirm obligation to will good to them than evil. The good, or blessedness is the thing, or end we are under obligation to will. But obligation to will an ultimate end can not possibly be founded in any thing else than the intrinsic value of the end. Suppose it should be said, that in the case of Merit, or Good Desert, the obligation is founded in Merit, and only conditioned on the intrinsic value of the good I am to will. This would be to make desert the end willed, and good only the condition, or means. This were absurd.

(3.) But again: to make Merit the ground of the obligation, and the good willed only a condition, amounts to this: I perceive Merit, whereupon I affirm my obligation to will what? Not good to him because of its value to him, nor from any disposition to see him enjoy blessedness for its own sake, but because of his Merit. But what does he merit? Why, good,

or blessedness. It is good, or blessedness, that I am to will to him, and this is the end I am bound to will, that is, I am to will his good, or blessedness, for its own intrinsic value. The obligation, then, must be founded in the intrinsic value of the end, that is, his well-being, or blessedness, and only conditioned upon Merit.

6. I am to answer objections.

(1.) It is objected to this view of the subject, and in support of the theory we are examining, that the Bible represents the goodness of God as a reason for loving him, or as a foundation of the obligation to love him.

To this I answer,

[1.] The Bible may assign, and does assign the goodness of God as a reason for loving him, but it does not follow, that it affirms, or assumes, that this reason is the foundation, or a foundation of the obligation. The inquiry is, in what sense does the Bible assign the goodness of God as a reason for loving him? Is it that the goodness of God is the foundation of the obligation, or only a condition of the obligation to will his actual blessedness? Is His goodness a distinct ground of obligation to love him? But what is this love that His goodness lays us under an obligation to exercise to him? It is agreed, that it can not be an emotion, that it must consist in willing something to Him. It is said by some, that the obligation is to treat Him as worthy. But I ask, worthy of what? Is He worthy of any thing? If so, what is it? For this is the thing that I ought to will to Him. Why, worthy of blessing, and honor, and praise and obedience. But these must all be embraced in the single word, love? The Law has forever decided the point, that our whole duty to God is expressed by this one term. It has been common to make assertions upon the subject, that involve a contradiction of the Bible. The Law of God, as revealed in the two precepts, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself," covers the whole ground of Moral Obligation. It is expressly and repeatedly taught in the Bible, that love to God and our neighbor, is the fulfilling of the law. It is, and must be admitted, that this love consists in willing something to God and our neighbor. What, then, is to be willed to them? The command is, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. This says nothing about the character of my neighbor. It is the value of His interests, of his well-being, that the Law requires me to regard. It does not require me to love my righteous neighbor merely, nor to love my righteous

neighbor better than I do my wicked neighbor. It is my neighbor that I am to love. That is, I am to will his well-being, or his good, with the conditions and means thereof, according to its value. If the Law contemplated the Virtue of any being as a distinct ground of obligation, it could not read as it does. It must, in that case, have read as follows: If thou art righteous, and thy neighbor is as righteous as thou art, thou shalt love him as thyself. But if he is righteous, and thou art not, thou shalt love him, and not thyself. If thou art righteous, and he is not, thou shalt love thyself, and not thy neighbor. How far would this be from the gloss of the Jewish Rabbies so fully rebuked by Christ, namely, "Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for them that despitefully use and persecute you. For if ye love them that love you, what thank have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?" The fact is, the Law knows but one ground of Moral Obligation. It requires us to love God and our neighbor. This love is good will. What else ought we, or can we possibly will to God and our neighbor, but their highest good, or well-being, with all the conditions and means thereof. This is all that can be of any value to them, and all that we can, or ought to will to them under any circumstances whatever. When we have willed this to them, we have done our whole duty to them. "Love is the fulfilling of the law." We owe them nothing more, absolutely. They can have nothing more. But this the Law requires us to will to God and our neighbor, on account of the intrinsic value of their good, whatever their character may be, that is, this is to be willed to God and our neighbor, as a possible good, whether they are holy or unholy, simply because of its intrinsic value.

But while the law requires that this should be willed to all, as a possible and intrinsic good, irrespective of character; it cannot, and does not require us to will that God, or any Moral Agent, shall be actually blessed, but upon condition that he be holy. Our obligation to the unholy, is to will that they might be holy, and perfectly blessed. Our obligation to the holy is to will that they be perfectly blessed. The Bible represents love to enemies as one of the highest forms of Virtue: "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." But if love to enemies be a high and a valuable form of Virtue, it must be only

because the true spirit of the Law requires the same love to them as to others, and because of the strong inducements not to love them. Who does not regard the Virtue of the atonement as being as great as if it had been made for the friends, instead of the enemies of God? And suppose God were supremely selfish and unreasonably our enemy, who would not regard good will exercised toward him as being as praiseworthy as it now is. Now, if he were unjustly our enemy, would not a hearty good will to him in such a case be a striking and valuable instance of virtue? In such a case we could not, might not will his actual blessedness, but we might, and should be under infinite obligation to will that he might become holy, and thereupon be perfectly blessed. We should be under obligation to will his good in such a sense, that should he become holy, we should will his actual blessedness, without any change in our ultimate choice or intention, and without any change in us that would imply an increase of virtue. So of our neighbor: we are bound to will his good, even if he is wicked, in such a sense as to need no new intention or ultimate choice, to will his actual blessedness, should he become holy. We may be as holy in loving a sinner, and in seeking his salvation while he is a sinner, as in willing his good after he is converted and becomes a saint. God was as virtuous in loving the world and seeking to save it while in sin, as he is in loving those in it who are holy. The fact is, if we are truly benevolent, and will the highest well-being of all, with the conditions and means of their blessedness, it follows, of course, and of necessity, that when one becomes holy, we shall love him with the love of complacency; that we shall, of course, will his actual blessedness, seeing that he has fulfilled the necessary conditions, and rendered himself worthy of blessedness. It implies no increase of Virtue in God when a sinner repents, to exercise complacency toward him. Complacency, as a state of Will or heart, is only benevolence modified by the consideration or relation of right character in the object of it. God, prophets, apostles, martyrs and saints, in all ages, are as virtuous in their self-denying and untiring labors to save the wicked, as they are in their complacent love to the saints. This is the universal doctrine of the Bible. It is in exact accordance with the spirit and letter of the law. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself:" that is, whatever his character may be. This is the doctrine of reason, and accords with the convictions of all men. But if this is so, it follows that Virtue is not a distinct ground of

Moral Obligation, but only modifies obligation in this sense—we are under obligation to will the actual blessedness of a moral being, upon condition of his holiness. We ought to will his good or blessedness for its own value, whatever his character may be; but we ought to will it as a fact and reality, only upon condition of his holiness. Its intrinsic value is the foundation of the obligation, and his holiness the condition of the obligation to will his actual enjoyment of perfect blessedness. When, therefore, the Bible calls on us to love God for his goodness, it does not and can not mean to assign the fundamental reason, or foundation of the obligation to will his good; for it were absurd to suppose, that his good is to be willed, not for its intrinsic value, but because he is good. Were it not for its intrinsic value, we should as soon affirm our obligation to will evil as good to him. The Bible assumes the first truths of Reason. It is a first truth of Reason, that God's well-being is of infinite value, and ought to be willed as a possible good whatever his character may be; and that it ought to be willed as an actual reality upon condition of His holiness. Now the Bible does just as in this case might be expected. It informs us of his actual and infinite holiness, and calls on us to love Him or to will His good for that reason. But this is not asserting nor implying that His holiness is the foundation of the obligation to will His good in any such sense as that we should not be under obligation to will it with all our heart and soul and mind and strength as a possible good whether He were holy or not. It is plain that the law contemplates only the intrinsic value of the end to be willed. It would require us to will the well-being of God with all our heart, &c., or as the supreme good, whatever His character might be. Were not this so, it could not be Moral Law. His interest would be the supreme and the infinite good in the sense of the intrinsically and infinitely valuable, and we should, for that reason, be under infinite obligation to will that it might be, whether He were holy or sinful, and upon condition of His holiness, to will the actual existence of his perfect and infinite blessedness. Upon our coming to the knowledge of his holiness, the obligation is instantly imposed, not merely to will his highest well-being as a possible, but as an actually existing good.

[2.] Again. It is impossible that *goodness, virtue, good desert, merit*, should be a distinct ground or foundation of moral obligation in such a sense as to impose or properly to increase obligation. It has been shown that neither of these can be

an ultimate good and impose obligation to choose it as an ultimate end or for its intrinsic value.

[3.] Again. If they impose obligation, it must be an obligation to will something as an ultimate end, or something for its own sake. But nothing can do that but the very thing that is the ultimate good or the intrinsically valuable. To choose a thing for its own sake or as an ultimate end, is to choose it for what it is in and of itself, and not for any other reason. Now if goodness or merit can impose moral obligation to will, it must be an obligation to will itself as an ultimate end. It must be because they are ultimate and intrinsic good. But this we have seen can not be; therefore these things can not be a distinct ground or foundation of moral obligation.

But again, the law does not make virtue, good desert, or merit, the ground of obligation, and require us to love them and to will them as an ultimate end; but to love God and our neighbor as an ultimate good. It does, no doubt, require us to will God's goodness, good desert, worthiness, merit, as a condition and means of his highest well-being, but it is absurd to say that it requires us to will either of these things as an ultimate end instead of his perfect blessedness, to which these sustain only the relation of a condition. Let it be distinctly understood that nothing can impose moral obligation but that which is an ultimate and an intrinsic good, for if it impose obligation it must be an obligation to choose itself for what it is in and of itself. All obligation must respect the choice either of an end or of means. Obligation to choose means is founded in the value of the end. Whatever then imposes obligation must be an ultimate end. It must possess that in and of itself that is worthy or deserving of choice as an intrinsic and ultimate good. This we have seen, virtue, merit, &c., can not be, therefore they can not be a foundation of moral obligation. But it is said they can increase obligation to love God and holy beings. But we are under infinite obligation to love God and to will his good with all our power, because of the intrinsic value of His well-being, *whether He is holy or sinful*. Upon condition that He is holy, we are under obligation to will His actual blessedness, but certainly we are under obligation to will it with no more than all our heart and soul and mind and strength. But this we are required to do because of the intrinsic value of His blessedness, whatever his character might be. The fact is, we can do no more, and can be under obli-

gation to do no more, than to will His good with all our power, and this we are bound to do for its own sake; and no more than this can we be under obligation to do for any reason whatever. Our obligation is to will His good with all our strength by virtue of its infinite value, and it can not be increased by any other consideration than our increased knowledge of its value, which increases our ability.

[4.] Again. I am bound to love my neighbor as myself whatever his character may be. If he is holy I am under obligation to love him no more. This settles the question that his holiness does not, can not increase my obligation. The fact is that merit, good desert, &c., only modify obligation in this respect; they are the condition of the obligation to will the actual blessedness of the holy being, but they never are or can be a distinct ground of obligation. The intrinsic value of the well-being of God and of moral agents, of itself imposes obligation to will their highest possible well-being with all the conditions and means thereof. This is all that they can possibly have, and this is all that I can will to them. Nothing remains, or can remain, but for them to fulfil the condition by being actually holy, and I am under obligation to will their actual and highest well-being for its own intrinsic value to them, or as an ultimate end. This is all that I can will, and this is all that they can have. This is all that I can be under obligation to will to them. This obligation must, as I have said, be founded in the intrinsic value of their well-being, and conditioned, so far as their actual blessedness is concerned, upon their holiness. This conducts us to a position from which we can see how to answer the following objections.

(2.) It is said that moral excellence can and does of itself impose moral obligation; for example, that a character for veracity imposes obligation to treat a truthful person as worthy of credit.

Answer: What is the obligation in this case? It must resolve itself into an obligation to will something to him. But what am I bound to will to him? What else than that he should be actually blessed? That since in him the conditions are fulfilled he should actually enjoy the highest blessedness? I am to will his highest blessedness as a possible good for its own sake irrespective of his character, and upon condition that he be holy, I am to will his actual enjoyment of all possible good. This is and must be my whole obligation to him. This implies obligation to believe him and out-

wardly to treat him as worthy of confidence, as thus treating him is a condition and means of his actual enjoyment of all possible good. The whole obligation, however, resolves itself into an obligation to will his actual and highest well-being.

(3.) It is said that favors received impose obligation to exercise gratitude; that the relation of benefactor itself imposes obligation to treat the benefactor according to this relation.

Answer: I suppose this objection contemplates this relation as a *virtuous* relation, that is, that the benefactor is truly virtuous and not selfish in his benefaction. If not, then the relation can not at all modify obligation.

If the benefactor has in the benefaction obeyed the law of love, if he has done his duty in sustaining this relation, I am under obligation to exercise gratitude toward him. But what is gratitude? It is not a mere emotion or feeling, for this is a phenomenon of the sensibility and, strictly speaking, without the pale both of legislation and morality. Gratitude when spoken of as a virtue and as that of which moral obligation can be affirmed, must be an act of will. An obligation to gratitude must be an obligation to will something to the benefactor. But what am I under obligation to will to a benefactor but his actual highest well-being? If it be God, I am under obligation to will his actual and infinite blessedness with all my heart and with all my soul. If it be my neighbor, I am bound to love him as myself, that is, to will his actual well-being as I do my own. What else can either God or man possess or enjoy, and what else can I be under obligation to will to them? I answer, nothing else. To the law and to the testimony; if any philosophy agree not herewith, it is because there is no light in it. The virtuous relation of benefactor modifies obligation just as any other and every other form of virtue does, and in no other way. Whenever we perceive virtue in any being, this supplies the condition upon which we are bound to will his actual highest well-being. He has done his duty. He has complied with obligation in the relation he sustains. He is truthful, upright, benevolent, just, merciful, no matter what the particular form may be in which the individual presents to me the evidence of his holy character. It is all precisely the same so far as my obligation extends. I am, independently of my knowledge of his character, under obligation to will his highest well-being for its own sake. That is, to will that he may fulfil all the conditions, and thereupon, enjoy perfect blessedness. But I am not under obligation to will his actual blessedness until I have evidence of his virtue.

This evidence, however I obtain it, by whatever manifestations of virtue in him or by whatever means, supplies the condition upon which I am under obligation to will his actual and highest well-being. This is my whole obligation. It is all he can have, and all I can will to him. All objections of this kind, and indeed all possible objections to the true theory and in support of the one I am examining, are founded in an erroneous view of the subject of moral obligation. Or in a false and anti-scriptural philosophy that contradicts the law of God, and sets up another rule of moral obligation.

(4.) But it is said that in all instances in which we affirm Moral Obligation, we necessarily affirm the *moral excellence* or goodness of God to be the foundation or reason of the obligation.

Answer : This is so great a mistake, that in no instance whatever do we or can we affirm the moral excellence of God to be the *foundation* of obligation, unless we do and can affirm the most palpable contradiction. Let it be remembered 1. That moral obligation respects ultimate intention only. 2. That ultimate intention is the choice of an end for its intrinsic value. 3. That the ground or reason of our obligation to intend an end is the intrinsic value of the end, and is really identical with the end to be chosen. 4. That moral excellence either consists in ultimate intention or in an attribute of this intention, and therefore can not be chosen as an ultimate end. 5. That moral obligation always resolves itself into an obligation to will the highest well-being of God and the universe for its own *intrinsic value*. 6. Now, can Reason be so utterly unreasonable as to affirm all these, and also that the ground or reason of the obligation to will the highest well-being of God and the universe for its own intrinsic value, is *not* its intrinsic value, but is the Divine Moral Excellence ?

(5.) But it is also insisted that when men attempt to assign a reason why they are under moral obligation of any kind, as of love to God, they all agree in this, in assigning the Divine Moral Excellence as the reason of that obligation. I answer:—

[1.] There is and can be but one kind of moral obligation.

[2.] It is not true that all men agree in assigning the moral excellence of God as the foundation or fundamental reason of the obligation, to love Him or to will his good for its own sake. I certainly am an exception to this rule.

[3.] If *any body* assigns this as the reason of the obligation, he assigns a false reason, as has just been shown.

[4.] No man who knew what he said ever assigned the goodness of God as the foundation of the obligation to will his good as an ultimate end, for this is as we have often seen a gross contradiction and an impossibility.

[5.] The only reason why any man supposes himself to assign the goodness of God as the foundation of the obligation to will good to Him is that he loosely confounds the conditions of the obligation to will his actual blessedness with the foundation of the obligation to will it for its own sake, or as a possible good. Were it not for the known intrinsic value of God's highest well-being, we should as soon affirm our obligation to will evil as good to Him, as has been said.

[6.] Again : If the Divine moral Excellence were the foundation of moral obligation, if God were not holy and good, moral obligation could not exist in any case.

[7.] God's moral obligation can not be founded in his own moral excellence, for his moral excellence consists in his conformity to moral obligation, and the fact implies the existence of moral obligation, prior, in the order of nature, to his moral excellence, as was said before.

[8.] The fact is, the intrinsic and infinite value of the well-being of God and of the universe, is a first truth of reason and always and necessarily taken along with us at all times. That moral excellence or good desert is a naturally necessary condition of their highest well-being is also a first truth always and necessarily taken along with us whether we are conscious of it or not. The natural impossibility of willing the actual existence of the highest well-being of God and the universe of moral agents but upon condition of their worthiness, is a self-evident truth. So that no man can affirm his obligation to will the actual highest well-being of God and of moral agents but upon condition of their moral excellence any more than he can affirm his obligation to will their eternal well-being but upon condition of their existence.

That every moral agent ought to will the highest well-being of God and of all the universe for its own sake as a possible good whatever their characters may be, is also a first truth of reason. Reason assigns and can assign no other reason for willing their good as an ultimate end than its intrinsic value; and to assign any other reason as imposing obligation to will it as an end, or for its own sake were absurd and self-contradictory. Obligation to will it as an end and for its own sake, implies the obligation to will its actual existence in all cases and to all persons when the indispensable conditions are

fulfilled. These conditions are seen to be fulfilled in God, and therefore upon this condition reason affirms obligation to will His actual and highest blessedness for its own sake, the intrinsic value being the fundamental reason of the obligation to will it as an end, and the Divine Goodness the condition of the obligation to will the actual existence of His highest blessedness. Suppose that I existed and had the idea of blessedness and its intrinsic value duly developed, together with an idea of all the necessary conditions of it; but that I did not know that any other being than myself existed and yet I knew their existence and blessedness possible. In this case I should be under obligation to will or wish that beings might exist and be blessed. Now suppose that I complied with this obligation, my virtue is just as real and as great as if I knew their existence and willed their actual blessedness, provided my idea of its intrinsic value were as clear and just as if I knew their existence. And now suppose I came to the knowledge of the actual existence and holiness of all holy beings, I should make no new ultimate choice in willing their actual blessedness. This I should do of course, and remaining benevolent, of necessity; and if this knowledge did not give me a higher idea of the value of that which I before willed for its own sake, the willing of the real existence of their blessedness would not make me a whit more virtuous than when I willed it as a *possible good* without knowing that the conditions of its actual existence would ever, in any case be fulfilled.

The Bible reads just as it might be expected to read and just as we should speak in common life. It being a *first truth of reason* that the well-being of God is of infinite value and therefore ought to be willed for its *own sake*—it also being a first truth that virtue is an indispensable condition of fulfilling the demands of his own reason and conscience, and of course of his *actual blessedness*, and of course also a condition of the *obligation* to will it, we might expect the bible to exhort and require us to love God or will His actual blessedness and mention His *virtue as the reason or fulfilled condition* of the obligation, rather than the *intrinsic value* of his blessedness as the foundation of the obligation. The *foundation* of the obligation being a *first truth of reason* needs not to be a matter of revelation. Nor need the fact that virtue is the condition of His blessedness, nor the fact that we are under no obligation to will His *actual blessedness but upon condition* of His holiness. But that in him this *condition is fulfilled* needs

to be revealed, and therefore the bible announces it as a reason or condition of the obligation to love Him, that is, to will His actual blessedness.

(6.) Again: it is asserted that when men would awaken a sense of moral obligation they universally contemplate the moral excellence of God as constituting the reason of their obligation, and if this contemplation does not awaken their sense of obligation nothing else can or will. I answer,

The only possible reason why men ever do or can take this course, is that they loosely consider religion to consist in *feelings* of *complacency* in God and are endeavoring to awaken these complacent emotions. If they conceive of religion as consisting in these emotions, they will of course conceive themselves to be under obligation to exercise them, and to be sure they take the only possible course to awaken both these and a sense of obligation to exercise them. But they are mistaken both in regard to their obligation and the nature of religion. Did they conceive of religion as consisting in good will, or in willing the highest well-being of God and of the universe for its own sake, would they, could they resort to the process in question, that is, the contemplation of the Divine moral excellence, as the only reason for willing good to him instead of considering the infinite value of those interests to the realization of which they ought to consecrate themselves?

If men often do resort to the process in question, it is because they love to feel and have a self-righteous satisfaction in feelings of complacency in God, and take more pains to awaken these feelings than to quicken and enlarge their benevolence. A purely selfish being may be greatly affected by the great goodness and kindness of God to him. I know a man who is a very niggard so far as all benevolent giving and doing for God and the world are concerned, who, I fear, resorts to the very process in question, and is often much affected with the goodness of God. He can bluster and denounce all who do not feel as he does. But ask him for a dollar to forward any benevolent enterprize and he will evade your request, and ask you how you feel, whether you are engaged in religion, &c.

(7.) It has been asserted that nothing can add to the sense of obligation thus excited.

To this I answer that if the obligation be regarded as an obligation to feel emotions of complacency in God, this is true. But if the obligation be contemplated as it really is,

an obligation to will the highest well-being of God for its own sake, the assertion is not true, but on the contrary affirms an absurdity. I am under obligation to will the highest well-being of God and of the Universe as an ultimate end, or for its own intrinsic value. Now according to this philosophy, in order to get the highest view of this obligation, I must contemplate *not the intrinsic value* of those infinite interests that I ought to will, but the goodness of God. This is absurd. The fact is, I must prize the value of the interests to be willed and the goodness of God as a reason for willing actual blessedness to Him in particular.

But it may well be asked, why does the bible and why do we so often present the character of God and of Christ as a means of awakening a sense of moral obligation and of inducing virtue? Answer,

It is to lead men to contemplate the infinite value of those interests which we ought to will. Presenting the example of God and of Christ, is the highest moral means that can be used. That God's example and man's example is the most impressive and efficient way in which he can declare his views and hold forth to public gaze the infinite value of those interests upon which all hearts ought to be set. For example, nothing can set the infinite value of the soul in a stronger light than the example of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost has done.

Nothing can beget a higher sense of obligation to will the glory of the Father and the salvation of souls, than the example of Christ. His example is his loudest preaching, his clearest most impressive exhibition, not merely of his own goodness, but of the intrinsic and infinite value of the interest he sought and which we ought to seek. It is the love, the care, the self-denial, and the example of God in his efforts to secure the great ends of benevolence that hold those interests forth in the strongest light, and thus beget a sense of obligation to seek the same end. But let it be observed, it is not a contemplation of the goodness of God that awakens this sense of obligation, but the contemplation of the value of those interests which he seeks, in the light of His painstaking and example; this quickens and gives efficiency to the sense of obligation to will what He wills. Suppose, for example, that I manifest the greatest concern and zeal for the salvation of souls, it would not be the contemplation of my goodness that would quicken in a by-stander a sense of obligation to save souls, but my zeal, and life, and spirit, would have

the strongest tendency to arouse in him a sense of the infinite and intrinsic value of the soul, and thus quicken a sense of obligation. Should I behold multitudes rushing to extinguish a flaming house, it would not be a contemplation of their goodness, but the contemplation of the interests at stake to the consideration of which their zeal would lead me that would quicken a sense of obligation in me to hasten to lend my aid.

(8.) Again: it is asserted that moral action is impracticable upon any other principle.

[1.] What does this mean? Does it mean that there can be no obligation unless the goodness of God be regarded as the foundation of moral obligation? If so, the mistake is radical.

[2.] Or does it mean that action can have no moral character whatever, unless it be put forth in view of the fact or upon the assumption that the goodness of God is the foundation of moral obligation? If this be the meaning, the mistake is no less radical.

Thus we see that it is grossly absurd and self-contradictory for any one to maintain that moral obligation respects the ultimate intention or choice of an end for its own intrinsic value, and at the same time assert that the Divine moral excellence is the foundation of moral obligation. The fact is, it never is, and never can be the foundation of moral obligation. Our whole duty resolves itself into an obligation to will the highest good or well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end. Faith, gratitude, and every phase of virtue resolves itself into this love or good will, and the foundation of the obligation to will this end for its own sake, can by no possibility be any other than its own intrinsic value. To affirm that it can is a most palpable contradiction. The moral law proposes an end to be sought, aimed at, chosen, intended. It is the duty of the Divine Being as well as of every other moral agent, to consecrate himself to the promotion of the most valuable end. This end can not be his own virtue. His virtue consists in choosing the end demanded by the law of his own reason. This end can not be identical with the choice itself; for this would be only to choose his own choice as an ultimate end. But again it is impossible that God should require moral agents to make His own virtue an ultimate end.

If it be said that the law requires us to will God's good, blessedness, &c., because or for the reason that He is virtu-

ous, I ask what can be intended by this assertion? Is it intended that we are bound to will His good not because it is valuable to Him, but because He is good? But why, I ask again, should we will good rather than evil to Him? The only answer must be because good is good or valuable. If the good is to be willed because it is valuable, this must be the fundamental reason or foundation of the obligation to will it; and His goodness is and can be only a secondary reason or condition of the obligation to will good to Him in particular, or to will His actual blessedness. My intelligence demands, and the intelligence of every moral being demands that holiness should be the unalterable condition of the blessedness of God and of every moral agent. This God's intelligence must demand. Now his complying with this condition is a changeless condition of the obligation of a moral agent to will His actual blessedness. Whatever His character might be, we are under obligations to will His blessedness with the conditions and means thereof, on account of its own intrinsic value. But not until we are informed that he has met this demand of reason and conscience and performed this condition and thus rendered himself worthy of blessedness, are we under obligation to will it as a reality and fact.

Revelation is concerned to make known the fact that He is holy and of course calls on us in view of His holiness to love and worship Him. But in doing this, it does not, can not mean that His holiness is the foundation of the obligation to will His good as an ultimate end.

The moral excellence of God, so far as I can see, can modify moral obligation only as follows. Every moral agent is under obligation of infinite weight to will the highest well-being of God as an ultimate end, or for its own sake, as a possible good, whether God be holy or sinful. But since the intelligence affirms that blessedness ought to be conditioned upon holiness, no moral agent is under obligation to exercise the love of complacency in God, that is, to will His actual blessedness but upon condition of his holiness. Now seeing that He is holy, moral agents are under obligation to will His actual, and perfect, and infinite and eternal blessedness. Or in other words, they are under infinite obligation to exercise that modification of benevolence toward Him which is properly termed complacency.

Our obligation when viewed apart from His character is to will or wish that God might fulfil all the conditions of perfect

blessedness and upon that condition that He might actually enjoy perfect and infinite satisfaction. But seeing that He meets the demands of His own intelligence and the intelligence of the universe, and that he voluntarily fulfils all the necessary conditions of his highest well-being, our obligation is to will his actual and most perfect and eternal blessedness.

But here it is said, as was noticed in a former lecture, that we often and indeed generally affirm our obligation to love God in view of His moral excellence, without any reference to the good or well-being of God as an end; that His goodness is the foundation of the obligation, and that in affirming this we have no respect to the value of his blessedness, and that indeed His well-being or blessedness is not so much as thought of, but only His holiness or goodness is the object of thought and attention. To this I answer: If we really affirm obligation to love God, we must affirm either that we ought to feel complacency in Him, or that we ought to will something to Him. It is admitted that the obligation is to will something to Him. But if God is good, holy, what ought we to will to Him? Why certainly something which is valuable to Him and that which is most valuable to Him. What should this be but his actual, perfect, infinite, eternal blessedness? It is certainly nonsense to say that a moral agent affirms himself to be under obligation to love God without any reference to his well-being. It is true that moral agents may be consciously and deeply affected with the consideration of the goodness of God when they affirm their obligation to love him. But in this affirmation they do and must assume the intrinsic value of his blessedness as the foundation of the obligation, or they make no intelligent affirmation whatever. They really do affirm and must affirm that they ought to will good to God, assuming the intrinsic value of the good to Him, or they would just as soon affirm obligation to will evil as good to Him.

LECTURE VIII.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

FALSE THEORIES.

VI. THEORY OF MORAL ORDER.

VII. THEORY OF NATURE AND RELATIONS.

VIII. THEORY THAT THE IDEA OF DUTY IS THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

IX. COMPLEX THEORY.

VI. I come now to consider the philosophy which teaches that Moral Order is the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

But what is moral order? The advocates of this theory define it to be identical with the fit, proper, suitable. It is, then, according to them, synonymous with the right. Moral order must be in their view either identical with law or with virtue. It must be either an idea of the fit, the right, the proper the suitable, which is the same as objective right; or it must consist in conformity of the will to this idea or law, which is virtue. It has been repeatedly shown that right, whether objective or subjective can not by any possibility be the end at which a moral agent ought to aim and to which he ought to consecrate himself. If moral order be not synonymous with right in one of these senses, I do not know what it is; and all that I can say is, that if it be not identical with the highest well-being of God and of the universe, it cannot be the end at which moral agents ought to aim, and can not be the foundation of moral obligation. But if by moral order, as the phraseology of some would seem to indicate, be meant that state of the universe in which all law is universally obeyed and as a consequence of universal well-being, this theory is only another name for the true one. It is the same as willing the highest well-being of the universe with the conditions and means thereof.

Or if it be meant, as other phraseology would seem to indicate, that moral order is a state of things in which either all law is obeyed, or the disobedient are punished for the sake of promoting the public good;—if this be what is meant by moral order—it is only another name for the true theory. Willing moral order is only willing the highest good of the universe for its own sake with the condition, and means thereof.

But if by moral order be meant the fit, suitable, in the sense

of law physical or moral, it is absurd to represent moral order as the foundation of moral obligation.

VII. I will next consider the Theory that maintains that the Nature and Relations of Moral Beings is the true Foundation of Moral Obligation.

I. The advocates of this theory confound the *conditions* of moral obligation with the foundation of obligation. The nature and relations of moral agents to each other and to the universe is the condition of their obligation to will the good of being, but not the foundation of the obligation. What! the nature and relations of moral beings the *foundation* of their obligation to choose an ultimate end. Then this end must be their nature and relations. This is absurd. Their nature and relations, being what they are, their highest well-being is known to them to be of infinite and intrinsic value. But it is and must be the intrinsic value of the end, and not their nature and relations that imposes obligation to will the highest good of the universe as an ultimate end.

Writers upon this subject are often falling into the mistake of confounding the conditions of moral obligation with the foundation of moral obligation. Moral agency is a condition, but not the foundation of the obligation. Light, or the knowledge of the intrinsically valuable to being, is a condition, but not the foundation of moral obligation. The intrinsically valuable is the *foundation* of the obligation, and light or the perception of the intrinsically valuable, is only a condition of the obligation. So the nature and relations of moral beings is a condition of their obligation to will each other's good, and so is light or a knowledge of the intrinsic value of their blessedness, but the intrinsic value is alone the foundation of the obligation. It is, therefore, a great mistake to affirm "that the known nature and relations of moral agents is the true foundation of moral obligation."

VIII. The next theory that demands attention is that which teaches that Moral Obligation is founded in the Idea of Duty.

According to this philosophy the end at which a moral agent ought to aim, is *duty*. He must in all things "aim at doing his duty." Or, in other words, he must always have respect to his obligation, and aim at discharging it.

It is plain that this theory, is only another form of stating the rightarian theory. By aiming, intending to do duty, we must understand the advocates of this theory to mean the adoption of a resolution or maxim, by which to regulate their lives—the formation of a resolve to obey God—to serve God

—to do at all times what appears to be right—to meet the demands of conscience—to obey the law—to discharge obligation, &c. I have expressed the thing intended in all these ways because it is common to hear this theory expressed in all these terms and in others like them. Especially in giving instruction to inquiring sinners, nothing is more common than for those who profess to be spiritual guides to assume the truth of this philosophy, and give instructions accordingly. These philosophers or theologians will say to sinners, Make up your mind to serve the Lord; resolve to do your whole duty and to do it at all times; resolve to obey God in all things—to keep all his commandments; resolve to deny yourselves—to forsake all sin—to love the Lord with all your heart and your neighbor as yourself. They often represent regeneration as consisting in this resolution or purpose.

Such-like phraseology, which is very common and almost universal among rightarian philosophers, demonstrates that they regard virtue or obedience to God as consisting in the adoption of a maxim of life. With them, duty is the great idea to be realized. All these modes of expression mean the same thing, and amount to just Kant's morality, which he admits does not necessarily imply religion, namely, "Act upon a maxim at all times fit for law universal," and to Cousin's, which is the same thing, namely, "Will the right for the sake of the right." Now, I can not but regard this philosophy on the one hand, and utilitarianism on the other, as equally wide from the truth, and as lying at the foundation of much of the spurious religion with which the church and the world are cursed. Utilitarianism begets one type of selfishness, which it calls religion, and this philosophy begets another, in some respects more specious, but not a whit the less selfish, God-dishonoring and soul-destroying. The nearest that this philosophy can be said to approach either to true morality or religion, is, that if the one who forms the resolution understood himself he would resolve to become truly moral instead of really becoming so. But this is in fact an absurdity and an impossibility, and the resolution-maker does not understand what he is about when he supposes himself to be forming or cherishing a resolution *to do his duty*. Observe: he intends to do his duty. But to do his duty is to form and cherish an ultimate intention. To intend to do his duty is merely to intend to intend. But this is not doing his duty, as will be shown. He intends to serve God, but this is not serving God as will also be shown. Whatever he intends, he is

neither truly moral nor religious, until he really intends the same end that God does; and this is not to do his duty, nor to do right, nor to comply with obligation, nor to keep a conscience void of offence, nor to deny himself, nor any such-like things. God aims at and intends the highest well-being of Himself and the Universe as an ultimate end, and this is *doing his duty*. It is not resolving or intending to do his duty, but is doing it. It is not resolving to do right for the sake of the right, but it is doing right. It is not resolving to serve himself and the universe but is actually rendering that service. It is not resolving to obey the moral law, but is actually obeying it. It is not resolving to love but actually loving his neighbor as himself. It is not, in other words, resolving to be benevolent but is being so. It is not resolving to deny self, but is actually denying self.

A man may resolve to serve God without any just idea of what it is to serve Him. If he had the idea of what the law of God requires him to choose clearly before his mind—if he perceived that to serve God was nothing less than to consecrate himself to the same end to which God consecrates himself, to love God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself, that is, to will or choose the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end—to devote all his being, substance, time and influence to this end;—I say, if this idea were clearly before his mind, he would not talk of resolving to consecrate himself to God—resolving to do his duty, to do right—to serve God—to keep a conscience void of offence, and such-like things. He would see that such resolutions were totally absurd and a mere evasion of the claims of God. It has been repeatedly shown that all virtue resolves itself into the intending of an ultimate end or of the highest well-being of God and the universe. This is true morality and nothing else is. This is identical with that love to God and man which the law of God requires. This then, is duty. This is serving God. This is keeping a conscience void of offence. This is right and nothing else is. But to intend or resolve to do this is only to intend to intend instead of at once intending what God requires. It is resolving to love God and his neighbor instead of really loving him; choosing to choose the highest well-being of God and of the universe instead of really choosing it. Now this is totally absurd, and when examined to the bottom will be seen to be nothing else than a most perverse postponement of duty and a most God-provoking evasion of his claims. To intend to do duty is gross nonsense. To do

duty is to love God with all the heart and our neighbor as ourselves, that is, to choose, will, intend the highest well-being of God and our neighbor for its own sake. To intend to do duty, to aim at doing duty, at doing right, at discharging obligation, &c. is to intend to intend, to choose to choose, and such-like nonsense. Moral obligation respects the ultimate intention. It requires that the intrinsically valuable to being shall be willed for its own sake. To comply with moral obligation is not to intend or aim at this compliance as an end, but to will, choose, intend that which moral law or moral obligation requires me to intend, namely, the highest good of being. To intend obedience to law is not obedience to law, for the reason that obedience is not that which the law requires me to intend. To aim at discharging obligation is not discharging it, just for the reason that I am under no obligation to intend this as an end. Nay, it is totally absurd and nonsensical to talk of resolving, aiming, intending to do duty—to serve the Lord, &c. &c. All such resolutions imply an entire overlooking of that in which true religion consists. Such resolutions and intentions from their very nature must respect outward actions in which is no moral character, and not the ultimate intention, in which all virtue and vice consist. A man may resolve or intend to do this or that. But to intend to intend an ultimate end, or to choose it for its intrinsic value instead of willing and at once intending or choosing that end, is grossly absurd, self-contradictory, and naturally impossible. Therefore this philosophy does not give a true definition and account of virtue. It is self-evident that it does not conceive rightly of it. And it can not be that those who give such instructions or those who receive and comply with them have the true idea of religion in their minds. Such teaching is radically false and such a philosophy leads only to bewilder, and dazzles to blind.

It is one thing for a man who actually loves God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself to resolve to regulate all his outward life by the law of God, and a totally different thing to intend to love God or to intend his highest glory and well-being. Resolutions may respect outward action, but it is totally absurd to intend or resolve to form an ultimate intention. But be it remembered that morality and religion do not belong to outward action, but to ultimate intentions. It is amazing and afflicting to witness the alarming extent to which a spurious philosophy has corrupted and is corrupting the church of God. Kant and Cousin and Coleridge have adopted a phraseology and manifestly have conceived in idea a philoso-

phy subversive of all true love to God and man, and teach a religion of maxims and resolutions instead of a religion of Love. It is a philosophy, as we shall see in a future Lecture, which teaches that the moral law or law of right, is entirely distinct from and may be opposite to the law of benevolence or love. The fact is, this philosophy conceives of duty and right as belonging to mere outward action. This must be, for it can not be crazy enough to talk of resolving or intending to form an ultimate intention. Let but the truth of this philosophy be assumed in giving instructions to the anxious sinner, and it will immediately dry off his tears and in all probability lead him to settle down in a religion of resolutions instead of a religion of love. Indeed this philosophy will immediately dry off, (if I may be allowed the expression) the most genuine and powerful revival of religion, and run it down into a mere revival of a heartless, Christless, loveless philosophy. It is much easier to persuade anxious sinners to resolve to do their duty, to resolve to love God, than it is to persuade them really to do their duty, and really to love God with all their heart and with all their soul and their neighbor as themselves.

IX. We now come to the consideration of that philosophy which teaches the Complexity of the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

This theory maintains that there are several distinct grounds of moral obligation; that the highest good of being is only one of the grounds of moral obligation, while right, moral order, the nature and relations of moral agents, merit and demerit, truth, duty, and many such like things, are distinct grounds of moral obligation; that these are not merely conditions of moral obligation, but that each one of them can by itself impose moral obligation. The advocates of this theory, perceiving its inconsistency with the doctrine that moral obligation respects the ultimate choice or intention only, seem disposed to relinquish the position that obligation respects strictly only the choice of an ultimate end, and to maintain that moral obligation respects the ultimate action of the will. By ultimate action of the will they mean, if I understand them, the will's treatment of every thing according to its intrinsic nature and character; that is, treating every thing or taking that attitude in respect to every thing known to the mind that is exactly suited to what it is in and of itself. For example, right ought to be regarded and treated by the will as right, because it is right. Truth ought to be regarded and treated as truth for its own sake, virtue as virtue, merit as merit, demerit as demerit, the useful as useful, the beautiful

as beautiful, the good or valuable as valuable, each for its own sake; that in each case the action of the will is ultimate in the sense that its action terminates on these objects as ultimates; in other words, that all those actions of the will are ultimates that treat things according to their nature and character, or according to what they are in and of themselves. Now in respect to this theory I would enquire:

I. What is intended by the will's treating a thing or taking that attitude in respect to it that is suited to its nature and character? Are there any other actions of will than choices and intentions? Choice, preference, intention, volition—are not all the actions of the will comprehended in these? Choice, preference, intention—are not these identical? Do not all the actions of the will consist either in the choice of an end or in the choice of means to secure an end? If there are any other actions than these, are they intelligent actions? If so, what are those actions of will that consist neither in the choice of an end, nor in volitions or efforts to secure an end? Can there be intelligent acts of will that neither respect ends nor means? Can there be moral acts of will when there is no choice or intention? If there is choice or intention, must not these respect an end or means? What then can be meant by ultimate action of will as distinguished from ultimate choice or intention? Can there be choice without there is an object of choice? If there is an object of choice, must not this object be chosen either as an end or as a means? If as an ultimate end, how does this differ from ultimate intention? If as a means, how can this be regarded as an ultimate action of the will? What can be intended by actions of will that are not acts of choice nor of volition? I can conceive of no other. But if all acts of will must of necessity consist in willing or nilling, that is in choosing or refusing, which is the same as willing one way or another in respect to all objects of choice apprehended by the mind, how can there be any intelligent act of the will that does not consist in or that may not and must not in its last analysis be resolvable into, and be properly considered as the choice of an end or of means to secure an end? Can moral law require any other action of will than choice and volition? What other actions of will are possible to us? Whatever moral law does require, it must and can only require choices and volitions. It can only require us to choose ends or means. It can not require us to choose as an ultimate end any thing that is not intrinsically worthy of choice—nor as a means any thing that does not sustain that relation.

2. Secondly, let us examine this theory in the light of the revealed law of God. The whole law is fulfilled in one word, Love.

Now we have seen that the will of God can not be the foundation of moral obligation. Moral obligation must be founded in the nature of that which moral law requires. Unless there be something in the nature of that which moral law requires us to will that renders it worthy or deserving of choice, we can be under no obligation to will or choose it. It is admitted that the love required by the law of God must consist in an act of the will and not in mere emotions. Now, does this love, willing, choice, embrace several distinct ultimates? If so, how can they all be expressed in one word love? Observe, the law requires only love to *God* and our *neighbor* as an ultimate. This love or willing must respect and terminate on God and our neighbor. The law says nothing about willing right for the sake of the right, or truth for the sake of the truth, or beauty for the sake of beauty, or virtue for the sake of virtue, or moral order for its own sake, or the nature and relations of moral agents for their own sake; nor is, nor can any such thing be implied in the command to love God and our neighbor. All these and innumerable other things are and may be conditions and means of the highest well-being of God and our neighbor. As such, the law may, and doubtless does, in requiring us to will the highest well-being of God and our neighbor as an ultimate end, require us to will all these as the necessary conditions and means. The end which the revealed law requires us to will is undeniably simple as opposed to complex. It requires only love to God and our neighbor. One word expresses the whole of moral obligation. Now certainly this word can not have a complex signification in such a sense as to include several distinct and ultimate objects of love, or of choice. This love is to terminate on God and our neighbor, and not on abstractions, nor on inanimate and insentient existences. I protest against any philosophy that contradicts the revealed law of God, and that teaches that any thing else than God and our neighbor, is to be loved for its own sake, or that any thing else is to be chosen as an ultimate end than the highest well-being of God and our neighbor. In other words, I object utterly to any philosophy that makes any thing obligatory upon a moral agent that is not expressed or implied in perfect good will to God and to the universe of sentient existences. "To the word and to the testimony; if" any philosophy "agree not therewith, it is because there is no

light in it." The revealed law of God knows but one ground or foundation of moral obligation. It requires but one thing, and that is just that attitude of the will toward God and our neighbor that accords with the intrinsic value of their highest well-being; that God's moral worth shall be willed as of infinite value as a condition of his own well-being, and that his actual and perfect blessedness shall be willed for its own sake, and because or upon condition that he is worthy; that our neighbor's moral worth shall be willed as an indispensable condition of his blessedness, and that if our neighbor is worthy of happiness, his actual and highest happiness shall be willed. The fact is that all ultimate acts of will must consist in ultimate choices and intentions, and the revealed law requires that our ultimate choice, intention, should terminate on the good of God and our neighbor, thus making the foundation of moral obligation simple, moral action simple, and all true morality to be summed up in one word, Love. It is impossible with our eye upon the revealed law to make more than one foundation of moral obligation, and it is utterly inadmissible to subvert this foundation by any philosophisings whatever. This law knows but one end which moral agents are under obligation to seek and sets at nought all so-called ultimate actions of will that do not terminate on the good of God and our neighbor. The ultimate choice with the choice of all the conditions and means of the highest well-being of God and the universe, is all that the revealed law recognizes as coming within the pale of its legislation. It requires nothing more and nothing less.

But there is another form of the complex theory of moral obligation that I must notice before I dismiss this subject. In the examination of it I shall be obliged to repeat some things which have been in substance said before. Indeed there has been so much confusion upon the subject of the nature of virtue or of the foundation of moral obligation as to render it indispensable in the examination of the various false theories and in removing objections to the true one, to frequently repeat the same thought in different connections. This I have found to be unavoidable if I would render the subject at all intelligible to the common reader.

I pass now to the consideration of another form of the theory that affirms the complexity of the foundation of Moral Obligation; complex, however, only in a certain sense.

This philosophy admits and maintains that *the good*, that is, the valuable to being, is the only ground of moral obligation,

and that in every possible case the valuable to being, or the good, must be intended as an end as a condition of the intention being virtuous. In this respect it maintains that the foundation of moral obligation is simple, a unit. But it also maintains that there are several ultimate goods or several ultimates or things which are intrinsically good or valuable in themselves, and are therefore to be chosen for their own sake or as an ultimate end; that to choose either of these as an ultimate end or for its own sake is virtue.

It admits that happiness or blessedness is *a* good, and should be willed for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, but it maintains that virtue is an ultimate good; that right is an ultimate good; that the just and the true are ultimate goods; in short that the realization of the ideas of the reason, or the carrying out into concrete existence any idea of the reason is an ultimate good. For instance: there were in the Divine mind from eternity, certain ideas of the good or valuable; the right, the just, the beautiful, the true, the useful, the holy. The realization of these ideas of the Divine reason, according to this theory, was the end which God aimed at or intended in creation; He aimed at their realization as ultimates or for its own sake, and regarded the concrete realization of every one of these ideas as a separate and ultimate good; and so certain as God is virtuous, so certain it is, says this theory, that an intention to realize these ideas for their own sake, or for the sake of the realization is virtue. Therefore the intention on our part to realize these ideas for the sake of the realization is virtue. Then the foundation of moral obligation is complex in the sense that to will either the good or valuable, the right, the true, the just, the virtuous, the beautiful, the useful, &c., for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, is virtue; that there is more than one virtuous ultimate choice or intention. Thus any one of several distinct things may be intended as an ultimate end with equal propriety and with equal virtuousness. The soul may at one moment be wholly consecrated to one end, that is, to one ultimate good, and sometimes to another, that is, sometimes it may will one good and sometimes another good as an ultimate end and still be equally virtuous.

In the discussion of this subject I will,

1. *State again the exact question to be discussed.*
2. *Define again the different senses of the term good.*
3. *Show in what sense of the term good it can be an ultimate.*
4. *That satisfaction or enjoyment is the only ultimate good.*

1. The exact question. It is this: *In what does the supreme and ultimate good consist?*

2. The different senses of the term good.

(1.) Good may be *natural* or *moral*. Natural good is synonymous with valuable. Moral good is synonymous with virtue. Moral good is in a certain sense a natural good, that is, it is valuable as a means of natural good; and the advocates of this theory affirm that moral good is valuable in itself.

(2.) Good, as has formerly been said, may be absolute and relative. Absolute good is that which is intrinsically valuable. Relative good is that which is valuable as a means. It is not valuable in itself, but valuable because it sustains to absolute good the relation of a means to an end. Absolute good may also be a relative good, that is, it may tend to perpetuate and augment itself.

Good may also be *ultimate*.

Ultimate good is that intrinsically valuable or absolute good in which all relative good, whether natural or moral, terminates. It is that absolute good to which all relative good sustains the relation of a means or condition.

3. *In what sense of the term good, it can be an ultimate.*

(1.) Not in the sense of moral good or virtue. This has been so often shown that it needs not be repeated here. I will only say that *virtue belongs to intention*. It is impossible that intention should be an ultimate. The thing intended must be the ultimate of the intention. We have seen that to make virtue an ultimate, the intention must terminate on itself, or on a quality of itself, which is absurd. Good can not be an ultimate in the sense of relative good. To suppose that it could, were to suppose a contradiction; for relative good is not *intrinsically* valuable, but only valuable on account of its relations.

(2.) Good can be an ultimate only in the sense of the natural and absolute, that is, that only can be an ultimate good, which is naturally and intrinsically valuable to being. This only can be an end or an ultimate good, namely, that which sustains such a relation to sentient existences as to be by reason of their own natures intrinsically valuable to them. And we shall soon inquire whether any thing can be intrinsically valuable to them but enjoyment, mental satisfaction, or blessedness.

I come now to state the point upon which issue is taken, to wit: That enjoyment, blessedness, or mental satisfaction is the only ultimate good.

(1.) It has been before remarked and should be repeated here that the intrinsically valuable must not only belong to and be inseparable from sentient beings, but that the ultimate or intrinsic absolute good of moral agents must consist in a state of mind. It must be something to be found in the field of consciousness. Nothing can be affirmed by a moral agent to be an intrinsic, absolute, ultimate good, but a state of mind. Take away mind, and what can be a good *per se*; or, what can be a good in any sense?

(2.) Again, it should be said that the ultimate and absolute good cannot consist in a choice or in a voluntary state of mind. The thing chosen is and must be the ultimate of the choice. Choice can never be chosen as an ultimate end. Benevolence then, or the love required by the law can never be the ultimate and absolute good. It is admitted that blessedness, enjoyment, mental satisfaction, is a good, an absolute and ultimate good. This is a first truth of reason. All men assume it. All men seek enjoyment either selfishly or disinterestedly, that is, they seek their own good supremely, or the general good of being. That it is the only absolute and ultimate good is also a first truth. But for this there could be no activity—no motive to action—no object of choice. Enjoyment is in fact the ultimate good. It is in fact the result of existence and of action. It results to God from his existence, his attributes, his activity, and his virtue, by a law of necessity. His powers are so correlated that blessedness can not but be the state of his mind, as resulting from the exercise of his attributes and the activity of his will. Happiness or enjoyment results both naturally and governmentally from obedience to law both physical and moral. This shows that government is not an end, but a means. It also shows that the end is blessedness and the means obedience to law. Obedience to law can not be the ultimate end of government, for,

[1.] Obedience to moral law consists in the love of God and our neighbor, that is, in willing good to God and our neighbor. The good and not the willing must be the end of government.

[2.] The sanctions of government or of law in the widest sense of the term, must be the ultimate of obedience and the end of government. The sanctions of moral government must be the ultimate good and evil. That is, they must promise and threaten that which is in its own nature an ultimate good or evil. Virtue must consist in the impartial

choice of that as an end which is proffered as the reward of virtue. This is and must be the ultimate good. Sin consists in choosing that which defeats or sets aside this end, or in selfishness.

But what is intended by the *right*, the *just*, the *true*, &c. being ultimate goods and ends to be chosen for their own sake? These may be *objective* or *subjective*. Objective right, truth, justice, &c. are mere ideas and can not be good or valuable in themselves. Subjective right, truth, justice, &c., are synonymous with righteousness, truthfulness, and justness. These are virtue. They consist in an active state of the will and resolve themselves into choice, intention. But we have repeatedly seen that intention can neither be an end nor a good in itself, in the sense of intrinsically valuable.

Again: Constituted as moral agents are, it is a matter of consciousness that the concrete realization of the ideas of right, and truth, and justice, of beauty, of fitness, of moral order, and in short, of all that class of ideas, is indispensable as the condition and means of their highest well-being, and that enjoyment or mental satisfaction is the result of realizing in the concrete those ideas. This enjoyment or satisfaction then is and must be the end or ultimate upon which the intention of God must have terminated, and upon which ours must terminate as an end or ultimate.

Again: The enjoyment resulting to God from the concrete realization of his own ideas must be infinite. He must therefore have intended it as the supreme good. It is in fact the ultimate good. It is in fact the *supremely valuable*.

Again: If there is more than one ultimate good, the mind must regard them all as one, or sometimes be consecrated to one and sometimes to another—sometimes wholly consecrated to the beautiful, sometimes to the just, and then again to the right, then to the useful, to the true &c. But it may be asked of what value is the beautiful aside from the enjoyment it affords to sentient existences. It meets a demand of our being, and hence affords satisfaction. But for this in what sense could it be regarded as good? The idea of the useful, again, can not be an idea of an ultimate end, for utility implies that something is valuable in itself to which the useful sustains the relation of a means and is useful only for that reason.

Of what value is the true, the right, the just, &c., aside from the pleasure or mental satisfaction resulting from them to sentient existences? Of what value were all the rest of

the universe, were there no sentient existences to enjoy it.

Suppose, again, that every thing else in the universe existed just as it does, except mental satisfaction or enjoyment, and that there were absolutely no enjoyment of any kind in any thing any more than there is in a block of granite, of what value would it all be; and to what or to whom would it be valuable? *Mind* without susceptibility of enjoyment could neither know nor be the subject of good nor evil, any more than a slab of marble. Truth in that case could no more be a good to mind than mind could be a good to truth; the eye would be the good of light as much as light would be the good of the eye. Nothing in the universe could give or receive the least satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Neither natural or moral fitness or unfitness could excite the least emotion or mental satisfaction. A block of marble might just as well be the subject of good as any thing else upon such a supposition.

Again: It is obvious that all creation, where law is obeyed, tends to one end, and that end is happiness or enjoyment. This demonstrates that enjoyment was the end at which God aimed in creation.

Again: It is evident that God is endeavoring to realize all the other ideas of his reason for the sake of, and as a means of realizing that of the valuable to being. This as a matter of fact is the result of realizing in the concrete all those ideas. This must then have been the end intended. ✓

But again: The bible knows of but one ultimate good. This, as has been said, the moral law has forever settled. The highest well-being of God and the universe is the only end required by the law. Creation proposes but one end. Physical and moral government propose but one end. The bible knows but one end, as we have just seen. The law and the gospel propose the good of being only as the end of virtuous intention. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbor as thyself." Here is the whole duty of man. But here is nothing of choosing, willing, loving, truth, justice, right, utility, or beauty, as an ultimate end for their own sakes. The fact is, there are innumerable relative goods, or conditions, or means of enjoyment, but only one *ultimate good*. Disinterested benevolence to God and man is the whole of virtue, and every modification of love resolves itself in the last analysis into this. If this is so, well-being in the sense of enjoyment must be the only ultimate or good. But well

being, in the complex sense of the term, is made up of enjoyment and the means and sources or conditions of enjoyment. *Conformity to law universal*, must be the condition and enjoyment; the ultimate end, strictly and properly speaking.

It is nonsense to object that if enjoyment or mental satisfaction be the only ground of moral obligation, we should be indifferent as to the means. This objection assumes that in seeking an end for its intrinsic value, we must be indifferent as to the way in which we obtain that end, that is, whether it be obtained in a manner possible or impossible, right or wrong. It overlooks the fact that from the laws of our own being it is impossible for us to will the end without willing also the indispensable and therefore the appropriate means; and also that we can not possibly regard any other conditions or means of the happiness of moral agents as possible, and therefore as appropriate or right, but holiness and universal conformity to the law of our being. As we said in a former lecture, enjoyment or mental satisfaction results from having the different demands of our being met. One demand of the reason and conscience of a moral agent is that happiness should be conditioned upon holiness. It is therefore naturally impossible for a moral agent to be satisfied with the happiness or enjoyment of moral agents except upon the condition of their holiness.

But this class of philosophers insist that all the archetypes of the ideas of the reason are necessarily regarded by us as good in themselves. For example: I have the idea of beauty. I behold a rose. The perception of this archetype of the idea of beauty gives me instantaneous pleasure. Now it is said, that this archetype is necessarily regarded by me as a good. I have pleasure in the presence and perception of it, and as often as I call it to remembrance. This pleasure, it is said, demonstrates that it is a good to me; and this good is in the very nature of the object, and must be regarded as a good in itself. To this I answer, that the presence of the rose is a good to me, but not an *ultimate* good. It is only a means or source of pleasure or happiness to me. The rose is not a good in itself. If there were no eyes to see it and no olfactories to smell it, to whom could it be a good? But in what sense can it be a good except in the sense that it gives satisfaction to the beholder? The satisfaction and not the rose, is and must be the ultimate good. But it is inquired, do not I desire the rose for its own sake? I answer, yes; you

desire it for its *own sake*, but you do not, can not *choose* it for its *own sake*, but, to gratify the desire. The desires all terminate on their respective objects. The desire for food terminates on food; thirst terminates on drink, &c. These things are so correlated to these appetites that they are desired for their own sakes. But they are not and cannot be chosen for their own sakes or as an ultimate end. They are and must be regarded and chosen as the means of gratifying their respective desires. To choose them simply in obedience to the desire were selfishness. But the gratification is a good and a part of universal good. The reason, therefore, urges and demands that they should be chosen as a means of good to myself. When thus chosen in obedience to the law of the intelligence, and no more stress is laid upon the gratification than in proportion to its relative value, and when no stress is laid upon it simply because it is my own gratification, the choice is holy. The perception of the archetypes of the various ideas of the reason will, in most instances, produce enjoyment. These archetypes, or, which is the same thing, the concrete realization of these ideas, is regarded by the mind as a good, but not as an ultimate good. The ultimate good is the satisfaction derived from the perception of them.

The perception of moral or physical beauty gives me satisfaction. Now moral and physical beauty are regarded by me as good, but not as ultimate good. They are relative good only. Were it not for the pleasure they give me, I could not in any way connect with them the idea of good. Suppose no such thing as mental satisfaction existed, that neither the perception of virtue nor of natural beauty, nor of any thing else, could produce the least emotion or feeling or satisfaction of any kind. There would be the idea and its archetype both in existence and exactly answering to each other. But what then? The archetype would no more be the good of, or valuable to the idea, than the idea would be the good of or valuable to the archetype. The mental eye might perceive order, beauty, physical and moral, or any thing else; but these things would no more be a good to the eye or intellect that perceived them than the eye would be a good to them. The fact is, the idea of good or of the valuable could not in such a case exist, consequently virtue or moral beauty could not exist. The idea of good, or of the valuable, must exist before virtue can exist. It is and must be the development of the idea of the valuable, that develops the idea of moral obligation, of right and wrong, and consequently, that makes virtue possible. The mind

must perceive an object of choice that is regarded as intrinsically valuable before it can have the idea of moral obligation to choose it as an end. This object of choice can not be virtue or moral beauty, for this would be to have the idea of virtue or of moral beauty before the idea of moral obligation, or of right and wrong. This were a contradiction. The mind must have the idea of some ultimate good the choice of which would be virtue or concerning which the reason affirms moral obligation, before the idea of virtue or of right or wrong can exist. The development of the idea of the valuable or of an ultimate good must precede the possibility of virtue or of the idea of virtue, of moral obligation, or of right and wrong. It is absurd to say that virtue is regarded as an ultimate good, when in fact the very idea of virtue does not and can not exist until a good is presented in view of which the mind affirms moral obligation to will it for its own sake, and also affirms that the choice of it for that reason would be virtue.

LECTURE IX.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

PRACTICAL BEARINGS OF THE DIFFERENT THEORIES.

It has already been observed that this is a highly practical question, and one of surpassing interest and importance, and I have gone through the discussion and examination of the several principal theories for the purpose of preparing the way to expose the practical results of those various theories, and show that they legitimately result in some of the most soul-destroying errors that cripple the church and curse the world. I have slightly touched already upon this subject, but so slightly, however, as to forbid its being left until we have looked more steadfastly, and thoroughly into it.

I. I will begin with the theory that regards the sovereign will of God as the foundation of moral obligation.

One legitimate and necessary result of this theory, is a totally erroneous conception both of the character of God and of the nature and design of His government. If God's will is the foundation of moral obligation, it follows that He is an arbitrary sovereign. He is not under law himself, and He has no rule by which to regulate His conduct, nor by which either himself or any other being can judge of his moral character. Indeed unless He is under law, or is a subject of moral obligation, he has and can have no moral character; for moral character always and necessarily implies moral law and moral obligation. If God's will is not itself under the law of His infinite reason, or in other words, if it is not conformed to the law imposed upon it by His intelligence, then His will is and must be arbitrary in the worst sense, that is, in the sense of having no regard to reason, or to the nature and relations of moral agents. But if His will is under the law of His reason, if he acts from principle, or has good and benevolent reasons for his conduct, then His will is not the foundation of moral obligation, but those reasons that lie revealed in the Divine intelligence, in view of which it affirms moral obligation, or that He ought to will in conformity with those reasons. In other words, if the intrinsic value of His own well-being and that of the universe be the foundation of moral obligation; if His reason affirms his obligation to choose this as an ultimate end, and to consecrate His infinite

energies to the realization of it; and if His will is conformed to this law, it follows,

(1.) That His will is not the foundation of moral obligation.

(2.) That He has infinitely good and wise reasons for what He wills, says, and does.

(3.) That He is not arbitrary, but always acts in conformity with principles and for reasons that will, when universally known, compel the respect and even admiration of every intelligent being in the universe.

(4.) That He has a moral character, and is infinitely virtuous.

(5.) That he must respect himself.

(6.) That he must possess a happiness intelligent in kind, and infinite in degree.

(7.) That creation, providential, and moral government, are the necessary means of an infinitely wise and good end, and that the evils that exist are only unavoidably incidental to this infinitely wise and benevolent arrangement, and although great, are indefinitely the less of two evils. That is, they are an evil indefinitely less than no creation and no government would have been, or than a different arrangement and government would have been. It is conceivable that a plan of administration might have been adopted that would have prevented the present evils, but if we admit that God has been governed by reason in the selection of the end he has in view, and in the use of means to accomplish it, it will follow that the evils are less than would have existed under any other plan of administration, or at least, that the present system, with all its evils, is the best that infinite wisdom and love could adopt.

(8.) These incidental evils, therefore, do not at all detract from the evidence of the wisdom and goodness of God, for in all these things He is not acting from caprice, or malice, or an arbitrary sovereignty, but is acting in conformity with the law of his infinite intelligence, and of course has infinitely good and weighty reasons for what He does and suffers to be done—so good and so weighty reasons that he could not do otherwise without violating the law of his own intelligence and therefore committing infinite sin.

(9.) It follows also that there is ground for perfect confidence, love, and submission to His Divine will in all things. That is: If His will is not arbitrary, but conformed to the law of His infinite intelligence, then it is obligatory as our rule of action, because it reveals infallibly what is in accordance with infinite intelligence. We may be entirely safe always in obeying all the Divine requirements, and in

submitting to all his dispensations, however mysterious, being assured that they are perfectly wise and good. Not only are we safe in doing so, but we are under infinite obligation to do so, not because His arbitrary will imposes obligation, but because it reveals to us infallibly the end we ought to choose and the indispensable means of securing it. His will is law, not in the sense of its originating and imposing obligation of its own arbitrary sovereignty, but in the sense of its being a revelation of both the end we ought to seek and the means by which the end can be secured. Indeed this is the only proper idea of law. It does not in any case of itself impose obligation, but is only a revelation of obligation. Law is a condition, but not the foundation of obligation. The will of God is a condition of obligation only so far forth as it is indispensable to our knowledge of the end we ought to seek, and the means by which this end is to be secured. Where these are known, there is obligation whether God has revealed his will or not.

The foregoing and many other important truths, little less important than those already mentioned, and too numerous to be now distinctly noticed, follow from the fact that the good of being and not the arbitrary will of God, is the foundation of moral obligation. But no one of them is or can be true if His will is the foundation of obligation. Nor can any one who consistently holds or believes that His will is the foundation of obligation, hold or believe any of the foregoing truths, nor indeed hold and believe any truth of the law or gospel. Nay, he cannot, if he be at all consistent, have even a correct conception of one truth of God's moral government. Now let us see if he can.

(1.) Can he believe that God's will is wise and good unless he admits and believes that it is subject to the law of His intelligence. Certainly he can not, and to affirm that he can is a palpable contradiction. But if he admits that the Divine will is governed by the law of the Divine intelligence this is denying that His will is the foundation of moral obligation. If he consistently holds that the Divine will is the foundation of moral obligation, he must either deny that His will is any evidence of what is wise and good, or maintain the absurdity that whatever God wills is wise and good, simply for the reason that God wills it, that if he willed the directly opposite of what he does, it would be equally wise and good. But this is an absurdity the swallowing of which would choke a moral agent to death.

(2.) If he consistently holds and believes that God's sovereign will is the foundation of moral obligation, he can not regard Him as having any moral character, for the reason that there is no standard by which to judge of His willing and acting; for, by the supposition, he has no intelligent rule of action, and therefore can have no moral character as he is not a moral agent, and can himself have no idea of the moral character of his own actions, for in fact, upon the supposition in question, they have none. Any one, therefore, who holds that God is not a subject of moral law, imposed on Him by His own reason, but on the contrary that His sovereign will is the foundation of moral obligation, must, if consistent, deny that He has moral character; and he must deny that God is an intelligent being, or admit that He is infinitely wicked for not conforming His will to the law of His intelligence, and for not being guided by his infinite reason instead of setting up an arbitrary sovereignty of will.

(3.) He who holds that God's sovereign will is the foundation of moral obligation instead of a revelation of obligation, if he be at all consistent, can neither assign nor have any good reason either for confidence in Him or submission to Him. If He has no good and wise reasons for what He commands, why should we obey Him? If He has no good and wise reasons for what he does, why should we submit to Him?

Will it be answered that if we refuse, we do it at our peril, and therefore it is wise to do so even if He have no good reasons for what he does and requires? To this I answer that it is impossible upon the supposition in question either to obey or submit to God with the heart. If we can see no good reasons, but on the other hand, are assured there are no good and wise reasons for the Divine commands and conduct, it is forever naturally impossible from the laws of our nature to render any thing more than feigned obedience and submission. Whenever we do not understand the reason for a Divine requirement, or of a dispensation of Divine providence, the condition of heart obedience to the one and submission to the other, is the assumption that He has good and wise reasons for both. But assume the contrary, to wit, that He has no good and wise reasons for either, and you render heart obedience, confidence, and submission impossible. It is perfectly plain, therefore, that he who consistently holds the theory in question, can neither conceive rightly of God nor of any thing respecting His law, gospel, or government, moral or providential. It is impossible for Him to have an

intelligent piety. His religion, if he have any, must be sheer superstition, in as much as he neither knows the true God, nor the true reason why he should love Him, believe, obey, or submit to Him. In short, he neither knows, nor, if consistent, can know any thing of the nature of true religion, and has not so much as a right conception of what constitutes virtue.

But do not understand me as affirming that none who profess to hold the theory in question have any true knowledge of God or any true religion. No, they are happily so purely theorists on this subject, and so happily inconsistent with themselves, as to have, after all, a practical judgment in favor of the truth. They do not see the logical consequences of their theory and of course do not embrace them, and this happy inconsistency is an indispensable condition of their salvation. There is no end to the absurdities to which this theory legitimately conducts us, as might be abundantly shown. But enough has been said, I trust, to put you on your guard that you do not entertain fundamentally false notions of God and of his government, and consequently of what constitutes true love, faith, obedience, and submission to Him.

(4.) Another pernicious consequence of this theory is, that those who hold it will of course give false directions to inquiring sinners. Indeed, if ministers, the whole strain of their instructions must be false. They must, if consistent, not only represent God to their hearers as an absolute and arbitrary sovereign, but they must represent religion as consisting in submission to this arbitrary sovereignty. If sinners inquire what they must do to be saved, they must answer in substance that they must cast themselves on the sovereignty of a God whose law is solely an expression of his arbitrary will, and whose every requirement and purpose is founded in his arbitrary sovereignty. This is the God whom they must love, in whom they must believe, and whom they must serve with a willing mind. How infinitely different such instructions are from those that would be given by one who knew the truth. Such an one would represent God to an inquirer as infinitely reasonable in all his requirements, in all his ways. He would represent the sovereignty of God as consisting, not in arbitrary will, but in benevolence or love directed by infinite knowledge in the promotion of the highest good of being. He would represent his law, not as the expression of his arbitrary will, but as having its foundation in the self-existent nature of God and in the nature of moral agents, as being the very rule which is agreeable to the nature and rela-

tions of moral agents; that its requisitions are not arbitrary, but that the very thing and only that is required which is in the nature of things indispensable to the highest well-being of moral agents; that God's will does not originate obligation by any arbitrary fiat, but on the contrary that he requires what he does because it is obligatory in the nature of things; that his requirement does not create right, but that he requires only that which is naturally and of necessity right. These and many such like things would irresistibly commend the character of God to the human intelligence as a being worthy to be trusted, and as one to whom submission is infinitely safe and reasonable.

But let the advocates of the theory under consideration but consistently press this theory upon the human intelligence, and the more they do so the less reason can it perceive either for submitting to, or for trusting in God. The fact is, the idea of arbitrary sovereignty is shocking and revolting not only to the human heart, whether unregenerate or regenerate, but also to the human intelligence. Religion, based upon such a view of God's character and government, must be sheer superstition or gross fanaticism.

✓ *II. I will next glance at the legitimate results of the theory of the Selfish School.*

This theory, as you recollect, teaches that our own interest is the foundation of moral obligation. In conversing with a distinguished defender of this philosophy, I requested the theorist to define moral obligation, and this was the definition given, to wit: "It is the obligation of a moral agent to seek his own happiness." Upon the practical tendency of this theory I remark,

1. It tends directly and inevitably to the confirmation and despotism of sin in the soul. All sin, as we shall abundantly see, resolves itself into a spirit of self-seeking, or into a disposition to seek good to self, and upon condition of its relations to self, and not impartially or disinterestedly. This philosophy represents this spirit of self-seeking as virtue, and only requires that in our efforts to secure our own happiness we should not interfere with the rights of others in also seeking theirs. But here it may be asked, when these philosophers insist that virtue consists in willing our own happiness, and that in seeking it we are bound to have respect to the right and happiness of others, do they mean that we are to have a *positive* or merely a *negative* regard to the rights and happiness of others? If they mean that we are to have a posi-

tive regard to others' rights and happiness, what is that but giving up their theory and holding the true one, to wit, that the happiness of each one shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic value, for its own sake? That is, that we should be disinterestedly benevolent? But if they mean that we are to regard our neighbor's happiness negatively, that is, merely in such a sense as not to hinder it, what is this but the most absurd thing conceivable? What! I need not care positively for my neighbor's happiness, I need not will it as a good in itself, and for its own value, and yet I must take care not to hinder it. But why? Why, because it is intrinsically as valuable as my own. Now if this is assigning any good reason why I ought not to hinder it, it is just because it is assigning a good reason why I ought positively and disinterestedly to will it; which is the true theory. But if this is not a sufficient reason to impose obligation, positively and disinterestedly to will it, it can never impose obligation to avoid *hindering* it, and I may pursue my own happiness in my own way without regard to that of any other.

2. If this theory be true, sinful and holy beings are precisely alike, so far as ultimate intention is concerned, in which we have seen all moral character consists. They have precisely the same end in view, and the difference lies only in the means they make use of to promote their own happiness. That sinners are seeking their own happiness, is a truth of universal consciousness. If moral agents are under obligation to seek their own happiness as the supreme end of life, it follows that holy beings do so. So that holy and sinful beings are precisely alike so far as the end for which they live is concerned, the only difference being, as has been observed, in the different means they make use of to promote this end. But observe, no reason can be assigned, in accordance with this philosophy, why they use different means only that they differ in judgment in respect to them, for let it be remembered that this philosophy denies that we are bound to have a *positive* and disinterested regard to our neighbor's interest, and of course no benevolent considerations prevent the holy from using the same means as do the wicked. Where, therefore, is the difference in their character, although they do use this diversity of means? I say again, there is none. If this difference be not to be ascribed to disinterested benevolence in one and to selfishness in the other, there really is and can be no difference in character between them. According to this theory nothing is right or wrong *in itself* but the intention to

promote my own happiness, and any thing is right or wrong as it is intended to promote this result or otherwise. For let it be borne in mind that if moral obligation respects strictly the ultimate intention only, it follows that ultimate intention alone is right or wrong in itself, and all other things are right or wrong as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate intention. This must be true. Also, if my own happiness be the foundation of my moral obligation, it follows that this is the ultimate end at which I ought to aim, and that nothing is right or wrong in itself, in me, but this intention or its opposite, and furthermore that every thing else must be right or wrong in me as it proceeds from this or from an opposite intention. I may do, and upon the supposition of the truth of this theory, I am bound to do whatever will, in my estimation, promote my own happiness, and that, not because of its intrinsic value as a part of universal good, but because it is my own. To seek it as a part of universal happiness, and not because it is my own, would be to act on the true theory, or the theory of disinterested benevolence; which this theory denies.

3. Upon this theory I am not to love God supremely, and my neighbor as myself. If I love God and my neighbor, it is to be only as a means of promoting my own happiness, which is not loving *Him* but loving *myself* supremely.

4. This theory teaches radical error in respect both to the character and government of God; and the consistent defender of it can not but hold fundamentally false views in respect to what constitutes holiness or virtue either in God or man. They do not and can not know the difference between virtue and vice. In short, it is impossible that all their views of religion should not be radically false and absurd.

5. The teachers of this theory must fatally mislead all who consistently follow out their instructions. In preaching they must, if consistent, appeal wholly to hope and fear, instead of addressing the heart through the intelligence. All their instructions must tend to confirm selfishness. All the motives they present, if consistent, tend only to stir up a zeal within them to secure their own happiness. If they pray, it will only be to implore the help of God to accomplish their selfish ends.

Indeed it is impossible that this theory should not blind its advocates to the fundamental truths of morality and religion, and it is hardly conceivable that one could more efficiently serve the devil than by the inculcation of such a philosophy as this.

III. Let us in the next place look into the natural, and if its advocates are consistent, necessary results of Utilitarianism.

This theory, you know, teaches that the utility of an action or of a choice, renders it obligatory. That is, I am bound to will good, not for the intrinsic value of the good; but because willing good tends to produce good—to choose an end, not because of the intrinsic value of the end, but because the willing of it tends to secure it. The absurdity of this theory has been sufficiently exposed. It only remains to notice its legitimate practical results.

1. It naturally, and, I may say, necessarily diverts the attention from that in which all morality consists, namely the ultimate intention. Indeed it seems that the abettors of this scheme must have in mind only outward action, or at most executive volitions, when they assert that the tendency of an action, is the reason of the obligation to put it forth. It seems impossible that they should assert that the reason for choosing an ultimate end should or could be the tendency of choice to secure it. This is so palpable a contradiction that it is difficult to believe that they have ultimate intention in mind when they make the assertion. An ultimate end is ever chosen for its intrinsic value, and not because choice tends to secure it. How, then, is it possible for them to hold that the tendency of choice to secure an ultimate end is the reason of an obligation to make that choice? But if they have not their eye upon ultimate intention when they speak of moral obligation, they are discoursing of that which is strictly without the pale of morality. I said in a former lecture, that the obligation to put forth volitions or *outward actions* to secure an ultimate end must be *conditionated* upon the perceived tendency of such volitions and actions to secure that end, but while this tendency is the condition of the obligation to executive volition, or outward action, the obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of the end to secure which such volitions tend. So that utilitarianism gives a radically false account of the reason of moral obligation. A *consistent* utilitarian therefore can not conceive rightly of the nature of morality or virtue. He can not consistently hold that virtue consists in willing the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end or for its own sake, but must, on the contrary, confine his ideas of moral obligation to volitions and outward actions in which there is strictly no morality, and withal assign an entirely false reason for these, to wit their tendency to secure an end rather than the value of the end which they tend to secure.

This is the proper place to speak of the doctrine of expediency, a doctrine strenuously maintained by utilitarians and as strenuously opposed by rightarians. It is this, that whatever is expedient is right for that reason, that is, that the expediency of an action or measure is the foundation of the obligation to put forth that action or adopt that measure. It is easy to see that this is just equivalent to saying that the utility of an action or measure is the reason of the obligation to put forth that action or adopt that measure. But, as we have seen, utility, tendency, expediency, is only a condition of the obligation (in the sense in which obligation can be affirmed of any thing but ultimate intention,) to put forth outward action or executive volition, never the foundation of the obligation, that always being the intrinsic value of the end to which the volition, action or measure sustains the relation of a means. I do not wonder that rightarians object to this, although I do wonder at the reason which, if consistent, they must assign for this obligation, to wit, that any action or volition, (ultimate intention excepted,) can be right or wrong in itself irrespective of its expediency or utility. This is absurd enough and flatly contradicts the doctrine of rightarians themselves, that moral obligation strictly belongs only to ultimate intention. If moral obligation belongs only to ultimate intention, then nothing but ultimate intention can be right or wrong in itself. And every thing else, that is, all executive volitions and outward actions must be right or wrong, (in the only sense in which moral character can be predicated of them,) as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate intention. This is the only form in which rightarians can consistently admit the doctrine of expediency, that is, that it relates exclusively to executive volitions and outward actions. And this they can admit only upon the assumption that executive volitions and outward actions have strictly no moral character in themselves but are right or wrong only as and because they proceed necessarily from a right or wrong ultimate intention. All schools that hold this doctrine, to wit, that moral obligation respects the ultimate intention only, must if consistent, deny that any thing can be either right or wrong *per se* but ultimate intention. Farther they must maintain that utility, expediency, or tendency to promote the ultimate end upon which ultimate intention terminates, is always a condition of the obligation to put forth those volitions and actions that sustain to this end the relation of a means. And still further, they must maintain that the obligation to use those means

must be founded in the value of the end and not in the tendency of the means to secure it, for unless the end be intrinsically valuable, the tendency of means to secure it can impose no obligation to use them. Tendency, utility, expediency, then, I say again, is only the condition of the obligation to use any given means but never the foundation of obligation. An action or executive volition is not obligatory, as utilitarians say, because and for the reason that it is useful or expedient, but merely upon condition that it is so. The obligation in respect to outward action is always founded in the value of the end to which this action sustains the relation of a means, and the obligation is conditioned upon the perceived tendency of the means to secure that end. *Expediency* can never have respect to the choice of an ultimate end, or to that in which moral character consists, to wit, ultimate intention. The end is to be chosen for its own sake. Ultimate intention is right or wrong in itself, and no questions of utility, expediency or tendency have any thing to do with the obligation to put forth ultimate intention, there being only one reason for this, namely, the intrinsic value of the end to be intended. It is true then that whatever is expedient is right, not for that reason, but only upon that condition. The inquiry then, Is it expedient? in respect to outward action, is always proper; for upon this condition does obligation to outward action turn. But in respect to ultimate intention or the choice of an ultimate end, an inquiry into the expediency of this choice or intention is never proper, the obligation being founded alone upon the perceived and intrinsic value of the end, and the obligation being without any condition whatever, except the possession of the powers of moral agency, with the perception of the end upon which intention ought to terminate, namely, the good of universal being. But the mistake of the utilitarian is fundamental, that *expediency is the foundation* of moral obligation, for in fact it cannot be so in any case whatever. I have said, and here repeat, that all schools that hold that moral obligation respects ultimate intention only, must, if consistent, maintain that perceived utility, expediency &c., is a condition of obligation to put forth any outward action, or which is the same thing, to use any means to secure the end of benevolence. Therefore, in practice or in daily life the true doctrine of expediency must of necessity have a place. The railers against expediency, therefore, know not what they say nor whereof they affirm. It is, however, impossible to practice upon the utilitarian philosophy. This

teaches that the tendency of an action to secure good instead of the intrinsic value of the good is the foundation of the obligation to put forth that action. But this is too absurd for practice. For unless the intrinsic value of the end be assumed as the foundation of the obligation to choose it, it is impossible to affirm obligation to put forth an action to secure that end. The folly and the danger of utilitarianism is, that it overlooks the true foundation of moral obligation, and consequently the true nature of virtue or holiness. A consistent utilitarian can not conceive rightly of either.

The teachings of a consistent utilitarian must of necessity abound with pernicious error. Instead of representing virtue as consisting in disinterested benevolence or in the consecration of the soul to the highest good of being in general for its own sake, it must represent it as consisting wholly in using means to promote good. That is, as consisting wholly in executive volitions and outward actions, which, strictly speaking, have no moral character in them. Thus consistent utilitarianism inculcates fundamentally false ideas of the nature of virtue. Of course it must teach equally erroneous ideas respecting the character of God—the spirit and meaning of His law—the nature of repentance—of sin—of regeneration—and in short of every practical doctrine of the Bible.

LECTURE X.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

PRACTICAL BEARINGS OF DIFFERENT THEORIES.

IV. Practical bearings and tendency of Rightarianism.

It will be recollected that this philosophy teaches that right is the foundation of moral obligation. With its advocates, virtue consists in willing the right for the sake of the right, instead of willing the good for the sake of the good. The right is the ultimate end to be aimed at in all things instead of the highest good of being. From such a theory the following consequences must flow. I speak only of consistent Rightarianism.

1. If this theory is true, there is a law of right entirely distinct from the law of love or benevolence. The advocates of this theory often, perhaps unwittingly, assume the existence of such a law. They speak of multitudes of things as being right or wrong *in themselves*, entirely independent of the law of benevolence. Nay, they go so far as to affirm that it is conceivable that virtue might necessarily tend to and result in universal misery, and that in such a case, we should be under obligation to do right, or will right, or intend right although universal misery should be the necessary result. This assumes and affirms that right has no necessary relation to willing the highest good of being for its own sake, or, what is the same thing, that the law of right is not only distinct from the law of benevolence, but may be directly opposed to it; that a moral agent may be under obligation to will as an ultimate end that which he knows will and must by a law of necessity promote and secure universal misery. Rightarians sternly maintain that right would be right, and that virtue would be virtue although this result were a necessary consequence. What is this but maintaining that *moral law* may require moral agents to set their hearts upon and consecrate themselves to that which is necessarily *subversive* of the well-being of the entire universe? And what is this but assuming that that may be moral law that requires a course of willing and acting entirely inconsistent with the nature and relations of moral agents? Thus virtue and benevolence, not only may be different things but opposite things, in case virtue or right and not benevolence is obligatory. This is not only ab-

surd, but it is the grossest nonsense; and a more capital error in morals or philosophy can hardly be conceived.

Nothing is or can be right but benevolence. Nothing is or can be moral law but that which requires that course of willing and acting that tends to secure the highest well-being of God and the universe. Nay, nothing can be moral law but that which requires that the highest well-being of God and of the universe should be chosen as an ultimate end. Rightarianism overlooks and misrepresents the very nature of moral law. Do but contemplate the grossness of that absurdity that maintains that that can be moral law that requires a course of willing that necessarily results in universal and perfect misery; that that may be right, and virtue, and obligatory that thus necessarily results in universal misery. What then, it may be asked, has moral law to do with the nature and relations of moral agents, except to mock, insult, and trample them under foot? Moral law is and must be the law of nature, that is, suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. But can that law be suited to the nature and relations of moral agents that requires a course of action necessarily resulting in universal misery? The fact is that rightarianism not only overlooks, but flatly contradicts the very nature of moral law and sets up a law of right that is the direct opposite of the law of nature.

2. This philosophy tends naturally to fanaticism. Conceiving as it does of right as distinct from and often opposed to benevolence, it scoffs or rails at the idea of inquiring what the highest good evidently demands. It insists that such and such things are right or wrong *in themselves* entirely irrespective of what the highest good demands. "*Justitia fiat, ruat coelum,*" is its motto—Do right, if it ruins the universe; thus assuming that that can be right which shall ruin God and the universe. Having thus in mind a law of right distinct from and perhaps opposed to benevolence what frightful conduct may not this philosophy lead to? This is indeed the law of fanaticism. The tendency of this philosophy is illustrated in the spirit of many reformers, who are bitterly contending for the right.

3. This philosophy teaches a false morality and a false religion. It exalts right above God and represents virtue as consisting in the love of right instead of the love of God. It exhorts men to will the right for the sake of the right instead of the good of being for the sake of the good or for the sake of being. It teaches us to inquire, How shall I do right? in-

stead of, How shall I do *good*? What is right? instead of, What will most promote the good of the universe? Now that which is most promotive of the highest good of being is *right*. To intend the highest well-being of God and of the universe is right. To use the necessary means to promote this end is right; and whatever in the use of means or in outward action is right is so for this reason, namely, it is designed, not that it tends to promote, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. To ascertain, then, what is right, we must inquire, not into a mere abstraction, but what is *intended*. Or if we would know what is duty or what would be right in us, we must understand that to intend the highest well-being of the universe as an end is right and duty; and that in practice every thing is duty or right that is intended to secure this. Thus and thus only can we ascertain what is right in intention, and what is right in the outward life. But rightarianism points out an opposite course. It says: Will the right for the sake of the right, that is, as an end; and in respect to means, Inquire not what is manifestly for the highest good of being, for this you have nothing to do with; your business is to will the right for the sake of the right. If you inquire how you are to know what is right, it does not direct you to the law of benevolence as the only standard, but it directs you to an abstract idea of right as an ultimate rule, having no regard to the law of benevolence or love. It tells you that right is right because it is right, and not that right is conformity to the law of benevolence, and right for this reason. The truth is that subjective right, or right in practice, is only a quality of disinterested benevolence. But the philosophy in question denies this and holds that so far from being a quality of benevolence, it must consist in willing the right for the sake of the right. Now certainly such teaching is radically false and subversive of all sound morality and true religion.

4. As we have formerly seen, this philosophy does not represent virtue as consisting in the love of God, or of Christ, or our neighbor. Consistency must require the abettors of this scheme to give fundamentally false instructions to inquiring sinners. Instead of representing God and all holy beings as devoted to the public good, and instead of exhorting sinners to love God and their neighbor, this philosophy must represent God and holy beings as consecrated to right for the sake of the right, and must exhort sinners who ask what they shall do to be saved, to will the right for the sake of the right, to love the right, to deify right and fall down and worship it. Who

does not know that there is much of this morality and religion in the world and in the church? Infidels are great sticklers for this religion, and often exhibit as much of it as do some rightarian professors of religion. The fact is, it is a severe, stern, loveless, Godless, Christless philosophy, and nothing but happy inconsistency prevents its advocates from uniformly so manifesting it to the world. I have already in a former lecture shown that this theory is identical with that which represents the idea of duty as the foundation of moral obligation and that it gives the same instructions to inquiring sinners. It exhorts them to resolve to do duty, to resolve to serve the Lord, to make up their minds at all times to do right, to resolve to give their hearts to God, to resolve to conform in all things to right, &c. The absurdity and danger of such instructions were sufficiently exposed in the lecture referred to. The law of right when conceived of as distinct from the law of benevolence, is a perfect strait-jacket, an iron collar, a snare of death.

This philosophy represents *all war, all slavery*, and many things as wrong *per se*, without insisting upon such a definition of those things as necessarily implies selfishness. Any thing whatever is wrong in itself that includes and implies selfishness, and nothing else is or can be. All war waged for selfish purposes is wrong *per se*. But war waged for benevolent purposes, or war required by the law of benevolence, is neither wrong in itself, nor wrong in any proper sense. All holding men in bondage for selfish motives is wrong in itself, but holding men in bondage in obedience to the law of benevolence is not wrong but right. And so it is with every thing else. Therefore where it is insisted that all war and all slavery or any thing else is wrong in itself, such a definition of things must be insisted on as necessarily implies selfishness. But consistent rightarianism will insist that all war, all slavery, and all of many other things, is wrong in itself without regard to its being a violation of the law of benevolence. This is consistent with this philosophy, but it is most false and absurd in fact. Indeed any philosophy that assumes the existence of a law of right distinct from and, may be, opposed to the law of benevolence, must teach many doctrines at war with both reason and revelation. It sets men in chase of a philosophical abstraction as the supreme end of life, instead of the concrete reality of the highest well-being of God and the universe. It preys upon his soul and turns into solid iron all the tender sensibilities of his being. Do but contemplate

a human being supremely devoted to an abstraction as the end of life. He wills the right for the sake of the right. For this he lives and moves and has his being. What sort of religion is this? God forbid that I should be understood as holding or insinuating that professed rightarians universally or even generally consistently carry their theory to its legitimate boundary, and that they manifest the spirit that it naturally begets. No. I am most happy in acknowledging that with many, and perhaps with most of them, it is so purely a theory that they are not greatly influenced by it in practice. Many of them I regard as among the excellent of the earth, and I am happy to count them among my dearest and most valued friends. But I speak of the philosophy with its natural results when embraced, not merely as a theory, but when adopted by the heart as the rule of life. It is only in such cases that its natural and legitimate fruits appear. Only let it be borne in mind that right is conformity to moral law, that moral law is the law of nature, or the law founded in the nature and relations of moral agents, the law that requires just that course of willing and action that tends naturally to secure the highest well-being of all moral agents, that requires this course of willing and acting for the sake of the end in which it naturally and governmentally results—and requires that this end shall be aimed at or intended by all moral agents as the supreme good and the only ultimate end of life. I say, only let these truths be borne in mind and you will never talk of a right or a virtue, or a law, obedience to which necessarily results in universal misery; nor will you conceive that such a thing is possible.

V. The philosophy that comes next under review is that which teaches that the Divine Goodness or Moral Excellence is the foundation of moral obligation.

The practical tendency of this philosophy is to inculcate and develop a false idea of what constitutes virtue. It inevitably leads its advocates to regard religion as consisting in a mere feeling of complacency in God. It overlooks, and, if consistent, must overlook the fact that all true morality and religion consists in benevolence or in willing the highest well-being of God and the universe as an ultimate end. It must represent true religion either as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or as consisting in willing the goodness or benevolence of God as an end; either of which is radical error. This scheme does not and can not rightly represent either the character of God or the nature and spirit of his law and govern-

ment. It, in teaching, presents the benevolence of God, not as an inducement to benevolence in us, that is, not as a means of leading us to consider and adopt the same end of life to which God is consecrated, but as being the end to which we are to consecrate ourselves. It holds forth the goodness of God, not for the sake of setting the great end he has in view strongly before us, and inducing us to become like him in consecrating ourselves to the same end, to wit, the highest good of being, but it absurdly insists that His goodness is the foundation of our obligation, which is the same thing as to insist that we are to make His goodness the ultimate end of life, instead of that end at which God aims, and aiming at which constitutes His virtue. Instead of representing the benevolence of God as clearly revealing our obligation to be benevolent, it represents the benevolence as being the foundation of obligation. Obligation to what? Not to will good, certainly; for it is a gross contradiction as we have repeatedly seen, to say that I am under obligation to will good to God as an ultimate end or for its own sake, yet not for this reason, but because God is good. This philosophy, if consistent, must present the goodness of God as a means of awakening emotions of complacency in God, and not for the purpose of making us benevolent, for it does not regard religion as consisting in benevolence, but in a love to God for His goodness, which can be nothing else than a feeling of complacency. But this is radical error. The practical bearings of this theory are well illustrated in the arguments used to support it, as stated and refuted when examining its claims in a former lecture. The fact is, it misrepresents the character, law, and government of God, and of necessity, the nature of true religion. It harps perpetually on the goodness of God as the sole reason for loving Him, which demonstrates that benevolence does not, and consistently can not enter into its idea of virtue or true religion.

There is, no doubt, a vast amount of spurious selfish religion in the world growing out of this philosophy. Many love God because they regard him as loving them, as being their benefactor and particular friend. They are grateful for favors bestowed on self. But they forget the philosophy and theology of Christ who said: "If ye love them that love you what thank have ye? Do not even sinners love those that love them?" They seem to have no idea of a religion of disinterested benevolence.

VI. The next theory to be noticed is that which teaches that Moral Order is the foundation of moral obligation.

The practical objection to this theory is, that it presents a totally wrong end as the great object of life. According to the teachings of this school, moral order is that intrinsically valuable end at which all moral agents ought to aim, and to which they are bound to consecrate themselves. If by moral order the highest good of being is intended, this philosophy is only another name for the true one. But if, as I suppose is the fact, by moral order no such thing as the highest good of God and the universe is intended, then the theory is false and can not teach other than pernicious error. It must misrepresent God, His law and government, and of course must hold radically false views in respect to the nature of holiness and sin. It holds up an abstraction as the end of life, and exalts moral order above all that is called God. It teaches that men ought to love moral order with all the heart, and with all the soul. But the theory is sheer nonsense as was shown in its place. Its practical bearing is only to bewilder and confuse the mind.

Again: The theory must overlook or deny the fact that moral obligation respects the ultimate intention; for it seems impossible that any one possessing reason can suppose that moral order can be the end to which moral beings ought to consecrate themselves. The absurdity of the theory itself was sufficiently exposed in a former lecture. Its practical bearings and tendency are only to beget confusion in all our ideas of moral law and moral government.

VII. We next come to the practical bearings of the theory that moral obligation is founded in the nature and relations of moral agents.

The first objection to this theory is that it confounds the *conditions* with the *foundation* of moral obligation. The nature and relations of moral beings are certainly conditions of their obligation to will each other's good. But it is absolutely childish to affirm that the obligation to will each other's good is not founded in the value of good but in their nature and relations. But for the intrinsic value of their good their nature and relations would be no reason at all why they should will good rather than evil to each other. To represent the nature and relations of moral agents as the foundation of moral obligation is to mystify and misrepresent the whole subject of moral law, moral government, moral obligation, the nature of sin and holiness, and beget confusion in all our thoughts on moral subjects. What but grossest error can find a lodgment in that mind that consistently regards the nature and relations

of moral beings as the foundation of moral obligation? If this be the true theory, then the nature and relations of moral agents is the ultimate end to which moral agents are bound to consecrate themselves. Their nature and relations is the intrinsically valuable end which we are bound to choose for its own sake. This is absurd. But if this philosophy misrepresents the foundation of moral obligation, it can consistently teach absolutely nothing but error on the whole subject of morals and religion. If it mistakes the end to be intended by moral agents, it errs on the fundamental fact of all morals and religion. As all true morality and true religion consists exclusively in willing the right end, if this end be mistaken, the error is fatal. It is, then, no light thing to hold that moral obligation is founded in the nature and relations of moral beings. Such statements are a great deal worse than nonsense—they are radical error on the most important subject in the world. What consistency can there be in the views of one who consistently holds this theory? What ideas must he have of moral law and of every thing else connected with practical theology? Instead of willing the highest good of God and of being he must hold himself under obligation to will the nature and relations of moral beings as an ultimate end.

VIII. The next theory in order is that which teaches that the idea of duty is the foundation of moral obligation. But as I sufficiently exposed the tendency and practical bearings of this theory in a former lecture, I will not repeat here, but pass to the consideration of another theory.

IX. The complexity of the foundation of moral obligation.

In respect to the practical bearings of this theory, I remark,

1. The reason that induces choice is the real object chosen. If, for example, the value of an object induce the choice of that object, the valuable is the real object chosen. If the rightness of a choice of an object induce choice, then the right is the real object chosen. If the virtuousness of an object induce choice, then virtue is the real object chosen.

2. Whatever really influences the mind in choosing must be an object chosen. Thus if the mind have various reasons for a choice, it will choose various ends or objects.

3. If the foundation of moral obligation be not a unit, moral action or intention can not be simple. If any thing else than the intrinsically valuable to being is or can be the foundation of moral obligation, then this thing, whatever it is,

is to be chosen for its own sake. If right, justice, truth, virtue, or any thing else is to be chosen as an end, then just so much regard must be had to them as their nature and importance demand. If the good or valuable to being be an ultimate good, and truth and justice and virtue are also to be chosen, each for its own sake, here we meet with this difficulty, namely, that the good or valuable is one end to be chosen, and right another, and virtue another, and truth another, and justice another, and the beautiful another, and so on. Now, who does not see that if this be so, moral obligation can not be a unit nor can moral action be simple? If there be more considerations than one that ought to have influence in deciding choice, the choice is not right, or at least wholly right unless each consideration that ought to have weight, really has the influence due to it in deciding choice. If each consideration has not its due regard, the choice certainly is not what it ought to be. In other words, all the things that ought to be chosen are not chosen. Indeed, it is self-evident, if there is complexity in the ultimate end to be chosen, there must be the same complexity in the choice, or the choice is not what it ought to be; and if several considerations ought to influence ultimate choice, then there are so many distinct ultimate ends. If this is so, then each of them must have its due regard in every case of virtuous intention. But who then could ever tell whether he allowed to each exactly the relative influence it ought to have? This would confound and stultify the whole subject of moral obligation. This theory virtually and flatly contradicts the law of God and the repeated declaration that love to God and our neighbor is the whole of virtue. What, does God say that all the law is fulfilled in one word, Love, that is, love to God and our neighbor; and shall a christian philosopher overlook this, and insist that we ought to love not only God and our neighbor, but to will the right, and the true, and the just, and the beautiful, and multitudes of such like things for their own sake? The law of God makes and knows only one ultimate end, and shall this philosophy be allowed to confuse us by teaching that there are many ultimate ends, that we ought to will each for its own sake? Nay verily. But if by this theory it is intended that right, and justice, and truth, and the beautiful, &c., are to be chosen only for their intrinsic or relative value to being, then the valuable alone is the foundation of moral obligation. This is simple and intelligible. But if these are to be chosen each for its own sake, then there are so

many different ends to be chosen. If it be their *intrinsic value* that is to be chosen, then there is really but one object of ultimate choice, and that is the intrinsically valuable to being, and it is this upon which the choice terminates in whatsoever this quality may be found, whether in *right, virtue, justice, truth, &c.* But if on the other hand it is not the valuable to being found in these things which is the reason for choosing them, but each of these things is to be chosen on its own account for a reason distinct from its intrinsic value to being, then there are, as has been said, distinct objects of choice or distinct ultimate ends, which must involve the whole subject of moral law, moral obligation, moral action, and moral character in vast confusion. I might here insist upon the intrinsic absurdity of regarding *right, justice, virtue, the beautiful, &c.* as ultimate goods, instead of mental satisfaction or enjoyment. But I waive this point at present, and observe that either this theory resolves itself into the true one, namely, that the valuable to being, in whatsoever that value be found, is the sole foundation of moral obligation, or it is pernicious error. If it be not the true theory, it does not and can not teach ought but error upon the subject of moral law, moral obligation, and of course of morals and religion. It is either, then, confusion and nonsense, or it resolves itself into the true theory, just stated.

X. Lastly, I come to the consideration of the practical bearings of what I regard as the true theory of the foundation of moral obligation, namely that the highest well-being of God and of the Universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation.

Upon this philosophy I remark,

1. That if this be true the whole subject of moral obligation is perfectly simple and intelligible; so plain indeed that "the wayfaring man though a fool *can not err* therein."

(1.) Upon this theory moral obligation respects the choice of an ultimate end.

(2.) This end is a unit.

(3.) It is necessarily known to every moral agent.

(4.) The choice of this end is the whole of virtue.

(5.) It is impossible to sin while this end is intended with all the heart and with all the soul.

(6.) Upon this theory every moral agent knows in every possible instance what is right, and can never mistake his real duty.

(7.) This ultimate intention is right and nothing else is right, more or less.

(8.) Right and wrong respect ultimate intention only and are always the same. Right can be predicated only of good will, and wrong only of selfishness. These are fixed and permanent. If a moral agent can know what end he aims at or lives for, he can know and can not but know at all times whether he is right or wrong. All that upon this theory a moral agent needs to be certain of is, whether he lives for the right end, and this, if at all honest or if dishonest, he really can not but know. If he would ask what is right or what is duty at any time, he need not wait for a reply. It is right for him to intend the highest good of being as an end. If he honestly does this, he can not, doing this, mistake his duty, for in doing this he really performs the whole of duty. With this honest intention it is impossible that he should not use the means to promote this end according to the best light he has; and this is right. A single eye to the highest good of God and the universe is the whole of morality, strictly considered, and upon this theory moral law, moral government, moral obligation, virtue, vice, and the whole subject of morals and religion are the perfection of simplicity. If this theory be true, no honest mind ever mistook the path of duty. To intend the highest good of being is right and is duty. No mind is honest that is not steadily pursuing this end. But in the nonest pursuit of this end there can be no sin, no mistaking the path of duty. That is and must be the path of duty that really appears to a benevolent mind to be so. That is, it must be his duty to act in conformity with his honest convictions. This is duty, this is right. So, upon this theory, no one who is truly honest in pursuing the highest good of being ever did or can mistake his duty in any such sense as to commit sin. I have spoken with great plainness, and perhaps with some severity, of the several systems of error, as I cannot but regard them, upon the most fundamental and important of subjects; not certainly from any want of love to those who hold them, but from a concern long cherished and growing upon me for the honor of truth and for the good of being. Should any of you ever take the trouble to look into this subject, length and breadth, and read the various systems, and take the trouble to trace out their practical results, as actually developed in the opinions and practices of men, you certainly would not be at a loss to account for the theological and philosophical fogs that so bewilder the world. How can it be otherwise with such confusion of opinion upon the fundamental question of morals and religion?

LECTURE XI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

I. IN WHAT SENSE OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW CANNOT BE PARTIAL.

In discussing this question I must,

1. Show what constitutes obedience to moral law.
2. That obedience cannot be partial in the sense that the subject ever does or can partly obey and partly disobey at the same time.

I. What constitutes obedience &c.

We have seen in former lectures that disinterested benevolence is all that the spirit of moral law requires, that is, that the love which it requires to God and our neighbor is good willing, willing the highest good or well-being of God and of being in general, as an end, or for its own sake; that this willing is a consecration of all the powers, so far as they are under the control of the will, to this end. Entire consecration to this end must of course constitute obedience to the moral law. The next question is: Can consecration to this end be real and yet partial in the sense of not being entire for the time being? This conducts us to the second proposition, namely:

II. That obedience can not be partial in the sense that the subject ever does or can partly obey and partly disobey at the same time.

That is, consecration, to be real, must be, for the time being, *entire and universal*. It will be seen that this discussion respects the simplicity of moral action, that is, whether the choices of the will that have any degree of conformity to moral law are always and necessarily wholly conformed or wholly disconformed to it. There are two distinct branches to this inquiry.

1. The one is, can the will at the same time make opposite choices? Can it choose the highest good of being as an ultimate end, and at the same time choose any other ultimate end or make any choices whatever inconsistent with this ultimate choice?

2. The second branch of this inquiry respects the strength or intensity of the choice. Suppose but one ultimate choice can exist at the same time, may not that choice be less efficient and intense than it ought to be?

Let us take up these two inquiries in their order.

1. Can the will at the same time choose opposite and conflicting ultimate ends? While one ultimate end is chosen can the will choose any thing inconsistent with this end? In reply to the first branch of this inquiry I observe,

(1.) That the choice of an ultimate end is, and must be, the supreme preference of the mind. Sin is the supreme preference of self-gratification. Holiness is the supreme preference of the good of being. Can then two supreme preferences coexist in the same mind? It is plainly impossible to make opposite choices at the same time. That is, to choose opposite and conflicting ultimate ends.

(2.) All intelligent choice, as has been formerly shown, must respect ends or means. Choice is synonymous with intention. If there is a choice or intention, of necessity something must be chosen or intended. This something must be chosen for its own sake or as an end, or for the sake of something else to which it sustains the relation of a means. To deny this were to deny that the choice is intelligent. But we are speaking of no other than intelligent choice, or the choice of a moral agent.

(3.) This conducts us to the inevitable conclusion that no choice whatever can be made inconsistent with the present choice of an ultimate end. The mind can not choose one ultimate end, and choose at the same time another ultimate end. But if this can not be, it is plain that it can not choose one ultimate end, and at the same time, while in the exercise of that choice, choose the means to secure some other ultimate end, which other end is not chosen. But if all choice must necessarily respect ends or means, and if the mind can choose but one ultimate end at a time, it follows that, while in the exercise of one choice, or while in the choice of one ultimate end, the mind can not choose, for the time being, any thing inconsistent with that choice. The mind, in the choice of an ultimate end, is shut up to the necessity of willing the means to accomplish that end; and before it can possibly will means to secure any other ultimate end, it must change its choice of an end. If, for example, the soul choose the highest well-being of God and the universe as an ultimate end, it can not while it continues to choose that end, use or choose the means to effect any other end. It can not while this choice continues, choose self-gratification or any thing else as an ultimate end, nor can it put forth any volition whatever known to be inconsistent with this end. Nay, it can put forth no intelligent volition whatever that is not designed

to secure this end. The only possible choice inconsistent with this end is the choice of another ultimate end. When this is done, other means can be used or chosen and not before. This, then, is plain, to wit, that obedience to moral law can not be partial, in the sense either that the mind can choose two opposite ultimate ends at the same time, or that it can choose one ultimate end and at the same time use or choose means to secure any other ultimate end. It "can not serve God and mammon." It can not will the good of being as an ultimate end, and at the same time will self-gratification as an ultimate end. In other words, it can not be selfish and benevolent at the same time. It can not choose as an ultimate end the highest good of being, and at the same time choose to gratify self as an ultimate end. Until self-gratification is chosen as an end, the mind can not will the means of self-gratification. This disposes of the first branch of the inquiry.

2. The second branch of the inquiry respects the strength or intensity of the choice.

May not the choice of an end be real and yet have less than the required strength or intensity? The inquiry resolves itself into this: Can the mind honestly intend or choose an ultimate end and yet not choose it with all the strength or intensity which is required or with which it ought to choose it? Now what degree of strength is demanded? By what criterion is this question to be settled? It can not be that the degree of intensity required is equal to the real value of the end chosen, for this is infinite. The value of the highest well-being of God and the universe is infinite. But a finite being can not be under obligation to exert infinite strength. The law requires him only to exert his own strength. But does or may he not choose the right end but with less than all his strength? All his strength lies in his will; the question, therefore, is, may he not will it honestly and yet at the same time withhold a part of the strength of his will? No one can presume that the choice can be acceptable unless it be honest. Can it be honest and yet less intense and energetic than it ought to be?

We have seen in a former lecture that the perception of an end is a condition of moral obligation to choose that end. I now remark that as light in respect to the end is the condition of the obligation, so the degree of obligation cannot exceed the degree of light. That is, the mind must apprehend the valuable as a condition of the obligation to will it. The

degree of the obligation must be just equal to the mind's honest estimate of the value of the end. The degree of the obligation must vary as the light varies. This is the doctrine of the Bible and of reason. If this is so, it follows that the mind is honest when and only when it devotes its strength to the end in view with an intensity just proportioned to its present light or estimate of the value of that end.

We have seen that the mind can not will any thing inconsistent with a present ultimate choice. If, therefore, the end is not chosen with an energy and intensity equal to the present light, it can not be because a part of the strength is employed in some other choice. If all the strength is not given to this object, it must be because some part of it is voluntarily withholden. That is, I choose the end, but not with all my strength, or I choose the end, but choose not to choose it with all my strength. Is this an honest choice, provided the end appears to me to be worthy of all my strength? Certainly it is not honest.

But again: It is absurd to affirm that I choose an ultimate end and yet do not consecrate to it all my strength. The choice of any ultimate end implies that that is the thing and the only thing for which we live and act; that we aim at and live for nothing else for the time being. Now what is intended by the assertion that I may honestly choose an ultimate end and yet with less strength or intensity than I ought. Is it intended that I can honestly choose an ultimate end, and yet not at every moment keep my will upon the strain, and will at every moment with the utmost possible intensity? If this be the meaning, I grant that this may be so. But I at the same time contend that the law of God does not require that the will or any other faculty should be at every moment upon the strain and the whole strength exerted at every moment. If it does, it is manifest that even Christ did not obey it. I insist that the moral law requires nothing more than honesty of intention, and assumes that honesty of intention will and must secure just that degree of intensity which from time to time the mind in its best judgment sees to be demanded. The Bible every where assumes that sincerity or honesty of intention is moral perfection; that it is obedience to the law. The terms sincerity and perfection in scripture language are synonymous. Uprightness, sincerity, holiness, honesty, perfection, are words of the same meaning in bible language.

Again: It seems to be intuitively certain that if the mind

✓ chooses its ultimate end, it must in the very act of choice consecrate all its time, and strength, and being to that end, and at every moment while the choice remains, choose and act with an intensity in precise conformity with its ability and the best light it has. The intensity of the choice and the strenuousness of its efforts to secure the end chosen must, if the intention be sincere, correspond with the view which the soul has of the importance of the end chosen. It does not seem possible that the choice or intention should be real and honest unless this is so. To will at every moment with the utmost strength and intensity is not only impossible, but, were it possible, to do so could not be in accordance with the soul's convictions of duty. The irresistible judgment of the mind is, that the intensity of its action should not exceed the bound of endurance. That the energies of both soul and body should be so husbanded as to be able to accomplish the most good upon the whole and not in a given moment.

✓ But to return to the question. Does the law of God require simply uprightness of intention, or does it require not only uprightness but also a certain degree of intensity in the intention? Is it satisfied with simple sincerity or uprightness of intention, or does it require that the highest possible intensity of choice shall exist at every moment? When it requires that we love God with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength, does it mean that all our heart, soul, mind and strength shall be consecrated to this end, and be used up from moment to moment and from hour to hour according to the best judgment which the mind can form of the necessity and expediency of strenuousness of effort, or does it mean that all the faculties of soul and body shall be at every moment on the strain to the uttermost? Does it mean that the whole being is to be consecrated to and used up for God with the best economy of which the soul is capable; or does it require that the whole being be not only consecrated to God, but be used up without any regard to economy, and without the soul's exercising any judgment or discretion in the case? In other words, is the law of God the law of reason, or of folly? Is it intelligible or just in its demands; or is it perfectly unintelligible and unjust? Is it a law suited to the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral agents; or has it no regard to them? If it has no regard to either, is it, can it be moral law and impose moral obligation? It seems to me that the law of God requires that all our power, and strength, and being be honestly and continu-

ally consecrated to God and held not in a state of the utmost tension, but that the strength shall be expended and employed in exact accordance with the mind's honest judgment of what is at every moment the best economy for God. If this be not the meaning and the spirit of the law, it can not *be law*, for it could be neither intelligible nor just. Nothing else can be a law of nature. What! Does, or can the command, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy strength, require that every particle of my strength and every faculty of my being shall be in a state of the utmost possible tension? How long could my strength hold out or my being last under such a pressure as this? What reason, or justice, or utility, or equity could there be in such a commandment as this? Were this suited to my nature and relations? That the law does not require the constant and most intense action of the will, I argue for the following reasons:

(1.) No creature in heaven or earth could possibly know whether he ever for a single moment obeyed it. How could he know that no more tension could possibly be endured?

(2.) Such a requirement would be unreasonable inasmuch as such a state of mind would be unendurable.

(3.) Such a state of constant tension and strain of the faculties could be of no possible use.

(4.) It would be uneconomical. More good could be effected by a husbanding of the strength.

(5.) Christ certainly obeyed the moral law and nothing is more evident than that his faculties were not always on the strain.

(6.) Every one knows that the intensity of the will's action depends and must depend upon the clearness with which the value of the object chosen is perceived. It is perfectly absurd to suppose that the will should or possibly can act at all times with the same degree of intensity. As the mind's apprehensions of truth vary, the intensity of the will's action must vary, or it does not act rationally, and consequently not virtuously. The intensity of the actions of the will, ought to vary as light varies, and if it does not, the mind is not honest. If honest, it must vary as light and ability vary.

That an intention can not be right and honest in kind and deficient in the degree of intensity, I argue.

1. From the fact that it is absurd to talk of an intention right in kind while it is deficient in intensity. What does rightness in kind mean? Does it mean simply that the inten-

tion terminates on the proper object? But is this the right kind of an intention when only the proper object is chosen, while there is a voluntary withholding of the required energy of choice? Is this, can this be an honest intention? If so what is meant by an honest intention? Is it honest, can it be honest voluntarily to withhold from God and the universe what we perceive to be their due? and what we are conscious that we might render? It is a contradiction to call this honest. In what sense then may, or can an intention be acceptable in kind, while deficient in degree? Certainly in no sense unless known and voluntary dishonesty can be acceptable. But let me ask again what is intended by an intention being deficient in degree of intensity? If this deficiency be a sinful deficiency, it must be a known deficiency. That is, the subject of it must know at the time that his intention is in point of intensity less than it ought to be, or that he wills with less energy than he ought; or, in other words, that the energy of the choice does not equal or is not agreeable to his own estimate of the value of the end chosen. But this implies an absurdity. Suppose I choose an end, that is, I choose a thing solely on account of its own intrinsic value. It is for its value that I choose it. I choose it for its value, but not according to its value. My perception of its value led me to choose it for that reason; and yet, while I choose it for that reason, I voluntarily withhold that degree of intensity which I know is demanded by my own estimate of the value of the thing which I choose! This is a manifest absurdity and contradiction. If I choose a thing for its value, this implies that I choose it according to my estimate of its value. Happiness for example is a good in itself. Now suppose I will its existence impartially, that is, solely on account of its intrinsic value. Now, does not this imply that every degree of happiness must be willed according to its real or relative value? Can I will it impartially, for its own sake, for and only for its intrinsic value, and yet not prefer a greater to a less amount of happiness? This is impossible. Willing it on account of its intrinsic value implies willing it according to my estimate of its intrinsic value. So, it must be that an intention cannot be sincere, honest, and acceptable in kind while it is sinfully deficient in degree. I will introduce here with some alteration and addition what I have elsewhere stated upon this subject. I quote from my letter in the Oberlin Evangelist upon the following proposition:—

Moral Character is always wholly right or wholly wrong, and never partly right and partly wrong at the same time.

"I must again remind you of that in which moral character consists, and occupy a few moments in stating what I have already said, that moral character belongs solely to the ultimate intention of the mind, or to choice, as distinguished from volition. The law of God requires supreme disinterested benevolence, and all holiness, in the last analysis, resolves itself into some modification of supreme disinterested benevolence, or good-willing. Benevolence, or good-willing, is synonymous with good-intending, or intending good. Now the true spirit of the requirement of the moral law is this—that every moral being shall choose every interest according to its value as perceived by the mind. This is holiness. It is exercising supreme love or good will to God, and equal love or good will to our neighbor.

This is a *choice* or intention, as distinguished from a *volition*. It is also an ultimate intention, as distinguished from a proximate intention.

Choice is the selection of an ultimate end. Volition is produced by choice, and is the effort of the will to accomplish the end chosen. An ultimate intention, or choice, is that which is intended or chosen for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, and not something chosen or intended as a means to accomplish some other and higher end. A proximate end is that which is chosen or intended, not as an ultimate end, but as a means to an ultimate end. If I choose an end, I, of course, put forth those volitions which are requisite to the accomplishment of that end. Holiness, or virtue, consists in the supreme ultimate intention, choice, or willing of the highest well-being of God and the highest good of his kingdom. Nothing else than this is virtue or holiness.

As holiness consists in ultimate intention, so does sin. And as holiness consists in choosing the highest well-being of God and the good of the universe, for its own sake, or as the supreme ultimate end of pursuit; so sin consists in willing, with a supreme choice or intention, self-gratification and self-interest. Preferring a less to a greater good because it is our own is selfishness. All selfishness consists in a supreme ultimate intention. By an ultimate intention, as I have said, is intended that which is chosen for its own sake as an end, and not as a means to some other end. Whenever a moral being prefers or chooses his own gratification, or his own interest, in preference to a higher good, because it is his own, he chooses it as an end, for its own sake, and as an ultimate end; not designing it as a means of promoting any other and

higher end, nor because it is a part of universal good. Every sin, then, consists in an act of will. It consists in preferring self-gratification, or self-interest, to the authority of God, the glory of God, and the good of the universe. It is, therefore, and must be, a supreme ultimate choice, or intention.

Sin and holiness, then, both consist in supreme, ultimate, and opposite choices, or intentions, and can not, by any possibility, co-exist.

But for the sake of entering more at large into the discussion of this question, I will—

1. Examine a little in detail the philosophy of the question, and,
2. Bring the philosophy into the light of the Bible.

And in discussing the philosophy of the question, I would observe that five suppositions may be made, and so far as I can see, only five, in respect to this subject.

1. It may be supposed, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in the same mind.

2. It may be supposed, that the same act or choice may have a complex character, on account of complexity in the motives which induce it.

3. It may be supposed, that an act or choice may be right, or holy in kind, but deficient in intensity or degree. Or,

4. That the will, or heart, may be right, while the affections, or emotions, are wrong. Or,

5. That there may be a ruling, latent, actually existing, holy preference, or intention, co-existing with opposing volitions.

Now unless one of these suppositions is true, it must follow that moral character is either wholly right or wholly wrong, and never partly right and partly wrong at the same time.

And now to the examination.

1. It may be supposed, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in the same mind.

It has been shown that selfishness and benevolence are supreme, ultimate, and opposite choices, or intentions. They can not, therefore, by any possibility, co-exist in the same mind.

2. The next supposition is, that the same act or choice may have a complex character, on account of complexity in the motives. On this let me say:

- (1.) Motives are objective or subjective. An objective motive is that thing external to the mind that induces choice or intention. Subjective motive is the intention itself.

- (2.) Character, therefore, does not belong to the objective motive, or to that thing which the mind chooses; but moral

character is confined to the subjective motive, which is synonymous with choice or intention. Thus we say a man is to be judged by his motives, meaning that his character is as his intention is. Multitudes of objective motives or considerations, may have concurred directly or indirectly in their influence, to induce choice or intention; but the intention or subjective motive is always necessarily simple and indivisible. In other words, moral character consists in the choice of an ultimate end, and this end is to be chosen for its own sake, else it is not an ultimate end. If the end chosen be the highest well-being of God and the good of the universe—if it be the willing or intending to promote and treat every interest in the universe according to its perceived relative value, it is a right, a holy motive, or intention. If it be any thing else, it is sinful. Now whatever complexity there may have been in the considerations that led the way to this choice or intention, it is self-evident that the intention must be one, simple, and indivisible.

(3.) Whatever complexity there might have been in those considerations that prepared the way to the settling down upon this intention, the mind in a *virtuous* choice has and can have but one reason for its choice, and that is the intrinsic value of the thing chosen. The highest well-being of God, the good of the universe, and every good according to its perceived relative value, must be chosen for one, and only one reason, and that is the intrinsic value of the good which is chosen for its own sake. If chosen for any other reason the choice is not virtuous. It is absurd to say, that a thing is good and valuable in itself, but may be chosen, not for that but for some other reason—that God's highest well-being and the happiness of the universe, are an infinite good in themselves, but are not to be chosen for that reason, and on their own account, but for some other reason. Holiness, then, must always consist in singleness of eye or intention. It must consist in the supreme disinterested choice, willing, or intending the good of God and of the universe, for its own sake. In this intention there can not be any complexity. If there were, it would not be holy, but sinful. It is, therefore, stark nonsense to say, that one and the same choice may have a complex character, on account of complexity of motive. For that motive in which moral character consists, is the supreme ultimate intention, or choice. This choice, or intention must consist in the choice of a thing as an end and for its own sake. The supposition, then, that the same choice or intention may have a complex character, on account of complexity in the motives, is wholly inadmissible.

If it be still urged, that the intention or subjective motive may be complex—that several things may be included in the intention and aimed at by the mind—and that it may, therefore, be partly holy and partly sinful—I reply;

(4.) If by this it be meant that several things may be aimed at or intended by the mind at the same time, I inquire what things? It is true that the supreme, disinterested choice of the highest good of being, may include the intention to use all the necessary means. It may also include the intention to promote every interest in the universe, according to its perceived relative value. These are all properly included in one intention; but this implies no such complexity in the subjective motive as to include both sin and holiness.

(5.) If by complexity of intention is meant that it may be partly disinterestedly benevolent, and partly selfish, which it must be to be partly holy and partly sinful, I reply, that this supposition is absurd. It has been shown that selfishness and benevolence consist in supreme, ultimate, and opposite choices or intentions. To suppose, then, that an intention can be both holy and sinful, is to suppose that it may include two supreme opposite and ultimate choices or intentions at the same time; in other words, that I may supremely and disinterestedly intend to regard and promote every interest in the universe according to its perceived relative value, for its own sake; and at the same time, may supremely regard my own self-interest and self-gratification, and in some things supremely intend to promote my selfish interests, in opposition to the interests of the universe and the commands of God. But this is naturally impossible. An ultimate intention, then, may be complex in the sense, that it may include the design to promote every perceived interest, according to its relative value; but it can not, by any possibility, be complex in the sense that it includes selfishness and benevolence, or holiness and sin.

3. The third supposition is, that holiness may be right, or pure in kind, but deficient in degree. On this, I remark:

(1.) We have seen that moral character consists in the ultimate intention.

(2.) The supposition, therefore, must be, that the intention may be right, or pure in kind, but deficient in the degree of its strength.

(3.) Our intention is to be tried by the law of God, both in respect to its kind and degree.

(4.) The law of God requires us to will, or intend the promotion of every interest in the universe according to its per-

ceived relative value, for its own sake; in other words, that all our powers shall be supremely and disinterestedly devoted to the glory of God and the good of the universe.

(5.) This cannot mean that any faculty shall at every moment be kept upon the strain, or in a state of utmost tension, for this would be inconsistent with natural ability. It would be to require a natural impossibility, and therefore be unjust.

(6.) It cannot mean that at all times, and on all subjects, the same degree of exertion shall be made; for the best possible discharge of duty does not always require the same degree or intensity of mental or corporeal exertion.

(7.) The law can not, justly or possibly, require more, than that the whole being shall be consecrated to God—that we shall fully and honestly will or intend the promotion of every interest according to its perceived relative value, and according to the extent of our ability.

(8.) Now the strength or intensity of the intention must, and ought, of necessity, to depend upon the degree of our knowledge or light in regard to any object of choice. If our obligation is not to be graduated by the light we possess, then it would follow that we may be under obligation to exceed our natural ability, which can not be.

(9.) The importance which we attach to objects of choice, and consequently the degree of ardor or intenseness of the intention, must depend upon the clearness or obscurity of our views of the real or relative value of the objects of choice.

(10.) Our obligation can not be measured by the views which God has of the importance of those objects of choice. It is a well settled and generally admitted truth, that increased light increases responsibility or moral obligation. No creature is bound to will any thing with the intenseness or degree of strength with which God wills it, for the plain reason, that no creature sees its importance or real value, as He does. If our obligation were to be graduated by God's knowledge of the real value of objects, we could never obey the moral law either in this world or the world to come, nor could any being but God ever, by any possibility, meet its demands.

(11.) Nor can our obligation be measured by the views or knowledge which angels may have of the intrinsic or relative value of the glory of God, the worth of souls, and the good of the universe.

(12.) Nor can the obligation of a heathen be measured by the knowledge and light of a Christian.

(13.) Nor the obligation of a child, by the knowledge of a man.

(14.) The fact is, that the obligation of every moral being must be graduated by his own knowledge.

(15.) If, therefore, his intention be equal in its intensity to his views or knowledge of the real or relative value of different objects, it is right. It is up to the full measure of his obligation; and if his own honest judgment is not to be made the measure of his obligation, then his obligation can exceed what he is able to know; which contradicts the true nature of moral law, and is, therefore, false.

(16.) If conscious honesty of intention, both as it respects the kind and degree of intention, according to the degree of light possessed, be not entire obedience to moral law, then there is no being in heaven or earth, who can know himself to be entirely obedient; for all that any being can possibly know upon this subject is, that he honestly wills or intends in accordance with the dictates of his reason, or the judgment which he has of the real or relative value of the object chosen.

(17.) If something more than this can be required, then a law can be binding farther than it is prescribed, or so published that it may be known, which is contradictory to natural justice, and absurd.

(18.) No moral being can possibly blame or charge himself with any default, when he is conscious of honestly intending, willing, or choosing, and acting, according to the best light he has; for in this case he obeys the law as he understands it, and of course can not conceive himself to be condemned by the law.

(19.) Good-willing, or intending is, in respect to God, to be at all times supreme, and in respect to other beings, it is to be in proportion to the relative value of their happiness as perceived by the mind. This is always to be the intention. The volitions, or efforts of the will to promote these objects, may and ought to vary indefinitely in their intensity, in proportion to the particular duty to which, for the time being, we are called.

(20.) But farther, we have seen that virtue consists in willing every good according to its perceived relative value, and that nothing short of this is virtue. But this is perfect virtue for the time being. In other words, virtue and moral perfection, in respect to a given act, or state of the will, are synonymous terms. Virtue is holiness. Holiness is uprightness. Uprightness is that which is just what, under the circumstances, it should be; and nothing else is virtue, holi-

ness, or uprightness. Virtue, holiness, uprightness, moral perfection—when we apply these terms to any given state of the will—are synonymous. To talk, therefore, of a virtue, holiness, uprightness, justice—right in kind, but deficient in degree—is to talk sheer nonsense. It is the same absurdity as to talk of *sinful* holiness, an *unjust* justice, a *wrong* rightness, an *impure* purity, an *imperfect* perfection, a *disobedient* obedience.

(21.) The fact is, virtue, holiness, uprightness, &c., signify a definite thing, and never any thing else than conformity to the law of God. That which is not entirely conformed to the law of God is not holiness. This must be true in philosophy, and the Bible affirms the same thing. "*Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.*" The spirit of this text as clearly and as fully assumes and affirms the doctrine under consideration as if it had been uttered with that design alone.

(22.) God has no right to call that holy which is defective in degree.

(23.) Unless every perceived interest is, for the time being, willed or intended according to its relative value, there is no virtue. Where this intention exists, there can be no sin.

4. The next supposition is, that the will, or heart, may be right, while the affections or emotions are wrong. Upon this I remark:

(1.) That this supposition overlooks that in which moral character consists. It has been shown that moral character consists in the supreme ultimate intention of the mind, and that this supreme, disinterested benevolence, good-willing, or intention, is the whole of virtue. Now this intention begets volitions. It directs the attention of the mind, and, therefore, produces thoughts, emotions, or affections. It also, through volition, begets bodily action. But moral character does not lie in outward actions, the movements of the arm, nor in the volition that moves the muscles; for that volition terminated upon the action itself. I will to move my arm, and my arm must move by a law of necessity. Moral character belongs solely to the intention, that produced the volition, that moved the muscles, to the performance of the outward act. So intention produces the volition that directs the attention of the mind to a given object. Attention, by a natural necessity, produces thought, affection, or emotion. Now thought, affection, or emotion, are all connected with volition, by a natural necessity; that is—if the attention is directed to an

object, corresponding thoughts and emotions must exist of course. Moral character no more lies in emotion, than in outward action. It does not lie in thought, or attention. It does not lie in the specific volition that directed the attention; but in that intention, or design of the mind, that produced the volition, which directed the attention, which, again, produced the thought, which, again, produced the emotion. Now the supposition, that the intention may be right, while the emotions or feelings of the mind may be wrong, is the same as to say, that outward action may be wrong, while the intention is right. The fact is, that moral character is and must be as the intention is. If any feeling or outward action is inconsistent with the existing ultimate intention, it must be so in spite of the agent. But if any outward action or state of feeling exists, in opposition to the intention or choice of the mind, it cannot, by any possibility, have moral character. Whatever is beyond the control of a moral agent, he can not be responsible for. Whatever he can not control by intention he can not control at all. Every thing for which he can possibly be responsible, resolves itself into his intention. His whole character, therefore, is and must be as his intention is. If, therefore, temptations, from whatever quarter they may come, produce emotions within him inconsistent with his intention, and which he can not control, he cannot be responsible for them.

(2.) As a matter of fact, although emotions, contrary to his intentions, may, by circumstances beyond his control, be brought to exist in his mind; yet, by willing to divert the attention of the mind from the objects that produce them, they can ordinarily be banished from the mind. If this is done as soon as in the nature of the case it can be, there is no sin. If it is not done as soon as in the nature of the case it can be, then it is absolutely certain that the intention is not what it ought to be. The intention is to devote the whole being to the service of God and the good of the universe, and of course to avoid every thought, affection, and emotion, inconsistent with this. While this intention exists, it is certain that if any object be thrust upon the attention which excites thoughts and emotions inconsistent with our supreme ultimate intention, the attention of the mind will be instantly diverted from those objects, and the hated emotion hushed, if this is possible. For, while the intention exists, corresponding *volitions* must exist. There cannot, therefore, be a right state of heart or intention, while the emotions or affections of the mind are

sinful. For emotions are in themselves in no case sinful, and when they exist against the will, through the force of temptation, the soul is not responsible for their existence. And, as I said, the supposition overlooks that in which moral character consists, and makes it to consist in that over which the law does not properly legislate; for love, or benevolence is the fulfilling of the law.

But here it may be said, that the law not only requires benevolence, or good-willing, but requires a certain kind of emotions, just as it requires the performance of certain outward actions, and that therefore there may be a right intention where there is a deficiency, either in kind or degree, of right emotions. To this I answer:

Outward actions are required of men, only because they are connected with intention, by a natural necessity. And no outward action is ever required of us, unless it can be produced by intending and aiming to do it. If the effect does not follow our honest endeavors, because of any antagonist influence, opposed to our exertions, which we can not overcome, we have by our intention complied with the spirit of the law, and are not to blame that the outward effect does not take place. Just so with emotions. All we have power to to do, is, to direct the attention of the mind to those objects calculated to secure a given state of emotion. If, from any exhaustion of the sensibility, or for any other cause beyond our control, the emotions do not arise which the consideration of that subject is calculated to produce, we are no more responsible for the absence or weakness of the emotion, than we should be for the want or weakness of motion in our muscles, when we willed to move them, in consequence of exhaustion or any other preventing cause, over which we had no control. The fact is, we can not be blame worthy for not feeling or doing that which we can not do or feel by intending it. If the intention then is what it ought to be for the time being, nothing can be *morally wrong*.

5. The last supposition is, that a latent preference, or right intention, may co-exist with opposing or sinful volitions. Upon this I remark:

That I have formerly supposed that this could be true, but am now convinced that it can not be true; for the following reasons:

(1.) Observe, the supposition is, that the intention or ruling preference may be right—may really exist as an active and virtuous state of mind, while, at the same time, *volition* may exist inconsistent with it.

(2.) Now what is a right intention? I answer: Nothing short of this—willing, choosing, or intending the highest good of God and of the universe, and to promote this at every moment, to the extent of our ability. In other words—right intention is supreme, disinterested benevolence. Now what are the elements which enter into this right intention?

a. The choice or willing of every interest according to its perceived intrinsic value.

b. To devote our entire being, now and for ever, to this end. This is right intention. Now the question is, can this intention co-exist with a volition inconsistent with it? Volition implies the choice of something, for some reason. If it be the choice of whatever can promote this supremely benevolent end, and for that reason, the volition is consistent with the intention; but if it be the choice of something perceived to be inconsistent with this end, and for a selfish reason, then the volition is inconsistent with the supposed intention. But the question is, do the volition and intention co-exist? According to the supposition, the will chooses, or wills something, for a selfish reason, or something perceived to be inconsistent with supreme, disinterested benevolence. Now it is plainly impossible, that this choice can take place while the opposite intention exists. For this selfish volition is, according to the supposition, sinful or selfish; that is—something is chosen for its own sake, which is inconsistent with disinterested benevolence. But here the intention is ultimate. It terminates upon the object chosen for its own sake. To suppose, then, that benevolence still remains in exercise, and that a volition co-exists with it that is sinful, involves the absurdity of supposing, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in the same mind, or that the will can choose, or will, with a supreme preference or choice, two opposites, at the same time. This is plainly impossible. Suppose I intend to go to the city of New York as soon as I possibly can. Now if, on my way, I will to loiter unnecessarily a moment, I necessarily relinquish one indispensable element of my intention. In willing to loiter, or turn aside to some other object for a day, or an hour, I must, of necessity, relinquish the intention of going as soon as I possibly can. I may not design to finally relinquish my journey, but I must of necessity relinquish the intention of going as soon as I can. Now virtue consists in intending to do all the good I possibly can, or in willing the glory of God and the good of the universe, and intending to promote them to the extent of my ability. Nothing short of this is virtue. Now

if at any time, I will something perceived to be inconsistent with this intention, I must, for the time being, relinquish the intention, as it must indispensably exist in my mind in order to be virtue. I may not come to the resolution, that I will never serve God any more, but I must of necessity relinquish, for the time being, the intention of doing my utmost to glorify God, if at any time I put forth a selfish *volition*. For a selfish *volition* implies a selfish *intention*. I can not put forth a *volition* intended to secure an end until I have chosen the end. Therefore, a holy intention can not co-exist with a selfish *volition*.

It must be, therefore, that in every sinful choice, the will of a holy being must necessarily drop the exercise of supreme, benevolent intention, and pass into an opposite state of choice; that is—the agent must cease, for the time being, to exercise benevolence, and make a selfish choice. For be it understood that *volition* is the choice of a means to an end; and of course a selfish *volition* implies a selfish choice of an end.

Having briefly examined the several suppositions that can be made in regard to the mixed character of actions, I will now answer a few objections; after which, I will bring this philosophy as briefly as possible, into the light of the Bible.

Objection. Does a Christian cease to be a Christian, whenever he commits a sin? I answer:

1. Whenever he sins, he must, for the time being, cease to be holy. This is self-evident.

2. Whenever he sins, he must be condemned. He must incur the penalty of the law of God. If he does not, it must be because the law of God is abrogated. But if the law of God be abrogated, he has no rule of duty; consequently, can neither be holy nor sinful. If it be said that the precept is still binding upon him, but that with respect to the Christian the penalty is forever set aside, or abrogated, I reply—that to abrogate the penalty is to repeal the precept; for a precept without penalty is no law. It is only counsel or advice. The Christian, therefore, is justified no farther than he obeys, and must be condemned when he disobeys, or Antinomianism is true.

3. When the Christian sins, he must repent, and 'do his first works,' or he will perish.

4. Until he repents he cannot be forgiven. In these respects, then, the sinning Christian and the unconverted sinner are upon precisely the same ground.

5. In two important respects the sinning Christian differs widely from the unconverted sinner:

(1.) In his relations to God. A Christian is a child of God. A sinning Christian is a disobedient child of God. An unconverted sinner is a child of the devil. A Christian sustains a covenant relation to God, such a covenant relation as to secure to him that discipline which tends to reclaim and bring him back, if he wanders away from God. "If his children forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments; if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments; then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes. Nevertheless my loving-kindness will I not utterly take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail. My covenant will I not break, nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips." Ps.. 89: 30—34.

(2.) The sinning Christian differs from the unconverted man, in the state of his sensibility. In whatever way it takes place, every Christian knows that the state of his sensibility in respect to the things of God, has undergone a great change. Now it is true, that moral character does not lie in the sensibility, nor in the will's obeying the sensibility. Nevertheless our consciousness teaches us, that our feelings have great power in promoting wrong choice on the one hand and in removing obstacles to right choice on the other. In every Christian's mind there is, therefore, a foundation laid for appeals to the sensibilities of the soul, that gives truth a decided advantage over the will. And multitudes of things in the experience of every Christian, give truth a more decided advantage over his will through the intelligence than is the case with unconverted sinners.

Obj. Can a man be born again, and then be unborn? I answer:

1. If there were any thing impossible in this, then perseverance would be no virtue.

2. None will maintain, that there is any thing naturally impossible in this, except it be those who hold to *physical regeneration*.

3. If regeneration consist in a change in the ruling preference of the mind or in the ultimate intention, as we shall see it does, it is plain, that an individual can be born again and afterwards cease to be virtuous.

4. That a Christian is *able to apostatize*, is evident, from the many warnings addressed to Christians in the Bible.

5. A Christian may certainly fall into sin and unbelief, and afterwards be renewed, both to repentance and faith.

Obj. Can there be no such thing as weak faith, weak love, and weak repentance? I answer:

1. If you mean comparatively weak, I say, yes. But if you mean weak, in such a sense as to be sinful, I say, no. Faith, Repentance, Love, and every Christian grace, properly so called, does and must consist in an act of will, and resolve itself into some modification of supreme, disinterested benevolence. I shall, in a future lecture, have occasion to show the philosophical nature of faith. Let it suffice here to say, that faith necessarily depends upon the clearness or obscurity of the intellectual apprehensions of truth. Faith, to be real or virtuous, must embrace whatever of truth is apprehended by the intelligence for the time being.

2. Various causes may operate to divert the intelligence from the objects of faith, or to cause the mind to perceive but few of them, and those in comparative obscurity.

3. Faith may be weak, and will certainly and necessarily be weak in such cases, in proportion to the obscurity of the views. And yet, if the will or heart confides so far as it apprehends the truth, which it must do to be virtuous at all, faith cannot be weak in such a sense as to be sinful; for if a man confides so far as he apprehends or perceives the truth, so far as faith is concerned he is doing his whole duty.

4. Faith may be weak in the sense, that it often intermits and gives place to unbelief. Faith is confidence, and unbelief is the withholding of confidence. It is the *rejection* of truth perceived. Faith is the *reception* of truth perceived. Faith and unbelief, then, are opposite states of choice, and can by no possibility co-exist.

5. Faith may be weak, in respect to its objects. The disciples of our Lord Jesus Christ knew so little of Him, were so filled with ignorance and the prejudices of education, as to have very weak faith in respect to the Messiahship, power, and divinity of their Master. He speaks of them as having but little confidence, and yet it does not appear that they did not implicitly trust Him, so far as they understood Him. And although, through ignorance, their faith was weak, yet there is no evidence, that when they had any faith at all they did not confide in whatever of truth they apprehended.

Obj. But did not the disciples pray, "Increase our faith?" I answer,

Yes. And by this they must have intended to pray for instruction; for what else could they mean? Unless a man means this, when he prays for faith, he does not know what he prays for. Christ produces faith by enlightening the mind. When we pray for faith we pray for light. And faith, to be

real faith at all, must be equal to the light we have. If apprehended truth be not implicitly received and confided in, there is no faith; but unbelief. If it be, faith is what it ought to be, wholly unmixed with sin.

Obj. But did not one say to our Lord, "Lord, I believe, help thou my unbelief," thus implying, that he was in the exercise both of faith and unbelief at the same time? I answer, yes, but,

1. This was not inspiration.
2. It is not certain, that he had any faith at all.
3. If he had and prayed understandingly, he meant nothing more than to ask for an increase of faith, or for such a degree of light as to remove his doubts in respect to the divine power of Christ.

Obj. Again it is objected that this philosophy contradicts Christian experience. To this I reply,

1. That it is absurd to appeal from reason and the Bible to *empirical consciousness*, which must be the appeal in this case. Reason and the Bible plainly attest the truth of the theory here advocated. What experience is then to be appealed to to set their testimony aside? Why, christian experience, it is replied. But what is christian experience? How shall we learn what it is? Why surely by appealing to reason and the Bible. But these declare that if a man offend in one point, he does and must for the time being violate the spirit of the whole law. Nothing is or can be more express than is the testimony of both reason and revelation upon this subject. Here, then, we have the unequivocal decision of the only court of competent jurisdiction in the case, and shall we be fool ourselves by appealing from this tribunal to the court of *empirical consciousness*? Of what does that take cognizance? Why, of what actually passes in the mind, that is, of its mental states. These we are conscious of as facts. But we call these states *christian experience*. How do we ascertain that they are in accordance with the law and gospel of God? Why only by an appeal to reason and the Bible. Here, then, we are driven back to the court from which we had before appealed, whose judgment is always the same.

Obj. But it is said this theory seems to be true in philosophy, that is, the intelligence seems to affirm it, but it is not true in fact.

Answer, If the intelligence affirms it, it must be true or reason deceives us. But if the intelligence deceives in this, it may also in other things. If it fails us here, it fails us on

the most important of all questions. If reason gives false testimony, we can never know truth from error upon any moral subject. We certainly can never know what religion is or is not, if the testimony of reason can be set aside. If the intelligence can not be safely appealed to, how are we to know what the bible means? for it is the only faculty by which we get at the truth of the oracles of God?

These are the principal objections to the philosophical view I have taken of the simplicity of moral action, that occur to my mind. I will now briefly advert to the consistency of this philosophy with the scriptures.

1. The Bible every where seems to assume, the simplicity of moral action. Christ expressly informed his disciples, that they could not serve God and Mammon. Now by this He did not mean, that a man could not serve God at one time and Mammon at another; but that he could not serve both at the same time. The philosophy that makes it possible for persons to be partly holy and partly sinful at the same time, does make it possible to serve God and Mammon at the same time, and thus flatly contradicts the assertion of our Savior.

2. James has expressly settled this philosophy, by saying, that, "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." Here he must mean to assert that one sin involves a breach of the whole spirit of the law, and is therefore inconsistent with any degree of holiness existing with it. Also, "Doth a fountain send forth at the same place sweet *water* and bitter? Can the fig-tree, my brethren, bear olive-berries? either a vine, figs? so can no fountain both yield salt water and fresh." James 3: 11, 12. In this passage he clearly affirms the simplicity of moral action; for by 'the same place' he evidently means, the same time, and what he says is equivalent to saying that a man can not be holy and sinful at the same time.

3. Christ has expressly taught, that nothing is regeneration, or virtue, but entire obedience, or the renunciation of all selfishness. "Except a man forsake all that he hath, he can not be my disciple."

4. The manner in which the precepts and threatenings of the Bible are usually given, show that nothing is regarded as obedience, or virtue, but doing exactly that which God commands.

5. The common philosophy, that maintains the co-existence of both sin and holiness in the mind at the same time, is virtually Antinomianism. It is a rejection of the law of God as

the standard of duty. It maintains, that something is holiness which is less than supreme disinterested benevolence, or the devotion for the time of the whole being to God. Now any philosophy that makes regeneration, or holiness, consist in any thing less than just that measure of obedience which the law of God requires, is Antinomianism. It is a letting down, a rejection of the law of God.

6. The very idea of sin and holiness co-existing in the same mind, is an absurd philosophy, contrary to scripture and common sense. It is an overlooking of that in which holiness consists. Holiness is obedience to the law of God, and nothing else is. By obedience, I mean entire obedience, or just that which the law requires. Any thing else than that which the law requires is not obedience and is not holiness. To maintain that it is, is to abrogate the law.

I might go to great lengths in the examination of scripture testimony, but it cannot be necessary, or in these lectures expedient. I must close this lecture, with a few inferences and remarks.

1. It has been supposed by some, that the simplicity of moral action, has been resorted to as a theory by the advocates of entire sanctification in this life, as the only consistent method of carrying out their principle. To this I reply:

(1.) That this theory is held in common, both by those who hold and those who deny the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life.

(2.) The truth of the doctrine of entire sanctification does not depend at all upon this philosophical theory for its support; but may be established by Bible testimony, whatever the philosophy of holiness may be.

2. Growth in grace consists in two things:

(1.) In the stability or permanency of holy, ultimate intention.

(2.) In intensity or strength. As knowledge increases, Christians will naturally grow in grace, in both these respects.

3. The theory of the mixed character of moral actions, is an eminently dangerous theory, as it leads its advocates to suppose that in their acts of rebellion there is something holy, or more strictly, that there is some holiness in them while they are in the known commission of sin.

It is dangerous, because it leads its advocates to place the standard of conversion, or regeneration, exceedingly low; to make regeneration, repentance, true love to God, faith, &c.,

consistent with the known or conscious commission of present sin. This must be a highly dangerous philosophy. The fact is, that regeneration, or holiness, under any form, is quite another thing than it is supposed to be by those who maintain the philosophy of the mixed character of moral action.

4. There can scarcely be a more dangerous error than that while we are conscious of present sin we are or can be in a state acceptable to God.

5. The false philosophy of many leads them to adopt a phraseology inconsistent with truth, and to speak as if they were guilty of present sin when in fact they are not, but are in a state of acceptance with God.

6. It is erroneous to say that Christians sin in their most holy exercises, and it is as injurious and dangerous as it is false. The fact is holiness is holiness, and it is really nonsense to speak of a holiness that consists with sin.

7. The tendency of this philosophy is to quiet in their delusions those whose consciences assure them of present sin, as if this could be true and they in a state of acceptance with God notwithstanding.

LECTURE XII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

I. IN WHAT SENSE OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW CAN BE PARTIAL.

II. THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD ACCEPTS NOTHING AS VIRTUE BUT OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

1. In what sense obedience to Moral Law can be partial.

In discussing this subject I must,

1. *Remind you of the sense in which it has been shown that obedience can not be partial, and,*

2. *Show the sense in which it can be partial.*

1. In what sense we have seen that obedience to moral law can not be partial.

(1.) Not in the sense that a moral agent can at the same time be selfish and benevolent. That is, a moral agent can not choose as an ultimate end the highest well-being of God and of the Universe, and, at the same time, choose an opposite end, namely, his own gratification. In other words he can not love God supremely and his neighbor as himself, and at the same time love himself supremely, and prefer his own gratification to the good of God and his neighbor. These two things, we have seen, can not be.

(2.) We have seen that a moral agent can not honestly choose the well-being of God and the universe as an ultimate end, that is, for and on account of its intrinsic value, and yet withhold the degree of intensity of choice which he sees the value of the end demands, and he is able to render. In other words, he can not be honest in knowingly and intentionally withholding from God and man their dues. That is, he can not be honestly dishonest.

(3.) We have seen that honesty of intention implies the esteeming and treating of every being and thing known to the mind according to its nature and relations, and every interest according to its estimated relative importance and our ability to promote it.

(4.) We have seen that neither of the following suppositions can be true.

It can not be true,

[1.] That an act or choice may have a complex character on account of complexity in the motives that induce it.

It can not be true,

[2.] That the will or heart may be right while the emotions and affections are wrong in the sense of sinful.

It can not be true,

[3.] That a ruling, latent, but actually existing holy preference or intention, may co-exist with opposing volitions.

These things, we have seen, can not be, and therefore that the following *is* true, to wit, that obedience to moral law can not be partial in the sense that a moral agent can partly obey and partly disobey at the same time; that he can not be both holy and unholy in the same act; that he can not at the same time serve both God and mammon. This certainly is the doctrine both of natural and revealed theology. This summing up of what was taught in the last lecture conducts us to the discussion of the second inquiry, namely:

I. In what sense obedience to moral law can be partial.

And here I would observe that the only sense in which obedience to moral law can be partial is, that obedience may be *intermittent*. That is, the subject may sometimes obey and at other times disobey. He may at one time be selfish or will his own gratification because it is his own, and without regard to the well-being of God and his neighbor, and at another time will the highest well-being of God and the Universe as an end and his own good only in proportion to its relative value. These are opposite choices or ultimate intentions. The one is holy; the other is sinful. One is obedience and entire obedience, to the law of God; the other is disobedience and entire disobedience to that law. These for ought we can see may succeed each other an indefinite number of times, but co-exist they plainly can not.

II. The Government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the law of God.

But it may be asked, why state this proposition? Was this truth ever called in question? If such questions be asked, I must answer that the truth of this proposition, (though apparently so self-evident that the suggestion that it is, or can be called in question, may reasonably excite astonishment,) is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine-tenths of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments that are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. They maintain that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that there is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law of God; that all christians are virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in short that God accepts as virtue

that which in every instance comes short of obedience to his law. And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of faith that obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence of a change of heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they will brand as a heretic or as a hypocrite any one who professes to obey the law, and maintain that men may be and are pious, and eminently so, who do not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which every one knows to be generally held by those who are styled orthodox Christians, must assume that there is some rule of right or of duty beside the moral law, or that virtue or true religion does not imply obedience to any law. In this discussion I shall,

1. *Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the moral law, and,*

2. *That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to this law.*

3. *That the Government of God acknowledges nothing else as virtue or true religion.*

1. *There can be no rule of duty but the moral law.*

Upon this proposition I remark,

(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the law of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature and relations. To deny this is palpably absurd and contradictory. But if this is right nothing else can be right. If this course is obligatory upon us by virtue of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature and relations, must be right and nothing more or less can be right. If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no such truths.

(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should He do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in His arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can He alter it, or introduce any other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make any thing else right than to love him with all the heart and our neighbor as ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is not made void but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from its very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law, and love or obedience to the

moral law always implies faith. As has been said on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is or can be obligatory on a moral agent but the course of conduct suited to his nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this. Nor can any being render any thing more than this obligatory. Indeed there can not possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law. There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions, and in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings us to the consideration of the second proposition, namely:

II. That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral law.

By this two things are intended:

(1.) That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law.

(2.) That nothing can be virtue but just that which the moral law requires.

That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law will appear if we consider,

[1.] That virtue is identical with true religion.

[2.] That true religion can not properly consist in any thing else than the love to God and man enjoined by the moral law.

[3.] That the bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the law, and as expressly denies that any thing else is acceptable to God.

“Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.” “Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, (love,) I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains and have not charity I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned and have not charity, (love) it profiteth me nothing.”

Love is repeatedly recognized in the bible, not only as constituting true religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every form of true religion is only a form of love or benevolence. *Repentance* consists in the turning of the soul from a state of selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to obedience to it. *Faith* is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ. Every christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when we come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God

is love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love or the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of him and of us. Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God and in all holy beings. Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only benevolence viewed in particular relations.

Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. That is, nothing short of what it requires can be in any sense virtue.

The common idea seems to be that a kind of obedience is rendered to God by Christians which is true religion, and which on Christ's account is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of full or entire obedience at any moment; that the Gospel has somehow brought men, that is, Christians, into such relations that God really accepts of them an imperfect obedience, something far below what His law requires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they render at best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less at every moment. Now this appears to me to be as radical an error as can well be taught. This question naturally branches out into two distinct inquiries:

(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey and partly to disobey the moral law at the same time?

(2.) Can God in any sense justify one who does not yield a present and full obedience to the moral law?

The first of these questions has been fully discussed under another head. We think it has been shown that obedience to the moral law can not be partial in the sense that the subject can partly obey and partly disobey at the same time.

We will now attend to the second question, namely: Can God, in any sense justify one who does not yield a present and full obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, can he accept any thing as virtue or obedience which is not for the time being full obedience, or all that the law requires?

The term *justification* is used in two senses.

[1.] In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless.

[2.] In the sense of pardon and acceptance.

It is in this last sense that the advocates of this theory hold that Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned and accepted and treated as just, though at every moment sinning by coming short of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at every moment condemns them for present sin, but that they are justified by

grace, not in the sense that they are made really and personally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts, and in this sense justifies them when they are in the present commission of an indefinite amount of sin; that *grace* accounts them righteous while in fact they are continually sinning; that they are fully pardoned and acquitted while at the same moment committing sin. While voluntarily withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted, and the sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he voluntarily withholds. This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, precisely what many hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose for discussion the following inquiries as of fundamental importance.

1. If a present partial obedience can be accepted, how great a part may be withholden and we be accepted?

2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which we are forgiven?

3. What good can result to the sinner, to God, or to the universe from forgiving impenitence, or sin which is persisted in?

4. Has God a right to pardon present, and of course unrepented sin?

5. Have we a right to ask him to forgive present unrepented sin?

6. Must not confession of present and of course unrepented sin be base hypocrisy?

7. Does the bible recognize the pardon of present and unrepented sin?

8. Does the bible recognize any justification in sin?

9. Can there be such a thing as partial repentance of sin? That is, does not repentance imply present full obedience to the law of God?

10. Must not that be a gross error that represents God as pardoning and justifying a sinner in the present voluntary commission of sin?

11. Can there be any other than a voluntary sin?

12. Must not present sin be unrepented sin?

We will now attend to these questions in their order.

1. How much sin may we commit, or how much may we at every moment come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be accepted and justified?

This must be an enquiry of infinite importance. If we may willfully withhold a part of our hearts from God and yet be accepted, how great a part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all our hearts and our neighbor less than ourselves and be accepted, how much less than supreme love to God and equal love to our neighbor will be accepted?

Shall we be told that the least degree of true love to God and our neighbor will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our neighbor? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not what is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted, then we may love ourselves more than we love God and yet be accepted. We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be in a state of acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our neighbor a little and ourselves more than we love God and all our neighbors, and yet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God must be loved supremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme love a loving with all the heart? But this is full and not partial obedience; but the latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or is supreme love, not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree of love than we exercise toward any other being? But how much greater must it be? Barely a little? How are we to measure it? In what scale are we to weigh, or by what standard are we to measure our love so as to know whether we love God a little more than any other being? But how much are we to love our neighbor in order to our being accepted? If we may love him a little less than ourselves, how much less and still be justified? These are certainly questions of vital importance. But such questions look like trifling. But why should they? If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must not only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer. The advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them. And if they can not, it is only because their theory is false. Is it possible that their theory should be true and yet no one be able to answer such vital questions as these just proposed? If a partial obedience can be accepted, it is a momentous question how partial or how complete must that obedience be? I say again, that this is a question of agonizing interest. God forbid that we should be left in the dark here. But let us look at the second question.

2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a

part of that which would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which we are forgiven?

The theory in question is that Christians never at any time in this world yield a full obedience to the Divine law; that they always withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet while in the very act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God and their neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services, fully forgives and justifies them. What is this but pardoning present and pertinacious rebellion! Receiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch! Forgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in? Yes this must be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present full obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils that represents God as receiving to favor a rebel who has at least one hand filled with weapons against his throne.

3. But what good can result to God or the sinner or to the universe by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be honored by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe the more respect, fear and honor God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it commend itself to the intelligence of the universe?

Will pardon and justification save the sinner, while yet he continues to withhold a part, at least, of his heart from God? While he still cleaves to a part of his sins? Can heaven be edified or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced by such a method of justification?

4. But again: Has God a right to pardon unrepented sin?

Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a question which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has God a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some course of conduct which is suitable in him? Has he not given us intelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the propriety of his public acts? Does He not invite and require scrutiny? Why has He required an atonement for sin, and why has He required repentance at all? Who does not know that no executive magistrate has a right to pardon unrepented sin? The lowest terms upon which any ruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or which is the same thing, a return to obedience. Who ever heard in any government of a rebel's being pardoned while he only renounced a part of his rebellion? To pardon him while any part of his rebellion is persevered in, were to sanction by a public act

that which is lacking in his repentance. It were to pronounce a public justification of his refusal to render full obedience.

5. But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the sin of withholding a part of our heart from Him?

God has no right to forgive, and we have no right to desire him to forgive us while we keep back any part of the price. While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbor, we can not profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And shall God forgive us while we can not without hypocrisy even profess repentance? To ask for pardon while we do not repent and cease from sin, is a gross insult to God.

6. But does the bible recognize the pardon of present unrepented sin?

Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is represented as pardoned or pardonable unless repented of and fully forsaken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this always stands revealed expressly or impliedly on every page of Divine Inspiration.

7. Does the bible any where recognize a justification in sin?

Where is such a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, every degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose heart the vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet not be condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely if the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most unequivocally teaches this: "If any man keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." What is this but asserting that if there could be a partial obedience, it would be unavailing, since the law would condemn for any degree of sin; that partial obedience, did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable obedience at all? The doctrine that a partial obedience (in the sense that the law is not at any time fully obeyed,) is accepted of God, is sheer Antinomianism.—What! a sinner justified while indulging in rebellion against God!

But it has been generally held in the church that a sinner must intend fully to obey the law as a condition of justification; that in his purpose, intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is intended by this language? We have seen in former lectures that moral character belongs properly only to the intention. If, then, perfection of intention be an indispensable condition of justification, what is this but an admission after all that full present obedience is a con-

dition of justification? But this is what we hold and they deny. What then can they mean? It is of importance to ascertain what is intended by the assertion repeated by them thousands of times that a sinner can not be justified but upon condition that he fully purposes and intends to abandon all sin and to live without sin; unless he seriously intends to render full obedience to all the commands of God. Intends to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why, love, good willing, good intending. Intending to obey the law is intending to intend, willing to will, choosing to choose! This is absurd.

What then is the state of mind which is and must be the condition of justification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be intended, to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. Fully intending this, and not fully intending to intend this, is the condition of justification. But fully intending this, is full present obedience to the law.

But again: It is absurd to say that a man can intend fully to obey the law unless he actually fully intends what the law requires him to intend. The law requires him fully to intend the highest well-being of God and of the universe. And unless he intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full obedience to the law; that he intends to live without sin.—Why, the supposition is that he is now sinning, that is, (for nothing else is sin) voluntarily withholding from God and man their due. He chooses, wills and intends this, and yet the supposition is, that at the same time he chooses, wills, intends fully to obey the law. What is this but the ridiculous assertion that he at the same time intends full obedience to the law and intends not fully to obey, but only to obey in part, voluntarily withholding from God and man their dues.

But again to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in him? Surely he can not either upon legal or gospel principles, unless the law be repealed. That he can not be justified by the law while there is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can he be pardoned and accepted, and then justified in the gospel sense, while sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly not. For the law, unless it be repealed and antinomianism be true, continues to condemn him while there is any degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say that he can be pardoned and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the time coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which the law is not

uttering its curses against him. "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law, to do them." The fact is, there never has been, and there never can be any such thing as sin without condemnation. "Beloved, if our own heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart," that is, he much more condemns us. "But if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God." God can not repeal the law. It is not founded in his arbitrary will. It is as unalterable and unrepealable as his own nature. God can never repeal nor alter it. He can, for Christ's sake, dispense with the execution of the penalty when the subject has returned to full present obedience to the precept, but in no other case, and upon no other possible conditions. To affirm that he can, is to affirm that God can alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral law and moral government.

8. The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial repentance of sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to present full obedience to the law of God?

In considering this question, I will state briefly,

- (1.) What repentance is not.
- (2.) What it is.
- (3.) What is not implied in it.
- (4.) What is.

I shall in this place only state these points briefly, leaving their full consideration to their appropriate place in this course of instruction.

- (1.) What repentance is not.

[1.] It is not a phenomenon of the intelligence. It does not consist in conviction of sin, nor in any intellectual views of sin whatever.

[2.] It is not a phenomenon of the sensibility. It does not consist in a feeling of regret, or remorse, or of sorrow of any kind or degree. It is not a feeling of any kind.

- (2.) What it is.

The primary signification of the word rendered repentance is, to think again, but more particularly, to change the mind in conformity with a second thought, or in accordance with a more rational and intelligent view of the subject. To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose a new end, to begin a new life, to turn from self-seeking to seeking the highest good of being, to turn from selfishness to disinterested benevolence, from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience.

- (3.) What is not implied in it.

[1.] It does not imply the remembrance of all past sin.— This would be implied if repentance consisted, as some seem to suppose, in sorrowing over every particular sin. But as repentance consists in returning or turning to God, from the spirit of self-seeking and self-pleasing to the spirit of seeking the highest well-being of God and the universe, no such thing as the remembrance of all past sin is implied in it.

[2.] It does not imply a continual sorrowing for past sin; for past sin is not, can not be, ought not to be the subject of continual thought.

(4.) What is implied in it.

[1.] An understanding of the nature of sin, that it consists in the spirit of self-seeking, or in selfishness. This is implied, as a condition upon which repentance can be exercised.

[2.] A turning from this state to a state of consecration to God and the good of the universe.

[3.] Sorrow for past sin when it is remembered. This and the following particulars are implied in repentance as necessarily following from it.

[4.] Universal, outward reformation.

[5.] Hatred of sin.

[6.] Self-loathing on account of sin.

Certainly if repentance means and implies any thing, it does imply a thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists in turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former lecture that selfishness and benevolence can not co-exist in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite ends. These ends can not both be chosen at the same time. To talk of partial repentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to overlook the very nature of repentance. What! a man both turn away from and hold on to sin at the same time? Serve God and Mammon at one and the same time! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed both by reason and by Christ.

9. The ninth inquiry is: Must not that be a gross error that represents God as pardoning and justifying a sinner in the present willful commission of sin? I answer, yes,

(1.) Because it is antinomianism, than which there is scarcely any form of error more God-dishonoring.

(2.) Because it represents God as doing what He has no right to do, and therefore, as doing what He can not do without sinning himself.

(3.) Because it represents Christ as the minister of sin,

and as justifying his people in their sins, instead of saving them from their sins.

(4.) Because it represents God as making void instead of establishing the law through faith.

(5.) Because it is a prolific source of delusion, leading multitudes to think themselves justified while living in known sin. But perhaps it will be objected that the sin of those who render but a partial obedience, and whom God pardons and accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the tenth inquiry:

10. Can there be any other than a voluntary sin?

What is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires benevolence, good willing. Sin is not a mere negation or a not willing, but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing contrary to the commandment of God. Sin as well as holiness consists in choosing, willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary. That is, it must be intelligent and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is nonsense to deny that sin is voluntary. The fact is there is either no sin or there is voluntary sin. Benevolence is willing the good of being in general as an end, and of course implies the rejection of self-gratification as an end. So sin is the choice of self-gratification as an end, and necessarily implies the rejection of the good of being in general as an end. Sin and holiness naturally and necessarily exclude each other. They are eternal opposites and antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of the other in the heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.

12. Must not present sin be unrepented sin?

Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that present sin is repented of is to affirm a contradiction. It is overlooking both the nature of sin and the nature of repentance. Sin is selfish willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent willing. These two states of will, as has just been said, cannot possibly co-exist. Whoever, then, is at present falling short of full obedience to the law of God, is voluntarily sinning against God and is impenitent. It is nonsense to say that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent; that he is penitent so far as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he disobeys. This really seems to be the loose idea of many, that a man can be partly penitent and partly impenitent at the same time. This idea doubtless is founded on the mistake that repentance consists in sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the sensibility. But we have seen that re-

penitance consists in a change of ultimate intention, a change in the choice of an end, a turning from selfishness to supreme disinterested benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly impossible for one to be partly penitent and partly impenitent at the same time, inasmuch as penitence and impenitence consist in supreme opposite choices.

So then it is plain that nothing is accepted as virtue under the government of God but present full obedience to his law.

REMARKS.

1. If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen into a great and ruinous mistake in supposing that a state of sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible attainment in this life. If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the *very beginning of true religion* in the soul, implies the renunciation of all sin. Sin ceases where holiness begins.— Now, how great and ruinous must that error be that teaches us to hope for heaven while living in conscious sin; to look upon a sinless state as not to be expected in this world; that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning even for an hour or a moment in this world; and yet to hope for heaven! And how infinitely unreasonable must that state of mind be that can brand as heretics those who teach that God justifies no one but upon condition of present sinlessness!

2. How great and ruinous the error that justification is conditioned upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one may be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission of more or less sin. This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all the universalism that ever cursed the world.

3. We see that if a righteous man forsake his righteousness and die in his sin, he must sink to hell.

4. We see that whenever a christian sins he comes under condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be lost.

LECTURE XIII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

WHAT IS NOT IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

I. I will state briefly what constitutes obedience.

II. What is not implied in it.

I. What constitutes obedience to moral law.

1. We have seen that all that the law requires is summarily expressed in the single word *love*; that this word is synonymous with benevolence; that benevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an end, or for its own sake; that this choice is an ultimate intention. In short we have seen that good will to being in general is obedience to the moral law. Now the question before us is, what is not implied in this good will or in this benevolent ultimate intention? I will here introduce, with some alteration, what I have formerly said upon this subject.

As the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard and the only standard by which the question in regard to what is not, and what is implied in entire sanctification is to be decided, it is of fundamental importance that we understand what is and what is not implied in entire obedience to this law. It must be apparent to all that this inquiry is of prime importance. And to settle this question is one of the main things to be attended to in this discussion. The doctrine of the entire satisfaction of believers in this life can never be satisfactorily settled until it is understood. And it can not be understood until it is known what is and what is not implied in it. Our judgment of our own state or of the state of others, can never be relied upon till these inquiries are settled. Nothing is more clear than that in the present vague unsettled views of the Church upon this question, no individual could set up a claim of having attained this state without being a stumbling block to the church. Christ was perfect, and yet so erroneous were the notions of the Jews in regard to what constituted perfection that they thought him possessed with a devil instead of being holy as he claimed to be. It certainly is impossible that a person should profess to render entire obedience to the moral law without being a stumbling block to himself and to others unless he and they clearly understand what is not and what is implied in it. I will state then what is not implied in entire obedience to the moral law as I understand it. The law as epitomized by

Christ, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself," I understand to lay down the whole duty of man to God and to his fellow creatures. Now the questions are what is not, and what is implied in perfect obedience to this law? Vague notions in regard to the proper answer to be given to these questions seem to me to have been the origin of much error. To settle these questions it is indispensable that we have distinctly before our minds just rules of legal interpretation. I will therefore lay down some first principles in regard to the interpretation of law, in the light of which, I think we may safely proceed to settle these questions.

RULE 1. Whatever is inconsistent with natural justice is not and can not be moral law.

2. Whatever is inconsistent with the nature and relations of moral beings, is contrary to natural justice and therefore can not be moral law.

3. That which requires more than man has natural ability to perform, is inconsistent with his nature and relations and therefore is inconsistent with natural justice, and of course is not moral law.

4. Moral law then must always be so understood and interpreted as to consist with the nature of the subjects, and their relations to each other and to the lawgiver. Any interpretation that makes the law to require more than is consistent with the nature and relations of moral beings, is the same as to declare that it is not law. No authority in heaven or on earth can make that law, or obligatory upon moral agents, which is inconsistent with their nature and relations.

5. Moral law must always be so interpreted as to cover the whole ground of natural right or justice. It must be so understood and explained as to require all that is right in itself, and therefore immutably and unalterably right.

6. Moral law must be so interpreted as not to require any thing more than is consistent with natural justice or with the nature and relations of moral beings.

7. Moral law is never to be so interpreted as to imply the possession of any attributes or strength and a perfection of attributes which the subject does not possess. Take for illustration the second commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Now the simple meaning of this commandment seems to be that we are to regard and treat every person and interest according to its relative value. We are

not to understand this commandment as expressly or impliedly requiring us to know in all cases the exact relative value of every person and thing in the universe; for this would imply the possession of the attribute of omniscience by us. No mind short of an omniscient one can have this knowledge. The commandment then must be so understood as only to require us to judge with candor of the relative value of different interests, and to treat them according to their value, and our ability to promote them, so far as we understand it. I repeat the rule therefore; Moral law is never to be so interpreted as to imply the possession of any attribute or a strength and perfection of attributes which the subject does not possess.

8. Moral law is never to be so interpreted as to require that which is naturally impossible in our circumstances. Example: The first commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," &c., is not to be so interpreted as to require us to make God the constant and sole object of our attention, thought, and affection, for this would not only be plainly impossible in our circumstances, but manifestly contrary to our duty.

9. Moral law is never to be so interpreted as to make one requirement inconsistent with another. Example: If the first commandment be so interpreted as to require us to make God the only object of thought, affection, and attention, then we cannot obey the second commandment which requires us to love our neighbor. And if the first commandment is to be so understood that every faculty and power is to be directed solely and exclusively to the contemplation and love of God, then love to all other beings is prohibited, and the second commandment is set aside. I repeat the rule therefore: commandments are not to be so interpreted as to conflict with each other.

10. A law requiring perpetual benevolence must be so construed as to consist with and require all the appropriate and essential modifications of this principle under every circumstance; such as justice, mercy, anger at sin and sinners, and a special and complacent regard to those who are virtuous.

11. Moral law must be so interpreted as that its claims shall always be restricted to the voluntary powers in such a sense that the right action of the will shall be regarded as fulfilling the spirit of the law, whether the desired outward action or inward emotion follow or not. If there be a willing mind, that is, if the will or heart is right, it is and must in

justice be accepted as obedience to the spirit of moral law. For whatever does not follow the action of the will, by a law of necessity, is naturally impossible to us and therefore not obligatory. To attempt to legislate directly over the involuntary powers would be inconsistent with natural justice. You may as well attempt to legislate over the beating of the heart, as directly over any involuntary mental actions.

12. In morals, actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation. The maxim, "*ignorantia legis non excusat*" (ignorance of the law excuses no one)—applies in morals to but a very limited extent. That actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation, will appear,

(1.) From the following Scriptures:

James 4: 17: "Therefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Luke 12: 47, 48: "And that servant, which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required, and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more." John 9:11: "Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind ye should have no sin: but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth." In the first and second chapters of Romans, the Apostle reasons at large on this subject. He convicts the heathen of sin, upon the ground that they violate their own consciences, and do not live according to the light they have.

(2.) The principle is every where recognized in the Bible, that an increase of knowledge increases obligation. This impliedly, but plainly recognizes the principle that knowledge is indispensable to, and commensurate with obligation. In sins of ignorance, the sin lies in the state of heart that neglects or refuses to be informed, but not in the neglect of what is unknown. A man may be guilty of present or past neglect to ascertain the truth. Here his ignorance is sin, or rather the state of heart that induces ignorance is sin. The heathen are culpable for not living up to the light of nature; but are under no obligation to embrace christianity until they have the opportunity to do so.

13. Moral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical law. In other words the application of moral law to human beings, must recognize man as he is, as both a corporeal and intellectual being; and must never be so inter-

puted as that obedience to it would violate the laws of the physical constitution, and prove the destruction of the body.

14. Moral law is to be so interpreted as to recognize all the attributes and circumstances of both body and soul. In the application of the law of God to human beings, we are to regard their powers and attributes as they really are, and not as they are not.

15. Moral law is to be so interpreted as to restrict its obligation to the actions, and not to extend them to the nature or constitution of moral beings. Law must not be understood as extending its legislation to the nature, or requiring a man to possess certain attributes, but as prescribing a rule of action. It is not the existence or possession of certain attributes which the law requires, or that these attributes should be in a certain state of perfection; but the right use of all these attributes as they are, is what the law is to be interpreted as requiring.

16. It should be always understood that the obedience of the heart to any law, implies, and includes general faith, or confidence in the lawgiver. But no law should be so construed as to require faith in what the intellect does not perceive. A man may be under obligation to perceive what he does not; that is, it may be his duty to inquire after and ascertain the truth. But obligation to believe with the heart, does not attach until the intellect obtains perception of the things to be believed.

Now, in the light of these rules let us proceed to inquire:

II. What is not implied in entire obedience to the law of God.

1. Entire obedience does not imply any change in the substance of the soul or body, for this the law does not require, and it would not be obligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent with natural justice and therefore not law. Entire obedience is the entire consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not imply any change in them, but simply the right use of them.

2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of character, such as constitutional ardor or impetuosity. There is nothing certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional traits to be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly directed in their exercise.

3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional appetites, or susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities, are in themselves sinful, and that a state of entire con-

formity to the law of God implies their entire annihilation. And I have often been astonished at the fact that those who array themselves against the doctrine of entire conformity to the law of God in this life, assume the sinfulness of the constitution of man. And I have been not a little surprised to find that some persons who I had supposed were far enough from embracing the doctrine of physical moral depravity, were, after all, resorting to this assumption to set aside the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life. But let us appeal to the law. Does the law any where, expressly or impliedly, condemn the constitution of man, or require the annihilation of any thing that is properly a part of the constitution itself? Does it require the annihilation of the appetite for food, or is it satisfied merely with regulating its indulgence? In short, does the law of God any where require any thing more than the consecration of all the powers, appetites, and susceptibilities of body and mind to the service of God?

Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural affection, or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean that certain persons may be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to have had a natural affection for John. By natural resentment I mean, that, from the laws of our being, we must resent or feel opposed to injustice or ill-treatment. Not that a disposition to retaliate or revenge ourselves is consistent with the law of God. But perfect obedience to the law of God does not imply that we should have no sense of injury and injustice, when we are abused. God has this, and ought to have it, and so has every moral being. To love your neighbor as yourself does not imply, that if he injure you, you feel no sense of the injury or injustice, but that you love him and would do him good, notwithstanding his injurious treatment.

5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind. Rule 13 lays down the principle that moral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical law. God's laws certainly do not clash with each other. And the moral law can not require such a state of constant mental excitement as will destroy the physical constitution. It can not require any more mental excitement than is consistent with all the laws, attributes, and circumstances of both soul and body, as stated in rule 14.

6. It does not imply that any organ or faculty is to be at all times exerted to the full measure of its capacity. This

would soon exhaust and destroy any and every organ of the body. Whatever may be true of the mind when separated from the body, it is, certain, while it acts through a material organ, that a constant state of excitement is impossible. When the mind is strongly excited, there is of necessity a great determination of blood to the brain. A high degree of excitement cannot long continue, certainly, without producing inflammation of the brain, and consequent insanity. And the law of God does not require any degree of emotion or mental excitement, that is inconsistent with life and health. Our Lord Jesus Christ does not appear to have been in a state of continual mental excitement. When he and his disciples had been in a great excitement for a time, they would turn aside, "and rest a while."

Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that the high degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in revivals of religion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must become deranged? It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a high degree of excitement should prevail for a time to arrest public and individual attention, and draw off people from other pursuits, to attend to the concerns of their souls. But if any suppose that this high degree of excitement is either necessary or desirable, or possible to be long continued, they have not well considered the matter. And here is one grand mistake of the Church. They have supposed that the revival consists mostly in this state of excited emotion, rather than in conformity of the human will to the law of God. Hence, when the reasons for much excitement have ceased, and the public mind begins to grow more calm, they begin immediately to say, that the revival is on the decline; when, in fact, with much less excited emotion, there may be vastly more real religion in the community.

Excitement is often important and indispensable, but the vigorous actings of the will are infinitely more important. And this state of mind may exist in the absence of highly excited emotions.

7. Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or intellectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not need the same strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they are not produced by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth as strong a volition to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames of a burning house? Should a mother watching over her sleeping nursing, when all is quiet and secure, put forth as powerful voli-

tions, as might be required to snatch it from the devouring flames? Now, suppose that she were equally devoted to God, in watching her sleeping babe, and in rescuing it from the jaws of death. Her holiness would not consist in the fact that she exercised equally strong volitions, in both cases; but that in both cases the volition was equal to the accomplishment of the thing required to be done. So that persons may be entirely holy, and yet continually varying in the strength of their affections, emotions, or volitions, according to their circumstances, the state of their physical system, and the business in which they are engaged.

All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and disposal of God. Just so much of physical, intellectual, and moral energy are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature and the circumstances of the case require. And nothing is farther from the truth, than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of emotion and mental action on any and every subject alike.

8. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the direct object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible in the nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to think of or love our neighbor as ourselves: Rule 9.

The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is meant that the mind's supreme preference should be of God—that God should be the great object of its supreme regard. But this state of mind is perfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary business of life—giving to that business that attention and exercising about it all those affections and emotions which its nature and importance demand.

If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the promotion of his glory, if his eye be single, his affections and conduct, so far as they have any moral character, are entirely holy when necessarily engaged in the right transaction of his business, although for the time being neither his thoughts nor affections are upon God.

Just as a man who is supremely devoted to his family may be acting consistently with his supreme affection, and rendering them the most important and perfect service, while he does not think of them at all. As I have endeavored to show in my lecture on the text, "Make to yourself a new heart, and a new spirit," the moral heart is the mind's supreme preference. As I there stated, the natural or fleshy heart, propels

the blood through all the physical system. Now there is a striking analogy between this and the moral heart. And the analogy consists in this, that as the natural heart, by its pulsations, diffuses life through the physical system, so the moral heart, or the supreme governing preference, or ultimate intention of the mind, is that which gives life and character to man's moral actions. Example, suppose that I am engaged in teaching Mathematics; in this, my ultimate intention is to glorify God, in this particular calling. Now, in demonstrating some of its intricate propositions, I am obliged, for hours together, to give the entire attention of my mind to that object. Now, while my mind is thus intensely employed in one particular business, it is impossible that I should have any thoughts directly about God, or should exercise any direct affections, or emotions, or volitions, towards him. Yet if, in this particular calling, all selfishness is excluded, and my supreme design is to glorify God, my mind is in a state of entire obedience, even though, for the time being, I do not think of God.

It should be understood that while the supreme preference or intention of the mind has such efficiency, as to exclude all selfishness, and to call forth just that strength of volition, thought, affection, and emotion, that is requisite to the right discharge of any duty, to which the mind may be called, the heart is in a right state. And this must always be the case while the intention is really honest, as was shown on a former occasion. By a suitable degree of thought, and feeling as to the right discharge of duty, I mean just that intensity of thought, and energy of action, that the nature and importance of the particular duty to which, for the time being, I am called, demand, in my honest estimation.

In this statement, I take it for granted, that the brain, together with all the circumstances of the constitution are such that the requisite amount of thought, feeling, &c., are possible. If the physical constitution be in such a state of exhaustion as to be unable to put forth that amount of exertion which the nature of the case might otherwise demand, even in this case, the languid efforts, though far below the importance of the subject, would be all that the law of God requires. Whoever, therefore, supposes that a state of entire obedience implies a state of entire abstraction of mind from every thing but God, labors under a grievous mistake. Such a state of mind is as inconsistent with duty, as it is impossible, while we are in the flesh.

The fact is that the language and spirit of the law have

been and generally are grossly misunderstood, and interpreted to mean what they never did, or can mean consistently with natural justice. Many a mind has been thrown open to the assaults of satan, and kept in a state of continual bondage and condemnation, because God was not, at all times, the direct object of thought, affection, and emotion; and because the mind was not kept in a state of perfect tension, and excited to the utmost at every moment.

9. Nor does it imply a state of continual calmness of mind. Christ was not in a state of continual calmness. The deep peace of his mind was never broken up, but the surface or emotions of his mind were often in a state of great excitement, and at other times in a state of great calmness. And here let me refer to Christ as we have his history in the Bible in illustration of the positions I have already taken. Example: Christ had all the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities of human nature. Had it been otherwise, he could not have been "tempted in all points like as we;" nor could he have been tempted in any point as we are, any further than he possessed a constitution similar to our own. Christ also manifested natural affection for his mother and for other friends. He also showed that he had a sense of injury and injustice, and exercised a suitable resentment when he was injured and persecuted. He was not always in a state of great excitement. He appears to have had his seasons of excitement and of calm—of labor and rest—of joy and sorrow, like other good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obedience to the law as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, and as if every kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feelings of love to God were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often manifested a great degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. In short his history would lead to the conclusion that his calmness and excitement were various, according to the circumstances of the case. And although he was sometimes so pointed and severe in his reproof, as to be accused of being possessed of a devil, yet his emotions and feelings were only those that were called for and suited to the occasion.

10. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind without any indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners.

Anger at sin is only a modification of love. A sense of justice, or a disposition to have the wicked punished for the benefit of the government, is only another of the modifications of love. And such dispositions are essential to the ex-

istence of love, where the circumstances call for their exercise. It is said of Christ that he was angry. He often manifested anger and holy indignation. "God is angry with the wicked every day." And holiness or a state of obedience, instead of being inconsistent with, always implies the existence of anger, whenever circumstances occur which demand its exercise. Rule 10.

11. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no sense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love. Justice or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is another of its modifications. God, and Christ, and all holy beings, exercise all those dispositions that constitute the different modifications of love under every possible circumstance.

12. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike irrespective of their value, circumstances and relations. One being may have a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more importance to the universe than another. Impartiality and the law of love require us not to regard all beings and things alike, but all beings and things according to their nature, relations, circumstances and value.

13. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all our relations: Rule 7. Now such an interpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order to yield obedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in us the possession of the attribute of omniscience; for certainly there is not a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation. And a knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite knowledge. It is plain that the law of God can not require any such thing as this; and that entire obedience to the law of God therefore implies no such thing.

14. Nor does it imply perfect knowledge on any subject. Perfect knowledge on any subject, implies a perfect knowledge of its nature, relations, bearings, and tendencies. Now as every single thing in the universe, sustains some relation to, and has some bearing upon every other thing, there can be no such thing as perfect knowledge on any one subject, that does not embrace universal or infinite knowledge.

15. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject whatever. It is maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to every man perfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt him from any mistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but would merely say the law does not expressly or impliedly require infallibility of

judgment in us. It only requires us to make the best use we can of all the light we have.

16 Nor does entire obedience imply the knowledge of the exact relative value of different interests. I have already said in illustrating Rule 7, that the second commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," does not imply that we should, in every instance, understand exactly the relative value and importance of every interest. This plainly can not be required, unless it be assumed that we are omniscient.

17. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge that we might have possessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The law can not require us to love God or man as well as we might have been able to love them, had we always improved all our time in obtaining all the knowledge we could, in regard to their nature, character, and interests. If this were implied in the requisition of the law, there is not a saint on earth or in heaven that does, or ever can perfectly obey. What is lost in this respect is lost, and past neglect can never be so atoned for that we shall ever be able to make up in our acquisitions of knowledge what we have lost. It will no doubt be true to all eternity, that we shall have less knowledge than we might have possessed, had we filled up all our time in its acquisition. We do not, can not, nor shall we ever be able to love God as well as we might have loved him, had we always applied our minds to the acquisition of knowledge respecting him. And if entire obedience is to be understood as implying that we love God as much as we should, had we all the knowledge we might have had, then I repeat it, there is not a saint on earth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that is entirely obedient.

18. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have rendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or suppose that our powers are in a perfect state; that our strength of body or mind is what it would have been, had we never sinned. But it simply requires us to use what strength we have. The very wording of the law is proof conclusive, that it extends its demands only to the full amount of what strength we have. And this is true of every moral being, however great or small.

The most perfect development and improvement of our powers, must depend upon the most perfect use of them. And every departure from their perfect use, is a diminishing of their highest development, and a curtailing of their capa-

bilities to serve God in the highest and best manner. All sin then does just so much towards crippling and curtailing the powers of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so much, incapable of performing the service they might otherwise have rendered.

To this view of the subject it has been objected that Christ taught an opposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed his feet with her tears, when he said, "To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth much." But can it be that Christ intended to be understood as teaching, that the more we sin the greater will be our love and our ultimate virtue? If this be so, I do not see why it does not follow that the more sin in this life, the better, if so be that we are forgiven. If our virtue is really to be improved by our sins, I see not why it would not be good economy both for God and man, to sin as much as we can while in this world. Certainly Christ meant to lay down no such principle as this. He undoubtedly meant to teach, that a person who was truly sensible of the greatness of his sins, would exercise more of the *love of gratitude*, than would be exercised by one who had a less affecting sense of ill-desert.

19. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that might have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin.

We can not believe any thing about God of which we have no evidence or knowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our intellectual perceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation to believe in Christ and thousands of other things of which they have no knowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than in a christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and greater faith than in an infant. And perfection in an angel would imply much greater faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows more of God than man does. Let it be always understood that entire obedience to God never implies that which is naturally impossible. It is certainly naturally impossible for us to believe that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience implies in this respect nothing more than the heart's faith or confidence in all the truth that is perceived by the intellect.

20. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our prayers. It has been maintained by some that entire obedience implies the offering of prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men. To this I reply,

(1.) Then Christ did not obey, for he offered no such prayer.

(2.) The law of God makes no such demand either expressly or impliedly.

(3.) We have no right to believe that all men will be converted in answer to our prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise to that effect.

(4.) As therefore there is no such promise, we are under no obligation to offer such prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the world imply that there are no saints in the world who fully obey God's law.

21. It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not an express or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas was not converted in answer to Christ's prayers does not prove that Christ did not fully obey.

22. Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or impliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers, or in other words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant of the existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect love implies the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly speaking can be duty, of which the mind has no knowledge. It can not therefore be our duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely ignorant or the application of which to any specific object we do not understand.

If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact that the soul neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be understood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the neglect of that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is inconsistent with any present neglect to know the truth; for such neglect is sin. But it is not inconsistent with our failing to do that of which we have no knowledge. James says: "He that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin." "If ye were blind," says Christ, "ye should have no sin, but because ye say we see, therefore your sin remaineth."

23. Entire obedience to the Divine law does not imply that others will of course regard our state of mind and our outward life as entirely conformed to the law.

It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ was possessed of a wicked, instead of a holy spirit. Such were their notions of holiness, that they no doubt supposed him to be actuated by any other than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on account of his opposition to

the current orthodoxy, and the ungodliness of the religious teachers of the day. Now, who does not see that when the Church is in a great measure conformed to the world, a spirit of holiness in any man would certainly lead him to aim the sharpest rebukes at the spirit and life of those in this state, whether in high or low places? And who does not see that this would naturally result in his being accused of possessing a wicked spirit? And who does not know that where a religious teacher finds himself under the necessity of attacking a false orthodoxy, he will certainly be hunted, almost as a beast of prey, by the religious teachers of his day, whose authority, influence, and orthodoxy are thus assailed?

The most violent opposition that I have ever seen manifested to any persons in my life, has been manifested by members of the Church, and even by some ministers of the gospel, towards those who I believe were among the most holy persons I ever knew. I have been shocked, and wounded beyond expression, at the almost fiendish opposition to such persons that I have witnessed. I have several times of late observed that writers in newspapers were calling for examples of Christian Perfection or entire sanctification, or which is the same thing, of entire obedience to the law of God. Now I would humbly inquire, of what use is it to point the Church to examples, so long as they do not know what is, and what is not implied in entire obedience to moral law? I would ask, are the church agreed among themselves in regard to what constitutes this state? Are any considerable number of ministers agreed among themselves as to what is implied in a state of entire obedience to the law of God? Now does not every body know that the Church and the ministry are in a great measure in the dark on this subject? Why then call for examples? No man can profess to render this obedience without being sure to be set at nought as a hypocrite and a self-deceiver.

24. Nor does it imply exemption from sorrow or mental suffering.

It was not so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for our own past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and vigor, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had sinned less; or sorrow for those around us—sorrow in view of human sinfulness, or suffering. These are all consistent with a state of joyful love to God and man, and indeed are the natural results of it.

25. Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society

—with mingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as some have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of papists in retiring to monasteries, and convents—in taking the veil, and as they say, retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state of voluntary exclusion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent with any degree of holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love to our neighbor.

26. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing is farther from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom, perhaps, few holier men have ever lived, that “he was so cheerful as often to be accused of being gay.” Cheerfulness is certainly the result of holy love. And entire obedience no more implies moroseness in this world than it does in heaven.

In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian holiness, writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry: What does obedience to the law of God imply, and what does it not imply? Instead of bringing every thing to this test, they seem to lose sight of it. On the one hand they bring in things that the law of God never required of man in his present state. Thus they lay a stumbling block and a snare for the saints, to keep them in perpetual bondage, supposing that this is the way to keep them humble, to place the standard entirely above their reach. Or, on the other hand, they really abrogate the law, so as to make it no longer binding. Or they so fritter away what is really implied in it, as to leave nothing in its requirements, but a sickly, whimsical, inefficient sentimentalism, or perfectionism, which in its manifestations and results, appears to me to be any thing else than that which the law of God requires.

27. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at or intend to do our duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always or ever terminates on duty as an ultimate end.

It is our duty to aim at or intend the highest well-being of God and the universe as an ultimate end, or for its own sake. This is the infinitely valuable end at which we are at all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at this. While we aim at this, we do our duty, but to aim at duty is not doing duty. To intend to do our duty is failing to do our duty. We do not, in this case, intend the thing which it is our duty to intend. Our duty is to intend the good of being. But to intend to do our duty, is only to intend to intend.

28. Nor does it imply that we always think at the time of

its being duty, or of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation is a first truth and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral agent, and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral agency. But it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to the moral law that moral obligation should at all times be present to the thoughts and the object of attention. The thing that we are bound to intend is the highest good of God and of being in general. The good, the valuable, must be before the mind. This must be intended. We are under moral obligation to intend this. But we are not under moral obligation to intend moral obligation or to intend to fulfil moral obligation as an ultimate end. Our obligation is a first truth and necessarily assumed by us at all times, whether it is an object of attention or not, just as causality or liberty is.

29. Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of benevolence is at all times the object of the mind's attention. We may intend the glory of God and the good of our neighbor without at all times thinking of the moral character of this intention. But the intention is not the less virtuous on this account. The mind unconsciously but necessarily assumes the rightness of benevolence or of willing the good of being, just as it assumes other first truths, without being distinctly conscious of the assumption. First truths are those truths that are universally and necessarily known to every moral agent, and that are therefore always and necessarily assumed by him, whatever his theory may be. Among them, are the law of causality—the freedom of moral agents—the intrinsic value of happiness or blessedness—moral obligation to will it for or because of its intrinsic value—the infinite value of God's well-being and the moral obligation to will it on that account—that to will the good of being is duty and to comply with moral obligation is right—that selfishness is wrong. These and many such like truths are among the class of first truths of reason. They are always and necessarily taken along with every moral agent at every moment of his moral agency. They live in his mind as intuitions or assumptions of his reason. He always and necessarily affirms their truth whether he thinks of them, that is, whether he is conscious of the assumption, or not. It is not therefore at all essential to obedience to the law of God that we should at all times have before our minds the virtuousness or moral character of benevolence.

30 Nor does obedience to the moral law imply that the law

itself should be at all times the object of thought or of the mind's attention. The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in the form of an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which every moral agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law as a rule of duty is a subjective idea always and necessarily developed in the mind of every moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily takes along with him, and he is always and necessarily a law to himself. Nevertheless this law or idea is not always the object of the mind's attention and thought. A moral agent may exercise good will or love to God and man without at the time being conscious of thinking that this love is required of him by the moral law. Nay, if I am not mistaken, the benevolent mind generally exercises benevolence so spontaneously as not very much of the time so much as to think that this love to God is required of him. But this is not the less virtuous on this account. If the infinite value of God's well-being and of His infinite goodness constrain me to love Him with all my heart, can any one suppose that this is regarded by Him as the less virtuous because I did not wait to reflect that God commanded me to love him and that it was my duty to do so?

The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is the good of being, and not the law that requires me to will it. When I will that end I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether the law be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may will that end for a wrong reason and therefore thus willing it is not virtue; that unless I will it because of my obligation and intend obedience to moral law or to God it is not virtue; I answer, that the objection involves an absurdity and a contradiction. I can not will the good of God and of being as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The reason of the choice and the end chosen are identical, so that if I will the good of being as an ultimate end; I will it for the right reason.

Again: to will the good of being, not for its intrinsic value, but because God commands it, and because I am under a moral obligation to will it, is not to will it as an ultimate end. It is willing the will of God or moral obligation as an ultimate end and not the good of being as an ultimate end. This willing would not be obedience to the moral law.

Again: It is absurd and a contradiction to say that I can love God, that is, will his good out of regard to his authority, rather than out of regard to the intrinsic value of his well-

being. It is impossible to will God's good as an end out of regard to his authority. This is to make his authority the end chosen, for the reason of a choice is identical with the end chosen. Therefore, to will anything for the reason that God requires it, is to will God's requirement as an ultimate end. I can not, therefore, love God with any acceptable love primarily because He commands it. God never expected to induce His creatures to love Him or to will His good by commanding them to do so. "The law" says the apostle "was not made for a righteous man but for sinners." If it be asked then "wherefore serveth the law?" I answer,

(1.) That the obligation to will good to God exists antecedently to His requiring it.

(2.) He requires it because it is naturally obligatory.

(3.) It is impossible that He, being benevolent, should not will that we should be benevolent.

(4.) His expressed will is only the promulgation of the law of nature. It is rather declaratory than dictatorial.

(5.) It is a vindication or illustration of His righteousness.

(6.) It sanctions and rewards love. It can not as a mere authority beget love, but it can encourage and reward it.

(7.) It can fix the attention on the end commanded and thus lead to a fuller understanding of the value of that end. In this way, it may convert the soul.

(8.) It can convince of sin in case of disobedience.

(9.) It holds before the mind the standard by which it is to judge itself and by which it is to be judged.

But let it be kept in constant remembrance that to aim at keeping the law as an ultimate end is not keeping it. It is a legal righteousness and not *love*.

31. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that the mind always or at any time intends the right for the sake of the right. This has been so fully shown in a former lecture that it need not be repeated here.

32. Nor does it imply that the benevolent mind always so much as thinks of the rightness of good willing. I surely may will the highest well-being of God and of men as an end or from a regard to its intrinsic value, and not at the time or at least at all times be conscious of having any reference to the rightness of this love. It is, however, none the less virtuous on this account. I behold the infinite value of the well-being of God and the infinite value of the immortal soul of my neighbor. My soul is fired with the view. I instantly consecrate my whole being to this end and perhaps do not so

much as think at the time either of moral obligation or of the rightness of the choice. I choose the end with a single eye to its intrinsic value. Will any one say that this is not virtue, that this is not true and real obedience to the law of God? And here I must repeat in substance what I have said on a former occasion.

33. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should *practically treat* all interests that are of equal value according to their value. For example, the precept, Love thy neighbor as thyself, can not mean that I am to take equal care of my own soul and the soul of every other human being. This were impossible. Nor does it mean that I should take the same care and oversight of my own and of all the families of the earth. Nor that I should divide what little of property or time or talent I have equally among all mankind. This were,

(1.) Impossible.

(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the universe by each individual's giving his attention particularly to the promotion of those interests that are within his reach and so under his influence that he possesses particular advantages for promoting them. Every interest is to be esteemed according to its relative value, but our efforts to promote particular interests should depend upon our relations and capacity to promote them. Some interests of great value we may be under no obligation to promote for the reason that we have no ability to promote them, while we may be under obligation to promote interests of vastly less value for the reason that we are able to promote them. We are to aim at promoting those interests that we can most surely and extensively promote, but always in a manner that shall not interfere with others promoting other interests according to their relative value. Every man is bound to promote his own and the salvation of his family, *not because they belong to self*, but because they are valuable in themselves and because they are particularly committed to him as being directly within his reach. This is a principle every where assumed in the government of God; (and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind as we proceed in our investigations, as it will on the one hand prevent misapprehension, and on the other avoid the necessity of circumlocution when we wish to express the same idea,) the true intent and meaning of the moral law no doubt is that every interest or good known to a moral being shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic value, and that in our efforts to promote good we are to aim at securing the greatest practica-

ble amount and to bestow our efforts where and as it appears from our circumstances and relations we can accomplish the greatest good. This ordinarily can be done, beyond all question, only by each one attending to the promotion of those particular interests which are most within the reach of his influence.

LECTURE XIV.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW.

It has been shown that the sum and spirit of the whole law is properly expressed in one word, *Love*. It has also been shown that this love is benevolence or good willing; that it consists in choosing the highest good of God and of universal being as an ultimate end, or for its own intrinsic value; in a spirit or state of entire consecration to this as the ultimate end of existence. Although the whole law is fulfilled in one word, love, yet there are many things implied in the state of mind expressed by this term. It is, therefore, indispensable to a right understanding of this subject, that we inquire into the characteristics or attributes of this love. We must keep steadily in mind certain truths of mental philosophy. I will, therefore,

I. Call attention to certain facts in mental philosophy which are revealed to us in consciousness, and

II. Point out the attributes of that love that constitutes obedience to the law of God; and as I proceed, I will call attention to those states of the Intelligence and of the Sensibility, and also to the course of outward conduct implied in the existence of this love in any mind, implied in it as necessarily resulting from it as an effect does from its cause.

I. Call attention to certain facts in mental philosophy as they are revealed in consciousness.

1. Moral agents possess Intelligence or the faculty of knowledge.

2. They also possess Sensibility, or Sensitivity, or in other words, the faculty or susceptibility of feeling.

3. They also possess Will, or the power of choosing or refusing in every case of moral obligation.

4. These primary faculties are so correlated to each other that the Intellect or the Sensibility may control the will, or the will may, in a certain sense, control them. That is, the will is free to choose in accordance with the demands of the intellect, or with the desires and impulses of the sensibility. It is free to be influenced by the impulses of the sensibility, or by the dictates of the intelligence, or to control and direct them both. It can directly control the attention of the intellect, and consequently its perceptions, thoughts, &c. It can indirectly control the states of the sensibility, or feeling faculty, by controlling the perceptions and thoughts of the intelli-

gence. We also know from consciousness, as was shown in a former lecture, that the voluntary muscles of the body are directly controlled by the will, and that the relation of outward action, as well as the states of the intelligence and the sensibility, to the action of the will, is that of necessity. That is, the law which obliges the attention, the feelings, and the actions of the body to obey the decisions of the will, is physical law or the law of necessity. The attention of the intellect and the outward actions are controlled directly, and the feelings indirectly, by the decisions of the will. The will can either command or obey. It can suffer itself to be enslaved by the impulses of the sensibility, or it can assert its sovereignty and control them. The will is not influenced by either the intellect or the sensibility, by the law of necessity or force; so that the will can always resist either the demands of the intelligence or the impulses of the sensibility. But while they can not *lord it* over the will through the agency of any law of force, the will has the aid of the law of necessity or force by which to control them.

Again: We are conscious of affirming to ourselves our obligation to obey the law of the intelligence rather than the impulses of the sensibility; that to act virtuously we must act rationally or intelligently, and not give ourselves up to the blind impulses of our feelings.

Now, inasmuch as the love required by the moral law consists in choice, willing, intention, as has been repeatedly shown, and inasmuch as choice, willing, intending, controls the states of the intellect and the outward actions directly by a law of necessity, and by the same law controls the feelings or states of the sensibility indirectly, it follows that certain states of the intellect and the sensibility and also certain outward actions must be implied in the existence of the love which the law of God requires. I say implied in it, not as making a part of it, but as necessarily resulting from it. The thoughts, opinions, judgments, feelings, and outward actions must be moulded and modified by the state of the heart or will.

Here it is important to remark that in common parlance, the same word is often used to express either an action or state of the will, or a state of the sensibility, or both. This is true of all the terms that represent what are called the christian graces or virtues, or those various modifications of virtue of which Christians are conscious and which appear in their life and temper.

Of this truth we shall be constantly reminded as we proceed in our investigations, for we shall find illustrations of it at every step of our progress. Before I proceed to point out the attributes of benevolence, it is important to remark that all the moral attributes of God and of all holy beings, are only attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a term that comprehensively expresses them all. *God is love.* This term expresses comprehensively God's whole moral character. This love, as we have repeatedly seen, is benevolence. Benevolence is good willing, or the choice of the highest good of God and the universe as an end. But from this comprehensive statement, accurate though it be, we are apt to receive very inadequate conceptions of what really belongs to as implied in benevolence. To say that love is the fulfilling of the whole law; that benevolence is the whole of true religion; that the whole duty of man to God and his neighbor, is expressed in one word, *love*—these statements, though true, are so comprehensive as to need with all minds much amplification and explanation. The fact is, that many things are implied in love or benevolence.* By this is intended that benevolence needs to be viewed under various aspects and in various relations, and its dispositions or willings considered in the various relations in which it is called to act. Benevolence is an ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate end. Now if we suppose that this is all that is implied in benevolence we shall egregiously err. Unless we inquire into the nature of the end which benevolence chooses, and the means by which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall understand but little of the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has many attributes or characteristics. These must all harmonize in the selection of its end, and in its efforts to realize it. *Wisdom, justice, mercy, truth, holiness,* and many other attributes, as we shall see, are essential elements or attributes of benevolence. To understand what true benevolence is, we must inquire into its attributes. Not every thing that is called *love* has at all the nature of benevolence. Nor has all that is called benevolence any title to that appellation. There are various kinds of love. Natural affection is called love. The affection that exists between the sexes is also called love. Our preference of certain kinds of diet is called love. Hence we say we love fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, &c. Benevolence is also called love, and is the kind of love, beyond all question, required by the law of God. But there is more than one state of mind that is called benevolence. There is

There is
a constitutional or phrenological benevolence, which is often mistaken for and confounded with the benevolence which constitutes virtue. This so called benevolence is in truth only an imposing form of selfishness; nevertheless it is called benevolence. Many of its manifestations are like those of true benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken in giving religious instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevolence, let it be remembered, is the obedience of the will to the law of the reason. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and not to gratify self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to the impulses of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The will seeks to gratify the desires and propensities for the pleasure of the gratification. Self-gratification is sought as an end and as the supreme end. It is preferred to the claims of God and the good of being. Phrenological or constitutional benevolence is only obedience to the impulse of the sensibility—a yielding to a feeling of compassion. It is only an effort to gratify a desire. It is, therefore, as really selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitutional desire whatever.

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It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the Divine law, and what is implied in it, without considering attentively the various attributes or aspects of benevolence, properly so called. Upon this discussion we are about to enter. But before I commence the enumeration and definition of these attributes, it is important further to remark that the moral attributes of God, as revealed in his works, providence, and word, throw much light upon the subject before us. Also the many precepts of the Bible, and the developments of benevolence therein revealed, will assist us much as we proceed in our inquiries upon this important subject. As the Bible expressly affirms that love comprehends the whole character of God—that it is the whole that the law requires of man—that the end of the commandment is charity or love—we may be assured that every form of true virtue is only a modification of love or benevolence, that is, that every state of mind required by the Bible, and recognized as virtue is, in its last analysis, resolvable into love or benevolence. In other words, every virtue is only benevolence viewed under certain aspects, or in certain relations. In other words still, it is only one of the elements, peculiarities, characteristics, or attributes of benevolence. This is true of God's moral attributes. They are, as has been said, only attributes of benevolence. They are only benevolence

viewed in certain relations and aspects. All his virtues are only so many attributes of benevolence. This is and must be true of every holy being.

II. I will now proceed, agreeably to my purpose, to point out the attributes of that love which constitutes obedience to the law of God.

As I proceed I will call attention to the states of the intelligence and of the sensibility, and also to the courses of outward conduct implied in the existence of this love in any mind—implied in its existence as necessarily resulting from it by the law of cause and effect. These attributes are,

1. *Voluntariness.* That is, it is a phenomenon of the will. There is a state of the sensibility often expressed by the term love. Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a mere feeling or emotion. The term is often used to express the emotion of fondness or attachment as distinct from a voluntary state of mind or a choice of the will. This emotion or feeling, as we are all aware, is purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind, it has in itself no moral character. The law of God requires voluntary love or good will, as has been repeatedly shown. This love consists in choice, intention. It is choosing the highest well-being of God and the universe of sentient beings as an end. Of course voluntariness must be one of its characteristics.

If it be voluntary, or consist in choice, if it be a phenomenon of the will, it must control the thoughts and states of the sensibility as well as the outward action. This love, then, not only consists in a spirit or state of consecration to God and the universe, but also implies deep emotions of love to God and man. Though a phenomenon of the will, it implies the existence of all those feelings of love and affection to God and man that necessarily result from the consecration of the heart or will to their highest well-being. It also implies all that outward course of life that necessarily flows from a state of will consecrated to this end. Let it be borne in mind that when these feelings do not arise in the sensibility, and when this course of life is not, then the true love or voluntary consecration to God and the universe required by the law, is not. These follow from this by a law of necessity. Those, that is, feelings or emotions of love and a correct outward life, may exist without this voluntary love, as I shall have occasion to show in its proper place; but this can not exist without

those, as they follow from it by a law of necessity. These emotions will vary in their strength as constitution and circumstances vary, but exist they must in some sensible degree whenever the will is in a benevolent attitude.

2. *Liberty* is an attribute of this love. The mind is free and spontaneous in its exercise. It makes this choice when it has the power at every moment to choose self-gratification as an end. Of this every moral agent is conscious. It is a free and therefore a responsible choice.

3. *Intelligence*. That is, the mind makes choice of this end intelligently. It not only knows what it chooses, and why it chooses, but also that it chooses in accordance with the dictates of the intelligence; that the end is worthy of being chosen, and that for this reason the intelligence demands that it should be chosen; and also, that for its own intrinsic value it is chosen.

Because voluntariness, liberty, and intelligence are natural attributes of this love, therefore the following are its moral attributes.

4. *Virtuousness* or *rightness* is an attribute of it. *Moral rightness* is moral perfection, *righteousness*, or *uprightness*. *Virtuousness* must be a moral element or attribute. The term marks or designates its relation to moral law and expresses its conformity to it.

In the exercise of this love or choice, the mind is conscious of uprightness or of being conformed to moral law or moral obligation. In other words, it is conscious of being virtuous or holy; of being like God; of loving what ought to be loved, and of consecration to the right end.

Because this choice is in accordance with the demands of the intelligence, therefore the mind in its exercise is conscious of the approbation of that power of the intelligence which we call conscience. The conscience must approve this love, choice, or intention.

Again: Because the conscience approves of this choice, therefore there is and must be a corresponding state of the sensibility. There is and must be in the sensibility a feeling of happiness or satisfaction, a feeling of complacency or delight in the love that is in the heart or will. This love, then, always produces self-approbation in the conscience, and a felt satisfaction in the sensibility, and these feelings are often very acute and joyous, in so much that the soul in the exercise of this love of the heart is sometimes led to rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory. This state of mind does

not always and necessarily amount to joy. Much depends in this respect on the clearness of the intellectual views, upon the state of the sensibility, and upon the manifestation of Divine approbation to the soul. But when peace or approbation of conscience, and consequently a peaceful state of the sensibility are not, this love is not. They are connected with it by a law of necessity, and must of course appear on the field of consciousness where it exists. These, then, are implied in obedience to the law of God. Conscious peace of mind and conscious joy in God must be where true love to God is.

5. *Disinterestedness* is another attribute of this love. By disinterestedness is not intended that the mind takes no interest in the object loved, for it does take a supreme interest in it. But this term expresses the mind's choice of an end for its own sake, and not merely upon condition that the good belongs to self. This love is disinterested in the sense that the highest well-being of God and the universe is chosen, not upon condition of its relation to self, but for its own intrinsic and infinite value. It is this attribute particularly that distinguishes this love from selfish love. Selfish love makes the relation of good to self the condition of choosing it. The good of God and of the Universe, if chosen at all, is only chosen as a means or condition of promoting the highest good of self. But this love does not make good to self its end; but good to God and being in general is its end.

As disinterestedness is an attribute of this love, it does not seek its own but the good of others. "Charity (love) seeketh not her own." It grasps the good of being in general, and of course, of necessity, secures a corresponding outward life and inward feeling. The intelligence will be employed in devising ways and means for the promotion of its end. The sensibility will be tremblingly alive to the good of all and of each, will rejoice in the good of others as in its own, and will grieve at the misery of others as in its own. It "will rejoice with them who do rejoice, and weep with them that weep." There will not, can not be envy at the prosperity of others, but unfeigned joy, joy as real and often as exquisite as in its own. Benevolence enjoys every body's good things, while selfishness is too envious at the good things of others even to enjoy its own. There is a Divine economy in benevolence. Each benevolent soul not only enjoys his own good things but also enjoys the good things of all others so far as he knows their happiness. He drinks at the river of God's pleasure. He not only rejoices in doing good to others, but

also in beholding their enjoyment of good things. He joys in God's joy and in the joy of angels and of saints. He also rejoices in the good things of all sentient existences. He is happy in beholding the pleasure of the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea. He sympathizes with all joy and all suffering known to him. Nor is his sympathy with the suffering of others a feeling of unmingled pain. It is a real luxury to sympathize in the woes of others. He would not be without this sympathy. It so accords with his sense of propriety and fitness, that mingled with the painful emotion there is a sweet feeling of self-approbation, so that a benevolent sympathy with the woes of others is by no means inconsistent with happiness, and with perfect happiness. God has this sympathy. He often expresses and otherwise manifests it. There is, indeed, a mysterious and an exquisite luxury in sharing the woes of others. God and angels and all holy beings know what it is. Where this result of love is not manifested, there love itself is not. Envy at the prosperity, influence, or good of others, the absence of sensible joy in view of the good enjoyed by others, and of sympathy with the sufferings of others, prove conclusively that this love does not exist. There is an expansiveness, an ampleness of embrace, a universality and a Divine disinterestedness in this love that necessarily manifests itself in the liberal devising of liberal things for Zion, and in the copious outpourings of the floods of sympathetic feeling, both of joys and sorrows, as their occasions present themselves before the mind.

5. *Impartiality* is another attribute of this love. By this term is not intended that the mind is indifferent to the character of him who is happy or miserable; that it would be as well pleased to see the wicked as the righteous eternally and perfectly blessed. But it is intended that, other things being equal, it is the intrinsic value of their well-being which is alone regarded by the mind. Other things being equal, it matters not to whom the good belongs. It is no respecter of persons. The good of being is its end and it seeks to promote every interest according to its relative value. Selfish love is partial. It seeks to promote self-interest first, and secondarily those interests that sustain such a relation to self as will at least indirectly promote the gratification of self. Selfish love has its favorites, its prejudices, unreasonable and ridiculous. Color, family, nation, and many other things of like nature modify it. But benevolence knows neither Jew

nor Greek, neither bond nor free, white nor black, Babarian, Cythian, European, Asiatic, African, nor American, but accounts all men as men, and by virtue of their common manhood calls every man a brother, and seeks the interest of all and of each. Impartiality being an attribute of this love, will of course manifest itself in the outward life and in the temper and spirit of its subject. This love can have no fellowship with those absurd and ridiculous prejudices that are so often rife among nominal Christians. Nor will it cherish them for a moment in the sensibility of him who exercises it. Benevolence recognizes no privileged classes on the one hand, nor proscribed classes on the other. It secures in the sensibility an utter loathing of those discriminations so odiously manifested and boasted of and which are founded exclusively in a selfish state of the will. The fact that a man is a man, and not that he is of our party, of our complexion, or of our town, state or nation—that he is a creature of God, that he is capable of virtue and happiness, these are the considerations that are seized upon by this divinely impartial love. It is the intrinsic value of his interests, and not that they are the interests of one connected with self, that the benevolent mind regards.

But here it is important to repeat the remark that the economy of benevolence demands that where two interests are, in themselves considered, of equal value, in order to secure the greatest amount of good, each one should bestow his efforts where they can be bestowed to the greatest advantage. For example: Every man sustains such relations that he can accomplish more good by seeking to promote the interest and happiness of certain persons rather than of others. His family, his kindred, his companions, his immediate neighbors and those to whom, in the providence of God, he sustains such relations as to give him access to them and influence over them. It is not unreasonable, it is not partial, but reasonable and impartial to bestow our efforts more directly upon them. Therefore, while benevolence regards every interest according to its relative value, it reasonably puts forth its efforts in the direction where there is a prospect of accomplishing the most good. This, I say, is not partiality, but impartiality; for be it understood, it is not the particular persons to whom good can be done, but the amount of good that can be accomplished that directs the efforts of benevolence. It is not because my family is my own, nor because their well-being is, of course, more valuable in itself than that of my neighbors' families,

but because my relations afford me higher facilities for doing them good, I am under particular obligation to aim first at promoting their good. Hence the apostle says: "If any man provide not for his own, especially for those of his own household, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel." Strictly speaking, benevolence esteems every known good according to its intrinsic and relative value; but practically treats every interest according to the perceived probability of securing on the whole the highest amount of good. This is a truth of great practical importance. It is developed in the experience and observation of every day and hour. It is manifest in the conduct of God and of Christ, of apostles and of martyrs. It is every where assumed in the precepts of the Bible, and every where manifested in the history of benevolent effort. Let it be understood, then, that impartiality, as an attribute of benevolence, does not imply that its effort to do good will not be modified by relations and circumstances. But, on the contrary, this attribute implies that the efforts to secure the great end of benevolence, to wit, the greatest amount of good to God and the universe, will be modified by those relations and circumstances that afford the highest advantages for doing good.

The impartiality of benevolence causes it always to lay supreme stress upon God's interests, because His well-being is of infinite value, and of course benevolence must be supreme to Him. Benevolence being impartial love, of course accounts God's interests and well-being, as of infinitely greater value than the aggregate of all other interests. Benevolence regards our neighbor's interests as our own, simply because they are in their intrinsic value as our own. Benevolence, therefore, is always supreme to God and equal to man.

6. Another attribute of this love is *Universality*. Benevolence chooses the highest good of being in general. It excludes none from its regard; but on the contrary embosoms all in its ample embrace. But by this it is not intended that it seeks to promote the good of every individual. It seeks the highest practicable amount of good. The interest of every individual is estimated according to its intrinsic value, whatever the circumstances or character of each may be. But character and relations may and must modify the manifestations of benevolence, or its efforts in seeking to promote this end. A wicked character and governmental relations and considerations may forbid benevolence to seek the good of some. Nay, they may demand that positive misery shall be

inflicted on some as a warning to others to beware of their destructive ways. By universality, as an attribute of benevolence, is intended that good will is truly exercised towards all sentient beings, whatever their character and relations may be; and that when the higher good of the greater number does not forbid it, the happiness of all and of each will be pursued with a degree of stress equal to their relative value and the prospect of securing each interest. Enemies as well as friends, strangers and foreigners as well as relations and immediate neighbors will be enfolded in its sweet embrace. It is the state of mind required by Christ in the truly Divine precept, "I say unto you, love your enemies, pray for them that hate you, and do good unto them that despitefully use and persecute you." This attribute of benevolence is gloriously conspicuous in the character of God. His love to sinners alone accounts for our being to-day out of hell. His aiming to secure the highest good of the greatest number is illustrated by the display of his glorious justice in the punishment of the wicked. His universal care for all ranks and conditions of sentient beings manifested in His works and providence, beautifully and gloriously illustrates the truth that "His tender mercies are over all His works."

It is easy to see that universality must be a modification of true benevolence. It consists in good willing, that is, in choosing the highest good of being as such and for its own sake. Of course it must, to be consistent with itself, seek the good of all and of each, so far as the good of each is consistent with the greatest good upon the whole. Benevolence not only wills and seeks the good of moral beings, but also the good of every sentient existence, from the minutest animalculum to the highest order of beings. It of course begets a state of the sensibility that is tremblingly alive to all happiness and to all pain. It will be pained with the agony of an insect, and also rejoice in its joy. God does this and all holy beings do this. Where this sympathy with the joys and sorrows of universal being is not, there benevolence is not. Observe, good is its end; where this is promoted by the proper means the feelings are gratified. Where evil is witnessed the benevolent spirit deeply and necessarily sympathizes.

LECTURE XV.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

✓ WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

7. *Efficiency* is another attribute or characteristic of benevolence. Benevolence consists in choice, intention. Now we know from consciousness that choice or intention constitutes the mind's deepest activity. If I honestly intend a thing I can not but make efforts to accomplish that which I intend, provided that I believe the thing possible. If I choose an end, this choice must and will energize to secure its end. When benevolence is the supreme choice, preference, intention of the soul, it is plainly impossible that it should not produce efforts to secure its end. It must cease to exist or manifest itself in exertions to secure its end as soon as and whenever the intelligence deems it wise to do so. If the will has yielded to the intelligence in the choice of an end, it will certainly obey the intelligence in pursuit of that end. Choice, intention, is the cause of all the outward activity of moral agents. They all have chosen some end, either their own gratification or the highest good of being; and all the busy bustle of this world's teeming population is nothing else than choice or intention seeking to compass its end.

✓ Efficiency therefore is an attribute of benevolent intention. It must, it will, it does energize in God, in angels, in saints on earth and in Heaven. It was this attribute of benevolence that led God to give His only begotten Son, and that led the Son to give himself "that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life."

✓ If Love is efficient in producing outward action and efficient in producing inward feelings; it is efficient to wake up the intellect and set the world of thought on fire in devising ways and means to realize its end. It wields all the infinite natural attributes of God. It is the mainspring that moves all heaven. It is the mighty power that is heaving the mass of mind and rocking the moral world like a smothered volcano. Look to the heavens above. It was benevolence that hung them out. It is benevolence that sustains those mighty rolling orbs in their courses. It was good will endeavoring to realize its end that at first put forth creative power. The same power for the same reason still energizes and will continue to energize for the realization of its end so long as God is benevolent. And O what a glorious thought that infinite

benevolence is wielding and will forever wield infinite attributes for the promotion of good. No mind but an infinite one can begin to conceive of the amount of good that Jehovah will secure. O blessed glorious thoughts! But it is, it must be a reality as surely as God and the universe exist. It is no imagination, it is one of the most stable as well as the most glorious truths in the universe. Mountains of granite are but vapor in the comparison of it. But will the truly benevolent on earth and in heaven sympathize with God? The power that energizes in him, energizes in them. One principle animates and moves them all, and that principle is love, good will to universal being. Well may our souls cry out, Amen, go on, God-speed, let the mighty power heave and wield universal mind until all the ills of earth shall be put away and until all that can be made holy are clothed in the garments of everlasting gladness.

Since benevolence is necessarily, from its very nature, active and efficient in putting forth efforts to secure its end, and since its end is the highest good of being, it follows that all who are truly religious will and must, from the very nature of true religion, be active in endeavoring to promote the good of being. While effort is possible to a christian, it is as natural to him as his breath. He has within him the very mainspring of activity, a heart set on the promotion of the highest good of universal being. This is the end for which he lives and moves and has his being. While he has life and activity at all, it will, and it must be directed to this end. Let this never be forgotten. An idle, an inactive, inefficient christian is a misnomer. Religion is an essentially active principle, and when and while it exists, it must exercise and manifest itself. It is not merely good desire, but it is good willing. Men may have desires, and hope and live on them, without making efforts to realize their desires. They may desire without action. If their will is active, their life must be. If they really choose an ultimate end, this choice must manifest itself. The sinner does and must manifest his selfish choice, and so likewise must the saint manifest his benevolence.

8. *Penitence* must be a characteristic of benevolence, in one who has been a sinner. Penitence, as we have briefly said and shall more fully illustrate hereafter, is not a phenomenon of the sensibility, but of the will. Every form of virtue must, of necessity, be a phenomenon of the will, and not of the intellect or of the sensibility. This word is commonly used also to designate a certain phenomenon of the sensibili-

ty, to wit, sorrow for sin. This sorrow, though called penitence, is not penitence regarded as a virtue. Evangelical penitence consists in a peculiar attitude of the will toward our own past sins. It is the will's continued rejection of and opposition to our past sins—the will's aversion to them. This rejection, opposition, and aversion, is penitence, and is always a peculiarity in the history of those benevolent minds that have been sinners. This change in the will, most deeply and permanently affects the sensibility. It will keep the intelligence thoroughly awake to the nature, character, and tendencies of sin, to its unspeakable guilt, and all its intrinsic odiousness. This will of course break up the fountains of the great deep of feeling; the sensibility will often pour forth a torrent of burning sorrow in view of past sin; and all its loathing and indignation will be kindled against it when it is beheld. This attribute of benevolence will secure confession and restitution, that is, these must necessarily follow from genuine repentance. If the soul forsake sin, it will of course make all possible reparation when it has done an injury. Benevolence seeks the good of all, of course it will and must seek to repair whatever injury it has inflicted on any.

Repentance will and must secure a God-justifying and self-condemning spirit. It will take all shame and all blame to self, and fully acquit God of blame. This deep self-abasement is always and necessarily a characteristic of the true penitent. Where this is not, true repentance is not.

It should, however, be here remarked that feelings of self-loathing, of self-abasement, and of abhorrence of sin, depend upon the view which the intelligence gains of the nature and guilt and aggravation of sin. In a sensible and manifested degree, it will always exist when the will has honestly turned or repented; but this feeling I have described gains strength as the soul from time to time gains a deeper insight into the nature, guilt and tendencies of sin. It is probable that repentance as an emotion will always gain strength, not only in this world but in heaven. Can it be that the saints can in heaven reflect upon their past abuse of the Savior, and not feel their sorrow stirred within them? Nor will this diminish their happiness. Godly sorrow is not unhappiness. There is a luxury in the exercise. Remorse can not be known in heaven, but godly sorrow, I think, must exist among the saints forever. However this may be in heaven, it certainly is implied in repentance on earth. This attribute must and will secure an outward life conformed to the law of love. There

may be an outward morality without benevolence, but there can not be benevolence without corresponding purity of outward life.

9. Another characteristic or attribute of benevolence is *Faith*. Evangelical faith is by no means, as some have supposed, a phenomenon of the intelligence. The term, however, is often used to express states both of the sensibility and of the intellect. Conviction, or a strong perception of truth, such as banishes doubt, is in common language called faith or belief, and this without any reference to the state of the will, whether it embraces or resists the truth perceived. But, certainly, this conviction can not be evangelical faith. In this belief, there is no virtue; it is but the faith of devils. The term is often used in common parlance to express a mere feeling of assurance, or confidence, and as often respects a falsehood as the truth. That is, persons often feel the utmost confidence in a lie. But whether the feeling be in accordance with truth or falsehood, it is not faith in the evangelical sense of the term. It is not virtue. Faith, to be a virtue, must be a phenomenon of the will. It must be an attribute of benevolence or love. As an attribute of benevolence, it is the will's embracing and loving truth. It is the soul's yielding or committing itself to the influence of truth. It is trust. It is the heart's embracing the truths of God's existence, attributes, works and word. It implies intellectual perception of truth, and consists in the heart's embracing all the truth perceived. It also implies that state of the sensibility which is called faith. Both the state of the intellect and the state of the sensibility just expressed are implied in faith, though neither of them make any part of it. Faith always begets a realizing state of the sensibility. The intellect sees the truth clearly, and the sensibility feels it deeply, in proportion to the strength of the intellectual perception. But the clearest possible perception and the deepest possible felt assurance of the truth may consist with a state of the utmost opposition of the will to truth. But this can not be trust, confidence, faith. The damned in hell, no doubt, see the truth clearly, and have a feeling of the utmost assurance of the truth of Christianity, but they have no faith.

Faith then must certainly be a phenomenon of the will, and must be a modification or attribute of benevolence. It is good will or benevolence considered in its relations to the truth of God. It is good will to God, confiding in his veracity and faithfulness. It can not be too distinctly borne in mind that

every modification or phase of virtue is only benevolence existing in certain relations, or good will to God and the universe manifesting itself in the various circumstances and relations in which it is called to act.

10. *Complacency* in holiness or moral excellence, is another attribute of benevolence. This consists in benevolence contemplated in its relations to holy beings.

This term also expresses both a state of the intelligence and of the sensibility. Moral agents are so constituted, that they necessarily approve of moral worth or excellence; and when even sinners behold right character, or moral goodness, they are compelled to respect and approve it by a law of their intelligence. This they not unfrequently regard as evidence of goodness in themselves. But this is doubtless just as common in hell as it is on earth. The veriest sinners on earth or in hell, have by the unalterable constitution of their nature, the necessity imposed upon them of paying *intellectual homage* to moral excellence. When a moral agent is intensely contemplating moral excellence, and his intellectual approbation is emphatically pronounced, the natural, and often the necessary result, is a corresponding feeling of complacency or delight in the sensibility. But this being altogether an involuntary state of mind, has no moral character. Complacency as a phenomenon of will consists in willing the actual highest blessedness of the holy being as a good in itself and upon condition of his moral excellence.

This attribute of benevolence is the cause of a complacent state of the sensibility. It is true that feelings of complacency may exist when complacency of will does *not* exist. But complacency of feeling surely will exist when complacency of will exists. Complacency of *will* implies complacency of *conscience*, or the approbation of the intelligence. When there is a complacency of intelligence and of will, there will be of course complacency of the sensibility.

It is highly worthy of observation here, that this complacency of feeling is that which is generally termed love to God and to the saints, in the common language of christians, and often in the popular language of the bible. It is a vivid and pleasant state of the sensibility, and very noticeable by consciousness of course. Indeed it is perhaps the general usage now to call this phenomenon of the sensibility, love, and for want of just discrimination, to speak of it as constituting religion. Many seem to suppose that this feeling of delight in and fondness for God, is the love required by the moral law.

They are conscious of not being voluntary in it, as well they may be. They judge of their religious state, not by the end for which they live, that is, by their choice or intention, but by their *emotions*. If they find themselves strongly exercised with *emotions* of love to God they look upon themselves as in a state well-pleasing to God. But if their feelings or emotions of love are not active, they of course judge themselves to have little or no religion. It is remarkable to what extent religion is regarded as a phenomenon of the sensibility and as consisting in mere feelings. So common is it, indeed, that almost uniformly when professed Christians speak of their *experience*, they speak of their *feelings* or the state of their sensibility, instead of speaking of their conscious consecration to God and the good of being.

It is also somewhat common for them to speak of their *views of Christ*, and of truth, in a manner that shows that they regard the states of the intelligence as constituting a part at least of their religion. It is of great importance that just views should prevail among Christians upon this momentous subject. Virtue or religion, as has been repeatedly said, must be a phenomenon of the heart or will. The attribute of benevolence which we are considering, that is, complacency of heart or will in God, is the most common light in which the Scriptures present it, and also the most common form in which it lies revealed on the field of consciousness. The Scriptures often assign the goodness of God as a reason for loving Him, and Christians are conscious of having much regard to His goodness in their love to Him. I mean in their good will to Him. They will good to Him and ascribe all praise and glory to Him upon the condition that He deserves it. Of this they are conscious. Now, as was shown in a former lecture, in their love or good will to God they do not regard His goodness as the fundamental reason for willing good to Him. Although His goodness is that which at the time most strongly impresses their minds, yet it must be that the intrinsic value of His well-being is assumed and had in view by them, or they would no sooner will that than any thing else to Him. In willing His good they must assume its intrinsic value to Him as the fundamental reason for willing it, and His goodness as a secondary reason or condition, but they are conscious of being much influenced in willing His good in particular by a regard to his goodness. Should you ask the Christian why he loved God or why he exercised good will to Him, he would probably reply, it is because God is good. But suppose he should be further asked

why he willed good rather than evil to God, he would say because good is good or valuable to Him. Or if he returned the same answer as before, to wit, because God is good, he would give this answer only because he would think it impossible for any one not to assume and to know that good is willed instead of evil because of its intrinsic value. The fact is, the intrinsic value of well-being is necessarily taken along with the mind, and always assumed by it as a first truth. When a virtuous being is perceived, this first truth being spontaneously and necessarily assumed, the mind thinks only of the secondary reason or condition, or the virtue of the being in willing good to Him.

The philosophy of the heart's complacency in God may be illustrated by many familiar examples. For instance: The law of causality is a first truth. Every one knows it. Every one assumes it and must assume it. No one ever did or can practically deny it. Now I have some important end to accomplish. In looking around for means to accomplish my end, I discover a certain means which I am sure will accomplish it. It is the tendency of this to accomplish my end that my mind is principally affected with at the time. Should I be asked why I choose this I should naturally answer because of its utility or tendency, and I should be conscious that this reason was upon the field of consciousness. But it is perfectly plain that the fundamental reason for this choice, and one which was assumed, and had in fact the prime and fundamental influence in producing the choice was the intrinsic value of the end to which the thing chosen sustained the relation of a means. Take another illustration: That happiness is intrinsically valuable is a first truth. Every body knows and assumes it as such. Now I behold a virtuous character. Assuming the first truth that happiness is intrinsically valuable, I affirm irresistibly that he deserves happiness and that it is my duty to will his happiness. Now, in this case the affirmation that he deserves happiness, and that I ought to will it, is based upon the assumption that happiness is intrinsically valuable. The thing with which I am immediately conscious of being affected, and which necessitated the affirmation of the obligation to will his good, and which induced me to will it, was the perception of his goodness or desert of happiness. Nevertheless, it is certain that I did assume, and was fundamentally influenced both in my affirmation of obligation and in my choice by the first truth, that happiness is intrinsically valuable. I assumed it and was influenced

by it, though unconscious of it. And this is generally true of first truths. They are so universally and so necessarily assumed in practice, that we lose the direct consciousness of being influenced by them. Myriads of illustrations of this are arising all around us. We do really love God, that is, exercise good will to Him. Of this we are strongly conscious. We are also conscious of willing His actual blessedness upon condition that He is good. This reason we naturally assign to ourselves and to others. But in this we may overlook the fact that there is still another and a deeper, and a more fundamental reason assumed for willing His good, to wit, its intrinsic value. And this reason is so fundamental that we should irresistibly affirm our obligation to will His good upon the bare perception of His susceptibility of Happiness wholly irrespective of His character.

Before I quit this subject, I must advert again to the subject of complacent love as a phenomenon of the sensibility and also as a phenomenon of the intelligence. There are sad mistakes and gross and ruinous delusions entertained by many upon this subject, if I mistake not. The intelligence of necessity, perfectly approves of the character of God where it is apprehended. The intelligence is so correlated to the sensibility that where it perceives in a strong light the Divine excellence, or the excellence of the Divine law, the sensibility is affected by the perception of the intelligence as a thing of course and of necessity. So that emotions of complacency and delight in the law, and in the Divine character may and often do glow and burn in the sensibility while the heart is unaffected. The will remains in a selfish choice, while the intellect and the sensibility are strongly impressed with the perception of the Divine excellence. This state of the intellect and the sensibility are, no doubt, often mistaken for true religion. We have undoubted illustrations of this in the Bible, and great multitudes of cases of it in common life. "Yet they seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and forsook not the ordinance of their God: they ask of me the ordinances of justice, they take delight in approaching to God." Isaiah 58: 2. "And, lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument: for they hear thy words, but they do them not." Ezekiel 33: 32.

Nothing is of greater importance than forever to understand that religion is always and necessarily a phenomenon of the will; that it always and necessarily produces outward ac-

tion and inward feeling; that on account of the correlation of the intellect and sensibility, almost any and every variety of feeling may exist in the mind, as produced by the perceptions of the intelligence whatever the state of the will may be; that unless we are conscious of good will or of consecration to God and the good of being—unless we are conscious of living for this end, it avails us nothing, whatever our views and feelings may be.

And also it behooves us to consider that although these views and feelings may exist while the heart is wrong, they will certainly exist when the heart is right; that there may be feeling, and deep feeling when the heart is wrong, yet that there will and must be deep emotion and strenuous action when the heart is right. Let it be remembered, then, that complacency, as a phenomenon of the will, is always a striking characteristic of true love or benevolence to God; that is, that the mind is affected and consciously influenced in willing the actual and infinite blessedness of God by a regard to His goodness. The goodness of God is not, as has been repeatedly shown, the fundamental influence or reason of the good will, but it is one reason or a condition both of the possibility of willing, and of the obligation to will his actual blessedness. It assigns to itself and to others, as has been said, this reason for loving God, or willing His good, rather than the truly fundamental one, to wit, the intrinsic value of good, because that is so universally and so necessarily assumed, that it thinks not of mentioning that, taking it always for granted, that that will and must be understood.

LECTURE XVI.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN ENTIRE OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

12. *Opposition* to sin is another attribute or characteristic of true love to God.

This attribute is simply benevolence contemplated in its relations to sin. This attribute certainly is implied in the very essence and nature of benevolence. Benevolence is good willing, or willing the highest good of being as an end. Now there is nothing in the universe more palpably and diametrically opposite to this end than sin. Benevolence can not do otherwise than be forever opposed to sin as that abominable thing which it necessarily hates. It is absurd and a contradiction to affirm that benevolence is not opposed to sin. God is love or benevolence. He must, therefore, be the unalterable opponent of sin—of all sin, in every form and degree.

But there is a state, both of the intellect and of the sensibility, that are often mistaken for the opposition of the will to sin. *Opposition* to sin as a virtue, is and must be a phenomenon of the will. But it also often exists as a phenomenon of the intellect, and likewise of the sensibility. The intelligence cannot contemplate sin without disapprobation. This disapprobation is often mistaken for opposition of heart, or of will, to it. When the intellect strongly disapproves of and denounces sin, there is naturally and necessarily a corresponding feeling of opposition to it in the sensibility, an emotion of loathing, of hatred, of abhorrence. This is often mistaken for opposition of the will, or heart. This is manifest from the fact, that often the most notorious sinners manifest strong indignation in view of oppression, injustice, falsehood, and many forms of sin. This phenomenon of the sensibility and of the intellect, as I said, is often mistaken for a virtuous opposition to sin.

But let it be remembered, that the only virtuous opposition to sin, is a phenomenon of the will. It is a characteristic of love to God and man, or of benevolence. This opposition to sin can not possibly co-exist with any degree of sin in the heart. That is, this opposition can not co-exist with a sinful choice. The will can not at the same time be opposed to sin, and commit sin. This is impossible, and the supposition involves a contradiction. *Opposition* to sin as a phenomenon

of the intellect, or of the sensibility may exist—in other words, the intellect may strongly disapprove of sin, and the sensibility may feel strongly opposed to it, while at the same time the will may cleave to self-indulgence, or to that which constitutes sin. This fact, no doubt, accounts for the common mistake, that we can at the same time have a virtuous opposition to sin, and still continue to commit it.

Many are, no doubt, laboring under this fatal delusion. They are conscious not only of an intellectual disapprobation of sin, but also at times of strong feelings of opposition to it. And yet they are also conscious of continuing to commit it. They, therefore, conclude that they have a principle of holiness in them, and also a principle of sin, that they are partly holy and partly sinful at the same time. Their opposition of intellect and of feeling, they suppose to be a holy opposition, when, no doubt, it is just as common in hell, and even more so than it is on earth, for the reason that sin is more naked there than it generally is here.

But now the enquiry may arise, how is it that both the intellect and the sensibility are opposed to it, and yet that it is persevered in? What reason can the mind have for a sinful choice when urged to it neither by the intellect nor the sensibility? The philosophy of this phenomenon needs explanation. Let us attend to it.

I am a moral agent. My intelligence necessarily disapproves of sin. My sensibility is so correlated to my intellect that it sympathizes with it, or is affected by its perceptions and its judgments. I contemplate sin. I necessarily disapprove of it and condemn it. This affects my sensibility. I loathe and abhor it. I nevertheless commit it. Now how is this to be accounted for? The usual method is by ascribing it to a depravity in the will itself, a lapsed or corrupted state of the faculty, so that it perversely chooses sin for its own sake. Although disapproved by the intelligence and loathed by the sensibility, yet such, it is said, is the inherent depravity of the will, that it pertinaciously cleaves to sin notwithstanding, and will continue to do so until the faculty is renewed by the Holy Spirit, and a holy bias or inclination is impressed upon the will itself.

But here is a gross mistake. In order to see the truth upon this subject, it is of indispensable importance to inquire what sin is.

It is admitted, on all hands, that selfishness is sin. Comparatively few seem to understand that selfishness is the whole

of sin, and that every form of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every form of virtue may be resolved into benevolence. It is not my purpose now to show that selfishness is the whole of sin. It is sufficient for the present to take the admission that selfishness is sin. But what is selfishness? It is the choice of self-gratification as an end. It is the preference of our own gratification to the highest good of universal being. Self-gratification is the supreme end of selfishness. This choice is sinful. That is, the moral element, quality or attribute of this selfish choice is sin. Now in no case is or can sin be chosen for its own sake or as an end. Whenever any thing is chosen to gratify self, it is not chosen because the choice is sinful, but notwithstanding it is sinful. It is not the sinfulness of the choice upon which the choice fixes as an end or for its own sake, but it is the gratification to be afforded by the thing chosen. For example: theft is sinful. But the will in an act of theft does not aim at and terminate on the sinfulness of theft, but upon the gratification expected from the stolen object. Drunkenness is sinful, but the inebriate does not intend or choose the sinfulness for its own sake or as an end. He does not choose strong drink because the choice is sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. We choose the gratification, but not the sin, as an end. To choose the gratification as an end is sinful, but it is not the sin that is the object of choice. Our mother Eve ate the forbidden fruit. This eating was sinful. But the thing that she chose or intended was not the sinfulness of eating, but the gratification expected from the fruit. It is not, it can not in any case be true that sin is chosen as an end or for its own sake. Sin is only a quality of selfishness. Selfishness is the choice, not of sin as an end or for its own sake, but of self-gratification; and this choice of self-gratification as an end is sinful. That is, the moral element, quality or attribute of the choice is sin. To say that sin is or can be chosen for its own sake is absurd. It is the same as saying that a choice can terminate on an element, quality or attribute of itself; that the thing chosen is really an element of the choice itself. This is absurd.

But it is said that sinners are sometimes conscious of choosing sin for its own sake, or because it is sin; that they possess such a malicious state of mind that they love sin for its own sake; that they "roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue;" that "they eat up the sins of God's people as they eat bread;" that is, that they love their sins and the sins of others as they do their necessary food, and choose it for that reason,

or just as they do their food. That they not only sin themselves with greediness, but also have pleasure in them that do sin. Now all this may be true, yet it does not at all disprove the position which I have taken, namely, that sin never is and never can be chosen as an end, or for its own sake. Sin may be sought and loved as a means, but never as an end. The choice of food will illustrate this. Food is never chosen as an ultimate end: it never can be so chosen. It is always as a means. It is the gratification or the utility of it in some point of view that constitutes the reason for choosing it. Gratification is always the end for which a selfish man eats. It may not be merely the present pleasure of eating which he alone or principally seeks. But, nevertheless, if a selfish man, he has his own gratification in view as an end. It may be that it is not so much a present as a remote gratification he has in view. Thus he may choose food to give him health and strength to pursue some distant gratification, the acquisition of wealth or something else that will gratify him.

It may happen that a sinner may get into a state of rebellion against God and the universe of so frightful a character that he shall take pleasure in willing and in doing and saying things that are sinful because they are sinful and displeasing to God and to holy beings. But in this case, sin is not chosen as an end, but as a means of gratifying this malicious feeling. It is, after all, self-gratification that is chosen as an end, and not sin. Sin is the means, and self-gratification is the end.

Now we are prepared to understand how it is that both the intellect and sensibility can often be opposed to sin, and yet the will cleave to the indulgence. An inebriate is contemplating the moral character of drunkenness. He instantly and necessarily condemns the abomination. His sensibility sympathizes with the intellect. He loathes the sinfulness of drinking strong drink, and himself on account of it. He is ashamed, and were it possible, he would spit in his own face. Now in this state it would surely be absurd to suppose that he could choose sin, the sin of drinking as an end, or *for its own sake*. This would be choosing it for an *impossible reason*, and not for *no reason*. But still he may choose to continue his drink, not because it is sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. For while the intellect condemns the sin of drinking strong drink, and the sensibility loathes the sinfulness of the indulgence, nevertheless there still exists so strong an appetite, not for the sin, but for the liquor, that the will seeks the gratification notwithstanding the sinfulness of it.

So it is and so it must be in every case where sin is committed in the face of the remonstrances of the intelligence and the loathing of the sensibility. The sensibility loathes the sinfulness, but more strongly desires the thing the choice of which is sinful. The will in a selfish being yields to the strongest impulse of the sensibility, and the end chosen is in no case sin, but self-gratification. Those who suppose this opposition of the intellect or of the sensibility to be a holy principle, are fatally deluded. This kind of opposition to sin, as I have said, is doubtless common and always must be in hell. It is this kind of opposition to sin that often manifests itself among wicked men, and that leads them to take credit for goodness which they do not possess. They will not believe themselves to be morally and totally depraved, while they are conscious of so much hostility to sin within them. But they should understand that this opposition is not of the will or they could not go on in sin; that it is purely an involuntary state of mind, and has no moral character whatever. Let it be ever remembered, then, that a virtuous opposition to sin is always and necessarily an attribute of benevolence, a phenomenon of the will, and that it is naturally impossible that this opposition of will should co-exist with the commission of sin.

As this opposition to sin is plainly implied in, and is an essential attribute of benevolence, or true love to God, it follows that obedience to the law of God can not be partial in the sense that we can both love God and sin at the same time.

13. *Compassion* for the miserable is also an attribute of benevolence, or of pure love to God and man. This is benevolence viewed in its relations to misery and to guilt.

There is a compassion also which is a phenomenon of the sensibility. It may, and does often exist in the form of an emotion. But this emotion being involuntary, has no moral character in itself. The compassion which is a virtue and which is required of us as a duty, is a phenomenon of the will, and is of course an attribute of benevolence. Benevolence, as has been often said, is good willing, or willing the highest happiness and well-being of God and the universe for its own sake, or as an end. It is impossible, therefore, from its own nature, that compassion for the miserable should not be one of its attributes. Compassion of will to misery is the choice that it should not exist. Benevolence wills that happiness should exist for its own sake. It must therefore, will that misery should not exist. This attribute or peculiarity of benevolence consists in willing the happiness of the miserable.

Benevolence simply considered, is willing the good or happiness of being in general. Compassion of will is a willing particularly that the miserable should be happy.

Compassion of sensibility is a feeling of pity in view of misery. As has been said, it is not a virtue. It is only a desire, but not willing; consequently does not benefit its object. It is the state of mind of which James speaks:—James 2: 15, 16: “If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be *ye* warmed and filled; notwithstanding *ye* give them not those things which are needful to the body, what *doth* it profit?” This kind of compassion may consist and co-exist with selfishness. But compassion of heart or will can not; for it consists in willing the happiness of the miserable for its own sake, and of course impartially. It will, and from its very nature must deny self to promote its end whenever it wisely can, that is, when it is demanded by the highest general good. Circumstances may exist that may render it unwise to express this compassion by actually extending relief to the miserable. Such circumstances forbid that God should extend relief to the lost in hell. But for their character and governmental relations, God’s compassion would no doubt make immediate efforts for their relief.

Many circumstances may exist in which although compassion would hasten to the relief of its object, yet on the whole the misery that exists is regarded as the less of two evils, and therefore the *wisdom* of benevolence forbids it to put forth exertions to save its object.

But it is of the last importance to distinguish carefully between compassion as a phenomenon of the sensibility or as a mere *feeling*, and compassion considered as a phenomenon of the *will*. This, be it remembered, is the only form of virtuous compassion. Many, who from the laws of their mental constitution, feel quickly and deeply, often take credit to themselves for being compassionate while they seldom do much for the poor, the down-trodden, the miserable. Their compassion is a mere feeling. It says, “Be *ye* warmed and clothed,” but does not that for them which is needful. It is this particular attribute of benevolence that was so conspicuous in the life of Howard, Wilberforce and many other Christian philanthropists.

It should be said before I leave the consideration of this attribute, that the will is often influenced by the *feeling* of *compassion*. In this case the mind is no less selfish in seeking

to promote the relief and happiness of its object than it is in any other form of selfishness. In such cases self-gratification is the end sought, and the relief of the suffering is only a means. Pity is stirred, and the sensibility is deeply pained and excited by the contemplation of misery. The will is influenced by this feeling, and makes efforts to relieve the painful emotion on the one hand, and to gratify the desire to see the sufferer happy on the other. This is only an imposing form of selfishness. We, no doubt, often witness this exhibition of self-gratification. The happiness of the miserable is not in this case sought as an end or for its own sake, but as a means of gratifying our own feelings. This is not obedience of will to the law of the intelligence, but obedience to the impulse of the sensibility. It is not a rational and intelligent compassion, but just such compassion as we often see mere animals exercise. They will risk, and even lay down their lives to give relief to one of their number, or to a man who is in misery. In them this has no moral character. Having no reason, it is not sin for them to obey their sensibility, nay, this is a law of their being. This they can not but do. For them, then, to seek their own gratification as an end is not sin. But man has reason; he is bound to obey it. He should will and seek the relief and the happiness of the miserable for its own sake, or for its intrinsic value. When he descends to seek it for no higher reason than to gratify his feelings, he denies his humanity. He seeks it, not out of regard to the sufferer, but in self-defence, or to relieve his own pain, and to gratify his own desires. This in him is sin.

Many, therefore, who take to themselves much credit for benevolence, are after all only in the exercise of this imposing form of selfishness. They take credit for holiness when their holiness is only sin. What is especially worthy of notice here, is, that this class of persons appear to themselves and to others to be all the more virtuous by how much more manifestly and exclusively they are led on by the impulse of feeling. They are conscious of feeling deeply, of being most sincere and earnest in obeying their feelings. Every body who knows them can also see that they feel deeply and are influenced by the strength of their feelings rather than by their intelligence. Now so gross is the darkness of most persons upon this subject, that they award praise to themselves and to others just in proportion as they are sure that they are actuated by the depth of their feelings rather than by their sober judgment.

But I must not leave this subject without also observing that when compassion exists as a phenomenon of the *will*, it will certainly also exist as a feeling of the sensibility. A man of a compassionate heart will also be a man of a compassionate sensibility. He will feel and he will act. Nevertheless his actions will not be the effect of his feelings, but will be the result of his sober judgment. These classes suppose themselves and are generally supposed by others to be truly compassionate persons. The one class exhibit much feeling of compassion; but their compassion does not influence their will, hence they do not act for the relief of suffering. These content themselves with mere desires and tears. They say, Be ye warmed and clothed, but give not the needed relief. Another class feel deeply, and give up to their feelings. Of course they are active and energetic in the relief of suffering. But being governed by feeling, instead of being influenced by their intelligence, they are not virtuous but selfish. Their compassion is only an imposing form of selfishness. A third class feel deeply, but are not governed by blind impulses of feeling. They take a rational view of the subject, act wisely and energetically. They obey their reason. Their feelings do not lead them, and they do not seek to gratify their feelings. But these last are truly virtuous, and altogether the most happy of the three. Their feelings are all the more gratified by how much less they aim at the gratification. They obey their intelligence, and therefore have the double satisfaction of the applause of conscience while their feelings are also fully gratified by seeing their desire accomplished.

LECTURE XVII.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

14. *Mercy* is also an attribute of benevolence. And this term likewise expresses a state of feeling and represents a phenomenon of the sensibility. Mercy is often understood to be synonymous with compassion, but it is not rightly understood.

Mercy, considered as a phenomenon of the will, is a disposition to pardon crime. It consists in willing the pardon and the well-being of one who deserves punishment. It is good will viewed in relation to one who deserves punishment. Mercy, considered as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a desire for the pardon or good of one who deserves punishment. It is only a feeling, a desire; of course it is involuntary, and has in itself no moral character.

Mercy, as an attribute of benevolence, is a willing the pardon and the good of the culprit. It will, of course, manifest itself in action and in effort to pardon or to procure a pardon, unless the attribute of wisdom prevent. It may be unwise to pardon or to seek the pardon of a guilty one. In such cases, as all the attributes of benevolence must necessarily harmonize, no effort will be made to realize its end.

It was this attribute of benevolence modified and limited in its exercise by wisdom and justice, that energized in providing the means and in opening the way for the pardon of our guilty race.

As wisdom and justice are also attributes of benevolence, mercy can never manifest itself by efforts to secure its end except in a manner and upon conditions that do not set aside justice and wisdom. No one attribute of benevolence is or can be exercised at the expense of, or in opposition to another. The moral attributes of God, as has been said, are only attributes of benevolence, for benevolence comprehends and expresses the whole of them. From the term benevolence we learn that the end upon which it fixes is good. And we must infer too, from the term itself, that the means are unobjectionable, because it is absurd to suppose that good would be chosen because it is good, and yet that the mind that makes this choice should not hesitate to use objectionable and injurious means to obtain its end. This would be a contradiction,

to will good for its own sake or out of regard to its intrinsic value, and then choose injurious means to accomplish this end. This can not be. The mind that can fix upon the highest well-being of God and the universe as an end, can never consent to use efforts for the accomplishment of this end that are seen to be inconsistent with it, that is, that tend to prevent the highest good of being.

Mercy, I have said, is that attribute of benevolence that wills the pardon of the guilty. But this attribute can not go out in exercise but upon conditions that consist with the other attributes of benevolence. Mercy viewed by itself would pardon without repentance or condition; would pardon without reference to public justice. But viewed in connection with the other attributes of benevolence, we learn that although a real attribute of benevolence, yet it is not and can not be exercised without the fulfilment of those conditions that will secure the consent of all the other attributes of benevolence. This truth is beautifully taught and illustrated in the doctrine and fact of atonement, as we shall see. Indeed, without consideration of the various attributes of benevolence, we are necessarily all in the dark and in confusion in respect to the character and government of God; the spirit and meaning of his law; the spirit and meaning of the gospel; our own spiritual state, and the developments of character around us. Without an acquaintance with the attributes of love or benevolence, we shall not fail to be perplexed—to find apparent discrepancies in the Bible and in the Divine administration—and in the manifestation of christian character both as revealed in the Bible and as exhibited in common life. For example: how universalists have stumbled for want of consideration upon this subject! God is love! Well, without considering the attributes of this love, they infer that if God is love, He can not hate sin and sinners. If He is merciful He can not punish sinners in hell, &c. Unitarians have stumbled in the same way. God is merciful, that is, disposed to pardon sin. Well then, what need of an atonement? If merciful, He can and will pardon upon repentance without atonement. But we may inquire, if He is merciful; why not pardon without repentance? If His mercy alone is to be taken into view, that is simply a disposition to pardon, that by itself would not wait for repentance. But if repentance is and must be a condition of the exercise of mercy, may there not be, nay must there not be other conditions of its exercise? If wisdom and public justice are also attributes of benevo-

lence and conditionate the exercise of mercy, and forbid that it should be exercised but upon condition of repentance, why may they not, nay, why must they not equally conditionate its exercise upon such a satisfaction of public justice as would secure as full and as deep a respect for the law as the execution of its penalty would do? In other words, if wisdom and justice be attributes of benevolence, and conditionate the exercise of mercy upon repentance, why may and must they not also conditionate its exercise upon the fact of an atonement? As mercy is an attribute of benevolence, it will naturally and inevitably direct the attention of the intellect to devising ways and means to render the exercise of mercy consistent with the other attributes of benevolence. It will employ the intelligence in devising means to secure the repentance of the sinner, and to remove all the obstacles out of the way of its free and full exercise.

It will also secure the state of feeling which is also called mercy or compassion. Hence it is certain that mercy will secure efforts to procure the repentance and pardon of sinners. It will secure a deep yearning in the sensibility over them, and energetic action to accomplish its end, that is, to secure their repentance and pardon. This attribute of benevolence led the Father to give His Only Begotten and Well-beloved Son, and it led the Son to give Himself to die to secure the repentance and pardon of sinners. It is this attribute of benevolence that leads the Holy Spirit to make such mighty and protracted efforts to secure the repentance of sinners. It is also this attribute that energized in prophets and apostles and martyrs, and in saints of every age, to secure the conversion of the lost in sin. It is an amiable attribute. All its sympathies are sweet, and tender, and kind as heaven.

15. *Justice* is another attribute of benevolence.

This term also expresses a state or phenomenon of the sensibility. As an attribute of benevolence it is the opposite of mercy, when viewed in its relations to crime. It consists in a disposition or willing to treat every moral agent according to his intrinsic desert or merit. In its relations to crime, the criminal, and the public, it consists in a willing his punishment according to law. Mercy would pardon—justice would punish for the public good.

Justice as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a feeling that the guilty deserves punishment, and a desire that he may be punished. This is an involuntary feeling, and has no moral character. It is often strongly excited, and is often

the cause of mobs and popular commotions. When it takes the control of the will, as it often does with sinners, it leads to lynching, and a resort to those summary methods of executing vengeance which are often so appalling.

I have said that the mere desire has no moral character. But when the will is governed by this desire and yields itself up to seek its gratification, this state of will is selfishness under one of its most odious and frightful forms. Under the providence of God, however, this form of selfishness, like every other in its turn, is overruled for good, like earthquakes, tornadoes, pestilence, and war, to purify the moral elements of society, and scourge away those moral nuisances with which communities are sometimes infested. Even war itself is often but an instance and an illustration of this.

Justice, as an attribute of benevolence, is virtue, and exhibits itself in the execution of the penalties of law, and in support of public order, and in various other ways.

There are several modifications of this attribute. That is, it may and must be viewed under various aspects and in various relations. One of these is public justice. This is a regard to the public interests, and secures a due administration of law for the public good. It will in no case suffer the execution of the penalty to be set aside, unless something be done to support the authority of the law and of the law-giver. It also secures the due administration of rewards, and looks narrowly after the public interests, always insisting that the greater interest shall prevail over the lesser; that private interest shall never set aside or prejudice a public one of greater value. Public justice is modified in its exercise by the attribute of mercy. It conditionates the exercise of mercy, and mercy conditionates its exercise. Mercy can not consistently with this attribute, extend a pardon but upon conditions of repentance, and an equivalent being rendered to the government. So on the other hand, justice is conditioned by mercy, and can not, consistently with that attribute, proceed to take vengeance when the highest good does not require it, and when punishment can be dispensed with without public loss. Thus these attributes mutually limit each other's exercise, and render the whole character of benevolence perfect, systematical, and heavenly.

Justice is reckoned among the sterner attributes of benevolence; but it is indispensable to the filling up of the entire circle of moral perfections. Although solemn and awful, and sometimes inexpressibly terrific in its exercise, it is neverthe-

less one of the glorious modifications and manifestations of benevolence. Benevolence without justice would be any thing but morally lovely and perfect. Nay it could not be benevolence. This attribute of benevolence appears conspicuous in the character of God as revealed in His law, in His gospel, and sometimes is indicated most impressively by His providence.

It is also conspicuous in the history of inspired men. The Psalms abound with expressions of this attribute. We find many prayers for the punishment of the wicked. Samuel hewed Agag in pieces, and David abounds in expressions that show that this attribute was strongly developed in his mind; and the circumstances under which he was placed, often rendered it proper to express and manifest in various ways the spirit of this attribute. Many have stumbled at such prayers, expressions, and manifestations as are here alluded to. But this is for want of due consideration. They have supposed that such exhibitions were inconsistent with a right spirit. Oh, they say, how unevangelical! How unchristlike! How inconsistent with the sweet and heavenly spirit of Christ and of the gospel! But this is all a mistake. These prayers were dictated by the spirit of Christ. Such exhibitions are only the manifestations of one of the essential attributes of benevolence. Those sinners deserved to die. It was for the greatest good that they should be made a public example. This the spirit of inspiration knew, and such prayers under such circumstances are only an expression of the mind and will of God. They are truly the spirit of justice pronouncing sentence upon them. These prayers and such like things found in the Bible are no vindication of the spirit of fanaticism and denunciation that so often have taken shelter under them. As well might fanatics burn cities and lay waste countries, and seek to justify themselves by an appeal to the destruction of the old world by flood and the destruction of the cities of the plain by fire and brimstone.

Retributive justice is another modification of this attribute. This consists in a disposition to visit the offender with that punishment which he deserves, because it is fit and proper that a moral agent should be dealt with according to his deeds. In a future lecture I shall enlarge upon this modification of justice.

Another modification of this attribute is commercial justice. This consists in willing exact equivalents, and uprightness in business transactions.

There are some other modifications of this attribute, but the foregoing may suffice to illustrate sufficiently the various departments over which this attribute presides.

This attribute, though stern in its spirit and manifestations, is nevertheless one of prime importance in all governments of moral agents whether human or Divine. Indeed without it government could not exist. It is vain for certain philosophers to think to disparage this attribute, and to dispense with it altogether in the administration of government. They will, if they try the experiment, find to their cost and confusion that no one attribute of benevolence can say to another, "I have no need of thee." In short, let any one attribute of benevolence be destroyed or overlooked, and you have destroyed its perfection, its beauty, its harmony, its propriety, its glory. It is no longer benevolence, but a sickly, and inefficient, and limping sentimentalism, that has no God, no virtue, no beauty, or form, or comeliness in it, that when we see it we should desire it.

This attribute stands by, nay it executes law. It aims to secure commercial honesty. It aims to secure public and private integrity and tranquility. It says to violence, disorder, and injustice, Peace, be still, and there must be a great calm. We see the evidences and the illustrations of this attribute in the thunderings of Sinai and in the agony of Calvary. We hear it in the wail of a world when the fountains of the great deep were broken up, and when the windows of heaven were opened, and the floods descended, and the population of a globe were swallowed up. We see its manifestations in the descending torrent that swept the cities of the plain; and lastly, we shall forever see its bright but awful and glorious displays in the dark and curling folds of that pillar of smoke of the torment of the damned, that ascends up before God forever and ever.

Many seem to be afraid to contemplate justice as an attribute of benevolence. Any manifestation of it among men, causes them to recoil and shudder as if they saw a demon. But let it have its place in the glorious circle of moral attributes. It must have. It will have. It can not be otherwise. Whenever any policy of government is adopted, in family or state, that excludes the exercise of this attribute, all must be failure, defeat, and ruin.

Again : Justice being an attribute of benevolence, will prevent the punishment of the finally impenitent from derogating from the happiness of God and of holy beings. They

will never delight in misery for its own sake. But they will take pleasure in the administration of justice. So that when the smoke of the torment of the damned comes up in the sight of heaven, they will, as they are represented, shout "Allelulia! the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth." "Just and righteous are thy ways thou King of saints!"

Before I relinquish the consideration of this topic, I must not omit to insist that where true benevolence is, there must be exact justice, commercial or business honesty and integrity. This is as certain as that benevolence exists. The rendering of exact equivalents, or the intention to do so, must be a characteristic of a truly benevolent mind. Impulsive benevolence may exist; that is, phrenological or constitutional benevolence, falsely so called, may exist to any extent and yet justice will not exist. The mind may be much and very often carried away by the impulse of feeling so that a man may at times have the appearance of true benevolence while the same individual is selfish in business and overreaching in all his commercial relations. This has been a wonder and an enigma to many, but the case is a plain one. The difficulty is, the man is not just, that is, not truly benevolent. His benevolence is only an imposing species of selfishness. "He that hath an ear to hear, let him hear." His benevolence results from feeling and is not true benevolence.

Again: Where benevolence is, the *golden rule* will surely be observed. "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." The justice of benevolence can not fail to secure conformity to this rule. Benevolence is a just state of the will. It is a willing justly. It must then by a law of necessity, secure a just exterior. If the heart is just, the life must be.

This attribute of benevolence must secure its possessor against every species and degree of injustice. He can not be unjust to his neighbor's reputation, his person, his property, his soul, his body, nor indeed be unjust in any respect to God or man. It will and must secure confession and restitution in every case of remembered wrong, so far as this is practicable. It should be distinctly understood, that a benevolent or a truly religious man cannot be unjust. He may indeed appear to be so to others; but he can not be truly religious or benevolent and unjust at the same time. If he appears to be so in any instance, he is not and can not be *really* so, if he is at the time in a benevolent state of mind. The attributes of selfishness, as we shall see in its proper place,

are the direct opposite of those of benevolence. The two states of mind are as opposite as heaven and hell and can no more co-exist in the same mind than a thing can be and not be at the same time. I said that if a man truly, in the exercise of benevolence, appears to be unjust in any thing, he is only so in appearance and not in fact. *Observe*; I am speaking of one who is really at the time in a benevolent state of mind. He may mistake and do that which would be unjust, did he see it differently and intend differently. Justice and injustice belong to the intention. No outward act can in itself be either just or unjust. To say that a man, in the exercise of a truly benevolent intention, can at the same time be unjust is the same absurdity as to say that he can intend justly and unjustly at the same time and in regard to the same thing; which is a contradiction. It must all along be borne in mind that benevolence is one identical thing, to wit, good will, willing for its own sake the highest good of being and every known good according to its relative value. Consequently, it is impossible that justice should not be an attribute of such a choice. Justice consists in regarding and treating or rather in willing every thing just agreeably to its nature or intrinsic and relative value and relations. To say, therefore, that present benevolence admits of any degree of present injustice is to affirm a palpable contradiction. A just man is a sanctified man, is a perfect man, in the sense that he is at present in a sinless state.

16. *Truth or Truthfulness* is another attribute of benevolence.

Truth is objective and subjective. Objective truth may be defined to be the reality of things. *Truthfulness* is subjective truth. It is the conformity of the will to the reality of things. Truth in statement is conformity of statement to the reality of things. Truth in action is action conformed to the nature and relations of things. Truthfulness is a disposition to conform to the reality of things. It is willing in accordance with the reality of things. It is willing the right end by the right means. It is willing the intrinsically valuable as an end and the relatively valuable as a means. In short it is the willing of every thing according to the reality or facts in the case.

Truthfulness, then, must be an attribute of benevolence. It is, like all the attributes, only benevolence viewed in a certain aspect or relation. It can not be distinguished from benevolence, for it is not distinct from it, but only a phase or form of benevolence. The universe is so constructed that if every thing proceeds and is conducted and willed according

to its nature and relations, the highest possible good must result. Truthfulness seeks the *good* as an end and truth as a means to secure this end. It wills the good and that it shall be secured only by means of truth. It wills truth in the end and truth in the means. The end is truly valuable and chosen for that reason. The means are truth, and truth is the only appropriate or possible means.

Truthfulness of heart, begets, of course, a state of the sensibility which we call the love of truth. It is a feeling of pleasure that spontaneously arises in the sensibility of one whose heart is truthful, in contemplating truth. This *feeling* is not virtue; it is rather a part of the reward of truthfulness of heart.

Truthfulness as a phenomenon of the *will*, is also often called and properly called a love of the truth. It is a willing in accordance with objective truth. This is virtue, and is an attribute of benevolence. Truth as an attribute of the Divine benevolence is the ground of confidence in Him as a moral governor. Both the physical and moral law of the universe evince and are instances and illustrations of the truthfulness of God. Falsehood, in the sense of lying, is naturally regarded by a moral agent with disapprobation, disgust and abhorrence. Truth is as necessarily regarded by him with approbation, and if the will be benevolent, with pleasure. We necessarily take pleasure in contemplating objective truth as it lies in idea on the field of consciousness. We also take pleasure in the perception and contemplation of truthfulness, in the concrete realization of the idea of truth. Truthfulness is moral beauty. We are pleased with it just as we are with natural beauty by a law of necessity, when the necessary conditions are fulfilled. This attribute of benevolence secures it against every attempt to promote the ultimate good of being by means of falsehood. True benevolence will no more, can no more resort to falsehood as a means of promoting good than it can contradict or deny itself. The intelligence affirms that the highest ultimate good can be secured only by a strict adherence to truth, for this adherence is a demand of the intelligence, and the mind can not be satisfied with any thing else. Indeed to suppose the contrary is to suppose a contradiction. It is the same absurdity as to suppose that the highest good could be secured only by the violation and setting aside of the nature and relations of things. Since the intelligence affirms this unalterable relation of truth to the highest ultimate good, benevolence or that attribute of benev-

olence which we denominate truthfulness or love of the truth, can no more consent to falsehood than it can consent to relinquish the highest good of being as an end. And in no case then, does or can a moral agent violate truth, except as he has for the time being at least become selfish and prefers a present gratification to the highest ultimate good of being. Therefore, every resort to falsehood, every pious fraud, falsely so called, is only a specious but real instance of selfishness. A moral agent can not lie for God, that is, he can not tell a sinful falsehood thinking and intending thereby to please God. He knows by intuition that God can not be pleased or truly served by a resort to lying. There is a great difference between concealing or withholding the truth for benevolent purposes and telling a wilful falsehood. An innocent persecuted and pursued man, has taken shelter from one who pursued him to shed his blood, under my roof. His pursuer comes and inquires after him. I am not under obligation to declare to him the fact that he is in my house. I may, and indeed ought to withhold the truth in this instance, for the wretch has no right to know it. The public and highest good demands that he should not know it. He only desires to know it for selfish and bloody purposes. But in this case I should not feel, or judge myself at liberty to state a known falsehood. I could not think that this would ultimately conduce to the highest good. The person might go away deceived, or under the impression that his victim was not there. But he could not accuse me of telling him a lie. He might have drawn his own inference from my refusing to give the desired information. But even to secure my own life or the life of my friend, I am not at liberty to tell a lie. If it be said that lying implies telling a falsehood for selfish purposes, and that therefore it is not lying to tell a falsehood for benevolent purposes, I reply, that our nature is such that we can no more state a wilful falsehood with a benevolent intention, than we can commit a sin with a benevolent intention. We necessarily regard falsehood as inconsistent with the highest good of being, just as we regard sin as inconsistent with the highest good of being, or just as we regard holiness and truthfulness as the indispensable conditions of the highest good of being. The correlation of the will and the intelligence forbids that the mistake should ever be fallen into that wilful falsehood is or can be the means or conditions of the highest good. Universal truthfulness, then, will always characterize a truly benevolent man. While he is truly benevolent he is, he

must be, faithful, truthful. So far as his knowledge goes, his statements may be depended upon with as much safety as the statements of an angel, or as the statements of God himself. Truthfulness is necessarily an attribute of benevolence in all beings. No liar has or can have a particle of virtue or benevolence in him.

LECTURE XVIII.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

17. *Patience* is another attribute of benevolence.

This term is frequently used to express a phenomenon of the sensibility. When thus used, it designates a calm and unruffled state of the sensibility or feelings under circumstances that tend to excite anger or impatience of feeling. The calmness of the sensibility, or patience as a phenomenon of the sensibility, is purely an involuntary state of mind, and although it is a pleasing and amiable manifestation, yet it is not properly virtue. It may be, and often is an effect of patience as a phenomenon of the will, and therefore an effect of virtue. But it is not itself virtue. This amiable temper may, and often does proceed from the constitutional temperament, and from circumstances and habits.

Patience as a virtue must be a voluntary state of mind. It must be an attribute of love or benevolence; for all virtue, as we have seen and as the bible teaches, is resolvable into love or benevolence. The term, *upomone* so often rendered patience in the New Testament, means perseverance under trials, continuance, bearing up under afflictions or privations, steadfastness of purpose in despite of obstacles. The word may be used in a good or in a bad sense. Thus a selfish man may patiently, that is, perseveringly pursue his end, and may bear up under much opposition to his course.

This is patience as an attribute of selfishness, and patience in a bad sense of the term. Patience in the good sense, or in the sense in which I am considering it, is an attribute of benevolence. It is constancy of intention, a fixedness, a bearing up under trials, afflictions, crosses, persecutions or discouragements. This must be an attribute of benevolence. Whenever patience ceases, when it holds out no longer, when discouragement prevails and the will relinquishes its end, benevolence ceases of course.

Patience as a phenomenon of the will, tends to patience as a phenomenon of the sensibility. That is, fixedness and steadfastness of intention naturally tends to keep down and allay impatience of temper. As however the states of the sensibility are not directly under the control of the will, there may be irritable or impatient feelings when the heart remains

steadfast. Facts or falsehoods may be suggested to the mind that may in despite of the will produce a ruffling of the sensibility even when the heart remains patient. The only way in which a temptation, (for it is only a temptation while the will abides firm to its purpose,) I say the only way in which a temptation of this kind can be disposed of, is by diverting the attention from that view of the subject that creates the disturbance in the sensibility. I should have said before, that although the will controls the feelings by a law of necessity, yet, as it does not do so directly but indirectly, it may and does often happen that feelings corresponding to the state of the will do not always exist in the sensibility. Nay, for a time, a state of the sensibility may exist which is the opposite of the state of the will. From this source arise many and indeed most of our temptations. We could never be properly tried or tempted at all if the feelings must always by a law of necessity correspond with the state of the will. Sin consists in willing to gratify our feelings or constitutional impulses in opposition to the law of our reason. But if these desires and impulses could never exist in opposition to the law of the reason, and consequently in opposition to a present holy choice then a holy being could not be tempted. He could have no motive or occasion to sin. If our mother Eve could have had no feelings of desire in opposition to the state of her will, she never could have desired the forbidden fruit, and of course could not have sinned. I wish now, then, to state distinctly what I should have said before, that the state or choice of the will does not necessarily so control the feelings, desires or emotions, but that these are sometimes strongly excited by Satan or by circumstances in opposition to the will, and thus become powerful temptations to seek their gratification instead of seeking the highest good of being. Feelings the gratification of which would be opposed to every attribute of benevolence, may at times co-exist with benevolence, and be a temptation to selfishness; but opposing acts of will can not co-exist with benevolence. All that can be truly said is, that as the will has an indirect control of the feelings, desires, appetites, passions, &c., it can suppress any class of feelings when they arise by diverting the attention from their causes, or by taking into consideration such views and facts as will calm or change the state of the sensibility. Irritable feelings, or what is commonly called impatience, may be directly caused by ill health, irritable nerves, and by many things over which the will has

no control. But this is not impatience in the sense of sin. If these feelings are not suffered to influence the will; if the will abides in patience; if such feelings are not cherished and are not suffered to shake the integrity of the will; they are not sin. That is, there can be no sin in themselves. They are only temptations. If they are allowed to control the will, to break forth in words and actions, then there is sin; but the sin does not consist in the feelings, but in the consent of the will, in the will's consent to gratify them. Thus, the apostle says "Be angry and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath." That is, if anger arise in the feelings and sensibility, do not sin by suffering it to control your will. Do not cherish the feeling, and let the sun go down upon it. For this cherishing it is sin. When it is cherished, the will consents and broods over the cause of it; this is sin. But if it be not cherished, it is not sin.

✓ That the outward actions will correspond with the states and actions of the will, provided the integrity of the nerves of voluntary motion be preserved, and provided also that no opposing force of greater power than that of my volitions be opposed to them, is a universal truth. But that feelings and desires can not exist contrary to the states or decisions of my will is not true. If this were a universal truth, temptation, as I have said, could not exist. The outward actions will be as the will is always; the feelings generally. Feelings corresponding to the choice of the will, will be the rule, and opposing feelings the exception. But these exceptions may and do exist in perfectly holy beings. They existed in Eve before she consented to sin, and had she resisted them, she had not sinned. They doubtless existed in Christ or he could not have been tempted in all points like as we are. If there be no desires or impulses of the sensibility contrary to the state of the will, there is not properly any temptation. The desire or impulse must appear on the field of consciousness before it is a motive to action, and of course before it is a temptation to self-indulgence. Just as certainly then as a holy being may be tempted and not sin, just so certain it is that emotions of any kind or of any strength may exist in the sensibility without sin. If they are not indulged, if the will does not consent to them and to their indulgence or gratification, the soul is not the less but all the more virtuous for their presence. Patience as a phenomenon of the will must strengthen and gird itself under such circumstances, so that patience of will may be, and if it exist at all, must be, in exact proportion to the im-

patience of the sensibility. The more impatience of sensibility there is, the more patience of will there must be, or virtue will cease altogether. So that it is not always true that virtue is the strongest when the sensibility is the most calm, placid and patient. When Christ passed through his greatest conflicts, his virtue as a man was undoubtedly most intense. When in his agony in the garden so great was the agony of his sensibility, that he sweat as it were great drops of blood. This, he says, was the hour of the Prince of Darkness. This was his great trial. But did he sin? No, indeed. But why? Was he calm and placid as a summer's evening? As far from it as possible.

Patience then as an attribute of benevolence consists, not in placid feeling, but in perseverance under trials and states of the sensibility that tend to selfishness. This is only benevolence viewed in a certain aspect. It is benevolence under circumstances of discouragement, of trial or temptation. "This is the patience of the saints."

Before I dismiss the subject of patience as an emotion, I would observe that the steadfastness of the heart tends so strongly to secure it, that if an opposite state of the sensibility is more than of momentary duration, there is strong presumption that the heart is not steadfast in love. The first risings of it will produce an immediate effort to suppress it. If it continues, this is evidence that the attention is allowed to dwell upon the cause of it. This shows that the will is in some sense indulging it.

If it so far influence the will as to manifest itself in impatient words and actions there must be a yielding of the will. Patience as an attribute of benevolence is overcome. If the sensibility were perfectly and directly under the control of the will, the least degree of impatience would imply sin. But as it is not directly but indirectly under the control of the will, momentary impatience of feeling where it does not at all influence the will, and when it is not at all indulged, is not sure evidence of a sinful state of the will. It should always be borne in mind that neither patience nor impatience in the form of mere feeling existing for any length of time and in any degree is in itself either holy on the one hand or sinful on the other. All that can be said of these states of the sensibility is, that they indicate as a general thing the attitude of the will. When the will is for a long time steadfast in its patience, the result is great equanimity of temper and great patience of feeling. This comes to be a law of the sensibility

insomuch that very advanced saints may and doubtless do experience the most entire patience of feeling for many years together. This does not constitute their holiness, but is a sweet fruit of it. It is to be regarded rather in the light of a reward of holiness than of holiness itself.

18. Another attribute of this benevolence is *Meekness*.

Meekness considered as a virtue is a phenomenon of the will. This term also expresses a state of the sensibility. When used to designate a phenomenon of the sensibility it is nearly synonymous with patience. It designates a sweet and forbearing temper under provocation. As a phenomenon of the will and as an attribute of benevolence, it represents a state of will which is the opposite of resistance to injury or retaliation. It is properly and strictly forbearance under injurious treatment. This certainly is an attribute of God, as our existence and our being out of hell plainly demonstrate. Christ said of himself that he was "meek and lowly in heart;" and surely this was no vain boast. How admirably and how incessantly did this attribute of his love manifest itself! The fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is a prophecy exhibiting this attribute in a most affecting light. Indeed scarcely any feature of the character of God and of Christ is more strikingly exhibited than this. This must be an attribute of benevolence. Benevolence is good will to all beings. We are naturally forbearing toward those whose good we honestly and diligently seek. If our hearts are set upon doing them good we shall naturally exercise great forbearance toward them. God has greatly commended his forbearance to us in that while we were yet His enemies, He forbore to punish us, and gave His son to die for us. Forbearance is a sweet and amiable attribute. How affectingly it displayed itself in the hall of Pilate, and on the cross. "As a lamb for the slaughter and as a sheep before its shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth."

This attribute has in this world abundant opportunity to develop and display itself in the person of the saints. There are daily occasions for the exercise of this form of virtue. Indeed all the attributes of benevolence are called into frequent exercise in this school of discipline. This is indeed a noble world in which to train God's children, to develop and strengthen every modification of holiness. This attribute must always appear where benevolence exists, wherever there is an occasion for its exercise.

It is delightful to contemplate the perfection and glory of

that love that constitutes obedience to the law of God. As occasions arise, we behold it developing one attribute after another, and there may be many of its attributes and modifications of which we have as yet no idea whatever. Circumstances will call them into exercise. It is probable, if not certain, that the attributes of benevolence were very imperfectly known in heaven previous to the existence of sin in the universe, and that but for sin many of these attributes would never have been manifested in exercise. But the existence of sin, great as the evil is, has afforded an opportunity for benevolence to manifest its beautiful phases and to develop its sweet attributes in a most enchanting manner. Thus the Divine economy of benevolence brings good out of so great an evil.

A hasty and unforbearing spirit is always demonstrative evidence of a want of benevolence or true religion. Meekness is and must be a peculiar characteristic of the saints in this world where there is so much provocation. Christ frequently and strongly enforced the obligation to forbearance. "But I say unto you that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain." How beautiful!

19. *Long-suffering* is another attribute of benevolence.

This attribute is hardly distinguishable from meekness or forbearance. It seems to be an intense form of forbearance; or it is forbearance exercised long and under great suffering from persecution and unreasonable opposition. God's forbearance is lengthened out to long suffering. Christ's forbearance also, was and is often put to the severest trial, and is lengthened out to most affecting long-suffering. This is an intense state or form of benevolence, when it is most sorely tried, and as it were put upon the rack. The Prophets, and Christ, and the Apostles, the martyrs and primitive saints, and many in different ages of the church have given forth a glorious specimen and illustration of this sweet attribute of love. But for the existence of sin, however, it is probable and perhaps certain that no being but God could have had an idea of its existence. The same no doubt may be said of many of the attributes of Divine love. God has no doubt intended to strongly exhibit this attribute in himself and in all his saints and angels. The introduction of sin, excuseless and abominable, has given occasion for a most thorough development and

a most affecting manifestation of this attribute of love. It is a sweet, a heavenly attribute. It is the most opposite to the spirit and maxims of this world. It is the very contrast of the law and the spirit of honor as it appears in this world. The law of honor says, If you receive an injury or an insult, resent it and retaliate. This gentle spirit says, If you receive many insults and injuries, do not resent them nor retaliate, but bear and forbear even to long suffering.

20. *Humility*, is another modification or attribute of love.

This term seems often to be used to express a sense of unworthiness, of guilt, of ignorance, and of nothingness, to express a feeling of ill-desert. It seems to be used in common parlance to express sometimes a state of the intelligence, when it seems to indicate a clear perception of our guilt. When used to designate a state of the sensibility, it represents those feelings of shame and unworthiness, of ignorance and of nothingness of which those are so conscious who have been enlightened by the Holy Spirit in respect to their true character.

But as a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute of love, it consists in a *willingness to be known and appreciated according to our real character*. Humility as a phenomenon either of the sensibility or of the intelligence may co-exist with great pride of heart. Pride is a disposition to exalt self, to get above others, to hide our defects and to pass for more than we are. Deep conviction of sin and deep feelings of shame, of ignorance, and of desert of hell, may co-exist with a great unwillingness to confess and be known just as we are, and to be appreciated just according to what our real character has been and is. There is no virtue in such humility. But humility, considered as a virtue, consists in the consent of the will to be known, to confess, and to take our proper place in the scale of being. It is that peculiarity of love that wills the good of being so disinterestedly as to will to pass for no other than we really are. This is an honest, a sweet and amiable feature of love. It must, perhaps, be peculiar to those who have sinned. It is only love acting under or in a certain relation or set of circumstances. It would under the same circumstances develop and manifest itself in all truly benevolent minds. This attribute will render confession of sin to God and man natural, and even make it a luxury. It is easy to see that but for this attribute the saints could not be happy in heaven. God has promised to bring into judgment every work and every secret thing whether it be good or whether it

be evil. Now while pride exists, it would greatly pain the soul to have all the character known. So that unless this attribute really belongs to the saints, they would be ashamed at the judgment and filled with confusion even in heaven itself. But this sweet attribute will secure them against that shame and confusion of face that would otherwise render heaven itself a hell to them. They will be perfectly willing and happy to be known and estimated according to their characters. This attribute will secure in all the saints on earth that confession of faults one to another which is so often enjoined in the bible. By this it is not intended that Christians always think it wise and necessary to make confession of all their secret sins to man. But it is intended that they will confess to those whom they have injured and to all to whom benevolence demands that they should confess. This attribute secures its possessor against spiritual pride, against ambition to get above others. It is a modest and unassuming state of mind.

LECTURE XIX.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

21. *Self-denial* is another attribute of love.

If we love any being better than ourselves, we of course deny ourselves when our own interests come in competition with his. Love is good will. If I will good to others more than to myself, it is absurd to say that I shall not deny myself when my own inclinations conflict with theirs.

Now the love required by the law of God we have repeatedly seen to be good will, or willing the highest good of being for its own sake or as an end.

As the interests of self are not at all regarded because they belong to self, but only according to their relative value, it must be certain that self-denial for the sake of promoting the higher interests of God and of the universe, is and must be a peculiarity or attribute of love.

But again. The very idea of disinterested benevolence, (and there is no other true benevolence,) implies the abandonment of the spirit of self-seeking or of selfishness. It is impossible to become benevolent without ceasing to be selfish. In other words, perfect self-denial is implied in beginning to be benevolent. Self-indulgence ceases when benevolence begins. This must be. Benevolence is the consecration of our powers to the highest good of being in general as an end. This is utterly inconsistent with consecration to self-interest or self-gratification. Selfishness makes good to self the end of every choice. Benevolence makes good to being in general the end of every choice. Benevolence, then, implies complete self-denial. That is, it implies that nothing is chosen merely because it belongs to self, but only because of and in proportion to its relative value.

I said there was no true benevolence but disinterested benevolence; no true love but disinterested love. There is such a thing as interested love or benevolence. That is, the good of others is willed, though not as an end or for its intrinsic value to them, but as a means of our own happiness or because of its relative value to us. Thus a man might will the good of his family or of his neighborhood or country or of any body or any thing that sustained such relations to self as to involve his own interests. When the ultimate reason of

his willing good to others is that his own may be promoted, this is selfishness. It is making good to self his end. This a sinner may do toward God, toward the church, and toward the interests of religion in general. This is what I call interested benevolence. It is willing good as an end only to self, and to all others only as a means of promoting our own good.

But again. When the will is governed by feeling in willing the good of others, this is only the spirit of self-indulgence, and is only interested benevolence. For example: the feeling of compassion is strongly excited by the presence of misery. The feeling is intense and constitutes, like all the feelings, a strong impulse or motive to the will to consent to its gratification. For the time being, this impulse is stronger than the feeling of avarice or any other feeling. I yield to it and give all the money I have to relieve the sufferer. I even take my clothes from my back and give them to him. Now in this case, I am just as selfish as if I had sold my clothes to gratify my appetite for strong drink. The gratification of my feelings was my end. This is one of the most specious and most delusive forms of selfishness.

Again. When one makes his own salvation the end of prayer, of almsgiving, and of all his religious duties, this is only selfishness and not true religion, however much he may abound in them. This is only interested benevolence or benevolence to self.

Again. From the very nature of true benevolence it is impossible that every interest should not be regarded according to its relative value. When another interest is seen by me to be more valuable in itself or of more value to God and the universe than my own, and when I see that by denying myself I can promote it, it is certain, if I am benevolent, that I shall do it. I can not fail to do it without failing to be benevolent. Two things in this case must be apprehended by the mind.

(1.) That the interest is either intrinsically or relatively more valuable than my own.

(2.) That by denying myself I can promote or secure a greater good to being than I sacrifice of my own. When these two conditions are fulfilled, it is impossible that I should remain benevolent unless I deny myself and seek the higher good.

Benevolence is an *honest and disinterested* consecration of the whole being to the highest good of God and of the universe. The benevolent man will, therefore, and must, honestly weigh

each interest as it is perceived in the balance of his own best judgment, and will always give the preference to the higher interest provided he believes that he can by endeavor and by self-denial secure it.

That self-denial is an attribute of the divine love, is manifested most gloriously and affectingly in the gift of his Son to die for men. This attribute was also most conspicuously manifested by Christ in denying himself and taking up his cross and suffering for his enemies. Observe. It was not for friends that Christ gave himself. It was not unfortunate but innocent sufferers for whom God gave his Son or for whom he gave himself. It was enemies. It was not that he might make slaves of them that he gave his Son nor from any selfish consideration whatever, but because he foresaw that by making this sacrifice himself, he could secure to the universe a greater good than he should sacrifice. It was this attribute of benevolence that caused him to give his son to suffer so much. It was disinterested benevolence alone that led him to deny himself for the sake of a greater good to the universe. Now observe: this sacrifice would not have been made unless it had been regarded by God as the less of two evils. That is, the sufferings of Christ, great and overwhelming as they were, were considered as an evil of less magnitude than the eternal sufferings of sinners. This induced him to make the sacrifice although for his enemies. It mattered not whether for friends or for enemies, if so be he could by making a less sacrifice secure a greater good to them. When I come to consider the economy of benevolence I may enlarge upon this topic.

Let it be understood that a self-indulgent spirit is never and can never be consistent with benevolence. No form of self-indulgence, properly so called, can exist where true benevolence exists. The fact is, self-denial must be and universally is wherever benevolence reigns. Christ has expressly made whole-hearted self-denial a condition of discipleship; which is the same thing as to affirm that it is an essential attribute of holiness or love; that there can not be the beginning of true virtue without it.

Again. Much that passes for self-denial is only a specious form of self-indulgence. The penances and self-mortifications, as they are falsely called, of the superstitious, what are they but a self-indulgent spirit after all? A popish priest abstains from marriage to obtain the honor and emoluments and the influence of the priestly office here, and eternal glory hereafter.

A nun takes the veil and a monk immures himself in a monastery; a hermit forsakes human society, and shuts himself up in a cave; a devotee makes a pilgrimage to Mecca, and a martyr goes to the stake. Now if these things are done with an ultimate reference to their own glory and happiness, although apparently instances of great self-denial, yet they are in fact only a spirit of self-indulgence and self-seeking. They are only following the strongest desire. They are instances of making good to self the end.

There are many mistakes upon this subject. For example, it is common for persons to deny self in one form for the sake of gratifying self in another form.

In one man avarice is the ruling passion. He will labor hard, rise early, and sit up late and eat the bread of carefulness, deny himself even the necessities of life for the sake of accumulating wealth. Every one can see that this is denying self in one form merely for the sake of gratifying self in another form. Yet this man will complain bitterly of the self-indulgent spirit manifested by others, their extravagance and want of piety.

One man will deny all his bodily appetites and passions for the sake of a reputation with men. This is also an instance of the same kind. Another will give the fruit of his body for the sin of his soul; will sacrifice every thing else to obtain an eternal inheritance, and be just as selfish as the man who sacrifices to the things of time his soul and all the riches of eternity.

But it should be remarked that this attribute of benevolence does and must secure the subjugation of all the propensities. It must, either suddenly or gradually, so far subdue and quiet them that their imperious clamor will cease. They will as it were be slain either suddenly or gradually, so that the sensibility will become in a great measure dead to those objects that so often and so easily excited it. It is a law of the sensibility—of all the desires and passions, that their indulgence develops and strengthens them and their denial suppresses them. Benevolence consists in a refusal to gratify the sensibility and in obeying the reason. Therefore it must be true that this denial of the propensities will greatly suppress them until they become tame and easily denied. While, on the contrary, the denial of the propensities and the indulgence of the intelligence and of the conscience will greatly develop them. Thus selfishness tends to stultify, while benevolence tends greatly to strengthen the intelligence.

22. *Condescension* is another attribute of love.

This attribute consists in a willingness to descend to the poor, the ignorant, or the vile for the purpose of securing their good. It is a willing the good of those whom Providence has placed in any respect below us, together with the means of securing their good, particularly our own stooping, descending, coming down to them for this purpose. It is a peculiar form of self-denial. God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, manifest infinite condescension in efforts to secure the well-being of sinners, even the most vile and degraded. This attribute is called by Christ lowliness of heart. God is said to humble himself, that is, to condescend when He beholds the things that are done in heaven. This is true, for every creature is and must forever be infinitely below Him in every respect. But how much greater must that condescension be that comes down to earth, and even to the lowest and most degraded of earth's inhabitants, for purposes of benevolence. This is a lovely modification of benevolence. It seems to be entirely above the gross conception of infidelity. Condescension seems to be regarded by most people, and especially by infidels, as rather a weakness than a virtue. Skeptics clothe their imaginary God with attributes in many respects the opposite of true virtue. They think it entirely beneath the dignity of God to come down even to notice, and much more to interfere, with the concerns of men. But hear the word of the Lord: "Thus saith the High and Lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy.—I dwell in the high and holy place; with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble and to revive the heart of the contrite ones." And again, "Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool, where is the house that ye build unto me? and where is the place of my rest? For all those things hath my hand made, and all those things have been, saith the Lord. But to this man will I look even to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit, and trembleth at my word." Thus the Bible represents God as clothed with condescension as with a cloak.

This is manifestly an attribute of benevolence and of true greatness. The natural perfections of God appear all the more wonderful when we consider that He can and does know and contemplate and control not only the highest but the lowest of all his creatures; that he is just as able to attend to every want and to every creature as if this were the sole object of attention with Him. So His moral attributes appear

all the more lovely and engaging when we consider that His "tender mercies are over all His works," that not a sparrow falleth to the ground without Him;" that He condescends to number the very hairs of the heads of His servants, and that not one of them can fall without Him. When we consider that no creature is too low, too filthy, or too degraded for Him to condescend to, this places His character in a most ravishing light. Benevolence is good will to all beings. Of course one of its characteristics must be condescension to those who are below us. This in God is manifestly infinite. He is infinitely above all creatures. For Him to hold communion with them is infinite condescension.

This is an attribute essentially belonging to benevolence or love in all benevolent beings. With the lowest of moral beings it may have no other development than in its relations to sentient existences below the rank of moral agents, for the reason that there are no moral agents below them to whom they can stoop. God's condescension stoops to all ranks of sentient existences. This is also true with every benevolent mind, as to all inferiors. It seeks the good of being in general, and never thinks any being too low to have his interests attended to and cared for, according to their relative value. Benevolence can not possibly retain its own essential nature, and yet be above any degree of condescension that can affect the greatest good. Benevolence does not, can not know any thing of that loftiness of spirit that considers it too degrading to stoop any where or to any being whose interests need to be and can be promoted by such condescension. Benevolence has its end, and it can not but seek this, and it does not, can not think any thing below it that is demanded to secure that end. O, the shame, the infinite folly and madness of pride, and every form of selfishness! How infinitely unlike God it is! Christ could condescend to be born in a manger; to be brought up in humble life; to be poorer than the fox of the desert or the fowls of heaven; to associate with fishermen; to mingle with and seek the good of all classes; to be despised in life, and die between two thieves on the cross. His benevolence "endured the cross and despised the shame." He was "meek and lowly in heart." The Lord of heaven and earth is as much more lowly in heart than any of his creatures as he is above them in his infinity. He can stoop to any thing but sin. He can stoop infinitely low.

23. *Candor* is another attribute of benevolence.

Candor is a disposition to treat every subject with fairness

and honesty; to examine and weigh all the evidence in the case, and decide according to testimony. It is a state of mind which is the opposite of prejudice. Prejudice is pre-judgment. It is a decision made up with but partial information. It is not a mere opinion. It is a committal of the will.

Candor is holding the intelligence open to conviction. It is that state of the will in which all the light is sought upon all questions, that can be obtained. Benevolence is an impartial, a disinterested choice of the highest good of being—not of some parts of it—not of self—but of being in general. It inquires not to whom an interest belongs, but what is its intrinsic and relative value, and what is the best means of promoting it. Selfishness, as we shall see, is never candid. It never can be candid. It is contrary to its very nature. Benevolence can not but be candid. It has no reasons for being otherwise. Its eye is single. It seeks to know all truth for the sake of doing it. It has no by-ends, no self-will or self-interest to consult. It is not seeking to please or profit self. It is not seeking the interest of some favorite. No, it is impartial and must be candid.

It should always be borne in mind that where there is prejudice, benevolence is not, can not be. There is not, can not be such a thing as honest prejudice. There may be an honest mistake for want of light, but this is not prejudice. If there be a mistake and it be honest, there will be and must be a readiness to receive light to correct the mistake. But where the will is committed, and there is not candor to receive evidence, there is and there must be selfishness. Few forms of sin are more odious and revolting than prejudice. Candor is an amiable and a lovely attribute of benevolence. It is captivating to behold it. To see a man where his own interest is deeply concerned, exhibit entire candor, is to witness a charming exhibition of the spirit of the law of love.

24. *Stability* is another attribute of benevolence. This love is not a mere feeling or emotion, that effervesces for a moment, and then cools down and disappears. But it is choice, not a mere volition which accomplishes its object and then rests. It is the choice of an end, a supreme end. It is an intelligent choice—the most intelligent choice that can be made. It is considerate choice—none so much so; a deliberate choice; a reasonable choice which will always commend itself to the highest perceptions and intuitions of the intelligence. It is intelligent and impartial, and universal consecration to an end, above all others the most important and

captivating in its influence. Now, stability must be a characteristic of such a choice as this. By stability it is not intended that the choice may not be changed. Nor that it never is changed; but that when the attributes of the choice are considered, it appears as if stability, as opposed to instability, must be an attribute of this choice. It is a new birth, a new nature, a new creature, a new heart, a new life. These and such like are the representations of Scripture. Are these representations of an evanescent state? The beginning of benevolence in the soul—this choice is represented as the death of sin, as a burial, a being planted, a crucifixion of the old man, and many such like things. Are these representations of what we so often see among professed converts to Christ? Nay verily. The nature of the change itself would seem to be a guaranty of its stability. We might reasonably suppose that any other choice would be relinquished sooner than this; that any other state of mind would fail sooner than benevolence. It is vain to reply to this that facts prove the contrary to be true. I answer, what facts? Who can prove them to be facts? Shall we appeal to the apparent facts in the instability of many professors of religion; or shall we appeal to the very nature of the choice and to the Scriptures? To these, doubtless. So far as philosophy can go, we might defy the world to produce an instance of choice which has so many chances for stability. The representations of Scripture are such as I have mentioned above. What then shall we conclude of those effervescing professors of religion, who are soon hot and soon cold; whose religion is a spasm; “whose goodness as the morning cloud and the early dew goeth away?” Why, we must conclude that they have never had the root of the matter in them. That they are not dead to sin and to the world, we see. That they are not new creatures; that they have not the spirit of Christ; that they do not keep his commandments, we see. What then shall we conclude but this, that they are stony ground Christians?

25. *Kindness* is another attribute of Love.

The original word rendered kindness is sometimes rendered gentleness. This term designates that state of the heart that begets a gentleness and kindness of outward demeanor towards those around us. Benevolence is good will. It must possess the attribute of kindness or gentleness toward its object. Love seeks to make others happy. It can not be otherwise than that the beloved object should be treated kindly and gently, unless circumstances and character demand:

different treatment. A deportment regardless of the sensibilities of those around us, indicates a decidedly and detestably selfish state of mind. Love always manifests a tender regard for the feelings and well-being of its object; and as benevolence is universal love, it will and must manifest the attribute of gentleness and kindness toward all except in those cases when either the good of the individual or of the public shall demand a different treatment. In such cases it will be love and only love that leads to different treatment; and in no case will benevolence treat any even the worst of beings more severely than is demanded by the highest good. Benevolence is a unit. It does every thing for one reason. It has but one end, and that is the highest good of being in general. It will and must treat all kindly unless the public good demands a different course. But it punishes when it does punish for the same reason that it forgives when it does forgive. It gives life and takes it away. It gives health and sickness, poverty and riches; it smiles and frowns; it blesses and curses, and does, and says, and omits, gives and withholds every thing for one and the same reason, to wit, the promotion of the highest good of being. It will be gentle or severe as occasions arise which demand either of these exhibitions. Kindness is its rule, and severity is its exception. Both, however, as we shall soon see, are equally and necessarily attributes of benevolence.

The gentleness and kindness of God and of Christ are strikingly manifested in providence and in grace. Christ is called a Lamb no doubt because of the gentleness and kindness of his character. He is called the good shepherd and represented as gently leading his flock and carrying the lambs in his bosom. Many such affecting representations are made of him in the bible, and he often makes the same manifestations in his actual treatment of his servants not only, but also of his enemies. Who has not witnessed this? and who can not testify to this attribute of his character as a thousand times affectingly manifested in his own history? Who can call to mind the dealings of his Heavenly Father without being deeply penetrated with the remembrances of his kindness not only, but his *loving kindness*, and tender mercy, its exceeding greatness? There is a multitude of tender representations in the bible which are all verified in the experience of every saint. "As the eagle stirreth up her nest, fluttereth over her young, spreadeth abroad her wings, taketh them, beareth them on her wings: so the Lord alone did lead him

and there was no strange God with him." This lovely attribute will and must always appear where benevolence is. It is important however to remark that constitutional temperament will often greatly modify the expression of it. "Charity is kind"—this is one of its attributes; yet as I just said, its manifestations will be modified by constitution, education &c. A manifest absence of it in cases where it would be appropriate is sad evidence that benevolence is wanting.

26. *Severity* is another attribute of benevolence. "Behold" says the Apostle "the goodness and severity of God." They greatly err who suppose that benevolence is all softness under all circumstances. Severity is not cruelty, but is love manifesting strictness, rigor, purity, when occasion demands. Love is universal good-will, or willing the highest good of being in general. When therefore any one or any number so conduct as to interfere with and endanger the public good, severity is just as natural and as necessary to benevolence as kindness and forbearance under other circumstances. Christ is not only a Lamb, but a Lion also. He is not only gentle as mercy, but stern as justice; not only yielding as the tender bowels of mercy, but as inflexibly stern as infinite purity and justice. He exhibits the one attribute or the other as occasion demands. At one time we hear him praying for his murderers, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." At another time, we hear him say by the pen of an apostle, "If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be accursed." At another time, we hear him in the person of the Psalmist praying for vengeance on his enemies: "Reproach hath broken my heart, and I am full of heaviness, and I looked for some to take pity, but there was none, and for comforters but I found none. They gave me gall for my meat, and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink. Let their table become a snare before them, and that which should have been for their welfare, let it become a trap. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not, and make their loins continually to shake. Pour out thine indignation upon them, and let thy wrathful anger take hold upon them. Let their habitation be desolate, and let none dwell in their tents. Add iniquity (punishment) to their iniquity and let them not come into thy righteousness. Let them be blotted out of the book of the living and not be written with the righteous." Many such like passages might be quoted from the records of inspiration as the breathings of the Spirit of the God of Love.

Now it is perfectly manifest that good will to the universe

of being implies opposition to whatever tends to prevent the highest good. Benevolence is and must be severe in a good sense towards incorrigible sinners like those against whom Christ prays in the Psalm just quoted.

The term severity is used sometimes in a good and sometimes in a bad sense. When used in a bad sense, it designates an unreasonable state of mind and of course a selfish state. It then represents a state which is the opposite of benevolence. But when used in a good sense, as it is when applied to God and Christ, and when spoken of as an attribute of benevolence, it designates the sternness, firmness, purity and justice of love, acting for the public good in cases where sin exists and where the public interests are at stake. In such circumstances, if severity were not developed as an attribute of benevolence, it would demonstrate that benevolence could not be the whole of virtue, even if it could be virtue at all. The intelligence of every moral being would affirm in such circumstances, that if severity did not appear, something was wanting to make the character perfect, that is, to make the character answerable to the emergency.

It is truly wonderful to witness the tendency among men to fasten upon some one attribute of benevolence and overlook the rest. They perhaps have been affected particularly by the manifestation of some one attribute, which leads them to represent the character of God as all summed up in that attribute. But this is fatally to err, and fatally to misrepresent God. God is represented in the Bible as being slow to anger, and of tender mercy; as being very pitiful; long-suffering; abundant in goodness and truth; keeping mercy for thousands; forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; but as also visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and that will by no means clear the guilty; and as being angry with the wicked every day. These are by no means contradictory representations. They only exhibit benevolence manifesting itself under different circumstances, and in different relations. These are just the attributes that we can see must belong to benevolence, and just what it ought to be and must be when these occasions arise. Good will to the universe ought to be and must be, in a good sense, severe where the public weal demands it, as it often does. It is one of the most shallow of dreams that the Divine character is all softness and sweetness in all its manifestations and in all circumstances. The fact is that sin has "enkindled a fire in the Divine anger that shall set on fire the foundations of the mountains and shall

burn to the lowest hell." Severity is also always and necessarily an attribute of benevolence in good angels and in good men. When occasions arise that plainly demand it, this attribute must be developed and manifested or benevolence must cease. It is, indeed, impossible that good will to the whole should not manifest severity and indignation to a part who should rebel against the interests of the whole. Benevolence will seek the good of all so long as there is hope. It will bear and forbear, and be patient, kind, meek even to long suffering, while there is not a manifestation of incorrigible wickedness. But where there is, the Lamb is laid aside and the Lion is developed; and his "wrathful anger" is as awful as his tender mercies are affecting. Innumerable instances of this are on record in this world's history. Why then should we seek to represent God's character as all made up of one attribute? It is, indeed, all comprehensively expressed in one word, love. But it should be forever remembered that this is a word of vast import, and that this love possesses, and as occasions arise, develops and manifests a great variety of attributes; all harmonious, and perfect, and glorious. This attribute always develops itself in the character of holy men when occasions offer that demand it. Behold the severity of Peter in the case of Ananias and Sapphira. Witness the rebuke administered by Paul to Peter when the latter dissembled and endangered the purity of the church. Witness also his severity in the case of Elymas, the sorcerer, and hear him say to the Galatians, "I would that they who trouble you were even cut off,"—and many such like things in the conduct and spirit of holy men. Now, I know that such exhibitions are sometimes regarded as unchristlike, as legal, and not evangelical. But they are evangelical. These are only manifestations of an essential attribute of benevolence, as every one must see who will consider the matter. It very often happens that such manifestations, whatever the occasion may be, are denounced as the manifestations of a wicked spirit, as anger, and as sinful anger. Indeed, it seems to be assumed by many that every kind and degree of anger is sinful, of course. But so far is all this from the truth, that occasions often, or at least sometimes, arise, that call for such manifestations; and to be any otherwise than indignant, to manifest any other than indignation and severity, were to be and manifest any thing but that which is demanded by the occasion.

I know that this truth is liable in a selfish world to abuse. But I know also that it is a truth of revelation; and God has

not withheld it for fear of its being abused. It is a truth of reason, and commends itself to the intuitions of every mind. It is a truth abundantly manifested in the moral and providential government of God. Let it not be denied nor concealed; but let no one abuse and pervert it.

LECTURE XX.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

27. *Holiness*, or *purity*, is another attribute of benevolence.

Holiness is a term that seems sometimes to be used as expressive of all the moral attributes of God. As an attribute of benevolence, it signifies purity. It denotes the moral purity or moral character or quality of God's benevolence, and indicates or expresses the intention to promote the happiness of moral beings by means of moral purity or virtue. Benevolence simply considered, is a willing or choosing the highest good of being, and especially of moral agents. Holiness as an attribute of benevolence, is that element of the choice that aims to secure the end of benevolence by means of virtue. Moral purity is uprightness or righteousness. This attribute is hardly distinguishable from righteousness or uprightness. Uprightness or integrity are generally used as synonymous with holiness.

That holiness is an attribute of God is every where assumed and frequently asserted in the bible.

If an attribute of God, it must be an attribute of love; for God is love. This attribute is celebrated in heaven as one of those aspects of the divine character that give ineffable delight. Isaiah saw the seraphim standing around the throne of Jehovah, and crying one to another, Holy! holy! holy! John also had a vision of the worship of heaven, and says "they rest not day nor night saying Holy! holy! holy! Lord God Almighty." When Isaiah beheld the holiness of Jehovah he cried out "Wo is me! I am undone. I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts!" God's holiness is infinite, and it is no wonder that a perception of it should thus affect the prophet.

Finite holiness must forever stand and feel itself to be comparative rottenness and impurity when brought into comparison with infinite holiness. The seraphim are represented as being affected much as the prophet was. At least, had the vision of his holiness been as new to them as it was to him, it might no doubt have impressed them as it did him. Their holiness in the comparison or light of his might have appeared to them like pollution. They veiled their faces in his pres-

ence. They covered their faces as if afraid, or as if they had considered that in his eyes the most holy creatures in the universe were comparatively unclean. Every christian of much experience knows well what it is to be confounded in the presence of his awful holiness. Job says, "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee: wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes." There is no comparing finite with infinite. The time will never come when creatures can behold the awful holiness of Jehovah without shrinking into comparative rottenness in his presence. This must be, and yet in another sense they may be and are as holy as he is. They may be as perfectly conformed to what light or truth they have as he is. This is doubtless what Christ intended when he said "Be ye perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." The meaning is, that they should live to the same end and be as entirely consecrated to it as he is. This they must be to be truly virtuous or holy in any degree. But when they are so, a full view of the holiness of God would confound and overwhelm them. If any one doubts this, he has not considered the matter in a proper light. He has not lifted up his thoughts as he needs to do to the contemplation of Infinite Holiness. No *creature*, however benevolent he be, can witness the divine benevolence without being overwhelmed with a clear vision of it. This is no doubt true of every attribute of the divine love. However perfect creature virtue may be, it is finite, and brought into the light of the attributes of infinite virtue, it will appear as comparative rottenness. Let the most just man on earth or in heaven witness and have a clear apprehension of the infinite justice of Jehovah, and it would no doubt fill him with unutterable awe of him. So, could the most merciful saint on earth or in heaven have a clear perception of the divine mercy in its fulness, it would swallow up all thought and imagination and no doubt overwhelm him. And so also of every attribute of God. Oh! when we speak of the attributes of Jehovah, we often do not know what we say. Should God unvail himself to us our bodies would instantly perish. "No man," says he, "can see my face and live." When Moses prayed, Show me thy glory, God condescendingly hid him in the cleft of a rock and covering him with his hand, he passed by and let Moses see only his back parts, informing him that he could not behold his face, that is, his unvailed glories and live.

Holiness is an essential attribute of disinterested love. It

must be so from the laws of our being, and from the very nature of benevolence. In man it manifests itself in great purity of conversation and deportment, in a great loathing of all impurity of flesh and spirit. Let no man profess piety who has not this attribute developed. The love required by the law of God is pure love. It seeks to make its object happy only by making him holy. It manifests the greatest abhorrence of sin and all uncleanness. In creatures it pants and doubtless ever will pant and struggle towards infinite purity or holiness. It will never find a resting place in such a sense as to desire to ascend no higher. As it perceives more and more of the fullness and infinity of God's holiness, it will no doubt pant and struggle to ascend the eternal heights where God sits in light too dazzling for the strong vision of the highest cherubim.

Holiness of heart begets a desire or feeling and love of purity in the sensibility. The feelings become exceedingly alive to the beauty of holiness and to the hatefulness and deformity of all spiritual and even physical impurity. The sensibility becomes ravished with the great loveliness of holiness, and unutterably disgusted with the opposite. The least impurity of conversation or of action exceedingly shocks one who is holy. Impure thoughts, if suggested to the mind of a holy being, are exceedingly detestable, and the soul heaves and struggles to cast them out as the most loathsome abominations.

28. *Modesty* is another attribute of love.

This may exist either as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or of the will.

As a phenomenon of the sensibility, it consists in a *feeling* of delicacy or shrinking from whatever is impure, unchaste; or from all boasting, vanity or egotism; a feeling like retiring from public observation, and especially from public applause. It is a feeling of self-diffidence, and is as a feeling the opposite of self-esteem and self-complacency. It takes on as a mere feeling a great variety of types, and when it controls the will, often gives its subject a very lovely and charming exterior; especially is this true when manifested by a female. But when this is only a phenomenon of the sensibility, and manifests itself only as this feeling takes control of the will, it is not virtue but only a specious and delusive form of selfishness. It appears lovely because it is the counterfeit of a sweet and charming form of virtue.

As a phenomenon of the will and as an attribute of bene-

volence it consists in a disposition opposed to display and self-exaltation. It is nearly allied to humility. It is a state of heart the opposite of an egotistical spirit. It seeks not personal applause or distinction. It is the unostentatious characteristic of benevolence. "Love seeketh not its own, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly." Benevolence seeketh not its own profit, nor its own honor. It seeks the good of being, with a single eye, and it is no part of its design to set off self to advantage. Hence modesty is one of its lovely characteristics. It manifests itself very much as the feeling of modesty manifests itself when it takes control of the will, so that often it is difficult to distinguish modesty as a virtue, or as an attribute of religion, from that modesty of feeling which is a peculiarity of the constitution of some, and which comes to control the will.

True piety is always modest. It is unassuming, unostentatious, anti-egotistical, content to seek with a single eye its object, the highest good of being. In this work it seeks not public notice or applause. It finds a luxury in doing good no matter how unobserved. If at any time it seeks to be known, it is entirely disinterested in this. It seeks to be known only to make "manifest that its deeds are wrought in God," and to stimulate and encourage others to good works. Modesty as a virtue shrinks from self-display, from trumpeting its own deeds. It is prone to "esteem others better than self;" to give the preference to others, and hold self in very moderate estimation. It is the opposite of self-confidence and self-exaltation. It aims not to exhibit self, but God and Christ.

This form of virtue is often conspicuous in men and women whom the providence of God has placed on high, so that they are exposed to the public gaze. They seem never to aim at the exhibition or exaltation of self; they never appear flattered by applause, nor to be disheartened by censure and abuse. Having this attribute largely developed, they pursue their way very much regardless both of the praise and the censure of men. Like Paul they can say "With me it is a small thing to be judged of man's judgment." It seeks only to commend itself to God and to the *consciences* of men.

29. *Sobriety* is another attribute of benevolence.

Sobriety as a virtue is the opposite of levity. There is, as every one knows, a remarkable difference in the constitutional temperament of different persons in regard to levity and sobriety considered as a tendency of the sensibility. Sobriety considered as a constitutional peculiarity, is often attributable

to a diseased state of the organs of organic life, and is then not unfrequently termed hypochondriasis. In other instances it seems not to result from or to indicate ill health, but is a peculiarity not to be accounted for by any philosophy of ours.

Sobriety as a phenomenon of the sensibility often results from conviction of sin and fear of punishment, and from worldly troubles, and indeed from a multitude of causes.

But sobriety considered as a virtue and as a characteristic or attribute of benevolence, consists in that solemn earnestness which must belong to an honest intention to pursue to the utmost the highest good of being.

Sobriety is not synonymous with *moroseness*. It is not a sour, fault-finding, censorious spirit. Neither is it inconsistent with cheerfulness—I mean the cheerfulness of love. It is the contrast of levity and not of cheerfulness. Sobriety is serious earnestness in the choice and promotion of the highest good of being. It has no heart for levity and folly. It can not brook the spirit of gossip and of giggling. Sober earnestness is one of the essential attributes of love to God and souls. It can not fail to manifest this characteristic. Benevolence supremely values its object. It meets with many obstacles in attempting to secure it. It too deeply prizes the good of being, and sees too plainly how much is to be done to have any time or inclination to levity and folly. God is always in serious earnest. Christ was always serious and in earnest. Trifling is an abomination to God and to benevolence also.

But let it never be forgotten that sobriety, as an attribute of benevolence, has nothing in it of the nature of moroseness and peevishness. It is not melancholy. It is not sorrowfulness. It is not despondency. It is a sober, honest, earnest, intense state of choice or of good will. It is not an affected but a perfectly natural and serious earnestness. Benevolence is in earnest and it *appears* to be so by a law of its own nature. It puts on no affectation of solemnity. It has need of none. It can laugh and weep for the same reason and at the same time. It can do either without levity on the one hand and without moroseness, melancholy or discouragement on the other. Abraham fell on his face and laughed when God promised him a son by Sarah. But it was not levity. It was benevolence rejoicing in the promise of a faithful God.

We should always be careful to distinguish between sobriety as a mere feeling and the sobriety of the heart. The former is often easily dissipated and succeeded by trifling and levity. The former is stable as benevolence itself because it

is one of its essential attributes. A trifling Christian is a contradiction. It is as absurd as a light and foolish benevolence. These are of a piece with a sinful holiness. Benevolence has and must have its changeless attributes. Some of them are manifest only on particular occasions that develop them. Others are manifest on all occasions as every occasion calls them into exercise. This attribute is one of that class. Benevolence must be in serious earnest on all occasions. The benevolent soul may and will rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those that weep. He may be always cheerful in faith and in hope, yet he always has too great business on hand to have a heart for trifling or for folly.

30. *Sincerity* is another attribute of benevolence.

Sincerity is the opposite of hypocrisy. The terms *sincerity* and *perfection* seem, as used in the bible, to be synonymous. Sincerity as an attribute of benevolence implies whole-hearted honesty, singleness of aim, true uprightness of purpose. Where this attribute is, there is a consciousness of its presence. The soul is satisfied that it is really and truly whole-hearted. It can not but respect its own honesty of intention and of purpose. It has not to *affect* sincerity—it *has* it. When the soul has this attribute developed it is as deeply conscious of whole-heartedness as of its own existence. It is honest. It is earnest. It is deeply sincere. It *knows* it, and never thinks of being suspected of insincerity, and of course has no reason for affectation.

This also is one of those attributes of benevolence that are manifest on all occasions. There is a manifestation of sincerity that carries conviction in the spirit and deportment of the truly benevolent man. It is exceedingly difficult so to counterfeit it that the deception shall not be seen. The very attempt to counterfeit sincerity will manifest hypocrisy to a discerning mind. There is a cant, a grimace, a put-on seriousness, a hollow, shallow, long-facedness that reveals a want of sincerity; and the more pains is taken to cover up insincerity, the more surely it reveals itself. There is a simplicity and unguardedness, a right up and down frankness, an open-heartedness, a transparency in sincerity that is charming. It tells the whole story, and carries with it on its very face the demonstration of its honesty. Sincerity is its own passport, its own letter of commendation. It is transparent as light and as honest as justice, as kind as mercy, and as faithful as truth. It is all lovely and praiseworthy. It needs no hoods or gowns or canonicals or ceremonials to set it off; it stands on its own

foundation. It walks abroad unsuspecting, and generally unsuspected of hypocrisy. It lives and moves and has its being in open day-light. It inhabits love as its dwelling place; and where benevolence is, there is its rest.

31. Another attribute of benevolence is *Zeal*. Zeal is not always a phenomenon of will, but this term often expresses an effervescing state of the sensibility. It often expresses enthusiasm in the form of excited feeling. Zeal is also often an attribute of selfishness. The term expresses *intensity* whether used of the will or of the emotions, whether designating a characteristic of selfishness or of benevolence. Benevolence is an intense action of the will or an intense state of choice. The intensity is not uniform, but varies with varying perceptions of the intellect. When the intellectual apprehensions of truth are clear, when the Holy Spirit shines on the soul, the actings of the will become proportionably intense. This must be, or benevolence must cease altogether. Benevolence is the honest choice of the highest good of being as an end. Of course it has no sinister or bye ends to prevent it from laying just that degree of stress upon the good of being which its importance seems to demand. Benevolence is yielding the will up unreservedly to the demands of the intelligence. Nothing else is benevolence. Hence it follows that the intensity of benevolence will and must vary with varying light. When the light of God shines strongly upon the soul, there is often a consuming intensity in the action of the will, and the soul can adopt the language of Christ, "The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up."

In its lowest estate, benevolence is zealous. That is, the intellectual perceptions never sink so low as to leave benevolence to become a stagnant pool. It is never lazy, never sluggish, never inactive. It is aggressive in its nature. It is essential activity in itself. It consists in choice, the supreme choice of an end—in consecration to that end. Zeal, therefore, must be one of its essential attributes. A lazy benevolence is a misnomer. In a world where sin is, benevolence must be aggressive. In such a world it can not be conservative. It must be reformatory. This is its essential nature. In such a world as this a conservative, anti-reform benevolence is sheer selfishness. To baptize anti-reform and conservatism with the name of christianity, is to steal a robe of light to cover the black shoulders of a fiend. Zeal, the zeal of benevolence, will not, can not rest while sin is in the world. God is represented as clothed with zeal as with a

cloak; and after making some of his exceeding great and precious promises, he concludes by saying, "The zeal of the Lord of Hosts will perform this."

32. *Unity* is another attribute of benevolence.

Benevolence or love has but one end. It consists in one choice, one ultimate intention. It is always one and indivisible. It possesses many attributes or characteristics; but they are all only so many phases of one principle. Every modification of virtue, actual or conceivable, may be and must be resolvable into love, for in fact it is only a modification of love or benevolence. It is easy to see that an honest choice of the highest good of being *as an end*, will sufficiently and fully account for every form in which virtue has appeared, or ever can appear. The love or good will of God is a unit. He has but one end. All he does is for one and the same reason. So it is and must be with love or benevolence in all beings. God's conduct is all equally good and equally praiseworthy.

(1.) Because he always has one intention.

(2.) Because he always has the same degree of light

With creatures this light varies, and consequently they, although benevolent, are not always equally praiseworthy. Their virtue increases as their light increases, and must forever do so if they continue benevolent. But their end is always one and the same. In this respect their virtue never varies. They have the same end that God has.

It is of great importance that the unity of virtue should be understood. Else that which really constitutes its essence is overlooked. If it be supposed that there can be various sorts of virtue, this is a fatal mistake. The fact is, virtue consists in whole-hearted consecration to one end, and that end is, as it ought to be and must be, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. This and nothing else, more nor less, is virtue. It is one and identical in all moral agents, in all worlds, and to all eternity. It can never be changed. It can never consist in any thing else. God could not alter its nature, nor one of its essential attributes. The inquiry and the only inquiry is, for what end do I live? To what end am I consecrated? Not, how do I feel, and what is my outward deportment? These may indicate the state of my will. But these can not settle the question! If a man know any thing, it must be that he knows what his supreme intention is. That is, if he considers at all and looks at the grand aim of his mind, he cannot fail to see whether he is really living for God and the universe or for himself.

If God is love, His virtue or love must be a unit. If all the law is fulfilled in one word; if love is the fulfilling of the law; then all virtue must resolve itself into love; and this unity is and must be an attribute of benevolence.

33. *Simplicity* is another attribute of benevolence.

By simplicity is intended singleness, without mixture. It has and can have but one simple end. It does not, and can not mingle with selfishness. It is simple or single in its aim. It is and must be simple or single in all its efforts to secure its end. It does not, can not attempt to serve God and mammon. But as I have dwelt at length upon this subject in a former lecture, I must refer you to that and not enlarge upon it here.

LECTURE XXI.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

34. *Gratitude* is another characteristic of Love.

This term also designates a state of the sensibility, or a mere feeling of being obliged or benefitted by another. This feeling includes an emotion of love and attachment to the benefactor who has shown us favor. It also includes a feeling of obligation and of readiness to make such returns as we are able, to the being who has shown us favor. But as a mere feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility gratitude has no moral character. It may exist in the sensibility of one who is entirely selfish. For selfish persons love to be obliged, and love those who love to oblige them, and can *feel* grateful for favors shown to themselves.

Gratitude, as a virtue, is only a modification or an attribute of benevolence or of good will. It consists in willing good to a benefactor either of ourselves or of others upon condition of favor bestowed. Gratitude always assumes of course the intrinsic value of the good willed as the fundamental reason for willing it. But it always has particular reference to the relation of benefactor as a secondary reason for willing good *to him*. This relation can not be the foundation of the obligation to love or will the good of any being in the universe; for the obligation to will his good, would exist if this relation did not exist, and even if the relation of persecutor existed in its stead. But gratitude always assuming the existence of the fundamental reason, to wit, the intrinsic value of the well-being of its object for its own sake, has, as I have just said, particular reference to the relation of benefactor; so particular reference to it that if asked why he loved or willed the good of that individual, he would naturally assign this relation as a reason. He would, as has been formerly shown, assign this as the reason, not because it is or can be or ought to be the fundamental reason, but because the other reason lies in the mind as a first truth, and is not so much noticed on the field of consciousness at the time as the secondary reason, to wit, the relation just referred to.

This attribute of benevolence may never have occasion for its exercise in the divine mind. No one can sustain to him the relation of benefactor. Yet in his mind, it may and no

doubt does exist in the form of good will to those who are the benefactors of others, and for that reason, just as finite minds may be affected by that relation.

That love will ever have an opportunity to develop all its attributes and manifest all its loveliness and take on every possible peculiarity, is more than we can know. All its loveliness can never be known nor conceived of by finite minds except so far as occasions develop its charming attributes. The love of gratitude finds abundant occasions of development in all finite minds, and especially among sinners of our race. Our ill-desert is so infinite, and God's goodness, mercy and long-suffering are so infinite and so manifested to us, that if we have any attribute of benevolence largely developed, it must be that of gratitude. Gratitude to God will manifest itself to God in a spirit of thanksgiving, and in a most tender regard to his feelings, his wishes, and all his commandments. A grateful soul will naturally raise the question on all occasions, will this or that please God? There will be a constant endeavor of the grateful soul to please him. This must be; it is the natural and inevitable result of gratitude. It should be always borne in mind that gratitude is good will modified by the relation of benefactor. It is not a mere feeling of thankfulness, but will always beget that feeling. It is a living, energizing attribute of benevolence and will and must manifest itself in corresponding feeling and action.

It should also be borne in mind that a selfish feeling of gratitude or thankfulness often exists, and imposes upon its subject and often upon others who witness its manifestation. It conceals its selfish foundation and character and passes in this world for virtue; but it is not. I recollect well weeping with gratitude to God years previous to my conversion. The same kind of feeling is often no doubt mistaken for evangelical gratitude.

Benevolence is a unifying principle. The benevolent soul regards all interests as his own and all beings as parts of himself in such a sense as to feel obligations of gratitude for favors bestowed on others as well as himself. Gratitude, as an attribute of benevolence, recognizes God as a benefactor to self in bestowing favors on others. Benevolence regarding all interests as our own acknowledges the favors bestowed upon any and upon all. It will thank God for favors bestowed upon the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air, and for "opening his hand and supplying the wants of every living thing."

35. *Wisdom* is another attribute of benevolence.

Wisdom is love directed by knowledge. It consists in the choice of the best and most valuable end and of the most appropriate means of obtaining it. It is like all the other attributes, only benevolence viewed in a certain relation, or only a particular aspect of it.

Wisdom is a term that expresses the perfectly intelligent character of love. It represents it as not a blind and unintelligent choice, but as being guided only by the highest intelligence. This attribute like all the others is *perfect* in God in an infinitely higher sense than in any creature. It must be perfect in creatures in such a sense as to be sinless, but can in them never be perfect in such a sense as to admit of no increase.

The manifold displays of the divine wisdom in creation, providence and grace, are enough when duly considered to overwhelm a finite mind. An inspired apostle could celebrate this attribute in such a strain as this: "O the depths of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out!" The wisdom of the saints appears in their choice of an end. They choose invariably the same end that God does, but do not, for want of knowledge, always use the best means. This, however, is not a sinful defect in them, provided they act according to the best light within their reach.

Wisdom is a term that is often and justly used to express true religion and to distinguish it from every thing else.

It expresses both benevolence or good will and the intelligent character of that choice, that is, that the choice is dictated by the intelligence as distinguished from selfish choice or choice occasioned by the impulses of feeling.

36. *Grace* is another attribute of benevolence.

Grace is a disposition to bestow gratuitous favor, that is, favor on the undeserving and on the ill-deserving.

Grace is not synonymous with mercy. It is a term of broader meaning.

Mercy is a disposition to forgive the guilty. Grace expresses not only a willingness to pardon, but to bestow other favors.

Mercy might pardon but unless great grace were bestowed our pardon would by no means secure our salvation.

"Grace first contrived the way
To save rebellious man;
And all the steps that grace display,
That drew the wondrous plan."

Grace does not wait for merit as a condition of bestowing favor. It causes its sun to shine on the evil and on the good and sends its rain upon the just and the unjust.

Grace in the saints manifests itself in acts of beneficence to the most unworthy as well as to the deserving. It seeks to do good to all whether meritorious or not. It seeks to do good from a love to being. It rejoices in opportunities to bestow its gratuities upon all classes that need them. To grace, necessity or want is the great recommendation. When we come to God his grace is delighted with the opportunity to supply our wants. The grace of God is a vast ocean without shore or bound or bottom. It is infinite. It is an ever overflowing ocean of beneficence. Its streams go forth to make glad the universe. All creatures are objects of his grace to a greater or less extent. All are not objects of his saving grace, but all are or have been the recipients of his bounty. Every sinner that is kept out of hell, is sustained every moment by grace. Every thing that any one receives who has ever sinned which is better than hell, is received of grace.

Repentance is a condition of the exercise of mercy. But grace is exercised in a thousand forms without any reference to character. Indeed, the very term expresses good will to the undeserving and ill-deserving. Surely it must have been a gracious disposition, deep and infinite, that devised and executed the plan of salvation for sinners of our race. A sympathy with the grace of God must manifest itself in strenuous and self-denying efforts to secure to the greatest possible number the benefits of this salvation. A gracious heart in man will leap forth to declare the infinite riches of the grace of God in the ears of a dying world. No man certainly has or can have a sympathy with Christ who will or can hesitate to do his utmost to carry the gospel and apply his grace to a perishing world. What! shall the gracious disposition of Christ prepare the way, prepare the feast; and can they have any sympathy with him who can hesitate to go or send to invite the starving poor? If Christ both lived and died to redeem man, is it a great thing for us to live to serve them? No, indeed: he only has the spirit of Christ who would, not merely live, but also die for them.

37. *Economy* is another attribute of benevolence.

This term expresses that peculiarity of benevolence that makes the best use, and the most that can be made of every thing to promote the public good. This attribute appears at every step in the works and government of God. It is truly wonderful to see how every thing is made and conducted to one end; and nothing exists or can exist in the universe which

God will not overrule to some good account. Even "the wrath of man shall praise Him, and the remainder of wrath He will restrain." A most Divine economy is every where manifest in the works and ways of God. If He is love, we might expect this. Nay if He is love, it is impossible that this should not be. He lives only for one end. All things were created and are ruled or overruled by Him. All things, then, must directly or indirectly work together for good. He will secure some benefit from every thing. Nothing has occurred, or will occur, or can ever occur to all eternity that will not in some way be used to promote the good of being. Even sin and punishment will not be without their use. God has created nothing, nor has He suffered any thing to occur in vain. There is nothing without its use. Sin, inexcusable and ruinous as it is, is not without its use. And God will take care to glorify Himself in sinners whether they consent or not. He says, "He has created all things for Himself, even the wicked for the day of evil." That is, He created no man wicked, but He created those who have become wicked. He created them not for the sake of punishing them, but knowing that they would become incorrigible sinners, He designed to punish them, and by making them a public example, render them useful to His government. He created them, not because He delighted in their punishment for its own sake, but that He might make their deserved punishment useful to the universe. In this sense, it may be truly said, that he created them for the day of evil. Foresceing that they would become incorrigible sinners, He designed, when He created them, to make them a public example.

God's glorious economy in husbanding all events for the public good, is affectingly displayed in the fact that all things are made to work together for good to them who love God. All beings, saints and sinners, good and evil angels, sin and holiness; in short there is not a being nor an event in the universe that is not all used up for the promotion of the highest good. Whether men mean it or not, God means it. If men do not mean it, no thanks to them whatever use God may make of them. He will give them, as he says, according to their endeavors or intentions, but He will take care to use them in one way or another for His glory. If sinners will consent to live and die for His glory and the good of being, well; they shall have their reward. But if they will not consent, He will take care to dispose of them for the public benefit. He will make the best use of them He can. If they are will-

ing, and obedient, if they sympathize with Him in promoting the good of the universe, well. But if not, He can make them a public example, and make the influence of their punishment useful to His kingdom. Nothing shall be lost in the sense that God will not make it answer some useful purpose. No, not even sin with all its deformities and guilt, and blasphemy with all its guilt and desolating tendencies shall be suffered to exist in vain. It will be made useful in innumerable ways. But no thanks to the sinner; he means no such thing as that his sin shall be useful. He is set upon his own gratification regardless of consequences. Nothing is farther from his heart than to do good and glorify God. But God has His eye upon him; has laid His plans in view of his foreseen wickedness; and so surely as Jehovah lives, so surely shall the sinner in one way or another be used all up for the glory of God and the highest good of being.

Economy is necessarily an attribute of benevolence in all minds. The very nature of benevolence shows that it must be so. It is consecration to the highest good of being. It lives for no other end. Now all choice must respect means or ends. Benevolence has but one end; and all its activity, every volition that it puts forth, must be to secure that end. The intellect will be used to devise means to promote that end. The whole life and activity of a benevolent being is and must be a life of strenuous economy for the promotion of the one great end of benevolence. Extravagance, self-indulgence, waste, are necessarily foreign to love. Every thing is devoted to one end. Every thing is scrupulously and wisely directed to secure the highest good of God and being, in general. This is, this must be the universal and undeviating aim of every mind just so far as it is truly benevolent. "He that hath an ear to hear, let him hear."

There are many other attributes of benevolence that might be enumerated and enlarged upon, all of which are implied in entire obedience to the law of God. Enough has been said I hope to fix your attention strongly upon the fact that every modification of virtue, actual, conceivable or possible, is only an attribute or form of benevolence. That attribute is always a phenomenon of will and an attribute of benevolence. And where benevolence is, there all virtue is and must be, and every form in which virtue does or can exist, must develop itself as its occasions shall arise, if benevolence really exists.

LECTURE XXII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

WHAT CONSTITUTES DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

In discussing this question, I will,

I. Revert to some points that have been settled.

II. Show what disobedience to the Moral Law can not consist in.

III. What it must consist in.

I. Revert to some points that have been settled.

1. That moral law requires love or benevolence, and that this is the sum of its requirements.

2. That benevolence is good will to being in general. In other words, that it consists in the impartial choice of the good of being, as an end, or for its own sake.

3. That obedience to moral law is a unit or that it invariably consists in disinterested benevolence. That consecration to the highest good of being is virtue and the whole of virtue.

4. That feeling and outward action are only results of ultimate intention, and in themselves neither virtue nor vice.

5. That all choice and volition must terminate upon some object, and that this object must be chosen as an *end* or as a *means*.

6. That the choice of any thing as a *means* to an end is in fact only carrying into execution the ultimate choice or the choice of an end.

7. That the mind must have chosen an end, or it can not choose the means. That is, the choice of means implies the previous choice of an end.

8. That moral character belongs to the ultimate intention only, or to the choice of an end.

9. That virtue or obedience to moral law consists in choosing in accordance with the demands of the intelligence in opposition to following the feelings, desires, or impulses of the sensibility.

10. That whatever is chosen for its own sake, and not as a means to an end, is and must be chosen as an end.

11. That the mind must always have an end in view, or it can not choose at all. That is, as has been said, the will must have an object of choice, and this object must be regarded as an end or as a means.

12. That the fundamental reason for choosing an end and the end chosen are identical. That is, the fundamental reason of the obligation to choose a thing must be found in the nature of the thing itself, and this reason is the end or thing chosen. Example: If the intrinsic value of a thing be the foundation of the obligation to choose it, the intrinsically valuable is the end or thing chosen.

II. Show what disobedience to moral law can not consist in.

1. It can not consist in *malevolence*, or in the choice of evil or *misery as an ultimate end*. This will appear if we consider,

(1.) That the choice of an end implies the choice of it not for *no* reason, but for *a* reason and for its own *intrinsic value*, or because the mind prizes it on its own account. But moral agents are so constituted that they can not regard misery as intrinsically valuable. They can not, therefore, choose it as an ultimate end, nor prize it on its own account.

(2.) To will misery as an ultimate end, would imply the choice of universal misery and every degree of it according to its relative amount.

(3.) The choice of universal misery as an end implies the choice of all the means necessary to that end.

(4.) The end chosen is identical with the reason for choosing it. To say that a thing can be chosen without *any reason* is to say that nothing is chosen, or that there is no object of choice, or that there is no choice. Misery may be chosen to assert our own sovereignty, but this were to choose self-gratification and not misery as an ultimate end. To choose misery as an ultimate end is to choose it, not to assert my own sovereignty, nor for any other reason than because it is misery.

(5.) To choose an end is not to choose without any reason, as has been said, but for *a* reason.

(6.) To choose misery as an end is to choose it for the reason that it is misery, and that misery is preferred to happiness for its own sake, which is absurd. Such a supposition overlooks the very nature of choice.

(7.) To will misery as a means is *possible*, but this is not *malevolence*, but might be either benevolence or selfishness.

(8.) The constitution of moral beings renders *malevolence*, or the willing of misery for its own sake impossible. Therefore disobedience to moral law can not consist in *it*.

2. Disobedience to moral law can not consist in the constitution of soul or body. The law does not command us to have a certain constitution, nor forbid us to have the constitution with which we came into being.

3. It can not consist in any state either of the sensibility or of the intelligence; for these, as we have seen, are involuntary and are dependent upon the actings of the will.

4. It can not consist in outward actions; for these, we have seen, are controlled by the actions of the will, and therefore can have no moral character in themselves.

5. It can not consist in inaction: for total inaction is to a moral agent impossible. Moral agents are necessarily active. That is, they can not exist as moral agents without choice. They must by a law of necessity choose either in accordance with, or in opposition to the law of God. They are free to choose in either direction, but they are not free to abstain from choice altogether. Choose they must. The law directs how they shall or ought to choose. If they do not choose thus, it must be because they choose otherwise, and not because they do not choose at all.

6. It can not consist in the choice of moral evil or sin as an ultimate end. Sin is but an element or attribute of choice or intention, or it is intention itself. If it be intention itself, then to make sin an end of intention would be to make intention or choice terminate on itself, and the sinner must choose his own choice or intend his own intention as an end: this is absurd.

If sin is but an element or attribute of choice or intention, then to suppose the sinner to choose it as an end, were to make choice or intention terminate on an element or attribute of itself, to suppose him to choose as an end an element of his own choice. This also is absurd and a contradiction.

The nature of a moral being forbids that he should choose sin for its own sake. He may choose those things the choosing of which is sinful, but it is not the sinfulness of the choice upon which the intention terminates. This is naturally impossible. Sin may be chosen as a means of gratifying a malicious feeling, but this is not choosing it as an end, but as a means. Malevolence, strictly speaking, is impossible to a moral agent. That is, the choice of moral or natural evil for its own sake contradicts the nature of moral agents and the nature of ultimate choice, and is therefore impossible.

III. What disobedience to moral law must consist in.

1. It must consist in choice or ultimate intention, for moral character belongs strictly only to ultimate intention.

2. As all choice must terminate on an end or on means, and as the means can not be chosen until the end is chosen and but for its sake, and as the choice of means for the sake of an end is but an endeavor to secure the end chosen, therefore it fol-

laws that disobedience to the moral law must consist in the choice of some *end* or *ends* inconsistent with its requisitions.

3. We have seen that misery or natural evil can not be chosen as an end by a moral agent. So this can not be the end chosen.

4. We have seen also that moral evil or sin can not be chosen as an ultimate end.

5. Disobedience to God's law must consist in the choice of self-gratification as an end. In other words, it must consist in selfishness.

Self-gratification is generally distinguished from self-love, but I apprehend without foundation. Self-love has been defined to be the *desire* of happiness. But *desire* is not *love*. Men constitutionally desire, not only their own happiness, but the happiness of others; but this desire for the happiness of others is not benevolence. It is not the love of being in general. But why may it not as properly be called the *love* of being in general, as the desire of our own happiness may be called *self-love*? Love, properly speaking is a voluntary state of mind. *Self-love*, properly speaking, is a choice to gratify our desires *as an end*, that is, for the sake of the gratification. The *desire* is not *self-love*. It is constitutional, and has no moral character. Self-love, strictly speaking, is the choice to gratify our desires. So that selfishness and self-love are identical. But as this distinction between selfishness and self-love has been common, and as the error lies only in giving a false definition to self-love, and in calling *desire* *love*, I will not insist on the identity of selfishness and self-love, but proceed to establish the position that disobedience to the moral law, or sin, consists wholly and exclusively in selfishness, or in making good to self and not the good of God and the universe of sentient beings an ultimate end.

In other words still, sin consists in choosing *self-gratification* as an end or for its own sake, instead of choosing, in accordance with the law of the reason, the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end. In other words still, sin or disobedience to the moral law consists in the consecration of the heart and life to the gratification of the constitutional and artificial desires rather than in obedience to the law of the intelligence. Or, to state it once more, sin consists in being governed by the sensibility instead of being governed by the law of God as it lies revealed in the reason.

That this is sin and the whole of sin will appear if we consider:

1. That this state of mind, or this choice is the "carnal mind or the minding of the flesh which the Apostle affirms to be enmity against God."

2. It is the universal representation of Scripture that sin consists in the spirit of self-seeking.

3. This spirit of self-seeking is always in the Bible represented as the contrast or opposite of disinterested benevolence, or the love which the law requires. "Ephraim bringeth forth fruit to himself," is the sum of God's charges against sinners.

4. Selfishness is always spoken of in terms of reprobation in the Bible.

5. It is known by every moral agent to be sinful.

6. It is the end in fact which all unregenerate men pursue, and the only end they pursue.

7. When we come to the consideration of the attributes of selfishness, it will be seen that every form of sin, not only may, but must resolve itself into selfishness just as we have seen that every form of virtue does and must resolve itself into love or benevolence.

6. From the laws of its constitution, the mind is shut up to the necessity of choosing that as an ultimate end which is regarded by the mind as intrinsically good or valuable in itself. This is the very idea of choosing an end, to wit, something chosen for its own sake, or for what it is in and of itself, that is, because it is regarded by the mind as intrinsically valuable to self, or to being in general, or to both.

6. The gratification or good of being is necessarily regarded by the mind as a good in itself, or as intrinsically valuable.

7. Nothing else is or can be regarded as valuable in itself but the good of being.

8. Moral agents are, therefore, shut up to the necessity of willing the good of being either partially or impartially. Nothing else can possibly be chosen as an end or for its own sake. Willing the good of being impartially, we have seen is virtue. To will it partially is to will it not for its own sake, but upon condition of its relation to self. That is, it is to will self good or good to self. In other words, it is to will the gratification of self as an end, in opposition to willing the good of universal being as an end, and every good, or the good of every being according to its intrinsic value.

9. But may not one will the good of a *part* of being as an end, or for the sake of the intrinsic value of their good? This would not be benevolence, for that, as we have seen, must

consist in willing good for its own sake, and implies the willing of every good and of the highest good of universal being. It would not be selfishness, as it would not be willing good to, or the gratification of, self. It would be sin, for it would be the partial love or choice of good. It would be loving some of my neighbors, but not all of them. It would therefore be sin, but not selfishness. If this can be, then there is such a thing possible, whether actual or not, as sin that does not consist in selfishness.

To say that I choose good for its own sake or because it is valuable to being, that is, in obedience to the law of my reason, implies that I choose all possible good, and every good according to its relative value. If then a being chooses his own good or the good of any being as an ultimate end, in obedience to the law of reason, it must be that he chooses, for the same reason, the highest possible good of all sentient being.

The partial choice of good implies the choice of it, not merely for its own sake, but upon condition of its relations to self, or to certain particular persons. It is its relations that conditionate the choice. When its relations to self *conditionate* the choice so that it is chosen, not for its intrinsic value irrespective of its relations, but for its relations to self, this is selfishness. It is the partial choice of good. If I choose the good of others besides myself and choose good because of its relations to *them*, it must be either,

(1.) Because I love their persons with the love of fondness, and will their good for that reason, that is, so gratify my affection for them, *which is selfishness*; or,

(2.) Because of their relations to me so that good to them is in some way a good to me, *which also is selfishness*; or,

(3.) Upon condition that they are worthy, which is benevolence: for if I will good to a being upon condition that he is worthy, I must value the good for its own sake, and will it particularly to him, because he deserves it. This is benevolence and not the partial choice of good, because it is obeying the law of my reason. If I will the good of any being or number of beings, it must be for some reason. I must will it as an end, or as a means. If I will it as an end, it must be the universal or impartial choice of good. If I will it as a means, it must be as a means to some end. The end can not be their good for its own sake, for this would be willing it as an end and not as a means. If I will it as a means, it must be as a means of my own gratification.

Again: If I will the good of any number of beings, I must do it in obedience to the law either of my intelligence or of my sensibility. But if I will in obedience to the law of my intelligence, it must be the choice of the highest good of universal being. But if I will in obedience to the law or impulse of my sensibility, it must be to gratify my feelings or desires. *This is selfishness.*

Again: As the will must either follow the law of the reason, or the impulses of the sensibility, it follows that moral agents are shut up to the necessity of being selfish or benevolent, and that there is no third way, because there is no third medium through which any object of choice can be presented. The mind can absolutely know nothing as an object of choice that is not recommended by one of these faculties. Selfishness, then, and benevolence are the only two alternatives.

Therefore, disobedience to the moral law must consist in selfishness and in selfishness alone.

It has been said that a moral agent may will the good of others for its own sake, and yet not will the good of all. That is, that he may will the good of *some for its intrinsic value*, and yet not will universal good. But this is absurd. To make the valuable the object of choice for its own sake without respect to any conditions or relations, is the same as to will all possible and universal good; that is, the one necessarily implies and includes the other. It has been asserted, for example, that an infidel abolitionist may be conscious of willing and seeking the good of the slave for its own sake or disinterestedly, and yet not exercise universal benevolence. I reply, he deceives himself just as a man would who should say he chooses fruit for its own sake. The fact is, he is conscious of desiring fruit for its own sake. But he does not and can not *choose* it for its own sake. He chooses it in obedience to his desire, that is, to gratify his desire. So it is and must be with the infidel abolitionist. It can not be that he chooses the good of the slave in obedience to the law of his intelligence; for if he did, his benevolence would be universal. It must be, then, that he chooses the good of the slave because he desires it, or to gratify a constitutional desire. Men naturally desire their own happiness and the happiness of others. This is constitutional. But when in obedience to these desires they will their own or others' happiness, they seek to gratify their sensibility or desires. This is selfishness.

Let it be remembered, then, that sin is a unit, and always and necessarily consists in selfish ultimate intention and in nothing else. This intention is sin; and every phase of sin resolves itself into selfishness. This will appear more and more, as we proceed to unfold the subject of moral depravity.

LECTURE XXIII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

WHAT IS NOT IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

In this discussion, I will

I. *State briefly what constitutes disobedience.*

II. *Show what is not implied in it.*

I. *What constitutes disobedience.*

We have seen that all sin or disobedience to moral law is a unit, and that it consists in selfishness, or in the choice of self-gratification as an end; in other words, that it consists in committing the will to the impulses of the sensibility, to the desires, emotions, feelings and passions, instead of committing it to the good of being in general in obedience to the law of the reason or to the law of God as it is revealed in the reason. Selfishness is the intention to gratify *self* as an end. It is the preference of self-interest to other and higher interests.

II. *What is not implied in disobedience to the law of God.*

I. It does not necessarily imply an intention to do wrong. The thing intended in selfishness is to gratify self as an end. This is wrong; but it is not necessary to its being wrong that the wrongness should be aimed at or intended. There may be a state of malicious feeling in a moral agent that would be gratified by the commission of sin. A sinner may have knowingly and intentionally made war upon God and man, and this may have induced a state of the sensibility so hostile to God as that the sinner has a malicious desire to offend and abuse God, to violate his law, and trample upon his authority. This state of feeling may take the control of the will, and he may deliberately intend to violate the law and to do what God hates for the purpose of gratifying this feeling. This, however, it will be seen, is not malevolence or willing either natural or moral evil for its own sake, but as a means of self-gratification. It is selfishness, and not malevolence.

But in the vast majority of instances, where the law is violated and sin committed, it is no part of the aim or intention of the sinner to do wrong. He intends to gratify himself at all events. This intention is wrong. But it is not an intention to do wrong, nor is the wrong the object in any case, or end upon which the intention terminates. There is a great mistake often entertained upon this subject. Many seem to think that they do not sin unless they intend to sin. The

important truth that sin belongs only to the ultimate intention, than which nothing is more true or more important, has been perverted in this manner. It has been assumed by some that they had not done wrong nor intended wrong, because they were conscious that the wrong was not the end at which they aimed. "I did not intend the wrong," say they, and "therefore I did not sin." Now here is a fatal mistake, and a total perversion of the great and important truth that sin and holiness belong only to the ultimate intention.

2. Disobedience to the moral law does not imply that wrong, or sin, or in other words, disobedience is ever intended as an end or for its own sake. Gross mistakes have been fallen into upon this subject. Sinners have been represented as loving sin and as choosing it for its own sake. They have been represented as having a natural and constitutional craving or appetite for sin, such as carnivorous animals have for flesh. Now, if this craving existed, still it would not prove that sin is sought or intended for its own sake. I have a constitutional desire for food and drink. My desires terminate on these objects, that is, they are *desired* for their own sake. But they are never and never can be chosen for their own sake or as an end. They are chosen as a means of gratifying the desire, or may be chosen as a means of glorifying God. Just so, if it were true that sinners have a constitutional appetency for sin, the sin would be desired for its own sake or as an end, but could not be chosen except as a means of self-gratification.

But again. It is not true that sinners have a constitutional appetency and craving for sin. They have a constitutional appetite or desire for a great many things around them. They crave food and drink and knowledge. So did our first parents; and when these desires were strongly excited, they were a powerful temptation to prohibited indulgence. Eve craved the fruit, and the knowledge which she supposed she might attain by partaking of it. These desires led her to seek their indulgence in a prohibited manner. She desired and craved the food and the knowledge, and not the sin of eating. So all sinners have constitutional and artificial appetites and desires enough. But not one of them is a craving for sin, unless it be the exception already named when the mind has come into such relations to God as to have a malicious satisfaction in abusing him. But this is not natural to man, and if it ever exists, is only brought about by rejecting great light and inducing a most terrible perversion of the

sensibility. But such cases are extremely rare; whereas it has been strangely and absurdly maintained that all sinners in consequence of the fall of Adam, have a sinful constitution or one that craves sin as it craves food and drink. This is false in fact and absurd in philosophy, and wholly inconsistent with Scripture, as we shall see when we make moral depravity the special subject of attention. The facts are these: men have constitutional desires, appetites and passions. These are not sinful. They all terminate on their respective objects. Selfishness or sin consists in choosing the gratification of these desires as an end or in preferring their gratification to other and higher interests. This choice or intention is sinful. But as I have said, sin is not the object intended, but self-gratification is the end intended.

Again. That disobedience to the law of God does not imply the choice of sin or the wrong for its own sake, has been shown in a former lecture. But I must so far repeat as to say that it is impossible that sin should be chosen as an end. Sin belongs to the ultimate intention. It either consists in and is identical with selfish intention or it is the moral element or attribute of that intention. If it be identical with it, then to intend sin as an end or for its own sake, were to intend my own intention as an end. If sin be but the moral element, quality or attribute of the intention, then to intend sin as an end, I must intend an attribute of my intention as an end. Either alternative is absurd and impossible.

3. Disobedience to moral law does not imply that the wrongness or sinfulness of the intention is so much as thought of at the time the intention is formed. The sin not only need not be intended, but it is not essential to sin that the moral character of the intention be at all taken into consideration or so much as thought of at the time the intention is formed. The sinner ought to will the good of being. This he knows, and if he be a moral agent, which is implied in his being a sinner, he can not but assume this as a first truth that he ought to will the good of being in general and not his own gratification as an end. This truth he always and necessarily takes with him in the form of an assumption of a universal truth. He knows and can not but know that he ought to will the good of God and of the universe as an end instead of willing his own good as an end. Now this being necessarily assumed by him as a first truth, it is no more essential to sin that he should think at the time that a particular intention is or would be sinful, than it is essential to murder that the law of caus-

ality should be distinctly before the mind as an object of attention when the murderer aims the fatal weapon at his victim. Murder consists in a selfish intention to kill a human being. I aim a pistol at my neighbor's head with an intention to gratify a spirit of revenge or of avarice or some desire by taking his life. I am, however, so exasperated and so intent on self-indulgence as not to think of the law of God or of God himself or of my obligation to do otherwise. Now, am I hereby justified? No, indeed. I no more think of that law of causality which alone will secure the effect at which I aim, than I do of my obligation and of the moral character of my intention. Nevertheless I assume and can not but assume these first truths at the moment of my intention. The first truths of reason are those, as has been repeatedly said, that are necessarily known and assumed by all moral agents. Among these truths are those of causality, moral obligation, right, wrong, human free agency, &c. Now whether I think of these truths or not at every moment, I can not but assume their truth at all times. In every endeavor to do any thing I assume the truth of causality, and generally without being conscious of any such assumption. I also assume the truth of my own free agency, and equally without being conscious of the assumption. I also assume that happiness is a good, for I am aiming to realize it. I assume that it is valuable to myself, and can not but assume that it is equally valuable to others. I can not but assume also that it ought to be chosen because of its intrinsic value, and that it ought to be chosen impartially, that is, that the good of each should be chosen according to its relative or intrinsic value. This is assuming my obligation to will it as an end, and is also assuming the rightness of such willing and the wrongness of selfishness.

Now every moral agent does and must (and this fact constitutes him a moral agent) assume all these and divers other truths at every moment of his moral agency. He assumes them all, one as really and as much as the other, and they are all assumed as first truths; and in the great majority of instances, the mind is not more taken up with the consciousness of the assumption or with attending to those truths as a subject of thought than it is with the first truths that space exists and is infinite, that duration exists and is infinite. It is of the highest importance that this should be distinctly understood—that sin does not imply that the moral character of an act or intention should be distinctly before the mind at the time of its commission. Indeed it is perfectly common for

sinners to act thoughtlessly as they say, that is without reflecting upon the moral character of their intentions. But hereby they are not justified. Indeed this very fact is often but an evidence and an instance of extreme depravity. Think you that an angel could sin thoughtlessly? Could he form a selfish intention without reflection or thinking of its wickedness? Sinners in sinning *thoughtlessly*, give the highest evidence of their desperate depravity. A sinner may become so hardened and his conscience so stupified, that he may go on from day to day without thinking of God, of moral obligation, of right or wrong; and yet his sin and his guilt are real. He does and must know and assume all these truths at every step, just as he assumes his own existence, the law of causality, his own liberty or free agency, &c. None of these need to be made the object of the mind's attention: they are known and not to be learned. They are first truths, and we can not act at all without assuming them.

4. Disobedience to moral law does not necessarily imply an outwardly immoral life. A sinner may outwardly conform to every precept of the Bible from selfish motives or with a selfish intention, to gratify himself, to secure his own reputation here and his salvation hereafter. This is sin; but it is not outward immorality, but on the contrary is outward morality.

5. Disobedience to moral law does not necessarily imply feelings of enmity to God or to man. The will may be set upon self-indulgence, and yet as the sinner does not apprehend God's indignation against him and his opposition to him on that account, he may have no hard feelings or feelings of hatred to God. Should God reveal to him His abhorrence of him on account of his sins, His determination to punish him for them, the holy sovereignty with which He will dispose of him; in this case the sinner might and probably would feel deeply malicious and revengeful feelings towards God. But sin does not consist in these feelings, nor necessarily imply them.

6. Sin or disobedience to moral law does not imply in any instance a sinful nature; or a constitution in itself sinful. Adam and Eve sinned. Holy angels sinned. Certainly in their case sin or disobedience did not imply a sinful nature or constitution. Adam and Eve, certainly, and holy angels also, must have sinned by yielding to temptation. The constitutional desire being excited by the perception of their correlated objects, they consented to prefer their own gratifica-

tion to obedience to God, in other words, to make their gratification an end. This was their sin. But in this there was no sin in their constitutions, and no other tendency to sin than this, that these desires, when strongly excited, are a temptation to unlawful indulgence.

It has been strangely and absurdly assumed that sin in action implies a sinful nature. But this is contrary to fact and to sound philosophy, as well as contrary to the Bible, which we shall see in its proper place.

As it was with Adam and Eve, so it is with every sinner. There is not, there can not be sin in the nature or the constitution. But there are constitutional appetites and passions, and when these are strongly excited, they are a strong temptation or inducement to the will to seek their gratification as an ultimate end. This, as I have said, is sin, and nothing else is or can be sin. It is selfishness. Under its appropriate head, I shall show that the nature or constitution of sinners has become physically depraved or diseased, and that as a consequence, the appetites and passions are more easily excited, and are more clamorous and despotic in their demands; and that, therefore, the constitution of man in its present state, tends more strongly than it otherwise would, to sin. But to affirm that the constitution is in itself sinful, is to talk mere nonsense.

LECTURE XXIV.

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

In the discussion of this question I must,

I. Remind you of what constitutes disobedience to moral law.

II. Show what is implied in it.

I. What constitutes disobedience to moral law?

1. We have seen that disobedience to moral law consists always in selfishness.

2 Selfishness consists in the ultimate choice of our own gratification.

3. An ultimate choice is the choice of an end, or the choice of something for its own sake or for its own intrinsic value.

4. The choice of our own gratification as an ultimate end, is the preference of our own gratification, not merely because gratification is a good, but because and upon condition that it is our own gratification or a good to self.

5. Selfishness chooses and cares for good only upon condition that it belongs to self. It is not the gratification of being in general, but self gratification upon which selfishness terminates. It is a good because it belongs to self or is chosen upon that condition. But when it is affirmed that selfishness is sin and the whole of sin, we are in danger of misconceiving the vast import of the word and of taking a very narrow and superficial and inadequate view of the subject. It is therefore indispensable to raise and push the inquiry, What is implied in selfishness? What are its characteristics and essential elements? What modifications or attributes does it develop and manifest under the various circumstances in which in the providence of God it is placed? It consists in the committal of the will to the gratification of *desire*. The Apostle calls it "fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind." What must be implied in the state of mind which consists in the committal of the whole being to the gratification of self as an end? What must be the effect upon the desires themselves to be thus indulged? What must be the effect upon the intellect to have its high demands trampled under foot? What must be the developments of it in the outward life? What must be the effect upon the temper and spirit to have self-indulgence the law of the soul? This leads to the investigation of the point before us namely,

II. What is implied in disobedience to moral law?

The inquiry, it will be seen, naturally divides itself into two branches. The first respects the moral character of selfishness. The second respects the attributes of selfishness. We will attend to these two inquiries in their order, and,

1. What is implied in the fact that selfishness is a breach of moral law? Why is selfishness blame-worthy? Why is not a spirit of self-seeking in mere animals or brute beasts as much a breach of moral law as is the same spirit in man? If this spirit of self-seeking in man is sin, what is implied in this fact? In other words, what conditions are necessary to render a spirit of self-seeking a breach of moral law? These conditions whatever they are, must be implied in disobedience to moral law. This brings us to the direct consideration of the things that belong to the first branch of our inquiry.

(1.) Disobedience to moral law implies the possession of the powers of moral agency. These have been so often enumerated as to render any enlargement upon this point unnecessary, except to say that it is impossible for any but a moral agent to violate moral law. Mere animals may do that which the moral law prohibits in moral agents. But the moral law does not legislate over them; therefore those things in them are not sin, not a violation of moral law.

(2.) It implies knowledge of the end which a moral agent is bound to choose. We have seen that the moral law requires love and that this love is benevolence, and that benevolence is the disinterested and impartial choice of the highest good of God and of being in general as an end. Now it follows that this end must be apprehended before we can possibly choose it. Therefore obligation to choose it implies the perception or knowledge of it. Disobedience to moral law, then, implies the development in the reason of the idea of the good or valuable to being. A being therefore who has not reason, or the ideas of whose reason on moral subjects are not at all developed, can not violate the law of God; for over such the moral law does not extend its claims.

(3.) It implies the development of the correlative of the idea of the good or the valuable, to wit, the idea of moral obligation to will or choose it for the sake of its intrinsic value. When the idea of the valuable to being is once developed, the mind is so constituted that it can not but instantly or simultaneously affirm its obligation to will it as an end and every good according to its perceived relative value.

(4.) Disobedience to moral law implies the development of the correlative of the idea of moral obligation, to wit, the

idea of right and wrong. That it is right to will good and wrong not to will it, or to will it only partially. This idea is the correlative of the idea of moral obligation and the development of the former necessitates the development of the latter.

(5.) Disobedience &c., also implies the development of the correlative of the ideas of right and wrong, namely: The idea of praise or blame-worthiness, or of virtue and vice, or in other words of *guilt* and innocence. This idea, that is, the idea of moral character is the correlative of that of right and wrong in such a sense that the idea of right and wrong necessitates and implies the idea of moral character or of praise and blame-worthiness. When these conditions are fulfilled and not till then does the spirit of self-seeking or the choice of our own gratification as an end become sin or constitute a breach of moral law. It will follow that no beings are subjects of moral government and capable of disobedience to moral law but such as are moral agents, that is, such as possess both the powers of moral agency and have these powers in such a state of development and integrity as to render obedience possible. It will follow that neither brute animals nor idiots, nor lunatics, nor somnambulists, nor indeed any being who is not *rational* and free, can disobey the moral law.

2. We come now to the second branch of the inquiry, namely: What is implied in selfishness, what are its attributes, and what states of the sensibility, and what outward developments are implied in selfishness? This, it will be seen, brings us to the immensely interesting and important task of contrasting selfishness with benevolence. But a little time since we considered the attributes of benevolence, and also what states of the sensibility and of the intellect, and also what outward actions were implied in it, as necessarily resulting from it. We are now to take the same course with selfishness, and,

✓ (1.) *Voluntariness* is an attribute of selfishness.

Selfishness has often been confounded with mere desire. But these things are by no means identical. Desire is constitutional. It is a phenomenon of the sensibility. It is a purely involuntary state of mind, and can in itself produce no action, and can in itself have no moral character. Selfishness is a phenomenon of the will, and consists in committing the will to the gratification of the desires. The desire itself is not selfishness, but submitting the will to be governed by the desires is selfishness. It should be understood that no kind of mere

desire, and no strength of mere desire constitutes selfishness. Selfishness commences when the will yields to the desire and seeks to obey it in opposition to the law of the intelligence. It matters not what kind of desire it is; if it is the desire that governs the will, this is selfishness. It must be the will in a state of committal to the gratification of desire.

(2.) *Liberty* is another attribute of selfishness.

That is, the choice of self-gratification is not necessitated by desire. But the will is always free to choose in opposition to desire. This every moral agent is as conscious of as of his own existence. The desire is not free, but the choice to gratify it is and must be free. There is a sense, as I shall have occasion to show, in which slavery is an attribute of selfishness, but not in the sense that the will chooses to gratify desire by a law of necessity. Liberty, in the sense of ability to make an opposite choice, must ever remain an attribute of selfishness, while selfishness continues to be a sin, or while it continues to sustain any relation to moral law.

3. *Intelligence* is another attribute of selfishness.

By this it is not intended that intelligence is an attribute or phenomenon of will, nor that the choice of self-gratification is in accordance with the demands of the intelligence. But it is intended that the choice is made with the knowledge of the moral character that will be involved in it. The mind knows its obligation to make an opposite choice. It is not a mistake. It is not a choice made in ignorance of moral obligation to choose the highest good of being as an end in opposition to self-gratification. It is an intelligent choice in the sense that it is a known resistance of the demands of the intelligence. It is a known rejection of its claims. It is a known setting up self-gratification, and preferring it to all higher interests.

4. *Unreasonableness* is another attribute of selfishness.

By this it is intended that the selfish choice is in direct opposition to the demands of the reason. The reason was given to rule. It imposes law and moral obligation. Obedience to moral law as it is revealed in the reason, is virtue. Obedience to the sensibility in opposition to the reason is sin. Selfishness consists in this. It is a dethroning of reason from the seat of government, and an enthroning of blind desire in opposition to it. Selfishness is always and necessarily unreasonable. It is a denial of that Divine attribute that allies man to God, makes him capable of virtue, and is a sinking him to the level of a brute. It is a denial of his manhood, of

his rational nature. It is a contempt of the voice of God within him, and a deliberate trampling down the sovereignty of his own intelligence. Shame on selfishness! It dethrones human reason and would dethrone the Divine, and place mere blind lust upon the throne of the universe.

5. *Interestedness* is another attribute of selfishness.

By interestedness is meant *self-interestedness*. It is not the disinterested choice of good, that is, it is not the choice of the good of being in general as an end, but it is the choice of self-good, of good to self. Its relation to self is the condition of the choice of it. But for its being the good of self it would not be chosen. The fundamental reason, or that which should induce choice, to wit, the intrinsic value of good, is rejected as insufficient, and the secondary reason, namely, its relation to self, is the condition of determining the will. This is really making self-good the Supreme end. In other words it is making *self-gratification* the end. Nothing is practically regarded as worthy of choice except as it sustains to self the relation of a means of self-gratification.

This attribute of selfishness secures a corresponding state of the sensibility. The sensibility under the indulgence, attains to a monstrous development, sometimes generally, but more frequently in some particular directions. Selfishness is the committal of the will to the indulgence of the propensities. But from this it by no means follows that all of the propensities will be indiscriminately indulged and thereby greatly developed. Sometimes one propensity and sometimes another has the greatest natural strength, and thereby gains the ascendancy in the control of the will. Sometimes circumstances tend more strongly to the development of one appetite or passion than another. Whatever propensity is most indulged will gain the greatest development. The propensities can not all be indulged at once, for they are often opposed to each other. But they may all be indulged and developed in their turn. For example: The licentious propensities, the propensities to various indulgences can not be indulged consistently with the simultaneous indulgence of the avaricious propensities, the desire of reputation and of ultimate happiness. Each of these, and of all the propensities may come in for a share, and in some instances may gain so equal a share of indulgence as upon the whole to be about equally developed. But in general, either from constitutional temperament, or from circumstances, some one or more of the propensities will gain so uniform a control of the will as

to occasion its monstrous development. It may be the love of reputation; and then there will be at least a public decent exterior, more or less strict according to the state of morals in the society in which the individual dwells. If it be amateness that gains the ascendancy over the other propensities, licentiousness will be the result. If it be alimentiveness, then gluttony and epicurianism will be the result. The result of selfishness must be to develop in general, or in particular, the propensities of the sensibility, and to beget a corresponding exterior.

If avarice take the control of the will, we have the haggard and ragged miser. All the other propensities wither under the reign of this detestable one.

Where the love of knowledge prevails, we have the scholar, the philosopher, the man of learning. This is one of the most decent and respectable forms of selfishness, but is nevertheless as absolutely selfishness as any other form.

When compassion, as a feeling, prevails, we have as a result the philanthropist and often the reformer; not the reformer in a virtuous sense, but the selfish reformer. Where love of kindred prevails, we often have the kind husband, the affectionate father, mother, brother, sister, and so on. These are the amiable sinners, especially among their own kindred. When the love of country prevails, we have the patriot, the statesman, and the soldier. This picture might be drawn at full length, but with these traits I must leave you to fill up the outline. I would only add that several of these forms of selfishness so nearly resemble certain forms of virtue as often to be confounded with them and mistaken for them.

6. *Partiality* is another attribute of selfishness. Partiality consists in giving the preference to certain interests on account of their being either directly the interests of self, or so connected with self-interest as to be preferred on that account. It matters not whether the interest to which the preference is given be of greater or of less value, if so be it is preferred not for the reason of its greater value, but because of its relation to self. In some instances the *practical* preference may justly be given to a less interest on account of its sustaining such a relation to us that we can secure it, when the greater interest could not be secured by us. If the reason of the preference in such case be not that it is *self-interest* but an interest that can be secured while the greater can not, the preference is a just one, and not partiality. My family, for example, sustain such relations to me that I can more readily and surely

secure their interests than I can those of my neighbor or of a stranger. For this reason I am under obligation to give the practical preference to the interests of my own family, not because they are my own, or because their interests sustain such a relation to my own, but because I can more readily secure their interests, although they may be of no greater, or even of less intrinsic value than the interests of many other families.

The question here turns upon the amount I am *able to secure*, and not on their intrinsic value merely. It is a general truth that we can secure more readily and certainly the interests of those to whom we sustain certain relations, and therefore, God and reason point out these interests as particular objects of our attention and effort. This is not partiality but impartiality. It is treating interests as they should be treated.

But selfishness is always partial. If it gives any interest whatever the preference, it is because of its relation to self. It always, and continuing to be selfishness, *necessarily* lays the greatest stress upon, and gives the preference to those interests the promotion of which will *gratify self*.

Here care should be taken to avoid delusion. Oftentimes selfishness appears to be very disinterested and very impartial. For example: Here is a man whose compassion, as a mere feeling or state of the sensibility, is greatly developed. He meets a beggar, an object that strongly excites his ruling passion. He empties his pockets, and even takes off his coat and gives it to him, and in his paroxysm he will divide his all with him or even give him all. Now this would generally pass for most undoubted virtue, as a rare and impressive instance of moral goodness. But there is no virtue, no benevolence in it. It is the mere yielding of the will to the control of feeling and has nothing in it of the nature of virtue. Innumerable examples of this might be adduced as illustrations of this truth. It is only an instance and an illustration of selfishness. It is the will seeking to gratify the feeling of compassion.

We constitutionally desire not only our own happiness but also that of men in general, when their happiness in no way conflicts with our own. Hence selfish men will often manifest a deep interest in the welfare of those whose welfare will not interfere with their own. Now, should the will be yielded up to the gratification of this desire, this would often be regarded as virtue. For example: A few years since much interest and feeling was excited in this country by the cause and sufferings of the Greeks in their struggle for liberty, and since

in the cause of the Poles. A spirit of enthusiasm appeared, and many were ready to give and do almost any thing for the cause of liberty. They gave up their will to the gratification of this excited state of feeling. This, they may have supposed, was virtue; but it was not, nor was there a semblance of virtue about it, when it is once understood that virtue consists in yielding the will to the law of the intelligence, and not to the impulse of excited feelings.

Some writers have fallen into the strange mistake of making virtue to consist in seeking the gratification of *certain* desires, because, as they say, these desires are virtuous. They make some of the desires selfish and some benevolent. To yield the will to the control of the selfish propensities is sin. To yield the will to the control of the benevolent desires, such as the desire of my neighbor's happiness and of the public happiness, is virtue, because these are *good* desires while the selfish desires are *evil*. Now this is and has been a very common view of virtue and vice. But it is fundamentally erroneous. None of the constitutional desires are good or evil in themselves. They are all alike involuntary and all alike terminate on their correlated objects. To yield the will to the control of any one of them, no matter which, is sin. It is following a blind feeling, desire or impulse of the sensibility instead of yielding to the demands of the intelligence. To will the good of my neighbor or of my country and of God because of the intrinsic value of those interests, that is to will them as an end and in obedience to the law of the reason, is virtue; but to will them to gratify a constitutional but blind desire is selfishness and sin. The desires to be sure terminate on their respective objects, but the will in this case seeks the objects, not for their own sake, but because they are desired, that is to gratify the desires. This is choosing them, not as an end, but as a means of self-gratification. This is making self-gratification the end after all. This must be a universal truth when a thing is chosen in obedience to desire. The benevolence of these writers is sheer selfishness, and their virtue is vice.

The choice of any thing whatever because it is desired, is selfishness and sin. It matters not what it is. The very statement that I choose a thing because I desire it, is only another form of saying that I choose it for my own sake, or for the sake of appeasing the desire, and not on account of its own intrinsic value. All such choice is always and necessarily partial. It is giving one interest the preference over another

not because of its perceived intrinsic and superior value, but because it is an object of desire. If I yield to desire in any case it must be to gratify the desire. This is, and in the case supposed, must be the end for which the choice is made. To deny this is to deny that the will seeks the object because it is desired. Partiality consists in giving one thing the preference of another for no good reason. That is, not because the intelligence demands this preference, but because the sensibility demands it. Partiality is therefore always and necessarily an attribute of selfishness.

7. *Impenitence* is another modification of selfishness. Perhaps it is more proper to say that impenitence is only another name for selfishness. Penitence or repentance is the turning of the heart from selfishness to benevolence. Impenitence is the heart's cleaving to the commission of sin, or more properly cleaving to that, the willing and doing of which is sin.

8. *Unbelief* is another modification or attribute of selfishness. Unbelief is not a mere negation or the mere absence of faith. Faith is the reposing of confidence in God. Unbelief is the withholding of confidence in Him. Faith is a committal or yielding up of the will to be moulded and influenced by truth. Unbelief is trusting in self and refusing to trust our souls and our interests in God's hands and to commit them to his disposal. It is saying, I will take care of my own interests and let God take care of His. "Who is God that I should serve Him, and what profit should I have should I pray unto Him?" It is a refusal to commit ourselves to the guidance of God and trusting to our own guidance. It is self-trust, self-dependence; and what is this but selfishness and self-seeking? Christ says to the Jews, "How can ye believe which seek honor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God-only?" This assumes that unbelief is a modification of selfishness; that their regard to their reputation with men, rendered faith, while that self-seeking spirit was indulged, impossible. They withheld confidence in Christ because it would cost them their reputation with men to believe. So every sinner who ever heard the gospel and has not embraced it, withholds confidence in Christ because it will cost self too much to yield this confidence. This is true in every case of unbelief. Confidence is withheld because to yield it involves and implies the denying of ourselves all ungodliness and every worldly lust. Christ requires the abandonment of every form and degree of selfishness. To believe is to receive with the heart Christ's instruction, and requirements. To

trust in them—to commit our whole being to be moulded by them. Now who does not see that unbelief is only a selfish withholding of this confidence, this committal? The fact is that faith implies and consists in the yielding up of selfishness; and unbelief is only selfishness contemplated in its relations to Christ and His gospel.

LECTURE XXV.

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

9. *Efficiency* is another attribute of selfishness.

Desire never produces action until it influences the will. It has no efficiency or causality in itself. It can not without the concurrence of the will, command the attention of the intellect, or move a muscle of the body. The whole causality of the mind resides in the will. In it lies the power of accomplishment.

Again. The whole efficiency of the mind as it respects accomplishment, resides in the choice of an end or in the ultimate intention. All action of the will or all willing must consist in choosing either an end or the means of accomplishing an end. If there is choice, something is chosen. That something is chosen for some reason. To deny this is a denial that any thing is chosen. The reason for the choice and the thing chosen are identical. This we have repeatedly seen.

Again: We have seen that the means can not be chosen until the end is chosen. The choice of the end is distinct from the volitions or endeavors of the mind to secure the end. But although the choice of an end is not identical with the subordinate choices and volitions to secure the end, yet it necessitates them. The choice once made, secures or necessitates the executive volitions to secure the end. By this it is not intended that the mind is not free to relinquish its end, and of course to relinquish the use of the means to accomplish it; but only that, while the choice or intention remains, the choice of the end is efficient in producing efforts to realize the end. This is true both of benevolence and selfishness. They are both choices of an end, and are necessarily efficient in producing the use of the means to realize this end. They are choices of opposite ends, and of course will produce their respective results.

The bible represents sinners as having eyes full of adultery and that can not cease from sin; that while the will is committed to the indulgence of the propensities, they can not cease from the indulgence. There is no way therefore for the sinner to escape from the commission of sin, but to cease to be selfish. While selfishness continues you may change the

form of outward manifestation, you may deny one appetite or desire for the sake of indulging another; but it is and must be sin still. The desire to escape hell and to obtain heaven may become the strongest, in which case selfishness will take on a most sanctimonious type. But if the will is following desire, it is selfishness still; and all your religious duties as you call them, are only selfishness robed in the stolen habiliments of love.

Be it remembered then that selfishness is choice. It is ultimate intention. It is and must be efficient in producing its effects. It is cause; the effect must follow. The whole life and activity of sinners is founded in it. It constitutes their life, or rather their spiritual death. They are dead in trespasses and in sins. It is in vain for them to dream of doing any thing good until they relinquish their selfishness. While this continues, they can not act at all except as they use the means to accomplish a selfish end. It is impossible while the will remains committed to a selfish end or to the promotion of self-interest or self-gratification that it should use the means to promote a benevolent end. The first thing is to change the end, and then the sinner can cease from outward sin. Indeed, if the end be changed, the same acts which were before sinful will become holy. While the selfish end continued whatever the sinner did, was all selfish. Whether he ate, or drank, or labored, or preached, or in short whatever he did, was to promote some form of self-interest. The end being wrong, all was and must have been wrong.

But let the end be changed; let benevolence take the place of selfishness, and all is right. With this end in view the mind is absolutely incapable of doing any thing or of choosing any thing except as a means of promoting the good of the universe.

I wish to impress this truth deeply upon the mind. Let me therefore give the substance of the preceding remarks in the form of definite propositions.

1. All action consists in or results from choice.
2. All choice must respect or consist in the choice of an end or of means. The mind is incapable of choosing unless it has an object of choice, and that object must be regarded by the mind either as an end or as a means.
3. The mind can have but one ultimate end at the same time.
4. It can not choose the means until it has chosen the end.
5. It can not choose one end and use means to accomplish another, at the same time.

6. Therefore, while the will is benevolent or committed to the glory of God and the good of being, it can not use the means of self-gratification, or in other words it can not put forth selfish volitions.

7. When the will is committed to self-indulgence "it can not use the means designed to glorify God and promote the good of men as an end. This is impossible.

8. The carnal heart or mind can not but sin; it is not subject to the law of God neither indeed can be," because it is "enmity against God."

✓ 9. The new or regenerate heart can not sin. It is benevolence, love to God and man. This can not sin. These are both ultimate choices or intentions. They are from their own nature efficient each excluding the other, and each securing for the time being, the exclusive use of means to promote its end. To deny this, is the same absurdity as to maintain, either that the will can at the same time choose two opposite ends, or that it can choose one end only, but at the same time choose the means to accomplish another end not yet chosen. Now either alternative is absurd. Then holiness and sin can never co-exist in the same mind. Each as has been said, for the time being, necessarily excludes the other. Selfishness and benevolence co-exist in the same mind! A greater absurdity and a more gross contradiction was never conceived or expressed. No one for a moment ever supposed that selfishness and benevolence could co-exist in the same mind, who had clearly defined ideas of what they are. When *desire* is mistaken on the one hand for benevolence, and on the other for selfishness, the mistake is natural that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in the same mind. But as soon as it is seen that benevolence and selfishness are supreme ultimate opposite choices, the affirmation is instantaneous and irresistible that they can neither co-exist, nor can one use means to promote the other. While benevolence remains the mind's whole activity springs from it as from a fountain. This is the philosophy of Christ. "Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his fruit. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things."—Matt. 12: 33, 35. "Doth a fountain send forth at the same place sweet *water* and bitter? Can the fig tree, my brethren, bear olive berries? either a vine figs? so *can* no fountain both yield salt water and fresh."—James 3: 11, 12.

“For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. For every tree is known by his own fruit: for of thorns men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes. A good man out of the good treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is evil; for out of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaketh.”—Luke 6: 43, 44, 45.

10. *Opposition to benevolence or to virtue*, or to holiness and true religion, is one of the attributes of selfishness.

Selfishness is not, in its relations to benevolence a mere negation. It can not be. It is the choice of self-gratification as the supreme and ultimate end of life. While the will is committed to this end, and benevolence or a mind committed to an opposite end is contemplated, the will can not remain in a state of indifference to benevolence. It must either yield its preference of self-indulgence, or resist the benevolence which the intellect perceives. The will can not remain in the exercise of this selfish choice without as it were bracing and girding itself against that virtue which it does not imitate. If it does not imitate it, it must be because it *refuses* to do so. The intelligence does and must strongly urge the will to imitate benevolence and to seek the same end. The will must yield or resist, and the resistance must be more or less resolute and determined as the demands of the intelligence are more or less emphatic. This resistance to benevolence or to the demands of the intelligence in view of it, is what the bible calls hardening the heart. It is obstinacy of will under the light of the presence of true religion and the claims of benevolence.

This opposition to benevolence or true religion must be developed whenever the mind apprehends true religion, or selfishness must be abandoned. Not only must this opposition be developed, or selfishness abandoned under such circumstances, but it must increase as true religion displays more and more of its loveliness. As the light from the radiant sun of benevolence is poured more and more upon the darkness of selfishness, the opposition of the heart must of necessity increase in the same proportion, or selfishness must be abandoned. Thus selfishness remaining under light, must manifest more and more opposition just in proportion as light increases and the soul has less the color of an apology for its opposition.

This peculiarity of selfishness has always been manifested

just in proportion as it has been dragged into the light of true religion. This accounts for all the opposition that has been made to true religion since the world began. It also proves that where there are impenitent sinners, and they retain their impenitence and manifest no hostility to the religion which they witness, that there is something defective in the professed piety which they behold, or at least they do not contemplate all the attributes of true piety. It also proves that persecution will always exist where much true religion is manifested to those who hold fast their selfishness.

The fact is, that selfishness and benevolence are just as much opposed to each other, and just as much and as necessarily at war with each other as God and Satan, as heaven and hell. There can never be a truce between them; they are essential and eternal opposites. They are not merely opposites, but they are opposite causes. They are essential activities. They are the two, and the only two great antagonistic principles in the universe of mind. Each is heaving and energizing like a volcano to realize its end. A war of mutual and uncompromising extermination necessarily exists between them. Neither can be in the presence of the other without repellant and opposition. Each energizes to subdue and overcome the other; and already selfishness has shed an ocean of the blood of the saints, and also the precious blood of the Prince of life. There is not a more gross and injurious mistake than to suppose that selfishness ever, under any circumstances, becomes reconciled to benevolence. The supposition is absurd and contradictory; since for selfishness to become reconciled to benevolence, were the same thing as for selfishness to become benevolence. Selfishness may change the mode of attack or of its opposition, but its real opposition it can never change while it retains its own nature and continues to be selfishness.

The opposition of the heart to benevolence often begets deep opposition of feeling. The opposition of the will engages the intellect in fabricating excuses, and cavils, and lies, and refuges, and often greatly perverts the thoughts, and begets the most bitter feelings imaginable toward God and toward the saints. Selfishness will strive to justify its opposition and to shield itself against the reproaches of conscience, and will resort to every possible expedient to cover up its real hostility to holiness. It will pretend that it is not holiness, but sin that it opposes. But the fact is, it is not sin but holiness to which it stands forever opposed. The opposi-

tion of feeling is only developed when the heart is brought into a strong light and makes deep and strong resistance. In such cases the sensibility sometimes boils with feelings of bitter opposition to God and Christ and to all good.

The question is often asked, may not this opposition exist in the sensibility, and those feelings of hostility to God exist when the heart is in a truly benevolent state? To this inquiry I would reply: If it can it must be produced by infernal or some other influence that misrepresents God and places His character before the mind in a false light. Blasphemous thoughts may be suggested, and as it were injected into the mind. These thoughts may have their natural effect in the sensibility, and feelings of bitterness and hostility may exist without the consent of the will. The will may all the while be endeavoring to repel these suggestions, and divert the attention from such thoughts, yet Satan may continue to hurl his fiery darts, and the soul may be racked with torture under the poison of hell, which seems to be taking effect in the Sensibility. The mind, at such times, seems to itself to be filled, so far as feeling is concerned, with all the bitterness of hell. And so it is, and yet it may be that in all this there is no selfishness. If the will holds fast its integrity; if it holds out in the struggle; and where God is maligned and misrepresented by the infernal suggestions, it says with Job, "Although He slay me yet will I trust in Him." However sharp the conflict in such cases, we can look back and say, we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us. In such cases it is the selfishness of Satan and not our own selfishness that kindled up those fires of hell in our sensibility. "Blessed is he that endureth temptation; for when he is tried he shall have a crown of life."

II. *Cruelty* is another attribute of selfishness.

This term is often used to designate a state of the sensibility. It then represents that state of feeling that has a barbarous or savage pleasure in the misery of others.

Cruelty, as a phenomenon of the will, or as an attribute of selfishness, consists, first, in a reckless disregard of the well-being of God and the universe, and, secondly, in persevering in a course that must ruin the souls of the subjects of it, and so far as they have influence, ruin the souls of others. What should we think of a man who was so intent on securing some petty gratification that he would not give the alarm if a city were on fire, and the sleeping citizens in imminent danger of perishing in the flames? Suppose that sooner than deny him-

self some momentary gratification, he would jeopard many lives. Should we not call this cruelty? Now there are many forms of cruelty. Because sinners are not always brought into circumstances where they exercise certain forms of it, they flatter themselves that they are not cruel. But the fact is, that selfishness is always and necessarily cruel—cruel to the soul and highest interests of the subject of it; cruel to the souls of others in neglecting to care and do for their salvation what may be done; cruel to God in abusing Him in ten thousand ways; cruel to the whole universe. If we should be shocked at the cruelty of him who should see his neighbor's house on fire, and the family asleep, and neglect to give them warning because too self-indulgent to rise from his bed, what shall we say of the cruelty of one who shall see his neighbor's soul in peril of eternal death, and yet neglect to give him warning?

Sinners are apt to possess very good dispositions, as they express it. They suppose they are the reverse of being cruel. They possess tender feelings, are often very compassionate in their feelings toward those who are sick and in distress, and who are in circumstances of any affliction. They are ready to do many things for them. Such persons would be shocked, should they be called cruel. And many professors would take their part, and consider them abused. Whatever else, it would be said, is an attribute of their character, surely cruelty is not. Now it is true that there are certain forms of cruelty with which such persons are not chargeable. But this is only because God has so moulded their constitution that they are not delighted in the misery of their fellow men. However, there is no virtue in their not being gratified at the sight of suffering, nor in their painstaking to prevent it while they continue selfish. They follow the impulses of their feelings, and if their temperament were such that it would gratify them to inflict misery on others; if this were the strongest tendency of their sensibility; their selfishness would instantly take on that type. But notwithstanding cruelty in all its forms is not common to all selfish persons; it is still true that some form of cruelty is practised by every sinner. God says: "the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." The fact that they live in sin, that they set an example of selfishness, that they do nothing for their own souls or for the souls of others;—these are really most atrocious forms of cruelty, and infinitely exceed all those comparatively petty forms that relate to the miseries of men in this life.

12. *Unreasonableness* is another attribute of selfishness.

The very definition of selfishness implies that unreasonableness is one of its attributes. Selfishness consists in the will's yielding itself to the impulses of the sensibility in opposition to the demands of the intelligence. Therefore, every act or choice of the will is necessarily altogether unreasonable. The sinner, while he continues such, never says or does one thing that is in accordance with right reason. Hence the Bible says that "madness is in their heart while they live." They have made an unreasonable choice of an end, and all their choices of means to secure their end are only a carrying out of their ultimate choice. They are, every one of them, put forth to secure an end contrary to reason. Therefore, no sinner who has never been converted, has, even in a single instance, chosen otherwise than in direct opposition to reason.

They are not merely sometimes unreasonable, but uniformly, and while they remain selfish, necessarily so. The very first time that a sinner acts or wills reasonably, is when he turns to God, or repents and becomes a christian. This is the first instance in which he practically acknowledges that he has reason. All previous to this, every one of the actions of his will and of his life, is a practical denial of his manhood, of his rational nature, of his obligation to God or his neighbor. We sometimes hear impenitent sinners spoken of as being unreasonable, and in such a manner as to imply that all sinners are not so. But this only favors the delusion of sinners by leaving them to suppose that they are not all of them at all times altogether unreasonable. But the fact is, that there is not, and there never can be in earth or hell one impenitent sinner who in any instance acts otherwise than in direct and palpable opposition to his reason.

It had, therefore, been infinitely better for sinners if they had never been endowed with reason. They do not merely act without consulting their reason, but in stout and determined opposition to it.

Again: They act as directly in opposition to it as they possibly can. They not only oppose it, but they oppose it as much and in as aggravated a manner as possible. What can be more directly and aggravatedly opposed to reason than the choice which the sinner makes of an end? Reason was given him to direct him in regard to the choice of the great end of life. It gives him the idea of the eternal and the infinite. It spreads out before him the interests of God and of

the universe as of absolutely infinite value. It affirms their value and the infinite obligation of the sinner to consecrate himself to these interests and it promises him endless rewards if he will do so. On the contrary it lays before him the consequences of refusal. It thunders in his ear the terrible sanctions of the law. It points him to the coming doom that awaits his refusal to comply with its demands. But behold in the face of all this the sinner, unhesitatingly in the face of these affirmations, demands and threatens, turns away and consecrates himself to the gratification of his desires with the certainty that he could not do greater despite to his own nature than in this most mad, most preposterous, most blasphemous choice. Why do not sinners consider that it is impossible for them to offer a greater insult to God who gave them reason, or more truly and deeply to shame and degrade themselves, than they do in their beastly selfishness. Total, universal, and shameless unreasonableness is the universal characteristic of every selfish mind.

13. *Injustice* is another attribute of selfishness.

Justice is a disposition to treat every being and interest according to its intrinsic worth.

Injustice is the opposite of this. It is a disposition to give the preference to self-interest, regardless of the relative value of the interests. The nature of selfishness demonstrates that injustice is always and necessarily one of its attributes, and one that is universally and constantly manifested.

(1.) There is the utmost injustice in the end chosen. It is the practical preference of a petty self-interest over infinite interests. This is injustice as great as possible. This is universal injustice to God and man. It is the most palpable and most flagrant piece of injustice possible to every being in the universe. Not one known by him to exist has not reason to bring against him the charge of most flagrant and shocking injustice. This injustice extends to every act and to every moment of life. He is never in the least degree just to any being in the universe. Nay he is perfectly unjust. He cares nothing for the rights of others as such, and never even in appearance regards them except for selfish reasons. This, then, is and can be only the appearance of regarding, while in fact no right of any being in the universe is or can be respected by a selfish mind any farther than in appearance. To deny this, is to deny his selfishness. He performs no act whatever but for one reason, that is, to promote his own gratification. This is his end. For the realization of this end every effort

is made and every individual act and volition put forth. Remaining selfish, it is impossible that he should act at all but with reference directly or indirectly to this end. But this end has been chosen and must be pursued, if pursued at all, in the most palpable and outrageous violation of the rights of God and of every creature in the universe. Justice demands that he should devote himself to the promotion of the highest good of God and the universe, that he should love God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself. Every sinner is openly and universally and as perfectly unjust as possible at every moment of his impenitence.

It should, therefore, always be understood that no sinner at any time is at all just to any being in the universe. All his paying of his debts, and all his apparent fairness and justice, is only a specious form of selfishness. He has, and if a sinner it is impossible that he should not have, some selfish reason for all he does, is, says, or omits. His entire activity is selfishness, and while he remains impenitent, it is impossible for him to think, or act, or will, or do, or be, or say, any thing more or less than he judges expedient to promote his own interest. He is not just. He can not be just, nor begin in any instance or in the least degree to be truly just either to God or man until he begins life anew, gives God his heart, and consecrates his entire being to the promotion of the good of universal being. This, justice demands. There is no beginning to be just unless the sinner begin here. Begin and be just in the choice of the great end of life, and then you can not but be just in the use of means. But be unjust in the choice of an end, and it is impossible for you, in any instance, to be otherwise than totally unjust in the use of means. In this case your entire activity is, and can be nothing else than a tissue of the most abominable injustice.

The only reason why every sinner does not openly and daily practice every species of outward commercial injustice, is that he is so circumstanced that upon the whole he judges it not for his interest to practice those things. This is the reason universally, and no thanks to any sinner for abstaining in any instance from any kind or degree of injustice in practice, for he is only restrained and kept from it by selfish considerations. That is, he is too selfish to do it. His selfishness and not the love of God or man prevents.

He may be prevented by a constitutional or phrenological conscientiousness, or sense of justice. But this is only a feeling of the sensibility, and if restrained only by this, he is just

✓ as absolutely selfish as if he had stolen a horse in obedience to acquisitiveness. God so tempers the constitution as to restrain men, that is, that one form of selfishness shall prevail over another. Approbativeness is in most persons so large that a desire to be applauded by their fellow men so modifies the developments of their selfishness that it takes on a type of outward decency and appearance of justice. But this is no less selfishness than if it took on altogether a different type. ✓

LECTURE XXVI.

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

14. *Oppression* is another attribute of selfishness.

Oppression is the spirit of slaveholding. It consists in a disposition to deprive others of their rights for the purpose of contributing to our own interest or gratification. To define it comprehensively: it is a disposition to enslave God and all the universe; to make them all give up their interest and happiness and glory and seek and live for ours. It is a willing that all beings should live to and for *us*; that all interests should bend and be sacrificed to ours. It is a practical denial of all rights but our own, and a practical setting up the claim that all beings are ours, our goods and chattels, our property. It is a spirit that aims at making all beings serve us and all interests subserve our own.

This must be an attribute of selfishness. Self-interest is the ultimate end; and the whole life and activity and aim and effort is to secure this end. The sinner, while he remains such has absolutely no other end in view and no other ultimate motive in any thing he does. Selfishness or self-gratification under some form is the reason for every volition, action and omission. For this end alone he lives and moves and has his being. This being his only end, it is impossible that oppression should not be an attribute of his character. The whole of oppression is included in the choice of the end of life. Nothing can be more oppressive to the whole universe than for a being to set up his interest as the sole good and account all other interests as of no value except as they contribute to his own. This is the perfection of oppression, and it matters not what particular course it takes to secure its end. They are all equally oppressive. If he does not seek the good of others for its own sake, but simply as a means of securing his own, which must be the fact, it matters not at all whether he pamper and fatten his slaves or whether he starve them, whether he work them hard or let them lounge, whether he lets them go naked or arrays them in costly attire. All is done for one and but one ultimate reason, and that is to promote self-interest and not at all for the intrinsic value of any interest but that of self. If such an one prays to God it is because he is unable to command and govern him

by authority, and not at all out of any true regard to the rights or character or relations of God. He desires God's services; and because he can not get them by force, he intrusts. God's interests and rights are practically treated as of no value by every sinner in the universe. They care nothing for God except to enslave him, that is, to make *Him* serve *them* without wages. They have no design to live to and for Him but that He should live to and for them. They regard all other beings just in the same manner. If there is in any instance the semblance of a regard to their interest for its own sake, it is only a semblance and not a reality. It is not, and it can not be a reality. The assertion that it is any thing more than a hypocritical pretence, is absurd and contradicts the supposition that he is a sinner, or selfish.

There are innumerable specious forms of oppression that to a superficial observer appear very like a regard to the real interest of the oppressed for its own sake.

It may be gratifying to the pride, the ambition or to some other *feeling* of a slaveholder to see his slaves well fed, well clad, full fleshed, cheerful, contented, attached to their master. For the same reason he might feed his dog, provide him a warm kennel, and ornament his neck with a brazen collar. He might do the same for his horse and for his swine. But what is the reason of all this? Why to gratify himself. God has so moulded his constitution that it would give him pain to whip his slave or his dog or his horse, or to see them hungry or naked. It would trouble his conscience and endanger his peace and his soul. There may often be the appearance of virtue in a slaveholder and in slaveholding; but it can absolutely be only an appearance. If it be properly slaveholding it is and must be oppression; it is and must be selfishness. Can it be that slaveholding is designed to promote the good of the slave for its own sake. But this could not be slaveholding.

Should an individual be held to service for his own benefit; should the law of benevolence really demand it; this could no more be the crime of slaveholding and oppression than it is murder or any other crime. It would not be selfishness, but benevolence, and therefore no crime at all, but virtue. But selfishness embodies and includes every element of oppression. Its end, the means, and its every breath is but an incessant denial of all rights but those of self. All *sinners* are *oppressors* and slaveholders in heart and in fact. They practice continual oppression and nothing else. They make God

serve them without wages, and they, as he says, "make Him to serve with their sins." God, all men and all things and events are as far as possible made to serve them without the return of the least disinterested regard to their interests. Disinterested regard! Why the very term contradicts the supposition that he is a sinner. He has, he can have in no instance any other than selfish aims in appearing, to care for any one's interest for its own sake.

All *unconverted abolitionists* are slaveholders in heart and so far as possible in life. There is not one of them who would not enslave every slave at the South and his master too and all at the North and the whole universe and God himself so far as he could. Indeed he does, and remaining selfish, he can not but aim to enslave all beings, to make them so far as possible contribute to his interest and pleasure without the least disinterested regard to their interest in return.

Oppression is an essential attribute of selfishness and always develops itself according to circumstances. When it has power, it uses the chain and the whip. When it has not power, it resorts to other means of securing the services of others without disinterested return. Sometimes it supplicates; but this is only because it is regarded as necessary or expedient. It is oppression under whatever form it assumes. It is in fact a denial of all rights but those of self, and a practical claiming of God and of all beings and events as ours. It is to all intents the chattel principle universally applied. So that all sinners are both slaves and slaveholders; in heart and endeavor they enslave God and all men; and other sinners in heart and endeavor enslave them. Every sinner is endeavoring in heart to appropriate to himself all good.

15. *War* is another attribute of selfishness.

War is strife. It is opposed to peace or amity. Selfishness on the very face of it, is a declaration of war with all beings. It is setting up self-interest *in opposition* to all other interests. It is an attempt and a deliberate intention to seize upon and subordinate all interests to our own. It is impossible that there should not be a state of perpetual hostility between a selfish being and all benevolent beings. They are mutually and necessarily opposed to each other. The benevolent are seeking the universal good, and the selfish are seeking their own gratification without the least voluntary regard to any interest but that of self. Here is opposition and war of course and of necessity.

But it is no less true that every selfish being is at war with

every other selfish being. Each is seeking and fully consecrated to his own interest and denying all rights but his own. Here is and must be war. There is no use in talking of putting away slavery or war from earth while selfishness is in it; for they both inhere in the very nature of selfishness; and every selfish being is an oppressor, a slaveholder, a tyrant, a warrior, a duelist, a pirate, and all that is implied in making war upon all beings. This is no railing accusation, but sober verity. The forms of war and of oppression may be modified indefinitely. The bloody sword may be sheathed. The manacle and the lash may be laid aside, and a more refined mode of oppression and of war may be carried on; but oppression and war must continue under some form so long as selfishness continues. It is impossible that it should not. Nor will the more refined and specious, and if you please, baptized forms of oppression and war that may succeed those now practised involve less guilt and be less displeasing to God than the present. No indeed. As light increases and compels selfishness to lay aside the sword and bury the manacle and the whip and profess the religion of Christ the guilt of selfishness increases every moment. The former manifestation is changed, compelled by increasing light and advancing civilization and christianization. Oppression and war, although so much changed in form are not at all abandoned in fact. Nay, they are only strengthened by increasing light. Nor can it be told or so much as rationally conjectured whether the more refined modifications of oppression and war that may succeed, will upon the whole be a real benefit to mankind. Guilt will certainly increase as light increases. Sin abounds and becomes exceeding sinful just in proportion as the light of truth is poured upon the selfish mind; and whether it is a real good to promote mere outward reform without reforming the heart, who can tell? The fact is selfishness must be done away; the ax must be laid at the root of the tree. It is a mistaken zeal that wastes its energies in merely modifying the forms in which selfishness manifests itself in changing the modes of oppression and war and bringing about mere refinements in sin. I can not for my life respect in myself or in others such efforts. What do they amount to after all but to whitewash and baptize a sinner and gather about him a delusion deep as death and send him by the shortest way to hell? All such efforts remind me of an affirmation I once heard a preacher make, namely, "that self-righteousness is good so far as it goes, but is like a coat without sleeves."

Many seem to think that to bring about mere outward reform is a good so far as it goes. But it is no real good unless true virtue and happiness be gained. Unless selfishness be put away it is no positive good. Whether, then, outward reforms will prove to be the less of two evils, who can tell? Do you ask, then, what shall we do? Shall we do nothing, but let things go on as they are? I answer, no, by no means. Do, if possible, ten times more than ever to put away these and all the evils that are under the sun. But aim at the annihilation of selfishness, and when you succeed in reforming the heart, the life can not but be reformed. Put away selfishness, and oppression and war are no more. But engage in bringing about any other reform, and you are but building dams of sand. Selfishness will force for itself a channel; and who can say that its desolations may not be more fearful and calamitous in this new modification than before? Attempting to reform selfishness and teach it better manners, is like damming up the waters of the Mississippi. It will only surely overflow its banks, and change its channel, and carry devastation and death in its course. I am aware that many will regard this as heresy. But God seeth not as man seeth. Man looketh on the outward appearance, but God looketh on the heart. All the wars and filthiness of heathenism God winks at as comparatively a light thing when put into the scale against the most refined form of intelligent but heartless Christianity that ever existed.

But to return. Let it be forever understood that selfishness is at war with all nations and with all beings. It has no element of peace in it any further than all beings and all interests are yielded to the gratification of self. This is its essential, its unalterable nature. This attribute can not cease while selfishness remains.

All selfish men who are advocates of peace principles, are necessarily hypocrites. They say and do not. They preach but do not practice. Peace is on their lips, but war is on their hearts. They proclaim peace and good will to men, while under their stolen robe of peace, they conceal their poisoned implements of war against God and the universe. This is, this must be. I am anxious to make the impression and lodge it deep in your inmost hearts, so that you shall always practically hold, and teach, and regard this as a fundamental truth both of natural and revealed religion, that a selfish man, be he who he may, instead of being a christian, a man of peace, and a servant of the Prince of peace, is, in

heart, in character, in spirit, in fact, a rebel, an enemy, a warrior, truly and in fact at war with God and all beings.

16. *Unmercifulness* is another attribute of selfishness.

Mercy is a disposition to pardon crime, and will and must manifest itself in efforts to secure the conditions upon which crime can be reasonably forgiven, if such condition can be secured. Unmercifulness is an unwillingness to forgive sin, and of course manifests itself either by resisting efforts to secure its forgiveness, or by treating such efforts with coldness or contempt. The manner in which sinners treat the plan of salvation, the atonement of Christ, the means used by God and the church to bring about the pardon of sin, demonstrates that their tender mercies are cruelty. The apostle charges them with being "*implacable, unmerciful.*" Their opposition to the gospel, to revivals of religion, and to all the exhibitions of the mercy of God which he has made to our world, show that unmercifulness is an attribute of their character.

Sinners generally profess to be the friends of mercy. They with their lips extol the mercy of God. But how do they treat it? Do they embrace it? Do they honor it as something which they favor? Do they hold it forth to all men as worthy of all acceptance? Or do they wage an unrelenting war with it? How did they treat Christ when he came on his errand of mercy? They brought forth the appalling demonstration that unmercifulness is an essential attribute of their character. They persecuted unto death the very impersonation and embodiment of mercy. And this same attribute of selfishness has always manifested itself under some form whenever a development and an exhibition of mercy has been made. Let the blood of prophets and apostles, the blood of millions of martyrs—and above all let the blood of the God of mercy speak. What is their united testimony? Why, this—that the perfection of unmercifulness is one of the essential and eternal attributes of selfishness.

Whenever, therefore, a selfish being appears to be of a merciful disposition, it is, it can be, only in appearance. His feelings may be sensitive, and he may sometimes, nay often, or always yield to them, but this is only selfishness. The reason and the only reason why every sinner does not exhibit every appalling form of unmercifulness and cruelty, is, that God has so tempered his sensibility, and so surrounded him with influences as to modify the manifestation of selfishness and to develop other attributes more prominently than this.

Unmerciful he is, and unmerciful he must be while he remains in sin. To represent him as other than an unmerciful wretch were to misrepresent him. No matter who it is. That delicate female who would faint at the sight of blood! if she is a sinner, she is spurning and scorning the mercy of God. She lets others go down to hell unpardoned without an effort to secure their pardon. Shall she be represented as other than unmerciful? No language can describe the hardness of her heart. See! the cup of salvation is presented to her lips by a Savior's bleeding hand. She nevertheless dashes it from her, and tramples its contents beneath her feet. It passes from lip to lip. But she offers no prayer that it may be accepted; or if she does, it is only the prayer of a hypocrite while she rejects it herself. No, with all her delicacy, her tender mercies are utter cruelty. With her own hands she crucifies the Son of God afresh and would put him to open shame! O monstrous! a woman murdering the Savior of the world! Her hands and garments all stained with blood! And call her merciful! O shame, where is thy blush?

17. *Falsehood or Lying* is another attribute of selfishness. ✓

Falsehood may be objective or subjective. Objective falsehood is that which stands opposed to truth. Subjective falsehood is a heart conformed to error and to objective falsehood. Subjective falsehood is a state of mind or an attribute of selfishness. It is the will in the attitude of resisting truth and embracing error and lies. This is always and necessarily an attribute of selfishness. 2

Selfishness consists in the choice of an end opposed to all truth, and can not but proceed to the realization of that end in conformity with error or falsehood instead of truth. If at any time it seize upon objective truth, as it often does, it is with a false intention. It is with an intention at war with the truth, the nature, and the relations of things. ✓

If any sinner, at any time and under any circumstances, tell the truth, it is for a selfish reason; it is to compass a false end. He has a lie in his heart and a lie in his right hand. He stands upon falsehood. He lives for it, and if he does not uniformly and openly falsify the truth, it is because objective truth is consistent with subjective falsehood. His heart is false, as false as it can be. It has embraced and sold itself to the greatest lie in the universe. The selfish man has practically proclaimed that his good is the supreme good; nay, that there is no other good but his own, that there are no other rights but his own, that all are bound to serve him, and 2

that all interests are to yield to his. Now all this, as I said, is the greatest falsehood that ever was or can be. Yet this is the solemn practical declaration of every sinner. His choice affirms that God has no rights, that he ought not to be loved and obeyed, that he has no right to govern the universe, but that God and all beings ought to obey and serve the sinner. Can there be a greater, a more shameless falsehood than all this? And shall such an one pretend to regard the truth? Nay, verily. The very pretence is only an instance and an illustration of the truth that Falsehood is an essential element of his character.

If every sinner on earth does not openly and at all times falsify the truth, it is not because of the truthfulness of his heart, but for some purely selfish reason. This must be. His heart is utterly false. It is impossible that, remaining a sinner, he should have any true regard to the truth. He is a liar in his heart: this is an essential and an eternal attribute of his character. It is true that his intelligence condemns falsehood and justifies truth, and that oftentimes through the intelligence, a deep impression is or may be made on his sensibility in favor of the truth; but if the heart is unchanged, it holds on to lies, and perseveres in the practical proclamation of the greatest lies in the universe, to wit: that God ought not to be trusted; that Christ is not worthy of confidence; that one's own interest is the supreme good; and that all interests ought to be accounted of less value than one's own.

18. *Pride* is another attribute of selfishness.

Pride is a disposition to exalt self above others, to get out of one's proper place in the scale of being, and to climb up over the heads of our equals or superiors. Pride is a species of injustice on the one hand, and is nearly allied to ambition on the other. It is not a term of so extensive an import as either injustice or ambition. It sustains to each of them a near relation, but is not identical with either. It is a kind of self-praise, self-worship, self-flattery, self-adulation, a spirit of self-consequence, of self-importance. It is an exalting not merely one's interest, but one's person above others, and above God, and above all other beings. A proud being supremely regards himself. He worships and can worship no one but self. He does not, and remaining selfish, he can not, practically admit that there is any one so good and worthy as himself. He aims at conferring supreme favor upon himself, and practically admits no claim of any being in the universe to any good or interest that will interfere with his own. He

can stoop to give preference to the interest, the reputation, the authority of no one, no not of God himself. His practical language is, *Who is Jehovah that I should bow down to him?* It is impossible that a selfish soul should be humble. Pride is an essential modification or attribute of selfishness. Sinners are represented in the bible as proud, as "flattering themselves in their own eyes."

Pride is not a vice distinct from selfishness, but is only a modification of selfishness. Selfishness is the root or stock in which every form of sin inheres. This it is important to show. Selfishness has been scarcely regarded by many as a vice, much less as constituting the whole of vice; consequently, when selfishness has been most apparent, it has been supposed and assumed that there might be along with it many forms of virtue. It is for this reason that I take up your time and my own in showing what are the essential elements of selfishness. So it has been supposed that selfishness might exist in any heart without implying every form of sin; that a man might be selfish and yet not proud. In short, it has been overlooked that where selfishness is, there must be every form of sin, that where there is one form of selfishness manifested, it is a breach of every commandment of God and implies in fact the real existence of every possible form of sin and abomination in the heart. My object is to pursue this course of instruction so far and no farther than will fully develop in your minds the great truth that where selfishness is, there must be in a state either of development or of undevelopment every form of sin that exists in earth or hell; that all sin is a unit, and some form of selfishness; and that where this is, all sin must be.

The only reason that pride, as a form of selfishness, does not appear in all sinners in the most disgusting forms is only this, that their constitutional temperament and providential circumstances are such as to give a more prominent development to some other attribute of selfishness. It is important to remark that where any one form of unqualified sin exists, there selfishness must exist, and there of course every form of sin must exist, at least in embryo, and waiting only for providential circumstances to develop it. When therefore you see any form of sin, know assuredly that selfishness, the root, is there, and expect nothing else, if selfishness continues, than to see developed, one after one, every form of sin as the providence of God shall present the occasion. Selfishness is a volcano, sometimes smothered, but which must have vent. The prov-

idence of God cannot but present occasions upon which its lava-tides will burst forth and carry desolation before them.

That all these forms of sin exist has been known and admitted. But it does not appear to me that the philosophy of sin has been duly considered by many. It is important that we should get at the fundamental or generic form of sin, that form which include sand implies all others, or more properly, which constitutes the whole of sin. Such is selfishness. "Let it be written with the point of a diamond and engraved in the rock forever," that it may be known that where selfishness is, there every precept of the law is violated, there is the whole of sin. Its guilt and ill desert must depend upon the light with which the selfish mind is surrounded. But sin, the whole of sin, is there.

LECTURE XXVII.

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

19. *Enmity* against God is also an attribute of selfishness.

Enmity is hatred. Hatred may exist either as a phenomenon of the sensibility or as a state or attitude of the will. Of course I am now to speak of enmity of heart or will. It is selfishness viewed in its relations to God. That selfishness is enmity against God will appear,

(1.) From the Bible. The Apostle expressly says that "the carnal mind (minding the flesh) is enmity against God." It is fully evident that the Apostle by the carnal mind means obeying the propensities or gratifying the desires. But this is selfishness as I have defined it.

(2.) Selfishness is directly opposed to the will of God as expressed in his law. That requires benevolence. Selfishness is its opposite, and therefore enmity against the lawgiver.

(3.) Selfishness is as hostile to God's government as it can be. It is directly opposed to every law and principle and measure of his government.

(4.) Selfishness is opposition to God's existence. Opposition to a government, is opposition to the will of the governor. It is opposition to his *existence in that capacity*. It is and must be enmity against the existence of the ruler as such. Selfishness must be enmity against the existence of God's government, and as He does and must sustain the relation of Sovereign Ruler, selfishness must be enmity against his life. Selfishness will brook no restraint in respect to securing its end. There is nothing in the universe it will not sacrifice to self. This is true, or it is not selfishness. If then God's happiness, or government, or life come into competition with it, they must be sacrificed.

(5.) But God is the uncompromising enemy of selfishness. It is the abominable thing his soul hateth. He is more in the way of selfishness than all other beings. The opposition of selfishness to Him is and must be supreme and perfect.

(6.) That selfishness is mortal enmity against God, is not left to conjecture nor to a mere deduction or inference. God once took to himself human nature and tried the experiment. Men could not brook his presence upon earth, and they rested not until they had murdered him.

(7.) Again. Selfishness is supreme enmity against God. That is, it is more opposed to God than to all other beings.

[1.] This must be because God is more opposed to it and more directly and eternally in its way. Selfishness must be relinquished or put itself in supreme opposition to God.

[2.] Enmity against any body or thing besides God can be overcome more easily than against him. All earthly enmities can be overcome by kindness and change of circumstances; but what kindness, what change of circumstances can change the human heart, can overcome the selfishness and enmity that reigns there?

(8.) Selfishness offers all manner and every possible degree of resistance to God. It disregards God's commands. It contemns his authority. It spurns his mercy. It tramples on his feelings. It tempts his forbearance. Selfishness in short is the universal antagonist and adversary of God. It can no more be reconciled to God or subject to his law than it can cease to be selfishness.

20. *Madness* is another attribute of selfishness.

Madness is used sometimes to mean anger, sometimes to mean intellectual insanity, and sometimes to mean moral insanity.

I speak of it now in the last sense.

Moral insanity is not insanity of the intelligence, but of the heart. Insanity of the intelligence destroys for the time being moral agency and accountability.

Moral insanity is a state in which the intellectual powers are not deranged, but the heart refuses to be controlled by the intelligence and acts unreasonably as if the intellect were deranged. That madness or moral insanity is an attribute of selfishness or of a sinful character is evident,

(1.) From the bible. "The heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live."—Eccles. 9: 3.

(2.) It has been shown that sinners or selfish persons act in every instance directly opposite to right reason. Indeed, nothing can be plainer than the moral insanity of every selfish soul. He prefers to seek his own interest as an end and prefers a straw to a universe. But not only so: he does this with the certain knowledge that in this way he can never secure his own highest interest. What an infinitely insane course that must be, first to prefer his own petty gratification to the infinite interests of God and of the universe, and secondly, to do this with the knowledge that in this way nothing

can be ultimately gained even to self, and that if the course is persisted in, it must result in endless evil to self, the very thing which is supremely dreaded! Sin is the greatest mystery and the greatest absurdity, and the greatest contradiction in the universe.

But madness is an essential element or attribute of selfishness. All sinners, without any exception, are and must be mad. Their choice of an end is madness. It is infinitely unreasonable. Their pursuit of it is madness persisted in. Their treatment of every thing that opposes their course is madness. All, all is madness infinite. This world is a moral Bedlam, an insane hospital where sinners are under regimen. If they can be cured, well. If not, they must be confined in the mad-house of the universe for eternity.

The only reason why sinners do not perceive their own and each other's madness is, that they are all mad together and their madness is all of one type. Hence they imagine that they are sane, and pronounce Christians mad. This is no wonder. What other conclusion can they come to unless they can discover that they are mad?

But let it not be forgotten that their madness is of the heart, and not of the intellect. It is voluntary and not unavoidable. If it were unavoidable it would involve no guilt. But it is a choice made and persisted in in the integrity of their intellectual powers, and therefore they are without excuse.

Sinners are generally supposed to act rationally on many subjects. But this is an evident mistake. They do every thing for the same ultimate reason and are as wholly irrational in one thing as another. There is nothing in their whole history and life, not an individual thing, that is not entirely and infinitely unreasonable. The end is mad; the means are mad; all, all is madness and desperation of spirit. They no doubt appear so to angels, and so they do to saints; and were it not so common to see them their conduct would fill the saints and angels with utter amazement.

21. *Impatience* is another attribute of selfishness.

This term expresses both a state of the sensibility and of the will. Impatience is a resistance of Providence. When this term is used to express a state of the sensibility, it designates fretfulness, ill temper, anger in the form of emotion. It is an unsubmissive and rebellious state of feeling in regard to those trials that occur under the administration of the providential government of God.

When the term is used to express a state of the will, it designates an attitude of resistance to God's providential dispensations. Selfishness has no faith in God, no confidence in his wisdom and goodness, and being set upon self-gratification, is continually exposed to disappointment. God is infinitely wise and benevolent. He also exercises a universal providence. He is conducting every thing with reference to the greatest good of the whole universe. He of course will often interfere with the selfish projects of those who are pursuing an opposite end to that which He pursues. They will of course be subject to almost continual disappointment under the providence of one who disposes of all events in accordance with a design at war with their own. It is impossible that the schemes of selfishness under such a government should not frequently be blown to the winds, and that such an one should not be the subject of incessant crosses, vexations and trials. Self-will can not but be impatient under a benevolent government. Selfishness would of course have every thing so disposed as to favor self-interest and self-gratification. But infinite wisdom and benevolence can not accommodate itself to this state of mind. The result must be a constant rasping and collision between the selfish soul and the providence of God. Selfishness must cease to be selfishness before it can be otherwise.

A selfish state of will must of course not only resist crosses and disappointments, but must also produce a feverish and fretful state of feeling in relation to the trials incident to life. Nothing but deep sympathy with God and that confidence in his wisdom and goodness and universal providence that annihilates self-will and begets universal and unqualified submission to him, can prevent impatience. Impatience is always a form of selfishness. It is resistance to God. It is self-will. Selfishness must be gratified or displeased of course. It should always be understood that when trials produce impatience of heart the will is in a selfish attitude. The trials of this life are designed to develop a submissive, confiding and patient state of mind. A selfish spirit is represented in the bible as being, under the providence of God, like a bullock unaccustomed to the yoke, restive, self-willed, impatient and rebellious.

When selfishness or self-will is subdued and benevolence is in exercise, we are in a state not to feel disappointments, trials and crosses. Having no way or will of our own about any thing, and having deep sympathy with and confidence in

God, we can not be disappointed in any such sense as to vex the spirit and break the peace of the soul.

The fact is that selfishness must be abandoned, or there is, there can be no peace to us. "There is no peace to the wicked, saith my God." "The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it can not rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt." An impressive figure this to represent the continually agitated state in which a selfish mind must be under a perfectly benevolent providence. Selfishness demands partiality in providence that will favor self. But benevolence will not bend to its inclinations. This must produce resistance and fretting, or selfishness must be abandoned. Let it be borne in mind that impatience is an attribute of selfishness and will always be developed under crosses and trials.

Selfishness will of course be patient while providence favors its schemes, but when crosses come, then the peace of the soul is broken.

22. *Intemperance* is also a form or attribute of selfishness.

Selfishness is *self-indulgence*. It consists in the committal of the will to the indulgence of the propensities. Of course some one, or more, of the propensities have taken the control of the will. Generally there is some ruling passion or propensity the influence of which becomes overshadowing and overrules the will for its own gratification. Sometimes it is acquisitiveness or avarice, the love of gain; sometimes alimentiveness or epicurianism; sometimes it is amativeness or sexual love; sometimes philoprogenitiveness or the love of our own children; sometimes self-esteem or a feeling of confidence in self; sometimes one and sometimes another of the great variety of the propensities, is so largely developed as to be the ruling tyrant that lords it over the will and over all the other propensities. It matters not which of the propensities or whether their united influence gains the mastery of the will: whenever the will is subject to them, this is selfishness. It is the carnal mind.

Intemperance consists in the undue or unlawful indulgence of any propensity. It is therefore an essential element or attribute of selfishness. All selfishness is intemperance: of course it is an unlawful indulgence of the propensities. Intemperance has as many forms as there are constitutional and artificial appetites to gratify. A selfish mind can not be temperate. If one or more of the propensities is restrained, it is only restrained for the sake of the undue and unlawful indulgence of another. Sometimes the tendencies are intellectual,

and the bodily appetites are denied for the sake of gratifying the love of study. But this is no less intemperance and selfishness than the gratification of amateness or alimentiveness. Selfishness is always and necessarily intemperate. It does not always or generally develop every form of intemperance in the outward life, but a spirit of self-indulgence must be the spirit of intemperance.

Some develop intemperance most prominently in the form of self-indulgence in eating; others in sleeping; others in lounging and idleness; others are gossipers; others love exercise and indulge that propensity; others study and impair health and induce derangement or seriously impair the nervous systems. Indeed there is no end to the forms which intemperance assumes because of the great number of propensities natural and artificial that in their turns seek and obtain indulgence.

It should be always borne in mind that any form of self-indulgence is equally an instance of selfishness and wholly inconsistent with any degree of virtue in the heart. But it may be asked, are we to have no regard whatever to our tastes, appetites and propensities? I answer we are to have no such regard to them as to make their gratification the end for which we live even for a moment. But there is a kind of regard to them which is lawful and therefore a virtue. For example: I am on a journey for the glory of God. Two ways are before me. One affords nothing to regale the senses; the other conducts me through variegated scenery, sublime mountain passes, deep ravines; along brawling brooks and meandering rivulets; through beds of gayest flowers and woods of richest foliage; through aromatic groves and forests vocal with feathered songsters. The two paths are equal in distance and in all respects that have a bearing upon the business I have in hand. Now reason dictates and demands that I should take the path that is most agreeable and edifying. But this is not being governed by the propensities, but by the reason. It is its voice which I hear and to which I listen when I take the sunny path. The delights of this path are a real good. As such they are not to be despised or neglected. But if taking this path would embarrass and hinder the end of my journey, I am not to sacrifice the greater public good for a less one of my own. I must not be guided by my feelings but by my reason and honest judgment in this and in every case of duty. God has not given us propensities to be our masters and to rule us but to be our servants and to

to minister to our enjoyment when we obey the biddings of reason and of God. They are given to render duty pleasant, and as a reward of virtue; to make the ways of wisdom pleasant. The propensities are not therefore to be despised, nor is their annihilation to be desired. Nor is it true that their gratification is always selfish. But when their gratification is sanctioned and demanded as in the case just supposed and in myriads of other cases that occur to the intelligence, the gratification is not a sin but a virtue. It is not selfishness but benevolence. But let it be remembered that the indulgence must not be sought in obedience to the propensity itself, but in obedience to the law of reason and of God. When reason and the will of God are not consulted, it must be selfishness.

Intemperance, as a sin, does not consist in the outward act of indulgence, but in an inward disposition. A dyspeptic who can eat but just enough to sustain life, may be an enormous glutton at heart. He may have a disposition, that is, he may not only *desire*, but he may be *willing* to eat all before him, but for the pain indulgence occasions him. But this is only the spirit of self-indulgence. He denies himself the amount of food he craves to avoid pain or to gratify a stronger propensity, to wit, the dread of pain. So a man who was never intoxicated in his life, may be guilty of the crime of drunkenness every day. He may be prevented from drinking to inebriation every day only by a regard to reputation or health, or by an avaricious disposition. It is only because he is prevented by the greater power of some other propensity. If one is in such a state of mind that he would indulge all his propensities without restraint were it not that it is impossible on account of the indulgence of some being inconsistent with the indulgence of the others, he is just as guilty as if he did indulge them all. For example: He has a disposition, that is, a will to accumulate property. He is avaricious in heart. He also has a strong tendency to luxury, to licentiousness and prodigality. The indulgence of these propensities is inconsistent with the indulgence of avarice. But for this contrariety he would in his state of mind indulge them all. Now he is really guilty of all those forms of vice, and just as blameworthy as if he indulged in them.

Again: That selfishness is the aggregate of all sin, and that he who is selfish, is actually chargeable with breaking the whole law, and of every form of iniquity, will appear, if we consider,

(1.) That it is the committal of the will to self-indulgence; and of course and of necessity,

(2.) No one propensity will be denied but for the indulgence of another.

(3.) But if no better reason than this exists for denying any propensity, then the selfish man is chargeable in the sight of God with actually in heart gratifying every propensity.

(4.) And this conducts to the plain conclusion that a selfish man is full of sin and actually in heart guilty of every possible or conceivable abomination.

(5.) "He that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." He may not have committed the outward act for want of opportunity, or for the reason that the indulgence is inconsistent with the love of reputation or fear of disgrace, or with some other propensity. Nevertheless he is in heart guilty of the deed.

Intemperance, as a crime is a state of mind. It is the attitude of the will. It is an attribute of selfishness. It consists in the choice or disposition to gratify the propensities regardless of the law of benevolence. This is intemperance; and so far as the mind is considered, it is the whole of it. Now inasmuch as the will is committed to self-indulgence, and nothing but the contrariety there is between the propensities prevents the unlimited indulgence of them all, it follows that every selfish person, or in other words every sinner, is chargeable in the sight of God with every species of intemperance actual or conceivable. His lusts have the reign. They conduct him whithersoever they list. He has sold himself to self-indulgence. If there is any form of self-indulgence that is not actually developed in him, no thanks to him. The providence of God has restrained the outward indulgence while there has been in him a readiness to do it.

23. *Recklessness* is another attribute of selfishness. Recklessness is carelessness, or a state of mind that seeks to gratify self regardless of consequences. It is a spirit of infatuation, a rushing upon ruin heedless of what may come.

This is one of the most prominent attributes of selfishness. It is universally prominent and manifest. What can be more manifest and striking and astonishing than the recklessness of every sinner? Self-indulgence is his motto; and the only appearance of consideration and moderation about him is, that he is careful to deny one propensity for the sake and only for the sake of indulging another. He hesitates not whether he shall indulge himself, but sometimes hesitates and ponders and de-

liberates in respect to the particular propensity to be indulged or denied. He is at all times perfectly reckless as it respects self-indulgence. This is settled. Whenever he hesitates about any given course, it is because of the strength of the self-indulgent spirit and with design upon the whole to realize the greatest amount of self-indulgence. When sinners hesitate about remaining in sin and think of giving up self-indulgence, it is only certain forms of sin that they contemplate relinquishing. They consider what they shall lose to themselves by continuing in sin, and what they shall gain to themselves by relinquishing sin and turning to God. It is a question of loss and gain with them. They have no idea of giving up every form of selfishness; nor do they consider that until they do, they are at every moment violating the whole law, whatever interest of self they may be plotting to secure, whether the interest be temporal or eternal, physical or spiritual. In respect to the denial or indulgence of one or another of the propensities, they may and indeed can not but be considerate consistently with selfishness. But in respect to duty; in respect to the commands and threatenings of God; in respect to every moral consideration, they are entirely and universally reckless. And when they appear not to be so, but to be thoughtful and considerate, it is only selfishness plotting its own indulgence and calculating its chances of loss and gain. Indeed it would appear, when we take into consideration the known consequences of every form of selfishness, and the sinner's pertinacious cleaving to self-indulgence in the face of such considerations, that every sinner is appallingly reckless, and that it may be said that his recklessness is infinite.

24. *Unity* is another attribute of selfishness.

By unity is intended that selfishness, and consequently all sin is a unit. That is, there are not various kinds of sin, nor various kinds of selfishness, nor, strictly speaking, are there various forms of selfishness. Selfishness is always one and but one thing. It has but one end, and not diverse ends. The indulgence of one appetite or passion, or another, does not imply different ends or forms of selfishness, strictly speaking. It is only one choice, or the choice of one end and the different forms are only the use of different means to accomplish this one end. Strictly speaking, there is but one form of virtue; and when we speak of various forms, we speak loosely and in accommodation to the general notions of mankind. Virtue, as we have before seen, is a unit. It

always consists in ultimate intention; and this ultimate intention is always one and the same. It is the choice of the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an end. This intention never changes its form, and all the efforts which the mind makes to realize this end, and which we loosely call different forms of virtue, are after all only the one unchanged and unchangable, uncompounded and indivisible intention, energizing to realize its one great end. Just so with selfishness. It is one choice, or the choice of one and only one end, to wit, self-gratification or self-indulgence. All the various, and every varying shifts and turns and modes of indulgence which make up the entire history of the sinner, imply no complexity in the form or substance of his choice. All are resorted to for one and only one reason. They are only this one uncompounded and uncompoundable, this never varying choice of self-indulgence, energizing and using various means to realize its one simple end. The reason why the idea is so common, and why the phraseology of men implies that there are really various forms of sin and of holiness is, that they unwittingly lose sight of that in which sin and holiness alone consist, and conceive of them as belonging to the outward act, or to the causative volition that is put forth by the intention to secure its end. Let it but always be remembered that holiness and sin are but the moral attributes of selfishness and benevolence, and that they are each the choice of one end and only one; and the delusion that there are various forms and kinds of sin and holiness will flee away forever.

Holiness is holiness, in form and essence one and indivisible. It is the moral element or quality of disinterested benevolence. Sin is sin, in form and essence one and indivisible; and is the moral attribute of selfishness or of the choice of self-indulgence as the end of life. This conducts us to the real meaning of those Scriptures which assert "that all the law is fulfilled in one word, love," that this is the whole of virtue, and comprises all that we loosely call the different virtues, or different forms of virtue. And it also explains this, "Whosoever shall keep the whole law and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." That is, offending in one point implies the real commission of all sin. It implies, and is selfishness, and this is the whole of sin. It is of the greatest importance that religious teachers should understand this, and no longer conceive of sin as original and actual; as sins of heart and sins of life; as sins of omission and commission; as sins of licentiousness and gluttony, intemperance and the

like. Now such notions and such phraseology will do for those who can not, or have no opportunity to look deeper into the philosophy of moral government; but it is time that the veil were taken away, and both sin and holiness laid open to the public gaze.

Let it not be inferred that because there is but one form or kind of sin or of holiness, strictly speaking, that therefore all sin is equally blameworthy, and that all holiness is equally praiseworthy. This does not follow, as we shall see under its proper head. Neither let it be called a contradiction that I have so often spoken and shall so often speak of the different forms of sin and of holiness. All this is convenient and as I judge indispensable in preparing the way, and to conduct the mind to the true conception and apprehension of this great and fundamental truth; fundamental in the sense that it lies at the foundation of all truly clear and just conceptions of either holiness or sin. They are both units and eternal and necessary opposites and antagonists. They can never dwell together or coalesce any more than heaven and hell can be wedded to each other.

LECTURE XXVIII.

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW OF GOD.

25. *Egotism* is another attribute of selfishness.

Egotism, when properly considered, does not consist in actually talking about and praising self; but in that disposition of mind that manifests itself in self-laudation. Parrots talk almost exclusively of themselves, and yet we do not accuse them of egotism, nor feel the least disgust toward them on that account.

Moral agents may be under circumstances that render it necessary to speak much of themselves. God's character and relations are such and the ignorance of men so great that it is necessary for Him to reveal himself to them, and consequently to speak to them very much about Himself. The same is true of Christ. Christ's principal object was to make the world acquainted with himself and with the nature and design of his mission. Of course he spake much of himself. But who ever thought of accusing either the Father or the Son of egotism?

The fact is that real egotism is a selfish state of the will. It is a selfish disposition. Selfishness is the supreme preference of self, of self-interest, self-indulgence; of course, this state of mind can not but *manifest egotism*. The *heart* is egotistical, and the language and deportment must be.

An egotistical state of mind manifests itself in a great variety of ways; not only in self-commendation and laudation, but also in selfish aims and actions, exalting self in action as well as in word. An egotistical spirit speaks of itself and its achievements in such a way as reveals the assumption that self is a very important personage. It demonstrates that self is the end of every thing and the great idol before which all ought to bow down and worship. This is not too strong language. The fact is, that selfishness is nothing short of a practical setting up of the shameless claim that self is of more importance than God and the whole universe; that self ought to be universally worshiped; that God and all other beings ought to be entirely consecrated to its interests and to the promotion of its glory. Now what but the most disgusting egotism can be expected from such a state of mind as this? This state of mind is essentially and necessarily egotistical. If it does not

manifest itself in one way, it will and must in another. The thoughts are upon self; the heart is upon self. Self-flattery is a necessary result or rather attribute of selfishness. A selfish man is always a self-flatterer, and a self-deceiver, and a self-devotee. This must be.

Self may speak very sparingly of self for the reason that it thinks *too* much of self to willingly incur the charge of egotism. A man may have a spirit too egotistical to speak out, and may reveal his superlative disposition to be praised by a studied abstinence from self-commendation. Nay, he may speak of himself in terms the most reproachful and self-abasing in the spirit of supreme egotism; to evince his humility and the deep self-knowledge which he possesses. But a spirit of self-deification, which selfishness always is, if it does not manifest itself in words, must and will in deeds. The great and supreme importance of self is assumed by the heart, and can not but in some way manifest itself. It may, and often does put on the garb of the utmost self-abasement. It stoops to conquer, and to gain universal praise, affects to be most empty of self.

But this is only a refined egotism. It is only saying, Come see my perfect humility and self-emptiness, Indeed there are myriads of ways in which an egotistical spirit manifests itself, and so subtle and refined are many of them that they resemble Satan robed in the stolen habiliments of an angel of light.

An egotistical spirit often manifests itself in self-consequential airs, and by thrusting self into the best seat at table, in a stage coach, a rail road car, or into the best state room in a steam boat. In short, it manifests in action what it is apt to manifest in word, to wit: a sense of supreme self-importance.

I said that the mere fact of speaking of self is not of itself proof of an egotistical spirit. The thing to be regarded is the manner and manifest design of speaking of self. A benevolent man may speak much of self because it may be important to others that he should do so, on account of his relations. When the design is the benefit of others and the glory of God, it is as far as possible from the spirit of egotism. A benevolent man might speak of himself just as he would of others. He has merged his interests in, or rather identified them with the interests of others and of course would naturally treat others and speak of them much as he treats and speaks of himself. If he sees and censures the conduct of others, and has ever been guilty of the like, he will censure his own baseness quite as severely as he does the same thing in others. If he

commends the virtues of others, it is but for the glory of God; and for the very same reason, he might speak of virtues of which he is conscious in himself, that God may have glory. A perfectly simple-hearted and guileless state of mind might naturally enough manifest itself in this manner. An egotistical spirit in another might, and doubtless would lead him to misunderstand such open heartedness and transparency of character. There would be nevertheless a radical difference in the spirit with which two such men would speak either of their own faults or virtues.

26. *Simplicity* is another attribute of selfishness.

By this term it is intended to express two things, to wit:

- (1.) Singleness, unmixed or unmingled, and
- (2.) That selfishness is always as intense as under the circumstances it can be. I will consider these two branches of the subject separately and in order.

(1.) Selfishness is simple in the sense of uncompounded or unmixed.

It consists, as we have repeatedly seen in ultimate choice or intention. It is the choice of an end, of course the supreme as well as the ultimate choice of the soul. Now it must be self-evident that no other and opposing choice can consist with it. Nor can the mind while in the exercise of this choice of an end possibly put forth any volitions inconsistent with it. Volitions are never and can never be put forth but to secure some end, or in other words, for some reason. If they could, such volitions would have no moral character because there would be no intention. Volitions always imply intention. It is therefore impossible that benevolent volitions should co-exist with a selfish intention or that selfish volitions should co-exist with a benevolent intention. Simplicity, in the sense of uncompounded or unmixed, must be an attribute of selfishness. This is evidently the philosophy assumed in the teachings of Christ and of inspiration. "Ye can not serve two masters"—(that is, certainly, at the same time) says Christ. And again: "Ye can not serve God and Mammon"—that is, of course at the same time. "Can a fountain at the same place send forth sweet water and bitter?" says James. Thus we see that the bible assumes and expressly teaches the philosophy here insisted on.

(2.) Selfishness is always as intense as under the circumstances it can be.

It is a choice. It is the choice of self-indulgence as an ultimate end. Therefore, if it lounge, it is only because the pro-

pensity to lounge at the time preponderates. If energetic, it is to secure some form of self-indulgence, which, at the time, is preferred to ease. If at one time it is more or less intense than at another, it is only because self-gratification at the time demands it. Indeed it is absurd to say that it is more intense at one time than at another except as its intensity is increased by the pressure of motives to abandon it, and become benevolent. If a selfish man give himself up to idleness, lounging, and sleeping, it is not for want of intensity in the action of his will, but because his disposition to self indulgence in this form is so strong. So if his selfishness take on any possible type, it is only because of the strength of his disposition to indulge self in that particular way. Selfishness lives only for one end, and it is impossible that that end while it continues to be chosen should not have the supreme control. Indeed, the choice of an ultimate end implies the consecration of the will to it, and it is a contradiction to say that the will is not true to the end which it chooses, and that it acts less intensely than is demanded by the nature of the end and the apprehensions of the mind in regard to the readiest way to realize it. The end is chosen without qualification or not at all as an ultimate end. The moment any thing should intervene that should cause the mind to withhold the requisite energy to secure it, that moment it would cease to be chosen as an ultimate end. That which has induced the will to withhold the requisite energy has become the supreme object of regard. It is palpably absurd to say that the spirit of self-indulgence should not always be as intense as will most indulge self. The *intensity* of the spirit of self-indulgence is always just what and as it is, because, and only because self is the most indulged and gratified thereby. If upon the whole self would be more indulged and gratified by greater or less intensity, it is impossible that that should not be. The presence of considerations inducing to benevolence must either annihilate or strengthen selfishness. The choice must be abandoned, or its intensity and obstinacy must increase with, and in proportion to increasing light. But at every moment the intensity of the selfish choice must be as great as is consistent with its nature, that is, with its being the choice of self-indulgence.

27. *Total Moral Depravity* is implied in selfishness as one of its attributes.

By this I intend that every selfish being is at every moment as wicked and as blameworthy as with his knowledge he can be. To establish this proposition, I must

- (1.) Remind you of that in which moral character consists.
- (2.) Of the foundation of moral obligation.
- (3.) Of the conditions of moral obligation.
- (4.) Show the unity of moral obligation.
- (5.) The unity of virtue and of vice.
- (6.) How to measure moral obligation.
- (7.) The guilt of transgression to be equal to the degree of obligation.
- (8.) Moral agents are at all times either as holy or as sinful as with their knowledge they can be.
- (9.) Consequently, total moral depravity is an attribute of selfishness in the sense that every sinner is as wicked as with his present light he can be.

(1.) *In what moral character consists.*

It has been repeatedly shown that moral character belongs only to ultimate intention, or that it consists in the choice of an ultimate end, or the end of life.

(2.) *The foundation of moral obligation.*

- [1.] Moral character implies moral obligation.
- [2.] Moral obligation respects ultimate intention.
- [3.] Ultimate choice or intention is the choice of an ultimate end, or the choice of something for its own sake.
- [4.] The foundation of the obligation to choose or intend *an end* or something for its own sake, must consist in the intrinsic value of the thing to be chosen.

[5.] The highest good or well-being of God and of the universe is of intrinsic and infinite value.

[6.] Therefore the highest well-being of God and of the universe of sentient beings is the foundation of moral obligation, that is, this is the ultimate end to which all moral agents ought to consecrate themselves.

(3.) *Conditions of moral obligation.*

[1.] The powers of moral agency: Intellect, Sensibility, and Free Will.

[2.] The existence and perception of the end that ought to be chosen.

(4.) *Unity of Moral Obligation.*

[1.] Moral obligation strictly belongs only to the ultimate intention.

[2.] It requires but one ultimate choice or intention.

[3.] It requires universally and only that every moral agent should at all times, and under all circumstances, honestly will, choose, intend the highest good of being as an end, or for its

own intrinsic value. Therefore moral obligation is a unit.

(5.) *Unity of virtue and vice.*

[1.] Virtue must be a unit, for it always and only consists in compliance with moral obligation, which is a unit.

[2.] It always and only consists in one and the same choice, or in the choice of one and the same end.

[3.] It has been fully shown that sin consists in selfishness and that selfishness is an ultimate choice, to wit, the choice of self-gratification as an end or for its own sake.

[4.] Selfishness is always one and the same choice or the choice of one and the same end.

[5.] Therefore, selfishness or sin must be a unit.

[6.] Or more strictly virtue is the moral element or attribute of disinterested benevolence or good willing. And sin or vice is the moral element or attribute of selfishness. Virtue is always the same attribute of the same choice. They are therefore always and necessarily units.

(6.) *How to measure moral obligation.*

[1.] It is affirmed both by reason and revelation that there are degrees of guilt; that some are more guilty than others; and that the same individual may be more guilty at one time than at another.

[2.] The same is true of virtue. One person may be more virtuous than another when both are truly virtuous. And also the same person may be more virtuous at one time than at another, although he may be virtuous at all times. In other words, it is affirmed both by reason and revelation that there is such a thing as growth both in virtue and vice.

[3.] It is matter of general belief also that the same individual with the same degree of light or knowledge, is more or less praise or blameworthy as he shall do one thing or another; or in other words, as he shall pursue one course or another, to accomplish the end he has in view; or, which is the same thing, that the same individual with the same knowledge or light, is more or less virtuous or vicious according to the course of outward life which he shall pursue. This I shall attempt to show is human prejudice, and a serious and most injurious error.

[4.] It is also generally held that two or more individuals having precisely the same degree of light or knowledge, and being both equally benevolent or selfish, may nevertheless differ in their degree of virtue or vice according as they pursue different courses of outward conduct. This also I shall attempt to show is fundamental error.

We can arrive at the truth upon this subject only by clearly understanding how to measure moral obligation, and of course how to ascertain the degree of virtue and sin. The amount or degree of virtue or vice or of praise or blame-worthiness is and must be decided by reference to the degree of obligation.

It is very important to remark here that virtue does not merit so much praise and reward as vice does blame and punishment. This is the universal and necessary affirmation of reason and the plain doctrine of inspiration. The reason is this: Virtue is a compliance with obligation. Christ says, "When you have done all, say, we are unprofitable servants: we have done what it was our duty to do." To suppose that virtue is as deserving of reward as vice is of punishment were to overlook obligation altogether, and make virtue a work of supererogation, or that to which we are under no obligation. Suppose I owe you a hundred dollars. When I pay you I only discharge my obligation, and lay you under no further obligation to me, except to treat me as an honest man when and as long as I am such. This is all the reward which the discharge of duty merits.

But suppose I refuse to pay you when it is in my power. Here my desert of blame, as every body must know, and as the Bible every where teaches, is vastly greater than my desert of praise in the former case. The difference lies in this, namely, that virtue is nothing more than a compliance with obligation. It is the doing of that which could not have been neglected without sin. Hence all the reward which it merits is that the virtuous being, so long as he is virtuous, shall be regarded and treated as one who does his duty and complies with his obligations.

But vice is the violation of obligation. It is a refusal to do what ought to be done. In this case it is clear that the guilt is equal to the obligation, that is, the measure of obligation is the measure of guilt. This brings us to the point of inquiry now before us, namely, now is moral obligation to be measured? What is the criterion, the rule, or standard by which the amount or degree of obligation is to be estimated?

And here I would remind you,

a That moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of the highest well-being of God and the universe, and,

b That the conditions of the obligation are the possession of the powers of moral agency and light, or the knowledge of the end to be chosen.

c Hence it follows that the obligation is to be measured by *the mind's honest apprehension or judgment of the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen*. That this and nothing else is the rule or standard by which the obligation, and consequently the guilt of violating it is to be measured, will appear if we consider,

a That the obligation can not be measured by the infinity of God, apart from the knowledge of the infinite value of His interests. He is an infinite being, and His well-being must be of intrinsic and of infinite value. But unless this be known to a moral agent, he can not be under obligation to will it as an ultimate end. If he knows it to be of some value he is bound to choose it for that reason. But the measure of his obligation must be just equal to the clearness of his apprehension of its intrinsic value.

Besides if the infinity of God were alone or without reference to the knowledge of the agent the rule by which moral obligation is to be measured, it would follow that obligation is in all cases the same, and of course that the guilt of disobedience would also in all cases be the same. But this, as has been said, contradicts both reason and revelation. Thus it appears that moral obligation, and of course guilt, can not be measured by the infinity of God without reference to the knowledge of the agent.

b It can not be measured by the infinity of His *authority* without reference to the knowledge of the agent for the same reasons as above.

c It can not be measured by the infinity of his moral excellence without reference both to the infinite value of his interests and of the knowledge of the agent; for his interests are to be chosen as an end or for their own value, and without knowledge of their value, there can be no obligation; nor can obligation exceed knowledge.

d If, again, the infinite excellence of God were alone or without reference to the knowledge of the agent to be the rule by which moral obligation is to be measured, it would follow that guilt in all cases of disobedience, is and must be equal. This we have seen can not be.

e It can not be measured by the intrinsic value of the good or well being of God and the universe without reference to the knowledge of the agent, for the same reason as above.

f It can not be measured by the particular course of life pursued by the agent. That the guilt of sin can not be measured by the particular course of life pursued, will appear, if

we consider that moral obligation has directly nothing to do with the outward life. It respects the ultimate intention only and that decides the course of outward action or life. The guilt of any outward action can not be decided by reference to the kind of action without regard to the intention, for the moral character of the act must be found in the intention, and not in the outward act or life. This leads me,

g To remark that the degree of moral obligation, and of course the degree of the guilt of disobedience can not be properly estimated by reference to the nature of the intention without respect to the degree of the knowledge of the agent. Selfish intention is, as we have seen, a unit, always the same; and if this were the standard by which the degree of guilt is to be measured, it would follow that it is always the same.

h Nor can obligation, nor of course guilt, be measured by the *tendency of sin*. All sin tends to infinite evil, to ruin the sinner, and from its contagious nature, to spread and ruin the universe. Nor can any finite mind know what the ultimate results of any sin may be, nor to what particular evil it may tend. As all sin tends to universal and eternal evil, if this were the criterion by which the guilt is to be estimated, all sin would be equally guilty, which can not be.

Again: That the guilt of sin can not be measured by the *tendency of sin* is manifest from the fact that moral obligation is not founded in the tendency of action or intention, but in the intrinsic value of the end to be intended. Estimating moral obligation or measuring sin or holiness by *tendency*, is in accordance with the utilitarian philosophy which we have seen to be false. Moral obligation respects the choice of an end, and is founded upon the intrinsic value of the end, and is not so much as conditioned upon the tendency of the choice to secure its end. Therefore tendency can never be the rule by which obligation can be measured, nor, of course, the rule by which guilt can be estimated.

i Nor can moral obligation be estimated by the results of a moral action or course of action. Moral obligation respects intention and respects results no farther than they were intended. Much good may result, as in the death of Christ, without any virtue but with much guilt. So, much evil may result as in the creation of the world, without guilt, but with great virtue. If moral obligation is not founded or conditioned on results, it follows that guilt can not be duly estimated by results without reference to knowledge and intention.

j What has been said has, I trust, rendered it evident that moral obligation is to be measured by the mind's honest apprehension or judgment of the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen and which is rejected, to wit, the highest well-being of God and the universe.

It should be distinctly understood that selfishness implies the rejection of the interests of God and of the universe for the sake of one's own. It refuses to will good but upon condition that it belongs to self. It spurns God's interests and those of the universe, and seeks only self-interest as an ultimate end. It must follow that the selfish man's guilt is just equal to his knowledge of the intrinsic value of those interests that he rejects. This is undeniably the doctrine of the bible. I will introduce a few paragraphs from one of my *reported* sermons upon this subject.

1. *The scriptures assume and affirm it.*

Acts 17: 30 affords a plain instance. The apostle alludes to those past ages when the heathen nations had no written revelation from God, and remarks that "those times of ignorance God winked at." This does not mean that God connived at their sin because of their darkness, but it does mean that he passed over it with comparatively slight notice, regarding it as a sin of far less aggravation than that which men would now commit if they turned away when God commanded them all to repent. True, sin is never absolutely a light thing; but comparatively, some sins incur small guilt when compared with the great guilt of other sins. This is implied in our text.

I next cite James 4: 17. "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." This plainly implies that knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation; and even more than this is implied, namely, that the guilt of any sinner is always equal to the amount of his knowledge on the subject. It always corresponds to the mind's perception of the value of the end which should have been chosen, but is rejected. If a man knows he ought in any given case to do good, and yet does not do it, to him this is sin—the sin plainly lying in the fact of not doing good when he knew he could do it, and being measured as to its guilt by the degree of that knowledge.

John 9: 41—"Jesus said unto them, if ye were blind, ye should have no sin: but now ye say, we see; therefore your sin remaineth." Here Christ asserts that men without knowledge would be without sin: and that men who have knowledge, and sin notwithstanding, are held guilty. This plainly affirms

that the presence of light or knowledge is requisite to the existence of sin, and obviously implies that the amount of knowledge possessed is the measure of the guilt of sin.

It is remarkable that the Bible everywhere assumes first truths. It does not stop to prove them, or even assert them—it always assumes their truth, and seems to assume that every one knows and will admit them. As I have been recently writing on moral government and studying the Bible as to its teachings on this class of subjects, I have been often struck with this remarkable fact.

John 15: 22—24 “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: but now they have no cloak for their sin. He that hateth me, hateth my Father also. If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father.” Christ holds the same doctrine here as in the last passage cited; light essential to constitute sin, and the degree of light, constituting the measure of its aggravation.

Let it be observed, however, that Christ probably did not mean to affirm in the absolute sense that if he had not come, the Jews would have had *no* sin; for they would have had some light if He had not come. He speaks, as I suppose, comparatively. Their sin if He had not come would have been so much less as to justify his strong language.

Luke, 12: 47, 48—“And that servant which knew his Lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.”

Here we have the doctrine laid down and the truth assumed that men shall be punished according to knowledge. To whom much light is given, of him shall much obedience be required. This is precisely the principle, that God requires of men according to the light they have.

1 Tim. 1: 13—“Who was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious: but I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.” Paul had done things in form as bad as well they could be; yet his guilt was far less because he did them under the darkness of unbelief; hence he obtained mercy, when otherwise, he might not. The plain assumption is that his ignorance abated from the malignity of his sin and favored his obtaining mercy.

In another passage, (Acts 26: 9) Paul says of himself—"I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." This had every thing to do with the degree of his guilt in rejecting the Messiah, and also with his obtaining pardon.

Luke, 23: 34—"Then said Jesus, Father forgive them: for they know not what they do." This passage presents to us the suffering Jesus, surrounded with Roman soldiers and malicious scribes and priests yet pouring out his prayer for them, and making the only plea in their behalf which could be made—"for they know not what they do." This does not imply that they had no guilt, for if this were true they would not have needed forgiveness; but it did imply that their guilt was greatly palliated by their ignorance. If they had known him to be the Messiah, their guilt might have been unpardonable.

Matt. 11: 20—24—"Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done because they repented not. Woe unto thee, Chorazin!—woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I say unto you it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you. And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell: for if the mighty works which have been done in thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But I say unto you, that it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom, in the day of judgment, than for thee." But why does Christ thus upbraid these cities? Why denounce so fearful a woe on Chorazin and Capernaum? Because most of his mighty works had been wrought there. His oft-repeated miracles which proved him to be the Messiah had been wrought before their eyes. Among them he had taught daily, and in their synagogues every Sabbath day. They had great light—hence their great—their unsurpassed guilt. Not even the men of Sodom had guilt to compare with theirs. The city most exalted, even as it were to heaven, must be brought down to the deepest hell. Guilt and punishment, evermore, according to light enjoyed, but resisted.

Luke 11: 47—51—"Woe unto you! for ye build the sepulchres of the prophets, and your fathers killed them. Truly ye bear witness that ye allow the deeds of your fathers: for they indeed killed them, and ye build their sepulchres. There-

fore also said the wisdom of God, I will send them prophets and apostles, and some of them they shall slay and persecute: that the blood of all the prophets, which was shed from the foundation of the world may be required of this generation. From the blood of Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, which perished between the altar and the temple: verily I say unto you it shall be required of this generation." Now here, I ask, on what principle was it that all the blood of martyred prophets ever since the world began was required of that generation? Because they deserved it; for God does no such thing as injustice. It never was known that he punished any people or any individual beyond their desert.

But why and how did they deserve this fearful and augmented visitation of the wrath of God for past centuries of persecution?

The answer is two-fold: *they sinned against accumulated light, and they virtually endorsed all the persecuting deeds of their fathers*, and concurred most heartily in their guilt. They had all the oracles of God. The whole history of the nation lay in their hands. They knew the blameless and holy character of those prophets who had been martyred; they could read the guilt of their persecutors and murderers. Yet under all this light, themselves go straight on and perpetrate deeds of the same sort, but of far deeper malignity.

Again: in doing this they virtually endorse all that their fathers did. Their conduct towards the Man of Nazareth put into words would read thus—"The holy men whom God sent to teach and rebuke our fathers, they maliciously traduced and put to death; *they did right*, and we will do the same thing toward Christ." Now it was not possible for them to give a more decided sanction to the bloody deeds of their fathers. They underwrote for every crime—assumed upon their own consciences all the guilt of their father. *In intention*, they do those deeds over again. They say, "if we had lived then, we should have done and sanctioned all they did."

On the same principle the accumulated guilt of all the blood and miseries of Slavery since the world began rests on this nation now. The guilt involved in every pang, every tear, every blood-drop forced out by the knotted scourge—all lie at the door of this generation.

Why? Because the history of all the past is before the pro-slavery men of this generation, and they endorse the whole by persisting in the practice of the same system and of the same wrongs. No generation before us ever had the light

on the evils and the wrongs of Slavery that we have; hence our guilt exceeds that of any former generation of slave-holders; and moreover, knowing all the cruel wrongs and miseries of the system from the history of the past, every persisting slave-holder endorses all the crimes and assumes all the guilt involved in the system and evolved out of it since the world began.

Rom. 7: 13—"Was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, worketh death in me by that which is good, that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful." The last clause of this verse brings out clearly the principle that under the light which the commandment, that is, the law affords, sin becomes exceeding guilty. This is the very principle, which, we have seen, is so clearly taught and implied in numerous passages of Scripture.

The diligent reader of the Bible knows that these are only a part of the texts which teach the same doctrine: we need not adduce any more.

2. I remark that this is the rule and the only just rule by which the guilt of sin can be measured. If I had time to turn the subject over and over—time to take up every other conceivable supposition, I could show that none of them can possibly be true. No supposition can abide a close examination except this, that the rule or measure of guilt is the mind's knowledge pertaining to the value of the end to be chosen.

There can be no other criterion by which guilt can be measured. It is the value of the end that ought to be chosen which constitutes sin guilty, and the mind's estimate of that value measures its own guilt. This is true according to the Bible, as we have seen; and every man needs only consult his own consciousness faithfully, and he will see that it is equally affirmed by the mind's own intuitions to be right.

(7.) The *guilt* of transgression is just equal to the degree of *obligation*.

[1.] The guilt of sin lies in its being the violation of an obligation.

[2.] It must follow that the degree of the guilt of violation must be just equal to the degree of obligation. This, as we have seen, is not true of virtue, for obvious reasons. But it must be true of vice.

[3.] Moral obligation respects the choice of an end. The amount of the obligation must be just equal to the *mind's apprehension of the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen*. The

guilt of transgression is and must be just equal to the amount of the obligation. This conducts us to the conclusion or truth to be demonstrated, namely:

(8.) That moral agents are at all times either as holy or as sinful as with their knowledge they can be.

This will more fully appear if we consider,

[1.] That moral obligation respects ultimate intention alone.

[2.] That obligation to choose or intend an end is founded in the apprehended intrinsic value of the end.

[3.] That when this end is chosen in accordance with apprehended value all present obligation is met or complied with. Virtue is now complete in the sense that it can only be increased by increased light in regard to the value of the end. New relations and interests may be discovered, or the mind may come to apprehend more clearly the intrinsic value of those partially known before. In this case virtue may increase and not otherwise. It matters not what particular course is taken to realize this end. The intention is honest. It is and must, to be honest, be intense according to the mind's apprehension of the intrinsic value of the end. The mind can not but act in accordance with its best judgment in regard to the use of means to compass its end. Whatever it does it does for one and the same reason. Its virtue belongs to its intention. The intention remaining, virtue does not, can not vary but with varying light. This renders it evident that the virtuous man is as virtuous as with his present light he can be.

The same must be true of sin or selfishness. We have seen in former lectures that malevolence, strictly speaking, is impossible; that selfishness is ultimate intention, or the choice of self-gratification as an end; that the obligation to benevolence is founded in the intrinsic value of the good of God and the universe. that the amount of obligation is equal to the mind's apprehension or knowledge of the value of the end; that sin is a unit and always consists in violating this obligation by the choice of an opposite end; that the guilt of this violation depends upon and is equal to the mind's apprehension of the intrinsic value of the end it ought to choose.

Selfishness is the rejection of all obligation. It is the violation of all obligation. The sin of selfishness is then complete; that is, the guilt of selfishness is as great as with its present light it can be. What can make it greater with present light? Can the course that it takes to realize its end mitigate its guilt? No: for whatever course it takes it is for a

selfish reason, and therefore in no wise lessens the guilt of the intention. Can the course it takes to realize its end without more or less light increase the guilt of the sin? No: for the sin lies exclusively in having the selfish intention. The intention necessitates the use of the means; and whatever means the selfish person uses, it is for one and the same reason, to gratify himself. As I said in a former lecture, if the selfish man were to preach the gospel, it would be only because upon the whole it was most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the sake of the good of being, as an end. If he should become a pirate, it would be for exactly the same reason, to wit, that this course is upon the whole most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the reason that that course is evil in itself. Whichever course he takes, he takes it for precisely the same reason; and with the same degree of light it must involve the same degree of guilt. Which of these courses may tend ultimately to the most evil, no finite being can say, nor which shall result in the greatest evil; and if one could, guilt is not to be measured by tendency nor by results, but belongs to the intention; and its degree is to be measured alone by the mind's apprehension of the reason of the obligation violated, namely the intrinsic value of the good of God and the universe which selfishness rejects. Now it should be remembered that whichever course the sinner takes to realize his end, it is the end at which he aims. He intends the end. If he become a preacher of the gospel for a selfish reason, he has no right regard to the good of being. If he regards it at all, it is only as a means of his own good. So, if he becomes a pirate, it is not from malice or a disposition to do evil for its own sake, but only to gratify himself. If he has any regard at all to the evil he may do, it is only to gratify himself that he regards it. Whether therefore he preach or pray, or rob and plunder upon the high seas, he does it only for one end, that is, for precisely the same reason; and of course his sinfulness is complete in the sense that it can be varied only by varying light. This I know is contrary to common opinion, but it is the truth and must be known; and it is of the highest importance that these fundamental truths of morality and of immorality should be held up to the minds of all.

Should the sinner abstain from any course of vice because it is wicked, it cannot be because he is benevolent, for this would contradict the supposition that he is selfish or that he is a sinner. If in consideration that an act or course is wicked he abstains from it, it must be for a selfish reason. It may

be in obedience to phrenological conscientiousness, or it may be from fear of hell, or of disgrace, or from remorse; at all events, it can not but be for some selfish reason.

(9.) Total moral depravity is an attribute of selfishness, in the sense that every selfish person is at all times just as wicked and blame-worthy as with his present light he can be.

[1.] He, remaining selfish, can take no other course than to please himself, and only that course which is upon the whole most pleasing to him for the time being. If he takes one course of outward conduct rather than another, it is only to please and gratify himself.

[2.] But if for this reason he should take any other outward course than he does, it would not vary his guilt, for his guilt lies in the intention and is measured by the light under which the intention is maintained.

A few *inferences* may be drawn from our doctrine.

1. Guilt is not to be measured by the nature of the intention; for sinful intention is always a unit—always one and the same thing—being nothing more nor less than an intention to gratify self.

2. Nor can it be measured by the particular type of self-gratification which the mind may prefer. No matter which of his numerous appetites or propensities the man may choose to indulge—whether for food, or strong drink—for power, pleasure, or gain—it is the same thing in the end—self-gratification, and nothing else. For the sake of this he sacrifices every other conflicting interest, and herein lies his guilt. Since he tramples on the greater good of others with equal recklessness, whatever type of self-gratification he prefers, it is clear that we can not find in this type the true measure of his guilt.

3. Nor again is the guilt to be decided by the amount of evil which the sin may bring into the universe. An agent not enlightened may introduce great evil, and yet no guilt attach to this agent. This is true of evil often done by brute animals. In fact it matters not how much or how little evil may result from the misdeeds of a moral agent, you can not determine the amount of his guilt from this circumstance. God may overrule the greatest sin so that but little evil shall result from it, or he may leave its tendencies uncounteracted, so that great evils shall result from the least sin. Who can tell how much or how little overruling agency may interpose between any sin, great or small, and its legitimate results?

Satan sinned in tempting Judas, and Judas sinned in betraying Christ. Yet God so overruled these sins, that most blessed results to the universe followed from Christ's betrayal and consequent death. Shall the sins of Satan and Judas be estimated from the evils actually resulting from them? If it should appear that the good immensely overbalanced the evil, does their sin thereby become holiness—meritorious holiness? Is their guilt at all the less for God's wisdom and love in overruling it for good?

It is not therefore the amount of resulting good or evil which determines the amount of guilt, but is the degree of light enjoyed under which the sin is committed.

4. Nor again can guilt be measured by the common opinions of men. Men associated in society are wont to form among themselves a sort of public sentiment which becomes a standard for estimating guilt; yet how often is it erroneous! Christ warns us against adopting this standard, and also against ever judging according to the outward appearance. Who does not know that the common opinions of men are exceedingly incorrect? It is indeed wonderful to see how far they diverge in all directions from the Bible standard.

5. The amount of guilt can be determined, as I have said, only by the degree in which those ideas are developed which throw light upon obligation. Just here sin lies, in resisting the light and acting in opposition to it, and therefore the degree of light should naturally measure the amount of guilt incurred.

REMARKS.

1. We see from this subject the principle on which many passages of scripture are to be explained. It might seem strange that Christ should charge the blood of all the martyred prophets of past ages on that generation. But the subject before us reveals the principle upon which this is done and ought to be done.

Whatever of apparent mystery may attach to the fact declared in our text—"The times of this ignorance God winked at"—finds in our subject an adequate explanation. Does it seem strange that for ages God should pass over almost without apparent notice the monstrous and reeking abominations of the heathen world? The reason is found in their ignorance. Therefore God winks at those odious and cruel idolatries. For all, taken together, are a trifle compared with the guilt of a single generation of enlightend men.

2. One sinner may be in such circumstances as to have

more light and knowledge than the whole heathen world. Alas! how little the heathen know! How little compared with what is known by sinners in this land, even by very young sinners!

Let me call up and question some impenitent sinner of Oberlin. It matters but little whom—let it be any Sabbath School child.

What do you know about God? I know that there is one God and only one.—The heathen believe there are hundreds of thousands.

What do you know about God?

I know that he is infinitely great and good.—But the heathen thinks some of his gods are both mean and mischievous—wicked as can be and the very patrons of wickedness among men.

What do you know about salvation? I know that God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son that whosoever would believe on him might live forever. O, the heathen never heard of that. They would faint away methinks in amazement if they should hear and really believe the startling, glorious fact. And that Sabbath School child knows that God gives his Spirit to convince of sin. He has perhaps often been sensible of the presence and power of that Spirit. But the heathen know nothing of this.

You too know that you are immortal—that beyond death there is still a conscious unchanging state of existence, blissful or wretched according to the deeds done here. But the heathen have no just ideas on this subject. It is to them as if all were a blank.

The amount of it then is that you know every thing—the heathen almost nothing. You know all you need to know to be saved, to be useful—to honor God and serve your generation according to his will. The heathen sit in deep darkness, wedded to their abominations, groping, yet finding nothing.

As your light, therefore, so is your guilt immeasurably greater than theirs. Be it so that their idolatries are monstrous—guilt in your impenitence under the light you have is vastly more so. See that heathen mother dragging her shrieking child and tumbling it into the Ganges! See her rush with another to throw him into the burning arms of Moloch. Mark; see that pile of wood flashing, lifting up its lurid flames toward heaven. Those men are dragging a dead husband—they heave his senseless corpse on that burning pile.—

There comes the widow—her hair all disheveled and flying—gaily festooned for such a sacrifice;—she dances on;—she rends the air with her howls and her wailings;—she shrinks and yet she does not shrink—she leaps on the pile, and the din of music with the yell of spectators buries her shrieks of agony; she is gone! O, my blood curdles and runs cold in my veins;—my hair stands on end; I am horrified with such scenes—but what shall we say of their guilt? Ah yes—what do they know of God—of worship—of the claims of God upon their heart and life? Ah, you may well spare your censure of the Heathen for their fearful orgies of cruelty and lust, and give it where light has been enjoyed and resisted.

3. You see then that often a sinner in some of our congregations may know more than all the heathen world know. If this be true, what follows from it as to the amount of his comparative guilt? This, inevitably, *that such a sinner deserves a direr and deeper damnation than all the heathen world!* This conclusion may seem startling; but how can we escape from it? We can not escape. It is as plain as any mathematical demonstration. This is the principle asserted by Christ when he said—"That servant which knew his Lord's will and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes." How solemn and how pungent the application of this doctrine would be in this congregation! I could call out many a sinner in this place and show him that beyond question his guilt is greater than that of all the heathen world. Yet how few ever estimated their own guilt.

Not long since, an ungodly young man, trained in this country, wrote back from the Sandwich Islands a glowing and perhaps a just description of their horrible abominations, moralizing on their monstrous enormities, and thanking God that he had been born and taught in a Christian land. Indeed! he might well have spared this censure of the dark-minded heathen! His own guilt in remaining an impenitent sinner under all the light of Christian America was greater than the whole aggregate guilt of all those Islands.

So we may all well spare our expressions of abhorrence at the guilty abominations of idolatry. You are often perhaps saying in your heart: Why does God endure these horrid abominations another day? See that rolling car of Juggernaut. Its wheels move axle-deep in the gushing blood and crushed bones of its deluded worshipers! And yet God looks on and

no red bolt leaps from his right hand to smite such wickedness. They are indeed guilty; but O how small their guilt compared with the guilt of those who know their duty perfectly, yet never do it! God sees their horrible abominations, yet does he wink at them because they are done in so much ignorance.

But see that impenitent sinner. Convicted of his sin under the clear gospel light that shines all around him, he is driven to pray. He knows he ought to repent, and almost thinks he is willing to, and will try. Yet still he clings to his sins and will not give up his heart to God. Still he holds his heart in a state of impenitence. Now mark me;—his sin, in thus withholding his heart from God under so much light, involves greater guilt than all the abominations of the heathen world. Put together the guilt of all those widows who immolate themselves on the funeral pile—of those who hurl their children into the Ganges, or into the burning arms of Moloch—all does not begin to approach the guilt of that convicted sinner's prayer who comes before God under the pressure of his conscience, and prays a heartless prayer, determined all the while to withhold his heart from God. O, why does this sinner thus tempt God, and thus abuse his love, and thus trample on his authority? O, that moment of impenitence, while his prayers are forced by conscience from his burning lips, and yet he will not yield the controversy with his Maker—that moment involves direr guilt than rests on all the heathen world together! He knows more than they all, yet sins despite of all his knowledge. The many stripes belong to him—the few to them.

4. This leads me to remark again that the Christian world may very well spare their revilings and condemnations of the heathen. Of all the portions of earth's population, Christendom is infinitely the most guilty—Christendom, where the gospel peals from ten thousand pulpits—where its praises are sung by a thousand choirs, but where many thousand hearts that know God and duty, refuse either to reverence the one or perform the other! All the abominations of the heathen world are a mere trifle compared with the guilt of Christendom. We may look down upon the filth and meanness and degradation of a heathen people, and feel a most polite disgust at the spectacle—and far be it from me to excuse these degrading, filthy or cruel practices; but how small their light and consequently their guilt, compared with our own! We therefore ask the Christian world to turn away from the spectacle of

Heathen degradation, and look nearer home upon the spectacle of Christian guilt! Let us look upon ourselves.

5. Again: let us not fear to say what you must all see to be true, that the nominal church is the most guilty part of Christendom. It can not for a moment be questioned, that the church has more light than any other portion; therefore has she more guilt. Of course I speak of the nominal church—not the real church whom He has pardoned, and cleansed from her sins. But in the nominal church, think of the sins that live and riot in their corruption. See that backslider. He has tasted the waters of life. He has been greatly enlightened. Perhaps he has really known the Lord by true faith—and then see, he turns away to eat the husks of earthly pleasure! He turns his back on the bleeding Lamb! Now, put together all the guilt of every Heathen soul that has gone to hell—of every soul that has gone from a state of utter moral darkness; and your guilt, backsliding Christian, is greater than all theirs!

Do you, therefore, say: may God then have mercy on my soul? So say we all; but we must add, if *it be possible*; for who can say that such guilt as yours can be forgiven! Can Christ pray for you as he prayed for his murderers—"Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do?" Can he plead in your behalf that you know not what you are doing? Awful! awful!! Where is the sounding line that shall measure the ocean-depth of your guilt!

6. Again: if our children remain in sin we may cease to congratulate ourselves that they were not born in Heathenism or Slavery! How often have I done this! How often, as I have looked upon my sons and daughters, have I thanked God that they were not born to be thrown into the burning arms of a Moloch, or to be crushed under the wheels of Juggernaut! But if they will live in sin, we must suspend our self-congratulations for their having Christian light and privileges. If they will not repent, it were infinitely better for them to have been born in the thickest Pagan darkness—better to have been thrown in their tender years into the Ganges, or into the fires which idolatry kindles—better be any thing else, or suffer any thing earthly, than have the gospel's light only to shut it out and go to hell despite of its admonitions.

Let us not, then, be hasty in congratulating ourselves, as if this great light enjoyed by us and by our children, were of course a certain good to them; but this we may do—we may

rejoice that God will honor himself—his mercy if he can, and his justice if he must. God will be honored, and we may glory in this. But oh, the sinner, the sinner! Who can measure the depth of his guilt, or the terror of his final doom! It will be more tolerable for all the heathen world together than for you.

7. It is time that we all understood this subject fully, and appreciated all its bearings. It is no doubt true, that however moral our children may be, they are more guilty than any other sinners under heaven, if they live in sin, and will not yield to the light under which they live. We may be perhaps congratulating ourselves on their fair morality; but if we saw their case in all its real bearings, our souls would groan with agony—our bowels would be all liquid with anguish—our very hearts within us would heave as if volcanic fires were kindled there—so deep a sense should we have of their fearful guilt and of the awful doom they incur in denying the Lord that bought them, and setting at nought a known salvation. O, if we ever pray, we should pour out our prayers for our offspring as if nothing could ever satisfy us or stay our importunity, but the blessings of a full salvation realized in their souls.

Let the mind contemplate the guilt of these children. I could not find a Sabbath School child, perhaps not one in all Christendom, who could not tell me more of God's salvation than all the heathen world know. That dear little boy who comes from his Sabbath school knows all about the gospel. He is almost ready to be converted, but not quite ready; yet that little boy, if he knows his duty and yet will not do it, is covered with more guilt than all the heathen world together. Yes, that boy, who goes alone and prays, yet holds back his heart from God, and then his mother comes and prays over him, and pours her tears on his head, and his little heart almost melts, and he seems on the very point of giving up his whole heart to the Savior; yet if he will not do it, he commits more sin in that refusal than all the sin of all the heathen world—his guilt is more than the guilt of all the murders, all the drownings of children, and burnings of widows, and deeds of cruelty and violence in all the heathen world. All this combination of guilt shall not be equal to the guilt of the lad who knows his duty, but will not yield his heart to its righteous claims.

8. "The Heathen," says an apostle, "sin without law and shall therefore perish without law." In their final doom they

will be cast away from God: this will be perhaps about all. The bitter reflection, "I had the light of the gospel and would not yield to it—I knew all my duty, yet did it not"—this can not be a part of their eternal doom. This is reserved for those who gather themselves into our sanctuaries and around our family altars, yet will not serve their own Infinite Father.

9. One more remark. Suppose I should call out a sinner by name—one of the sinners of this congregation, a son of pious parents, and should call up the father also.—I might say Is this your son? Yes. What testimony can you bear about this son of yours? I have endeavored to teach him all the ways of the Lord. Son, what can you say? I knew my duty—I have heard it a thousand times. I knew I ought to repent, but I never would.

O, if we understood this matter in all its bearings, it would fill every bosom with consternation and grief. How would our bowels yearn and our bosoms heave as a volcano. There would be one universal outcry of anguish and terror at the awful guilt and fearful doom of such a sinner!

Young man, are you going away this day in your sins? Then, what angel can compute your guilt? O how long has Jesus held out his hands, yes, his bleeding hands, and besought you to look and live? A thousand times, and in countless varied ways has he called, but you have refused; stretched out his hand, and you have not regarded. O, will you not repent? Why not say at once: It is enough that I have sinned so long. I can not live so any longer! O, sinner, *why will you live so?* Would you go down to hell—ah, to the deepest hell—where, if we would find you, we must work our way down for a thousand years through ranks of lost spirits less guilty than you, ere we could reach the fearful depth to which you have sunk! O, sinner, what a hell is that which can adequately punish such guilt as thine!

LECTURE XXIX.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

I. OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW IS AND MUST BE, UNDER EVERY DISPENSATION OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT, THE UNALTERABLE CONDITION OF SALVATION.

II. UNDER A GRACIOUS DISPENSATION OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW IS NOT DISPENSED WITH AS THE CONDITION OF SALVATION, BUT THAT OBEDIENCE TO LAW IS SECURED BY THE INDWELLING SPIRIT AND GRACE OF CHRIST.

I. OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW IS AND MUST BE, UNDER EVERY DISPENSATION OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT THE UNALTERABLE CONDITION OF SALVATION.

In discussing this proposition I will,

1. *Show what is not intended by it.*

2. *What is intended by it, and*

3. *Show that it must be true.*

1. *What is not intended by it.*

It is not intended that no one can be saved who has at any time broken the law. For this would shut all sinners out from the possibility of salvation.

2. *What is intended.*

That no one can be saved who does not return to full obedience to the law.

3. *Prove the proposition.*

(1.) Salvation upon any other condition is naturally impossible. Without holiness salvation is out of the question. But holiness and full obedience to the moral law are the same thing.

(2.) The gospel is not a repeal of the law, but designed to establish it.

(3.) As the moral law is the law of nature, it is absurd to suppose that entire obedience to it should not be the unalterable condition of salvation, that is, that salvation should be possible upon a less condition than a return on the part of sinners to the state of mind required by this law of nature.

(4.) The bible everywhere represents the perfect love required by the law as indispensable to salvation. It is naturally indispensable.

Perhaps some one will say that it is true indeed that one can not enter heaven without first becoming entirely obedient to the divine law, but that this obedience may first take place

immediately after death. I reply,—that the uniform representation of the bible is that men shall be judged according to the deeds done in the body, and that the state of mind in which they enter the eternal world shall decide their destiny forever. It is nowhere so much as hinted in the bible that men shall be saved in consequence or upon condition of a change that takes place after death. But the opposite of this is the unvarying teaching of the bible. If men are not holy here, they never will be holy. If they are not sanctified by the Spirit and the belief of the truth in this life, there is no intimation in the bible that they ever will be; but the contrary of this is the plain and unequivocal teaching of the bible. The work of regeneration and sanctification is always represented as being instrumentally effected by the instrumentality and agency of those means that Christ has provided in this world. “But unto every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ. Wherefore he saith, When he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. (Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth. He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that he might fill all things.) And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.”—Eph. 4: 7—13. This passage is only a specimen of scripture declarations and teachings upon this subject. It unequivocally teaches the entire sanctification of the whole mystical body or church of Christ in this life or by the means which he has provided, and which means relate exclusively to this life.

II. UNDER A GRACIOUS DISPENSATION, A RETURN TO FULL OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW IS NOT DISPENSED WITH AS A CONDITION OF SALVATION, BUT THIS OBEDIENCE IS SECURED BY THE INDWELLING SPIRIT OF CHRIST RECEIVED BY FAITH TO REIGN IN THE HEART.

In discussing this proposition I shall endeavor to show,

1. *That salvation by grace does not dispense with a return to full obedience to law as a condition of salvation, and*
2. *That the grace of the gospel is designed to restore sinners to full obedience to the law.*
3. *That the efficient influence that secures this conformity to*

law is the Spirit of Christ or the Holy Spirit received into and reigning in the heart by faith.

1. *Salvation by grace does not dispense with a return to full obedience as a condition of salvation.*

There is a class of scripture texts which have been quoted by antinomians in support of the doctrine that salvation is *not conditioned* upon personal holiness or upon a return to full obedience. It has been found very convenient by many who were lovers of sin and never conscious of personal holiness, to adopt the idea of an imputed holiness, contenting themselves with an outward righteousness imputed to them instead of submitting by faith to have the righteousness of God wrought *in them*. Unwilling to be *personally pious* they be-take themselves to an *imputed piety*. Because the scriptures declare that men are not *saved by works of the law*, they infer that a return to that state of love required by the law is not even a *condition* of salvation. The texts above referred to are such as these. "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified."—Gal. 2: 16. This and sundry other passages that hold the same language are grossly misunderstood and misapplied by antinomians. They merely declare that men are not justified and saved by their own works, which of course they can not be if they have committed even one sin. But they do not intimate, and there is no passage rightly understood that does intimate, that men are saved or justified upon conditions short of personal holiness or a return to full obedience to the moral law.

Again: James wrote his epistle to establish this point. Grace can not save by dispensing with personal holiness or a return to full obedience to the law. Grace must not only pardon, but secure personal holiness, or the soul is not fitted either for the employments or enjoyments of heaven. It is naturally impossible for grace to save the soul but upon condition of entire sanctification.

2. *The grace of the Gospel was designed to restore sinners to full obedience to the moral law.*

This is abundantly evident from almost every part of the Bible. "And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul that thou mayest live."—Deuteronomy 30: 7. "And I will give them a heart to know

me, that I am the Lord; and they shall be my people, and I will be their God: for they shall return unto me with their whole heart.”—Jeremiah 24: 7. “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord: for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.”—Jeremiah 31: 31—34. “And I will give them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within you: and I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them a heart of flesh.”—Eze. 11: 19. “Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness and from all your idols I will cleanse you.”—Eze. 36: 25. “For finding fault with them, he saith, Behold the days come, saith the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah, not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day when I took them by the hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt, because they continued not in my covenant, and I regarded them not, saith the Lord. For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; After those days saith the Lord, I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people: and they shall not teach every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least to the greatest. For I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more.”—Hebrews 8: 8—12. “And he shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call his name JESUS; for he shall save his people from their sins.”—Matt. 1: 21. “And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly: and *I pray God* your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful *is* he that calleth you, who also will do *it*.”—1. Thess. 5: 23, 24. “For sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace.”—Rom. 6: 14. These and many other passages of like import plainly teach the truth of the proposition we are considering, namely, that grace was designed to secure personal holiness and full return to the love required by the law rather than to dispense with this holiness or obedience as a condition of salvation.

3. *The efficient influence that secures this return to full obedience to the law is the Holy Spirit received to reign in the heart by faith.*

That God writes his law in the heart by his indwelling Spirit, is abundantly taught in the bible. Writing his law in the heart is begetting the spirit or love required by the law in their heart.

By his reigning in the heart is intended his setting up and continuing his dominion in the heart by writing his law there, or as is said just above, by begetting the love required by the law in the heart.

Also by reigning in the heart is intended that He leads, guides and controls the soul by enlightening and drawing it into conformity in all things to his will. Thus it is said, "It is God that worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure."

By the assertion that the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of Christ is received by faith to reign in the heart it is intended that He is actually trusted in or submitted to by faith, and His influence suffered to control us. He does not guide and control us by irresistible power or force, but faith confides the guidance of our souls to Him. Faith receives and confides in Him, and consents to be governed and directed by Him. As His influence is moral and not physical, it is plain that He can influence us no farther than we have confidence in Him, that is, no farther than we trust, confide in Him. But I must cite some passages that sustain these positions. "That the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith."—Gal. 3: 14. "Until the Spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be a fruitful field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest."—Isaiah 32: 15. "For I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground: I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring."—Isaiah 44: 3. "But this shall be the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel; After those days saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my people."—Jer. 31: 33. "And I will make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not turn away from them, to do them good; but I will put my fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from me."—Jer. 32: 40. "And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daugh-

ters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions.”—Joel 2: 28, 29. “And I will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem the spirit of grace and supplication; and they shall look upon me whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him as one mourneth for his only son, and shall be in bitterness for him, as one that is in bitterness for his first born.”—Zechariah 12: 10. “But this spake he of the Spirit which they that believe on him should receive: for the Holy Ghost was not yet given; because that Jesus was not yet glorified.” John 7: 39. “Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear.”—Acts 2: 33. “Even the Spirit of truth; whom the world can not receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him; for he dwelleth with you and shall be in you.”—John 14: 17. “There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of his. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.”—Romans 8: 1—5—9—11—13, 14, 15, 16. “But if ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law.”—Gal. 5: 18. “Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?”—1 Cor. 3: 16. “What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?”—1 Cor. 6: 19. “But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith. If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.”—Gal. 5: 22—25. “That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith, that ye, being rooted and grounded in love.”—Eph.

3: 17. "For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God."—Eph. 2: 8. "And be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith."—Phil. 3: 9. "Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead."—Col. 2: 12.

These passages abundantly support the position for the establishment of which they are quoted. It is only necessary to remark here,

1. That the Holy Spirit controls, directs, and sanctifies the soul, not by a physical influence, nor by impulses or by impressions made on the sensibility, but by enlightening and convincing the intelligence.

2. The fundamentally important doctrine of an in dwelling Christ, that the Spirit of Christ must be received by faith to reign in the heart, has been extensively overlooked. "Christ our sanctification!" said a minister to me a few months since, "I never heard of such a thing." Also said a Doctor of Divinity to me, "I never heard Christ spoken of as our sanctification until the Perfectionists affirmed it." Indeed it is amazing to see how this blessed truth has been overlooked. Christ, by his Spirit, must actually dwell within and reign over us, and this is an unalterable condition of salvation. He is our King. He must be received by faith to set up and establish His kingdom in the heart, or salvation is impossible.

LECTURE XXX.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

SANCTIONS OF MORAL LAW, NATURAL AND GOVERNMENTAL.

In the discussion of this subject, I shall show,

I. What constitutes the sanctions of law.

II. That there can be no law without sanctions.

III. In what light the sanctions of law are to be regarded.

IV. The end to be secured by law and the execution of penal sanctions.

V. The rule by which sanctions ought to be graduated.

I. What constitutes the sanctions of law.

1. The sanctions of law are the motives to obedience, that which is to be the natural and the governmental consequence or result of obedience and of disobedience.

2. They are *remuneratory*, that is, they promise reward to obedience.

3. They are *vindictory*, that is, they threaten the disobedient with punishment.

4. They are natural, that is,

(1.) All moral law is that rule of action which is in exact accordance with the nature and relations of moral beings.

(2.) Happiness is to some extent naturally connected with, and the necessary consequence of obedience to moral law.

(3.) Misery is naturally and necessarily connected with and results from disobedience to moral law, or from acting contrary to the nature and relations of moral beings.

5. Sanctions are governmental. By governmental sanctions are intended,

(1.) The favor of the government as due to obedience.

(2.) A positive reward bestowed upon the obedient by government.

(3.) The displeasure of government towards the disobedient

(4.) Direct punishment inflicted by the government as due to disobedience.

6. All happiness and misery resulting from obedience or disobedience, either natural or from the favor or frown of government, are to be regarded as constituting the sanctions of law.

II. There can be no law without sanctions.

1. It has been said in a former lecture that precepts without sanctions are only counsel or advice, and no law.

2. Nothing is law, but the rule of action which is founded in the nature and relations of moral beings. It is therefore absurd to say, that there should be no natural sanctions to this rule of action. It is the same absurdity as to say, that conformity to the laws of our being would not produce happiness, and that disconformity to the laws of our being would not produce misery: which is a contradiction; for what do we mean by acting in conformity to the laws of our being, but that course of conduct in which all the powers of our being will sweetly harmonize, and produce happiness? And what do we mean by disconformity to the laws of our being, but that course of action that creates mutiny among our powers themselves, that produces discord instead of harmony, misery instead of happiness?

3. A precept, to have the nature and the force of law, must be founded in reason, that is, it must have some reason for its existence. And it were unjust to hold out no motives to obedience where a law is founded in a necessity of our nature.

4. But whatever is unjust is no law. Therefore a precept without a sanction is not law.

5. Necessity is the condition of all rightful government. There would be and could be no just government, but for the necessities of the universe. But these necessities can not be met, the great end of government can not be secured without motives or sanctions. Therefore that is no government, no law, that has no sanctions.

III. In what light sanctions are to be regarded.

1. Sanctions are to be regarded as an expression of the benevolent regard of the law-giver for his subjects: the motives which he exhibits to induce in the subjects the course of conduct that will secure their highest well-being.

2. They are to be regarded as an expression of his estimation of the justice, necessity, and value of the precept.

3. They are to be regarded as an expression of the amount or strength of his desire to secure the happiness of his subjects.

4. They are to be regarded as an expression of his opinion in respect to the desert of disobedience.

The natural sanctions are to be regarded as a demonstration of the justice, necessity, and perfection of the precept.

IV. The end to be secured by law, and the execution of penal sanctions.

1. The ultimate end of all government is blessedness.

2 This is the ultimate end of the precept and the sanction of law.

3. This can be secured only by the prevention of sin and the promotion of holiness.

4. Confidence in the government is the *sine qua non* of all virtue.

5. Confidence results from a revelation of the lawgiver to his subjects. Confidence in God results from a revelation of himself to his creatures.

6. The moral law, in its precepts and sanctions, is a revelation of God.

7. The execution of penal sanctions, is also a revelation of the mind, will, and character of the lawgiver.

8. The highest and most influential sanctions of government are those motives that most fully reveal the true character of God.

V. By what rule sanctions ought to be graduated.

1. We have seen in a former lecture that moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of the well-being of God and of the universe, and conditioned upon the perception of its value.

2. That guilt ought always to be measured by the perceived value of the end which moral beings ought to choose.

3. The sanctions of law should be graduated by the intrinsic merit or demerit of holiness and sin.

SANCTIONS OF GOD'S LAW.

I. God's law has sanctions.

II. What constitutes the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God.

III. The perfection and duration of the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God.

IV. What constitutes the vindicatory sanctions of the law of God.

V. Their duration.

I. God's law has sanctions.

1. That sin or disobedience to the moral law, is attended with, and results in misery, is a matter of consciousness.

2. That virtue or holiness is attended with and results in happiness, is also attested by consciousness.

3. Therefore that God's law has natural sanctions, both remuneratory and vindicatory, is a matter of fact.

4. That there are governmental sanctions added to the natural, must be true, or God in fact has no Government.

5. The Bible expressly and in every variety of form teach-

es that God will reward the righteous and punish the wicked.

II. What constitutes the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God.

1. The happiness that is naturally and necessarily connected with, and results from holiness or obedience.
2. The merited favor, protection, and blessing of God.
3. All the natural and governmental rewards of virtue.

III. The perfection and duration of the remuneratory sanctions of the law of God.

1. The perfection of the natural reward is and must be proportioned to the perfection of virtue.
2. The duration of the remuneratory sanction must be equal to the duration of obedience. This can not possibly be otherwise.
3. If the existence and virtue of man are immortal his happiness must be endless.
4. The Bible most unequivocally asserts the immortality both of the existence and virtue of the righteous, and also that their happiness shall be endless.
5. The very design and end of government make it necessary that governmental rewards should be as perfect and unending as virtue.

IV. What constitutes the vindicatory sanctions of the law of God.

1. The misery naturally and necessarily connected with, and the result of disobedience to moral law. Here again let it be understood that moral law is nothing else than that rule of action which accords with the nature and relations of moral beings. Therefore the natural vindicatory sanction of the law of God is misery resulting from a violation of man's own nature.

2. The displeasure of God, the loss of his protection and governmental favor, together with that punishment which it is his duty to inflict upon the disobedient.

3. The rewards of holiness and the punishment of sin, are described in the Bible in figurative language. The rewards of virtue are called eternal life. The punishment of vice is called death. By life is intended, not only existence, but that happiness which makes life desirable. By death is intended, not annihilation, but that misery which renders existence an evil.

V. Duration of the penal sanctions of the law of God.

1. Examine the question in the light of natural theology.
2. In the light of revelation.

In examining it in the light of natural theology, I shall,

1. Inquire into the meaning of the term *infinite*.
2. Show that infinities may differ indefinitely in amount.
3. Remind you of the rule by which the degrees of guilt are to be estimated.
4. That all and every sin must, from its very nature, involve infinite guilt, in the sense of deserving endless punishment.
5. That notwithstanding all sin deserves endless punishment, yet the guilt of different persons may vary indefinitely, and that punishment although always endless in duration may and ought to and must vary in degree, in proportion as guilt varies.
6. That the duration of penal inflictions under the government of God will be endless.

I. Inquire into the meaning of the term Infinite.

1. It literally and properly means *not finite, not limited, not bounded*, or unlimited, boundless. This is the meaning of the term and the sense in which I shall use it in this discussion.

II. Infinities may differ indefinitely in amount.

1. This is the doctrine of Sir Isaac Newton, and of natural and mathematical science, as most persons at all acquainted with this subject know.

2. It is a plain matter of fact. For example: suppose that from this point radiate mathematical lines endlessly in every direction. Let each two of these lines make an angle of one degree and let the points be sufficiently numerous to fill up the whole circle. Now as these lines extend endlessly in every direction every pair of them form the legs of a triangle whose sides extend endlessly and which has no base or which has no bound in one direction. It is self-evident that the *superficial area* contained between any two of those radii is *infinite* in the sense that its superficial amount is *unlimited*. Thus the whole of space is no more than infinite, and yet there is in the sense of unlimited an infinite amount of space between every two of those radii.

The same would be true upon the supposition of parallel mathematical lines of infinite length no matter how near together: the superficies or area between them must be infinite in amount. Any thing is infinite which has no whole, which is boundless in any sense. In the sense in which it is boundless it is infinite. For example, in the cases supposed the area between any two of the radii of the circle or of the parallel lines is not infinite in the sense that it has no bounds in any direction. For it is bounded on its sides. But it is infi-

nite in the sense of its superficial measure or contents. So, endless happiness or misery may be finite in one sense and infinite in another. They may be infinite in amount taking into view their endlessness, however small they may be in degree. So that in degree they may, and with finite creatures must be finite in degree but infinite in amount. There is and can be no *whole* of them and therefore in amount they are infinite. God's happiness may be and is infinite both in degree and in duration, which amounts to infinite in the absolute sense.

III. I must remind you of the rule by which degrees of guilt are to be estimated.

And here let it be remembered,

1. That moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of those interests which moral agents are bound to choose as an end.

2. That the obligation is conditioned upon the knowledge of this end, and,

3. That the degree of obligation is just equal to the degree of light which the mind has in regard to the intrinsic value of those interests which it is bound to choose.

4. That the guilt of refusal to will these interests is in proportion, or is equal to the amount of the obligation, and,

5. That consequently the mind's honest apprehension or judgment of the value of those interests which it refuses to will, is and must be the rule by which the degree of guilt involved in that refusal ought to be measured. I do not mean that guilt is to be measured by the mind's actual but dishonest estimate of the value of the interests it rejects; but guilt is to be measured by the light enjoyed or by the estimate which the mind would have with the light that now shines around it, were it honest and disposed to receive the light and judge accordingly.

IV. That all and every sin must from its very nature involve infinite guilt in the sense of deserving endless punishment.

1. Sin implies moral obligation.

2. Moral obligation implies moral agency.

3. Moral agency implies light, or the knowledge of the end that moral agents ought to will.

4. This end is the highest well-being of God and of the universe.

5. The idea or apprehension of this end implies the knowledge that the intrinsic value of those endless interests must be infinite.

If the idea of God and of the good of being be developed,

which is implied in moral agency, there must be in the mind the idea or first truth that the good of God and of the universe is infinitely valuable. The idea may lie in comparative obscurity. Nevertheless it is and must be in the mind. If this is so, (and it must be so,) it follows that every refusal to will the highest well-being of God and of the universe involves infinite guilt. Every moral agent must be able to affirm, and indeed must affirm to himself that the intrinsic value of the happiness of God and the universe must be boundless, unlimited, infinite. He must affirm that there can be no limit to it. By this affirmation or by the apprehension that necessitates this affirmation, his guilt ought to be measured, if he refuses to consecrate himself to the promotion of those interests.

V. Notwithstanding all sin deserves endless punishment, yet the guilt of different persons may vary indefinitely, and punishment, although always endless in duration, may and ought to vary in degree according to the guilt of each individual.

The guilt of different persons may vary indefinitely.—This also may be true of the same person at different periods of life. Observe: the degree of guilt depends on the degree of intellectual development on moral subjects—upon the clearness with which the mind apprehends moral relations, especially the intrinsic value of those interests which it ought to choose. These apprehensions vary, as every moral agent is conscious, almost continually. The obligation to will an end lies in the intrinsic value of the end. The obligation is greater or less as the mind's honest estimate of the value of it is greater or less. Every moral agent knows that the value of the end is unbounded. Yet some have an indefinitely larger conception of what infinite and boundless means. Some minds mean indefinitely more by such language than others do. As light increases and the mind obtains enlarged conceptions of God, of the universe, of endless happiness or misery, and of all those great truths that cluster around these subjects, its obligation increases in exact proportion to increasing light, and so does the guilt of selfishness.

VI. That penal inflictions under the government of God must be endless.

Here the inquiry is, what kind of death is intended where death is denounced against the transgressor as the penalty of the law of God?

I. It is not merely natural death, for,

1. This would in reality be no penalty at all. But it would be offering a reward to sin. If natural death is all that is intended, and if persons, as soon as they are naturally dead have suffered the penalty of the law, and their souls go immediately to heaven, the case stands thus: If your obedience is perfect and perpetual, you shall live in this world forever: but if you sin, you shall die and go right to heaven. This would be hire and salary, and not punishment.

2. If natural death be the penalty of God's law, the righteous who are forgiven, should not die a natural death.

3. If natural death be the penalty of God's law, there is no such thing as forgiveness, but all must actually endure the penalty.

4. If natural death be the penalty, then infants and animals suffer this penalty as well as the most abandoned transgressors.

5. If natural death be the penalty it sustains no proportion whatever to the guilt of sin.

6. Natural death would be no adequate expression of the importance of the precept.

II. The penalty of God's law is not spiritual death.

1. Because spiritual death is a state of entire sinfulness.

2. To make a state of entire sinfulness the penalty of the law of God, would be to make the penalty and the breach of the precept identical.

3. It would be making God the author of sin, and would represent him as compelling the sinner to commit one sin as the punishment for another, as forcing him into a state of total depravity as the reward of his first transgression.

III. But the penal sanction of the law of God is *eternal death* or that state of suffering which is the natural and governmental result of sin or spiritual death.

Before I proceed to the proof of this, I will notice an objection which is often urged against the doctrine of eternal punishments. The objection is *one*, but it is stated in three different forms. This, and every other objection to the doctrine of endless punishment, with which I am acquainted, is leveled against the justice of such a governmental infliction.

1. It is said that endless punishment is unjust because life is so short that men do not live long enough in this world to commit so great a number of sins as to deserve endless punishment. To this I answer,

(1.) That it is founded in a ridiculous ignorance or disregard of a universal principle of government, viz: that one

breach of the precept always incurs the penalty of the law, whatever that penalty is.

(2.) The length of time employed in committing a sin, has nothing to do with its blameworthiness or guilt. It is the *design* which constitutes the moral character of the action, and not the length of time required for its accomplishment.

(3.) This objection takes for granted that it is the number of sins and not the intrinsic guilt of sin that constitutes its blameworthiness, whereas it is the intrinsic desert or guilt of sin, as we shall soon see, that renders it deserving of endless punishment.

2. Another form of the objection is, that a finite creature can not commit an infinite sin. But none but an infinite sin can deserve endless punishment: therefore endless punishments are unjust.

(1.) This objection takes for granted that man is so diminutive a creature, so much less than the Creator, that he can not deserve his endless frown.

(2.) The fact is, the greater the distance between the creature and the creator, the more aggravated is the guilt of insult or rebellion in the creature. Which is the greater crime, for a child to insult his playfellow or his parent? Which would involve the most guilt, for a man to smite his neighbor and his equal, or his lawful sovereign?

(3.) The higher the ruler is exalted above the subject in his nature, character, and rightful authority, the greater is the guilt of transgression in the subject. Therefore the fact that man is so infinitely below his Maker but enhances the guilt of his rebellion and renders him worthy of his endless frown.

3. A third form of the objection is, that sin is not an infinite evil, and therefore does not deserve endless punishment.

This objection may mean either that sin would not produce infinite mischief if unrestrained, or that it does not involve infinite guilt. It can not mean the first, for it is agreed on all hands that misery must continue as long as sin does, and therefore that sin unrestrained would produce endless evil. The objection therefore must mean that sin does not involve infinite guilt. Observe then, the point at issue is, what is the intrinsic demerit or guilt of sin? What does all sin in its own nature deserve? They who deny the justice of endless punishment, manifestly consider the guilt of sin as a mere trifle. They who maintain the justice of endless punishment, consider sin as an evil of immeasurable magnitude,

and, in its own nature, as deserving of endless punishment.
Proof:

1. The guilt or blameworthiness of an action consists in its being the violation of an obligation. Example: Should a child refuse obedience to his fellow who has no natural or acquired claims upon his obedience, he would not be blameworthy. But should he refuse obedience to his parent who has both a natural and acquired claim to his obedience, this conduct would be blameworthy. This shows in what blameworthiness consists.

2. The guilt or blameworthiness of an action is equal to the amount of obligation to do or omit that thing. We have just seen that the blameworthiness lies in its being the violation of an obligation. Hence the amount of blameworthiness must be equal to the amount of obligation. If a child refuse to obey his fellow, he contracts no guilt. If he refuse to obey his parent, he contracts a degree of guilt equal to the amount of his obligation to obey. Suppose that some one upon whom he is a thousand times as dependent as upon his parent, and who therefore has a thousand times higher claim upon his obedience than his parent has, should command him to do or omit a certain thing. Should he in this case disobey, his guilt would be a thousand times as great as when he disobeyed his parents. Now suppose that God, upon whom every moral being is not only perfectly but endlessly dependent, requires the creature to love him with all his heart; who does not see that his guilt in refusing obedience must be as great as his obligation to obey?

Having shown that moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of the highest well-being of God and of the universe, and that it is always equal to the light afforded to the mind or to the soul's knowledge of the value of those interests, and having shown also that every moral agent necessarily has the idea more or less clearly developed that the value of those interests is infinite, it follows:

That the law is infinitely unjust, if its penal sections are not endless. Law must be just in two respects.

The precept must be in accordance with the law of nature.

The penalty must be equal to the importance of the precept. That which has not these two peculiarities is not just, and therefore is not and can not be law. Either, then, God has no law, or its penal sanctions are endless.

1. That the penal sanctions of the law of God are endless,

is evident from the fact that a less penalty would not exhibit as high motives as the nature of the case admits, to restrain sin and promote virtue.

2. Natural justice demands that God should exhibit as high motives to secure obedience as the value of the law demands, and the nature of the case admits.

3. The justice, holiness and benevolence of God demand that the penal sanctions of his law should be endless; and if they are not, God can not be just, holy or benevolent.

4. Unless the penal sanctions of the law of God are endless, they are virtually and really no penalty at all. If a man be threatened with punishment for one thousand, or ten thousand, or ten millions, or ten hundred millions of years, after which he is to come out, as a matter of justice, and go to heaven, there is beyond an absolute eternity of happiness. Now there is no sort of proportion between the longest finite period that can be named, or even conceived, and endless duration. If, therefore, limited punishment, ending in an eternity of heaven, be the penalty of God's law, the case stands thus: Be perfect, and you live here forever. Sin, and receive finite suffering, with an eternity of heaven. This would be, after all, offering reward to sin.

5. Death is eternal in its nature. The fact, therefore, that this figure is used to express the future punishment of the wicked affords a plain inference that it is endless.

6. The tendency of sin to perpetuate and aggravate itself, affords another strong inference that the sinfulness and misery of the wicked will be eternal.

7. The fact that punishment has no tendency to beget disinterested love in a selfish mind towards him who inflicts the punishment, also affords a strong presumption that future punishment will be eternal.

8. The law makes no provision for terminating future punishment.

9. Sin deserves endless punishment just as fully as it deserves any punishment at all. If, therefore, it is not forgiven, if it be punished at all with penal suffering, the punishment must be endless.

10. To deny the justice of eternal punishments, involves the same principle as a denial of the justice of any degree of punishment.

11. To deny the justice of endless punishment, is virtually to deny the fact of moral evil. But to deny this is to deny moral obligation. To deny moral obligation is to deny moral

agency. But of both moral obligation and moral agency we are absolutely conscious. Therefore it follows to a demonstration, not only that moral evil does exist, but that it deserves endless punishment.

II. Examine this question in the light of Revelation.

The bible in a great many ways represents the future punishment of the wicked as eternal. It expresses the duration of the future punishment of the wicked by the same terms, and in every way as forcibly as it expresses the duration of the future happiness of the righteous.]

I will here introduce without comment some passages of scripture confirmatory of this last remark. "The hope of the righteous *shall be* gladness: but the expectation of the wicked shall perish."—Prov. 10: 28. "When a wicked man dieth, *his* expectation shall perish; and the hope of unjust *men* perisheth."—Prov. 11: 7. "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall wake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame *and* everlasting contempt."—Dan. 12: 2. "Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels: for I was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal."—Matt. 25: 41, 42, 46. "And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched."—Mark 9: 43, 44. "The Son of man goeth as it is written of him: but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! it had been good for that man if he had not been born."—Matt. 26: 24. "Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and will gather the wheat into his garner; but the chaff he will burn with fire unquenchable."—Luke 3: 17. "And besides all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you can not; neither can they pass to us, that *would come* from thence."—Luke 16: 26. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him."—John 3: 36. "And to you who are troubled, rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ: who

shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.”—2 Thess. 1: 7—9. “And the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day. Even as Sodom and Gomorrha, and the cities about them, in like manner, giving themselves over to fornication, and going after strange flesh, are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire. Raging waves of the sea, foaming out their own shame; wandering stars, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever.”—Jude, 6, 7, 13. “And the third angel followed them, saying with a loud voice, If any man worship the beast and his image, and receive *his* mark in his forehead, or in his hand, the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb: and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever: and they have no rest day nor night, who worship the beast and his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name.”—Rev. 14: 9—11. “And the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet *are*, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.”—Rev. 20: 10. “He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still: and he that is holy let him be holy still.”—Rev. 22: 11. But there is scarcely any end to the multitude of passages that teach directly or by inference both the fact and the endlessness of the future punishment of the wicked. But the fuller consideration of this subject belongs more appropriately to a future place in this course of instruction, my object here being only to consider the penal sanctions of moral law didactically, reserving the polemic discussion of the question of endless punishment for a future occasion.

LECTURE XXXI.

ATONEMENT.

We come now to the consideration of a very important feature of the moral government of God; namely the atonement.

In discussing this subject I will,

I. CALL ATTENTION TO SEVERAL WELL ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTAL PRINCIPLES, IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH OUR INVESTIGATION WILL PROCEED.

II. DEFINE THE TERM ATONEMENT AS USED IN THIS DISCUSSION.

III. INQUIRE INTO THE TEACHINGS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY, OR INTO THE A PRIORI AFFIRMATIONS OF REASON UPON THIS SUBJECT.

IV. SHOW THE FACT OF ATONEMENT.

V. THE DESIGN OF ATONEMENT.

VI. EXTENT OF ATONEMENT.

VII. ANSWER OBJECTIONS.

I. *I will call attention to several well established governmental principles.*

1. We have already seen that moral law is not founded in the mere arbitrary will of God or of any other being, but that it has its foundation in the nature and relations of moral agents, that it is that rule of action or of willing which is imposed on them by the law of their own intelligence.

2. As the will of no being can create moral law, so the will of no being can repeal or alter moral law. It being just that rule of action that is agreeable to the nature and relations of moral agents, it is as immutable as those natures and relations.

3. There is a distinction between the letter and the spirit of moral law. The letter is the language in which it is expressed. The spirit is its true and proper meaning. For example: the spirit of the moral law requires disinterested benevolence and is all expressed in one word love. The letter of the law is found in the commandments of the Decalogue and in divers other precepts.

4. To the letter of the law there may be many exceptions, but to the spirit of moral law there can be no exceptions. That is, the spirit of the moral law may sometimes admit and require that the letter of the law shall be disregarded or violated; but the spirit of the law ought never to be disregarded.

ded or violated. For example: the letter of the law *prohibits* all labor on the Sabbath day. But the spirit of the law often *requires* labor on the sabbath. The spirit of the law requires the exercise of universal and perfect love or benevolence to God and man, and the law of benevolence often requires that labor shall be done on the sabbath; as administering to the sick, relieving the poor, feeding animals; and in short whatever is plainly the work of necessity or mercy, in such a sense that enlightened benevolence demands it, is required by the spirit of moral law upon the sabbath as well as all other days. This is expressly taught by Christ both by precept and example. So again, the letter of the law says the soul that sinneth, *it shall die*; but the spirit of the law admits and requires that upon certain conditions, to be examined in the proper place, the soul that sinneth shall live. The letter makes no exceptions: the spirit makes many exceptions. The letter of the law is inexorable and condemns and sentences to death all violators of its precepts without regard to atonement or repentance. The spirit of moral law allows and requires that upon condition of satisfaction being made to public justice and the return of the sinner to obedience, he shall live and not die.

5. In establishing a government and promulgating law, the lawgiver is always understood as pledging himself duly to administer the laws in support of public order and for the promotion of public morals, to reward the innocent with his favor and protection and to punish the disobedient with the loss of his protection and his favor.

6. Laws are public property in which every subject of the government has an interest. Every obedient subject of government is interested to have law supported and obeyed, and wherever the law is violated, every subject of the government is injured and his rights are invaded; and each and all have a right to expect the government to duly execute the penalties of law when it is violated.

7. There is an important distinction between *distributive* and *public* justice. Distributive justice consists, in its exercise, in distributing to every subject of government according to his character. It respects the intrinsic merit or demerit of each individual, and deals with him accordingly. Public justice, in its exercise, consists in the promotion and protection of the public interests by such legislation and such an administration of law as is demanded by the highest good of the public. It implies the execution of the penalties of law where

the precept is violated, unless something else is done that will as effectually secure the public interests. When this is done, public justice demands that the execution of the penalty shall be dispensed with by extending pardon to the criminal. Distributive justice makes no exceptions, but punishes without mercy in every instance of crime. Public justice makes exceptions as often as this is permitted or required by the public good. Public justice is identical with the spirit of the moral law in its relations to the public interests, or, in its exercise, regards only the spirit of the law. Distributive justice cleaves to the letter, and makes no exceptions to the rule, "the soul that sinneth it shall die."

8. The design of penalties to laws is prevention, or to secure obedience to the precept. The same is also the design of executing them when the precept is violated. The sanctions are to be regarded as an expression of the views of the lawgiver in respect to the importance of his law; and the execution of penalties is designed and calculated to evince his sincerity in enacting, and his continued adherence to, and determination to abide by the principles of his government as revealed in the law; his abhorrence of all crime; his regard to the public interests; and His unalterable determination to carry out, support and establish the authority of His law.

9. It is a fact well established by the experience of all ages and nations that the exercise of mercy in setting aside the execution of penalties is a matter of extreme delicacy and danger. The influence of law, as might be expected, is found very much to depend upon the certainty felt by the subjects that it will be duly executed. It is found to be true that the exercise of mercy in every government where no atonement is made, weakens government by begetting and fostering a hope of impunity in case sin is committed or the precept violated.

10. Since the head of the government is pledged to protect and promote the public interests by a due administration of law, if in any instance he would dispense with the execution of penalties in case of a violation of the precept, public justice requires that he shall see that a substitute for the execution of law is provided, or that something is done that shall as effectually secure the influence of law as the execution of the penalty would do. He can not make exceptions to the spirit of the law. Either the soul that sinneth must die, according to the letter of the law, or a substitute must be provided in accordance with the spirit of the law.

11. Whatever will as fully evince the regard of the lawgiver to his law—his determination to support it—his abhorrence of all violations of its precepts—and withal guard as effectually against the inference that violators of the precept might expect to escape with impunity, as the execution of the penalty would do, is a full satisfaction of public justice. When these conditions are fulfilled, and the sinner has returned to obedience, public justice not only admits, but absolutely demands that the penalty shall be set aside by extending pardon to the offender. The offender still deserves to be punished, and upon the principles of distributive justice, might be punished according to his deserts. But the public good admits and requires that upon the above conditions he should live, and hence, public justice, in compliance with the public interests and the spirit of the law of love, spares and pardons him.

12. If mercy or pardon is to be extended to any who have violated law, it ought to be done in a manner and upon conditions that will settle the question and establish the truth that the execution of penalties is not to be dispensed with merely upon condition of the repentance of the offender. In other words, if pardon is to be extended, it should be known to be upon a condition not within the power of the offender. Else he may know that he can violate the law and yet be sure to escape with impunity by fulfilling the conditions of forgiveness, which are, upon the supposition, all within his own power.

13. So, if mercy is to be exercised, it should be upon a condition that is not to be repeated. The thing required by public justice is that nothing shall be done to undermine or disturb the influence of law. Hence it can not consent to have the execution of penalties dispensed with upon any condition that shall encourage the hope of impunity. Therefore, public justice can not consent to the pardon of sin but upon condition of an atonement, and also upon the assumption that atonement is not to be repeated, nor to extend its benefits beyond the limits of the race for whom it was made, and that only for a limited time. If an atonement were to extend its benefits to all worlds and to all eternity, it would nullify its own influence and encourage the universal hope of impunity in case the precepts of the law were violated. This would be indefinitely worse than no atonement; and public justice might as well consent to have mercy exercised without any regard to securing the authority and influence of law.

14. The spirit of the moral law can no more be dispensed

with by the law giver than it can be repealed. The spirit of the law requires that when the precept is violated the penalty shall be executed or that something shall be done that will as effectually and impressively negative the inference or assumption that sin can escape with impunity under the government of God, beyond the limits of the race for whom the atonement was especially made, as the execution of the law would do. It is easy to see that the following things must be true under a perfect government, as has been said above.

(1.) That sin can not be forgiven merely upon condition of repentance; for this condition is within the power of the subject, so that he might be sure of impunity.

(2.) Nor can it be forgiven upon a condition that shall be repeated, for this would encourage the hope of impunity.

(3.) Nor can it be forgiven upon a condition that will extend to all worlds and throughout all eternity, for this would be equivalent to forgiving sin merely upon condition of repentance without any reference to the authority of law or to public justice.

II. Define the term Atonement.

The English word Atonement is synonymous with the Hebrew word *Cofar*. This is a noun from the verb *caufar*, to cover. The *cofer* or cover, was the name of the lid or cover of the ark of the covenant, and constituted what was called the mercy seat. The Greek word rendered Atonement is *katallage*. This means reconciliation to favor, or more strictly, the means or conditions of reconciliation to favor; from *katallasso*, to change, or exchange. The term properly means substitution. An examination of these original words, in the connection in which they stand, will show that the Atonement is the governmental substitution of the sufferings of Christ for the sufferings of sinners. It is a covering of their sins, by his sufferings.

III. I am to inquire into the teachings of natural theology, or into the *a priori* affirmations of reason upon this subject.

1. The doctrine of atonement has been regarded as so purely a doctrine of revelation as to preclude the supposition that reason could, *a priori*, make any affirmations about it. It has been generally regarded as lying absolutely without the pale of natural theology in so high a sense that aside from revelation no assumption could be made nor even a reasonable conjecture indulged. But there are certain facts in this world's history that render this assumption exceedingly doubtful. It is true indeed that natural theology could not

ascertain and establish the fact that an atonement had been made, or that it certainly would be made; but if I am not mistaken, it might have been reasonably inferred, the true character of God being known and assumed, that an atonement of some kind would be made to render it consistent with his relations to the universe to extend mercy to the guilty inhabitants of this world. The manifest necessity of a divine revelation has been supposed to afford a strong presumptive argument that such a revelation has been or will be made. From the benevolence of God as manifested in his works and providence it has been, as I suppose, justly inferred that he would make arrangements to secure the holiness and salvation of men, and as a condition of this result that he would grant them a further revelation of his will than had been given in creation and providence. The argument stands thus:

(1.) From consciousness and observation we know that this is not a state of retribution; and from all the facts in the case that lie open to observation, this is evidently a state of trial or probation.

(2.) The providence of God in this world is manifestly disciplinary and designed to reform mankind.

(3.) These facts taken in connection with the great ignorance and darkness of the human mind on moral and religious subjects afford a strong presumption that the benevolent Creator will make to the inhabitants of this world who are so evidently yet in a state of trial, a further revelation of his will.

Now if this argument is good, so far as it goes, I see not why we may not reasonably go still further.

Since the above are facts, and since it is also a fact that when the subject is duly considered (and the more thoroughly the better) there is manifestly a great difficulty in the exercise of mercy without satisfaction being made to public justice, and since the benevolence of God would not allow him on the one hand to pardon sin at the expense of public justice, or on the other to punish or execute the penalty of law if it could be wisely and consistently avoided, these facts being understood and admitted, it might naturally have been inferred that the wisdom and benevolence of God would devise and execute a method of meeting the demands of public justice that should render the forgiveness of sin possible. That the philosophy of government would render this possible is to us very manifest. I know indeed that with the light the gospel has afforded *us*, *we* much more clearly discern this than they could who had no other light than that of nature. Whatever

might have been known to the ancients and those who have not the bible, I think that when the facts are announced by revelation, we can see that such a governmental expedient was not only possible, but just what might have been expected of the benevolence of God. It would of course have been impossible for us, *a priori*, to have devised or reasonably conjectured the plan that has been adopted. So little was known or knowable on the subject of the trinity of God without revelation that natural theology could perhaps in its best estate have taught nothing farther than that if it was possible, some governmental expedient would be resorted to and was in contemplation, for the ultimate restoration of the sinning race who were evidently spared hitherto from the execution of law and placed under a system of discipline.

But since the gospel has announced the fact of the atonement, it appears that natural theology or governmental philosophy can satisfactorily explain it; that reason can discern a divine philosophy in it.

Natural theology can teach,

1. That human nature is in a fallen state, and that the law of selfishness, and not the law of benevolence, is that to which unreformed men conform their lives.

2. It can teach that God is benevolent, and hence that mercy must be an attribute of God.

3. Consequently that no atonement was needed to satisfy any implacable spirit in the divine mind; that he was sufficiently and infinitely disposed to extend pardon to the penitent, if this could be wisely and safely done.

4. It can also abundantly teach that there is a real and a great difficulty and danger in the exercise of mercy under a moral government, and supremely great under a government so vast and so enduring as the government of God; that under such a government the danger is very great that the exercise of mercy will be understood as encouraging the hope of impunity in the commission of sin.

5. It can also show the indispensable necessity of such an administration of the Divine government as to secure the fullest confidence throughout the universe in the sincerity of God in promulgating his law with its tremendous penalty, and of his unalterable adherence to its spirit and determination not to falter in carrying out and securing its authority at all events. That this is indispensable to the well being of the universe, is entirely manifest.

6. Hence it is very obvious to natural theology, that sin can

not be pardoned without something is done to forbid the otherwise natural inference that sin will be forgiven under the government of God upon condition of repentance alone and of course upon a condition within the power of the sinner himself. It must be manifest that to proclaim throughout the universe that sin would be pardoned universally upon condition of repentance alone, would be a virtual repeal of the Divine law. All creatures would instantly perceive that no one need to fear punishment in any case as his forgiveness was secure, however much he might trample on the Divine authority, alone upon a condition which he could at will perform.

7. Natural theology is abundantly competent to show that God could not be just to his own intelligence, just to his character, and hence just to the universe in dispensing with the execution of the Divine law except upon the condition of providing a substitute of such a nature as to as fully reveal and as deeply impress the lessons that would be taught by the execution as the execution itself would do. The great design of penalties is prevention, and this is of course the design of executing penalties. The head of any government is pledged to sustain the authority of law by a due administration of rewards and punishments, and has no right in any instance to extend pardon except upon conditions that will as effectually support the authority of law as the execution would do. It was never found to be safe, or even possible under any government to make the universal offer of pardon to violators of law upon the bare condition of repentance for the very obvious reason already suggested, that it would be a virtual repeal of all law. Public justice, by which every executive magistrate in the universe is bound, sternly and peremptorily forbids that mercy shall be extended to any culprit without some equivalent being rendered to the government, that is, without something being done that will fully answer as a substitute for the execution of penalties. This principle God fully admits to be binding upon him, and hence He affirms that he gave his son to justify or to render it just in him to forgive sin. Rom. 3: 24—26; "Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."

8. All nations have felt the necessity of expiatory sacrifices.

This is evident from the fact that all nations have offered them. Hence *antipsucha*, or ransoms for their souls, have been offered by nearly every nation under heaven. (See Buck's Theo. Dic. p. 539.)

9. The wisest heathen philosophers, who saw the intrinsic inefficacy of animal sacrifices, held that God could not forgive sin. This proves to a demonstration, that they felt the necessity of an atonement or expiatory sacrifice. And having too just views of God and his government, to suppose that either animal, or merely human sacrifices could be efficacious under the government of God, they were unable to understand upon what principles sin could be forgiven.

10. Public justice required either that an atonement should be made, or that the law should be executed upon every offender. By public justice is intended, that due administration of law, that shall secure in the highest manner the nature of the case admits, private and public interests, and establish the order and well-being of the universe. In establishing the government of the universe, God had given the pledge, both impliedly and expressly, that he would regard the public interests and, by a due administration of the law, secure and promote, as far as possible, public and individual happiness.

11. Public justice could strictly require only the execution of law; for God had neither expressly or impliedly given a pledge to do any thing more for the promotion of virtue and happiness, than to administer due rewards to both the righteous and the wicked. Yet an Atonement, as we shall see, would more fully meet the necessities of the government, and act as a more efficient preventive of sin, and a more powerful persuasive to holiness, than the infliction of the penalty of his law would do.

12. An Atonement was needed for the removal of obstacles to the free exercise of benevolence toward our race. Without an Atonement, the race of man after the fall, sustained to the government of God the relation of rebels and outlaws. And before God, as the great executive magistrate of the universe, could manifest his benevolence toward them, an Atonement must be decided upon and made known, as the reason upon which his favorable treatment of them was founded.

13. An Atonement was needed to promote the glory and influence of God in the universe. But more of this hereafter.

14. An Atonement was needed to present overpowering motives to repentance.

15. An Atonement was needed, that the offer of pardon might not seem like connivance at sin.

16. An Atonement was needed to manifest the sincerity of God in his legal enactments.

17. An Atonement was needed to make it safe to present the offer and promise of pardon.

18. Natural theology can inform us that if the Lawgiver would or could condescend so much to deny himself as to attest his regard to his law, and his determination to support it by suffering its curse in such a sense as was possible and consistent with his character and relations, and so far forth as emphatically to inculcate the great lesson that sin was not to be forgiven upon the bare condition of repentance in any case, and also to establish the universal conviction that the execution of law was not to be dispensed with, but that it is an unalterable rule under his Divine government that where there is sin there must be inflicted suffering—this would be so complete a satisfaction of public justice that sin might safely be forgiven.

IV. The fact of Atonement.

This is purely a doctrine of revelation and in the establishment of this truth appeal must be made to the scriptures alone.

1. The whole Jewish scriptures, especially the whole ceremonial dispensation of the Jews attest, most unequivocally, the necessity of an Atonement.

2. The New Testament is just as unequivocal in its testimony to the same point. The Apostle expressly asserts, that "without the shedding of blood, there is no remission of sin."

I shall here take it as established that Christ was properly "God manifest in the flesh," and proceed to cite a few out of the great multitude of passages that attest the fact of his death, and also its vicarious nature, that is, that it was for us and as a satisfaction to public justice for our sins that his blood was shed. I will first quote a few passages to show that the Atonement and redemption through it was a matter of understanding and covenant between the Father and the Son. "I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant. Thy seed will I establish forever, and build up thy throne to all generations. Selah."—Ps. 89: 3, 4. "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul and shall be satisfied; by his knowledge shall my righteous

servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him *a portion* with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he hath poured out his soul unto death: and he was numbered with the transgressors; and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.”—Isaiah 53: 10, 11, 12. “All that the Father giveth me shall come to me: and he that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me. And this is the Father’s will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.”—John 6: 37, 38, 39. “I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them me; and they have kept thy word. I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine. And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are.”—John 17: 6, 9, 11.

I will next quote some passages to show that if sinners were to be saved at all, it must be through an Atonement. “Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved.”—Acts 4: 12. “Be it known unto you therefore men and brethren, that through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins: And by him all that believe are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses.”—Acts 13: 38, 39. “Now we know, that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin.”—Romans 3: 19, 20. “Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness *come* by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.”—Galatians 2: 16, 21. “For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them. But that no man is

justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident: for, The just shall live by faith. And the law is not of faith: but the man that doeth them shall live in them. For if the inheritance be of the law, it is no more of promise: but God gave it to Abraham by promise. Wherefore then *serveth* the law? It was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise was made; *and it was* ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator. Now a mediator is not a *mediator* of one, but God is one. Is the law then against the promises of God? God forbid for if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. Wherefore the law was our school-master *to bring us unto* Christ, that we might be justified by faith.”—Galatians 3: 10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24. “And almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission. It *was* therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these; but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these.”

I will now cite some passages that establish the fact of the vicarious death of Christ and redemption through his blood. “But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all.”—Isaiah 53: 5, 6—11. “Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.”—Mat. 20: 28. “For this is my blood of the new testament which is shed for many for the remission of sins.”—Mat. 26: 28. “And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have eternal life.”—John 3: 14, 15. “I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.”—John 6: 51. “Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood.”—Acts 20: 28. “Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. To declare, *I say*, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus. For when we were

yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will one die: yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. But God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement. Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."—Ro. 3: 24—26; 5: 9—11, 18, 19. "Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened. For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us: For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures."—I Cor. 5: 7; 15: 3. "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree: That the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith."—Gal. 2: 20; 3: 13, 14. "But now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. And walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet smelling savor."—Eph. 2: 13; 5: 2. "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption *for us*. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God? And almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission. *It was* therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these, but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, *which are* the fig-

ures of the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us: Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the holy place every year with blood of others; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world: but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment: so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation." Heb. 9: 12—14, 22—28. "By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once *for all*. And every priest standeth daily ministering and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God; from henceforth expecting till his enemies be made his footstool, For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified."—Heb. 10: 10—14. "Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way which he hath consecrated for us through the vail, that is to say, his flesh," &c.—Heb. 10: 19, 20. "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers: but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot."—1. Pet. 1: 18, 19. "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness; by whose stripes ye were healed."—1. Pet. 2: 24. "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit."—1. Peter 3: 18. "But if we walk in the light as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin."—1 John 1: 7. "And ye know that he was manifested to take away our sins; and in him is no sin."—1. John 3: 5. "In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world that we might live through him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins."—1. John 4: 9, 10.

These, as every reader of the Bible must know, are only some of the passages that teach the doctrine of atonement

and redemption by the death of Christ. It is truly wonderful in how many ways this doctrine is taught, assumed, and implied in the Bible. Indeed it is emphatically the great theme of the Bible. It is expressed or implied upon nearly every page of Divine inspiration.

V. The next inquiry is into the design of the atonement.

The answer to this inquiry has been, already, in part, unavoidably anticipated. Under this head I will show,

FIRST. *That Christ's obedience to the moral law as a covenant of works, did not constitute the atonement.*

1. Christ owed obedience to the moral law both as God and man. He was under as much obligation to be perfectly benevolent as any moral creature is. It was therefore impossible for him to perform any works of supererogation; that is, so far as obedience to law was concerned, he could, neither as God nor as man, do any thing more than his duty.

2. Had he obeyed for us, he would not have suffered for us. Were his obedience to be substituted for our obedience, he need not certainly have both fulfilled the law for us, as our substitute under a covenant of works, and at the same time have suffered, a substitute for the penalty of the law.

3. If he obeyed the law as our substitute, then why should our own personal obedience be insisted upon as a *sine qua non* of our salvation?

4. The idea that any part of the atonement consisted in Christ's obeying the law for us, and in our stead and behalf, represents God as requiring:

- (1.) The *obedience* of our substitute.
- (2.) The same *suffering* as if no obedience had been rendered.
- (3.) Our *repentance*.
- (4.) Our *personal obedience*.
- (5.) And then represents him as, after all, ascribing our salvation to grace. Strange grace this, that requires a debt to be paid several times over before the obligation is discharged!

SECOND. *I must show that the atonement was not a commercial transaction.*

Some have regarded the atonement simply in the light of the payment of a debt; and have represented Christ as purchasing the elect of the Father and paying down the same amount of suffering in his own person that justice would have exacted of them. To this I answer:

1. It is naturally impossible, as it would require that satisfaction should be made to retributive justice. Strictly speak-

ing, retributive or distributive justice can never be satisfied in the sense that the guilty can be punished as much and as long as he deserves; for this would imply that he was punished until he ceased to be guilty, or became innocent. When law is once violated the sinner can make no satisfaction. He can never cease to be guilty or to deserve punishment, and no possible amount of suffering renders him the less guilty or the less deserving of punishment; therefore to satisfy retributive justice is impossible.

2. But as we have seen in a former lecture, retributive justice must have inflicted on him eternal death. To suppose, therefore, that Christ suffered in amount all that was due to the elect, is to suppose that he suffered an eternal punishment multiplied by the whole number of the elect.

THIRD. *The atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public justice.*

1. The moral law did not originate in the divine will, but is founded in his self-existent and immutable nature. He can not therefore repeal or alter it. To the letter of the moral law there may be exceptions, but to the spirit of the law no being can make exceptions. God can not repeal the precept, and just for this reason he can not set aside the spirit of the sanctions. For to dispense with the sanctions were a virtual repeal of the precept. He can not therefore set aside the execution of the penalty when the precept has been violated without something being done that shall meet the demands of the true spirit of the law. "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, *Isay*, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."—Ro. 3: 24—26. This passage assigns the reason or declares the design of the Atonement, to have been to justify God in the pardon of sin or in dispensing with the execution of law.

Isa. 43: 10—12: "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the

strong: because he hath poured out his soul unto death: and he was numbered with the transgressors: and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors."

2. Public justice requires:

1. That penalties shall be annexed to laws that are equal to the importance of the precept.

2. That when these penalties are incurred they shall be inflicted for the public good, as an expression of the lawgiver's regard to law, of his determination to support public order, and by a due administration of justice to secure the highest well-being of the public. A leading design of the sanctions of law is prevention; and the execution of penal sanctions is demanded by public justice. The great design of sanctions, both remuneratory and vindictory, is to prevent disobedience and secure obedience and universal happiness. This is done by such a revelation of the heart of the lawgiver, through the precept, sanctions, and execution of his law, as to beget awe on the one hand, and the most entire confidence and love on the other.

3. Whatever can as effectually reveal God, make known his hatred to sin, his love of order, his determination to support government, and to promote the holiness and happiness of his creatures, as the execution of his law would do, is a full satisfaction of public justice.

4. Atonement is, therefore, a part, and a most influential part of moral government. It is an auxiliary to a strictly legal government. It does not take the place of the execution of law in such a sense as to exclude penal inflictions from the universe. The execution of law still holds a place and makes up an indispensable part of the great circle of motives essential to the perfection of moral government. Fallen angels, and the finally impenitent of this world, will receive the full execution of the penalty of the Divine law. Atonement is an expedient above the letter, but in accordance with the spirit of law, which adds new and vastly influential motives to induce obedience. I have said it is an auxiliary to law, adding to the precept and sanctions of law an overpowering exhibition of love and compassion.

5. The Atonement is an illustrious exhibition of commutative justice, in which the government of God, by an act of infinite grace, commutes or substitutes the sufferings of Christ for the eternal damnation of sinners.

6. An atonement was needed, and therefore doubtless designed, to contradict the slander of Satan. He had seduced

our first parents by the insinuation that God was selfish, in prohibiting their eating the fruit of a certain tree. Now the execution of the penalty of his law would not so thoroughly refute this abominable slander as would the great self-denial of God exhibited in the Atonement.

7. An atonement was needed to inspire confidence in the offers and promises of pardon, and in all the promises of God to man. Guilty selfish man finds it difficult, when thoroughly convicted of sin, to realize and believe that God is actually sincere in his promises and offers of pardon and salvation. But whenever the soul can apprehend the reality of the Atonement, it can then believe every offer and promise as the very thing to be expected from a being who could give his Son to die for enemies.

An Atonement was needed, therefore, as the great and only means of sanctifying sinners:

Rom. 8: 3, 4. "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." The law was calculated, when once its penalty was incurred, to shut the sinner up in a dungeon, and only to develop more and more his depravity. Nothing could subdue his sin and cause him to love but the manifestation to him of disinterested benevolence. The atonement is just the thing to meet this necessity and subdue rebellion.

8. An Atonement was needed, not to render God merciful, but to reconcile pardon with a due administration of justice. This has been virtually said before, but needs to be repeated in this connection.

Rom. 3: 22—26. "For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God has set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time, his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."

I present several farther reasons why an Atonement under the government of God was preferable in the case of the inhabitants of this world to punishment, or to the execution of the Divine law. Several reasons have already been assigned, to which I will add the following, some of which are plainly

revealed in the Bible; others are plainly inferable from what the Bible does reveal; and others still are plainly inferable from the very nature of the case:

1. God's great and disinterested love to sinners themselves was a prime reason for the Atonement.

John 3: 16. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

2. His great love to the universe at large must have been another reason, inasmuch as it was impossible that the Atonement should not exert an amazing influence over moral beings, in whatever world they might exist, and the fact of atonement should be known.

3. Another reason for substituting the sufferings of Christ in the place of the eternal damnation of sinners is, that an infinite amount of suffering might be prevented. The relation of Christ to the universe rendered his sufferings so infinitely valuable and influential as an expression of God's abhorrence of sin on the one hand, and great love to his subjects on the other, that an infinitely less amount of suffering in him than must have been inflicted on sinners, would be equally, and no doubt vastly more influential in supporting the government of God, than the execution of the law upon them would have been. Be it borne in mind that Christ was the lawgiver, and his suffering in behalf of sinners is to be regarded as the lawgiver and executive magistrate suffering in the behalf and stead of a rebellious province of his empire. As a governmental expedient it is easy to see the great value of such a substitute; that on the one hand it fully evinced the determination of the ruler not to yield the authority of his law, and on the other to evince his great and disinterested love for his rebellious subjects.

4. By this substitution, an immense good might be gained, the eternal happiness of all that can be reclaimed from sin, together with all the augmented happiness of those who have never sinned that must result from this glorious revelation of God.

5. Another reason for preferring the Atonement to the punishment of sinners, must have been, that sin had afforded an opportunity for the highest manifestation of virtue in God: the manifestation of forbearance, mercy, self-denial, and suffering for enemies that were within his own power, and for those from whom he could expect no equivalent in return.

It is impossible to conceive of a higher order of virtues

than are exhibited in the Atonement of Christ.

It was vastly desirable that God should take advantage of such an opportunity to exhibit his true character, and shew to the universe what was in his heart. The strength and stability of any government of moral law must depend upon the estimation in which the sovereign is held by his subjects. It was therefore indispensable that God should improve the opportunity which sin had afforded, to manifest and make known his true character and thus secure the highest confidence of his subjects.

6. Another reason for preferring Atonement was God's desire to lay open his heart to the inspection and imitation of moral beings.

7. Another reason is, because God is love, and prefers mercy when it can be safely exercised. The Bible represents him as delighting in mercy, and affirms that "judgment is his strange work."

Because he so much prefers mercy to judgment as to be willing to suffer as the sinner's substitute, to afford himself the opportunity to exercise pardon on principles that are consistent with a due administration of justice.

8. In the Atonement God consulted his own happiness and his own glory. To deny himself for the salvation of sinners was a part of his own infinite happiness, always intended by him, and therefore always enjoyed. This was not selfishness in him as his own well-being is of infinitely greater value than that of all the universe besides, he ought so to regard and treat it because of its supreme and intrinsic value.

9. In making the Atonement, God complied with the laws of his own intelligence and did just that, all things considered, in the highest degree promotive of the universal good.

10. The Atonement would present to creatures the highest possible motives to virtue. Example is the highest moral influence that can be exerted. If God or any other being would make others benevolent he must manifest benevolence himself. If the benevolence manifested in the Atonement does not subdue the selfishness of sinners their case is hopeless.

11. It would beget among creatures the highest kind and degree of happiness, by leading them to contemplate and imitate his love.

12. The circumstances of his government rendered an Atonement necessary; as the execution of law was not, as a matter of fact, a sufficient preventive of sin. The annihila-

lation of the wicked would not answer the purposes of government. A full revelation of mercy blended with such an exhibition of justice, was called for by the circumstances of the universe.

13. To confirm holy beings. Nothing could be more highly calculated to establish and confirm the confidence, love, and obedience of holy beings than this disinterested manifestation of love to sinners and rebels.

14. To confound his enemies. How could any thing be more directly calculated to silence all cavils and to shut every mouth, and forever close up all opposing lips, than such an exhibition of love and willingness to make sacrifices for sinners?

15. A just and necessary regard to his own reputation made him prefer Atonement to the punishment of sinners.

A desire to sustain his own reputation, as the only moral power that could support his own moral government, must have been a leading reason for the Atonement.

The Atonement was preferred as the best and perhaps only way to inspire an affectionate confidence in him.

It must have been the most agreeable to God, and the most beneficial to the universe.

16. Atonement would afford him an opportunity always to gratify his love in his kindness to sinners in using means for their salvation, in forgiving and saving them when they repent, without the danger of its being inferred in the universe that he had not a sufficient abhorrence for their sin.

17. Another reason for the Atonement was to counteract the influence of the Devil, whose whole influence is exerted in this world for the promotion of selfishness.

18. To make the final punishment of the wicked more impressive in the light of the infinite love manifest in the Atonement.

19. The Atonement is the highest testimony that God can bear against selfishness. It is the testimony of his own example.

20. The Atonement is a higher expression of his regard for the public interest than the execution of law. It is therefore a fuller satisfaction to public justice.

21. The Atonement so reveals all the attributes of God as to complete the whole circle of motives needed to influence the minds of moral beings.

22. By dying in human nature, Christ exhibited his heart to both worlds.

23. The fact that the execution of the law of God on rebel angels had not and could not arrest the progress of rebellion in the universe, proves that something more needed to be done, in support of the authority of law, than would be done in the execution of its penalty upon rebels. While the execution of law may have a strong tendency to prevent the beginning of rebellion among loyal subjects and to restrain rebels themselves; yet penal inflictions, do not as a matter of fact, subdue the heart, under any government, whether human or divine.

As a matter of fact, the law, was only exasperating rebels, without confirming holy beings. Paul affirmed that the action of the law upon his own mind, while in impenitence, was, to beget in him all manner of concupiscence. One grand reason for giving the law was, to develop the nature of sin, and to show that the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. The law was, therefore, given that the offence might abound, that thereby it might be demonstrated, that without an Atonement there could be no salvation for rebels under the government of God.

24. The nature, degree, and execution of the penalty of the law, made the holiness and justice of God so prominent, as to absorb too much of public attention to be safe. Those features of his character were so fully revealed, by the execution of his law upon the rebel angels, that to have pursued the same course with the inhabitants of this world, without the offer of mercy, might have had, and doubtless would have had an injurious influence upon the universe, by creating more of fear than of love to God and his government.

Hence, a fuller revelation of the love and compassion of God was necessary, to guard against the influence of slavish fear.

FOURTH. *His taking human nature, and obeying unto death, under such circumstances, constituted a good reason for our being treated as righteous.*

1. It is a common practice in human governments, and one that is founded in the nature and laws of mind, to reward distinguished public service by conferring favors on the children of those who have rendered this service, and treating them as if they had rendered it themselves. This is both benevolent and wise. Its governmental importance, its wisdom and excellent influence have been most abundantly attested in the experience of nations.

2. As a governmental transaction, this same principle prevails, and for the same reason, under the government of God.

All that are Christ's children and belong to him, are received for his sake, treated with favor, and the rewards of the righteous are bestowed upon them for his sake. And the public service which he has rendered the universe by laying down his life for the support of the divine government, has rendered it eminently wise that all who are united to him by faith should be treated as righteous for his sake.

LECTURE XXXII.

EXTENT OF ATONEMENT.

In discussing this part of the subject I must inquire briefly into the governmental value and bearings of the Atonement.

1. It is valuable only as it tends to promote the glory of God, and the virtue and happiness of the universe.

2. In order to understand, in what the value of the Atonement consists, we must understand:

(1.) That happiness is an ultimate good.

(2.) That virtue is indispensable to happiness.

(3.) That the knowledge of God is indispensable to virtue.

(4.) That Christ, who made the Atonement, is God.

(5.) That the work of Atonement was the most interesting and impressive exhibition of God that ever was made in this world and probably in the universe.

(6.) That, therefore, the Atonement is the highest means of promoting virtue that exists in this world, and perhaps in the universe. And that it is valuable only, and just so far as it reveals God, and tends to promote virtue and happiness.

(7.) That the work of Atonement was a gratification of the infinite benevolence of God.

(8.) It was a work eternally designed by him, and therefore eternally enjoyed.

(9.) The design to make an Atonement, together with the foreseen results which were in an important sense always present to him, have eternally made no small part of the happiness of God.

(10.) The development or carrying out of this design, in the work of Atonement, highly promotes and will for ever promote his glory in the universe.

(11.) Its value consists in its adaptedness to promote the virtue and happiness of holy angels, and all moral agents who have never sinned. As it is a new and most stupendous revelation of God, it must of course greatly increase their knowledge of God, and be greatly promotive of their virtue and happiness.

(12.) Its value consists in its adaptedness to prevent farther rebellion against God in every part of the universe. The Atonement exhibits God in such a light, as must greatly strengthen the confidence of holy beings in his character and government. It is therefore calculated in the highest degree,

to confirm holy beings in their allegiance to God, and thus prevent the further progress of rebellion.

Let it be remembered, the value of the Atonement consists in its moral power or tendency to promote virtue and happiness.

Moral power is the power of motive.

The highest moral power is the influence of example. Advice has moral power. Precept has moral power. Sanction has moral power. But example is the highest moral influence that can be exerted by any being.

Moral beings are so created as to be naturally influenced by the example of each other. The example of a child, as a moral influence, has power upon other children. The example of an adult, as a moral influence, has power. The example of great men and of angels has great moral power. But the example of God is the highest moral influence in the universe.

The word of God has power. His commands, threatenings, promises; but his example is a higher moral influence than his precepts or his threatenings.

Virtue consists in benevolence. God requires benevolence, threatens all his subjects with punishment, if they are not benevolent, and promises them eternal life if they are. All this has power. But his example, his own benevolence, his own disinterested love, as expressed in the Atonement, is a vastly higher moral influence than his word, or any other of his ways.

Christ is God. In the Atonement God has given us the influence of his own example, has exhibited his own love; his own compassion, his own self-denial, his own patience, his own long-suffering, under abuse from enemies. In the Atonement he has exhibited all the highest and most perfect forms of virtue, has united himself with human nature, has exhibited these forms of virtue to the inspection of our senses, and labored, wept, suffered, bled, and died for man. This is not only the highest revelation of God, that could be given to man; but is giving the whole weight of his own example in favor of all the virtues which he requires of man.

This is the highest possible moral influence. It is properly moral omnipotence; that is—the influence of the Atonement, when apprehended by the mind, will accomplish whatever is an object of moral power. It can not compel a moral agent, and set aside his freedom, for this is not an object of moral power; but it will do all that motive can, in the na-

ture of the case, accomplish. It is the highest and most weighty motive that the mind of a moral being can conceive. It is the most moving, impressive, and influential consideration in the universe.

Its value may be estimated, by its moral influence in the promotion of holiness among all holy beings:

1. Their love to God must depend upon their knowledge of him.

2. As he is infinite, and all creatures are finite, finite beings know him only as he is pleased to reveal himself.

3. The Atonement has disclosed or revealed to the universe of holy beings, a class and an order of virtues, as resident in the divine mind, which, but for the Atonement, would probably have forever remained unknown.

4. As the Atonement is the most impressive revelation of God, of which we have any knowledge, or can form any conception, we have reason to believe that it has greatly increased the holiness and happiness of all holy creatures, that it has done more than any other and perhaps every other revelation of God, to exalt his character, strengthen his government, enlighten the universe, and increase its happiness.

5. The value of the Atonement may be estimated by the amount of good it has done and will do in this world. The Atonement is an exhibition of God suffering as a substitute for his rebellious subjects. His relation to the law and to the universe, is that which gives his sufferings such infinite value. I have said, in a former lecture, that the utility of executing penal sanctions consists in the exhibition it makes of the true character and designs of the lawgiver. It creates public confidence, makes a public impression, and thus strengthens the influence of government, and is in this way promotive of order and happiness. The Atonement is the highest testimony that God could give of his holy abhorrence of sin; of his regard to his law; of his determination to support it; and, also, of his great love for his subjects, his great compassion for sinners; and his willingness to suffer himself in their stead; rather, on the one hand, than to punish them, and on the other, than to set aside the penalty without satisfaction being made to public justice.

6. The Atonement may be viewed in either of two points of light.

(1.) Christ may be considered as the law-giver, and attesting his sincerity, love of holiness, approbation of the law, and

compassion for his subjects, by laying down his life as their substitute.

(2.) Or Christ may be considered as the Son of the Supreme Ruler; and then we have the spectacle of a sovereign, giving his only begotten and well beloved Son, his greatest treasure, to die a shameful and agonizing death, in testimony of his great compassion for his rebellious subjects, and of his high regard for public justice.

7. The value of the Atonement may be estimated, by considering the fact that it provides for the pardon of sin, in a way that forbids the hope of impunity in any other case. This, the good of the universe imperiously demanded. If sin is to be forgiven at all, under the government of God, it should be known to be forgiven upon principles that will by no means encourage rebellion, or hold out the least hope of impunity, should rebellion break out in any other part of the universe.

8. The Atonement has settled the question, that sin can never be forgiven, under the government of God, simply on account of the repentance of any being. It has demonstrated, that sin can never be forgiven without full satisfaction being made to public justice, and that public justice can never be satisfied with any thing less than an Atonement made by God himself. Now, as it can never be expected, that the Atonement will be repeated, it is for ever settled, that rebellion in any other world than this, can have no hope of impunity. This answers the question so often asked by infidels, "If God was disposed to be merciful, why could he not forgive without an Atonement?" The answer is plain; he could not forgive sin, but upon such principles as would for ever preclude the hope of impunity, should rebellion ever break out in any other part of the universe.

9. From these considerations, it is manifest that the value of the Atonement is infinite. We have reason to believe, that Christ, by his Atonement, is not only the Savior of this world, but the Savior of the universe in an important sense. Rebellion once broke out in Heaven, and upon the rebel angels God executed his law, and sent them down to hell. It next broke out in this world; and as the execution of law was found by experience not to be a sufficient preventive of rebellion, there was no certainty that rebellion would not have spread until it had ruined the universe, but for that revelation of God which Christ has made in the Atonement. This exhibition of God has proved itself, not merely able to

prevent rebellion among holy beings, but to reclaim and reform rebels. Millions of rebels have been reclaimed and reformed. This world is to be turned back to its allegiance to God, and the blessed Atonement of Christ has so unbosomed God before the universe, as, no doubt, not only to save other worlds from going into rebellion, but to save myriads of our already rebellious race from the depths of an eternal hell.

For whose benefit the Atonement was intended.

1. God does all things for himself; that is, he consults his own glory and happiness, as the supreme and most influential reason for all his conduct. This is wise and right in him, because his own glory and happiness, are infinitely the greatest good in the universe. He does what he does, because his intelligence demands it. He made the atonement to satisfy himself; "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." God himself, then was greatly benefitted by the Atonement. In other words, his happiness, in a great measure consisted in its contemplation, execution and results.

2. He made the Atonement for the benefit of the universe. All holy beings are and must be benefitted by it, from its very nature, as it gives them a higher knowledge of God, than ever they had before, or ever could have gained in any other way. The Atonement is the greatest work that he could have wrought for them, the most blessed, and excellent, and benevolent thing he could have done for them. For this reason, angels are described as desiring to look into the Atonement. The inhabitants of Heaven are represented as being deeply interested in the work of Atonement and those displays of the character of God that are made in it. The Atonement is then, no doubt, one of the greatest blessings that ever God conferred upon the universe of holy beings.

3. The Atonement was made for the benefit particularly of the inhabitants of this world, from its very nature, as it is calculated to benefit all the inhabitants of this world; as it is a most stupendous revelation of God to man. Its nature is adapted to benefit all mankind. All mankind can be pardoned, if they will be rightly affected and brought to repentance by it, as well as any part of mankind can.

4. The Bible declares that Christ tasted death for every man.

5. All do certainly receive many blessings on account of it. There is reason to believe, that but for the Atonement, none

of our race, except the first human pair, would ever have had an existence.

6. But for the Atonement, no man could have been treated with lenity and forbearance any more than Satan can.

7. The lives, and all the blessings which all mankind enjoy, are conferred on them on account of the Atonement of Christ; that is—God could not consistently wait on sinners, and bless, and do all that the nature of the case admits to save them, were it not for the fact of atonement.

8. That it was made for all mankind, is evident, from the fact that it is offered to all, indiscriminately.

9. Sinners are universally condemned, for not receiving it.

10. If the Atonement is not intended for all mankind, God is insincere in making them the offer of salvation through the Atonement.

11. If not, sinners in hell will see and know that their salvation was never possible; that no Atonement was made for them; and that God was insincere in offering them salvation.

12. If the Atonement is not for all men, no one can know for whom, in particular, it was intended, without direct revelation. Hence,

13. If the Atonement is for none but the elect, no man can know whether he has a right to embrace it, until by a direct revelation, God has made known to him that he is one of the elect.

14. If the Atonement was made but for the elect, no man can by any possibility embrace it without such a revelation. Why can not Satan believe in, embrace, and be saved by the Atonement? Simply because it was not made for him. If it was not made for the non-elect, they can no more embrace and be saved by it than Satan can. If, therefore, the Atonement was made but for a part of mankind, it is entirely nugatory, unless a further revelation make known for whom in particular it was made.

15. If it was not made for all men, ministers do not know to whom they should offer it.

16. If ministers do not believe that it was made for all men, they can not heartily and honestly press its acceptance upon any individual, or congregation in the world; for they can not assure any individual or congregation, that there is any Atonement for him or them, any more than there is for Satan.

But upon this subject, let the Bible speak for itself: "The next day John seeth Jesus coming unto him, and saith, Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world."

"For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not his Son into the world, to condemn the world: but that the world through him might be saved." "And said unto the woman, Now we believe, not because of thy saying; for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Savior of the world."—Jno. 1: 29; 3: 16, 17; 4: 42. "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life."—Rom. 5: 18. "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead: And that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again."—2d Cor. 5; 14, 15. "Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time." "For therefore we both labor and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Savior of all men, especially of those that believe."—1st. Tim. 2: 6; 4: 10. "And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world."—1 Jno. 2: 2.

That the atonement is sufficient for all men, and, in that sense, general, as opposed to particular, is also evident from the fact that the invitations and promises of the gospel are addressed to all men, and all are freely offered salvation through Christ. "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth: for I am God, and there is none else." "Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money; come ye, buy and eat; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money and without price. Wherefore do ye spend money for that which is not bread? and your labor for that which satisfieth not? hearken diligently unto me, and eat ye that which is good, and let your soul delight itself in fatness. Incline your ear, and come unto me: hear and your soul shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David."—Isa. 45: 22; 55: 1, 2, 3. "Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light." "Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them which are bidden, Behold, I have prepared my dinner; my oxen and my fatlings are killed, and all things are ready; come unto the marriage."—Mat. 11: 28, 29, 30; 22: 4. "And sent his servant at

supper time to say to them that were bidden, Come, for all things are now ready."—Luke 14: 17. "In the last day, the great day of the feast, Jesus stood and cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink."—Jno. 7: 37. "Behold I stand at the door and knock, if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me." "And the spirit and the bride say Come. And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely."—Rev. 22: 17.

Again: I infer that the atonement was made, and is sufficient for all men, from the fact that God not only invites all, but expostulates with them for not accepting his invitations. "Wisdom crieth without; she uttereth her voice in the streets: She crieth in the chief place of concourse, in the openings of the gates; in the city she uttereth her words, saying, how long ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity? and the scorers delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn you at my reproof: behold I will pour out my spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you."—Prov. 1: 20—23. "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord: though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow, though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool."—Isaiah 1: 18. "Thus saith the Lord, thy Redeemer, the Holy One of Israel, I am the Lord thy God which teacheth thee to profit, which leadeth thee by the way that thou shouldst go. Oh that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments! then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea."—Isaiah 48: 17, 18. "Say unto them, as I live saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?"—Eze. 33: 11. "Hear ye now what the Lord saith: Arise, contend thou before the mountains, and let the hills hear thy voice. Hear ye, O mountains, the Lord's controversy, and ye strong foundations of the earth; for the Lord hath a controversy with his people, and he will plead with Israel. O my people what have I done unto thee? and wherein have I wearied thee? testify against me."—Micah 6: 1—3. "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!"—Mat. 23: 37.

Again. The same may be inferred from the professed sin-

cerity of God in his invitations. "O that there were such an heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always, that it might be well with them, and with their children forever!"—Deut. 5: 39. "O that they were wise, *that* they understood this, *that* they would consider their latter end!"—Deut. 32: 29. "For thou *art* not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness; neither shall evil dwell with thee."—Ps. 5: 4. "Oh that my people had hearkened unto me, *and* Israel had walked in my ways! I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries. The haters of the LORD should have submitted themselves unto him: but their time should have endured for ever."—Ps. 81: 13—15. "O that thou hadst hearkened unto my commandments! then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea."—Isaiah 48: 18. "For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the LORD GOD: wherefore turn *yourselves*, and live ye."—Eze. 18: 32. "And when he was come near, he beheld the city, and wept over it, saying. If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things *which belong* unto thy peace! But now they are hid from thine eyes."—Luke 19: 41, 42. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved."—John 3: 16, 17. "I exhort therefore, that first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men: for kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior; Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth."—1 Tim. 1—4. "The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness; but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."—2 Peter 3: 9.

Again the same inference is forced upon us by the fact that God complains of sinners for rejecting his overtures of mercy: "Because I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded."—Prov. 1: 24. "But they refused to hearken, and pulled away the shoulder, and stopped their ears, that they should not hear. Yea, they made their hearts *as* an adamant stone, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of hosts hath sent in

his Spirit by the former prophets: therefore came a great wrath from the Lord of hosts. Therefore it is come to pass; *that* as he cried and they would not hear: so they cried, and I would not hear, saith the Lord of hosts.”—Zechariah 7: 11, 12, 13. “The kingdom of heaven is like unto a certain king which made a marriage for his son. And sent forth his servants to call them that were bidden to the wedding: and they would not come. Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them which are bidden, Behold, I have prepared my dinner; my oxen and my fatlings are killed, and all things are ready: come unto the marriage. But they made light of it, and went their ways, one to his farm, another to his merchandise: and the remnant took his servants, and treated them spitefully, and slew them.”—Matthew 22: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. “And sent his servant at supper-time to say to them that were bidden, Come; for all things are now ready. And they all with one *consent* began to make excuse. The first said unto him, I have bought a piece of ground, and I must needs go and see it: I pray thee have me excused. And another said, I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to prove them: I pray thee have me excused. And another said I have married a wife; and therefore I can not come.”—Luke 14: 17, 18, 19, 20. “And ye will not come to me, that ye might have life.”—John 5: 40. “Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost: as your fathers did, so do ye.”—Acts 7: 51. “And as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled, and answered, Go thy way for this time; when I have a convenient season I will call for thee.”—Acts 24: 25.

Again, the same is inferable from the fact that sinners are represented as having no excuse for being lost and for not being saved by Christ. “And he saith unto him, Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having a wedding-garment? And he was speechless.”—Matthew 22: 12. “For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse.”—Romans 1: 20. “And ye will not come to me, that ye might have life.”—John 5: 40. “Now we know, that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law, that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God.”—Romans 3: 19.

VII. I now proceed to answer objections.

I. To the *fact* of atonement. It is said that the doctrine of atonement represents God as unmerciful.

Ans. 1. This objection supposes that the atonement was demanded to satisfy retributive instead of public justice.

2. The atonement was the exhibition of a merciful disposition. It was because God was disposed to pardon that he consented to give his own Son to die as the substitute of sinners.

3. The atonement is infinitely the most illustrious exhibition of mercy ever made in the universe. The mere pardon of sin, as an act of mercy, can not compare with the merciful disposition displayed in the atonement itself.

II. It is objected that the atonement is unnecessary.

Ans. 1. The testimony of the world and of the consciences of all men is against this objection. This is universally attested by their expiatory sacrifices. These, as has been said, have been offered by nearly every nation of whose religious history we have any reliable account. This shows that human beings are universally conscious of being sinners and under the government of a sin-hating God; that their intelligence demands either the punishment of sinners, or that a substitute should be offered to public justice; that they all own and have the idea that substitution is possible, and hence they offer their sacrifices as expiatory.

A heathen philosopher can answer this objection, and rebuke the folly of him who makes it.

III. It is objected that the doctrine of the atonement is inconsistent with the idea of mercy and forgiveness.

Ans. 1. This takes for granted that the atonement was the literal payment of a debt, and that Christ suffered all that was due to all the sinners for whom he died, so that their discharge or pardon is an act of justice and not of mercy. But this was by no means the nature of the atonement. The atonement, as we have seen, had respect simply to *public*, and not at all to *retributive* justice. Christ suffered what was necessary to illustrate the intention of God in respect to sin and in respect to his law. But the amount of his sufferings had no respect to the amount of punishment that might have justly been inflicted on the wicked.

2. The punishment of sinners is just as much deserved by them as if Christ had not suffered at all.

3. Their forgiveness, therefore, is just as much an act of mercy as if there had been no atonement.

IV. It is objected that it is unjust to punish an innocent being instead of the guilty.

Ans. 1. Yes, it would not only be unjust, but it is impossible to *punish* an innocent individual at all. Punishment implies

guilt. An innocent being may suffer, but he can not be punished. Christ voluntarily "suffered, the just for the unjust." He had a right to exercise this self-denial; and as it was by his own voluntary consent, no injustice was done to any one.

2. If he had no right to make an atonement, he had no right to consult and promote his own happiness; for it is said that "for the joy that was set before him, he endured the cross, despising the shame."

V. It is objected that the doctrine of atonement is utterly incredible.

To this I have replied in a former lecture; but will here again state, that it is utterly incredible upon any other supposition than that God is love. But if God is love, as the Bible expressly affirms that he is, the work of Atonement is just what might be expected of him under the circumstances; and the doctrine of Atonement is the most reasonable doctrine in the universe.

VI. It is objected to the doctrine of Atonement, that it is of a demoralizing tendency.

Ans. 1. There is a broad distinction between the natural tendency of a thing and such an abuse of a good thing as to make it the instrument of evil. The best things and doctrines may be, and often are, abused, and their natural tendency perverted.

2. The natural tendency of the Atonement is the direct opposite of demoralizing. Is the manifestation of deep disinterested love naturally calculated to beget enmity? Who does not know that the natural tendency of manifested love is to beget love in return?

3. Those who have the most fully believed in the Atonement, have exhibited the purest morality that has ever been exhibited in this world; while the rejecters of the Atonement, almost without exception, exhibit a loose morality. This is as might be expected from the very nature of Atonement.

VII. To a *general* Atonement, it is objected that the Bible represents Christ as laying down his life for his sheep, or for the elect only, and not for all mankind.

Ans. 1. It does indeed represent Christ as laying down his life for his sheep, and also for all mankind.

1 John 2: 2. "And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world."

John 3: 17. "For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved."

Heb. 2: 9. "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor; that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man."

2. Those who object to the general Atonement, take substantially the same course to evade this doctrine that Unitarians do to set aside the doctrine of the Trinity, and the Divinity of Christ. They quote those passages that prove the unity of God and the humanity of Christ, and then take it for granted that they have disproved the doctrine of the Trinity and Christ's Divinity. The asserters of limited atonement in like manner quote those passages that prove that Christ died for the elect and for his saints, and then take it for granted that he died for none else. To the Unitarian we reply, we admit the unity of God, and the humanity of Christ, and the full meaning of those passages of Scripture which you quote in proof of these doctrines; but we insist that this is not the whole truth, but there are still other passages which prove the doctrine of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. Just so to the asserters of limited Atonement we reply, we believe that Christ laid down his life for his sheep, as well as you; but we also believe that he tasted death for every man.

John 3: 16. "For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

VIII. To the doctrine of general Atonement it is objected, that it would be folly in God to provide what he knew would be rejected; and that to suffer Christ to die for those who he foresaw would not repent, would be a useless expenditure of blood and suffering.

Ans. 1. This objection assumes that the Atonement was a literal payment of a debt, which we have seen is not the nature of the Atonement.

2. If sinners do not accept it, no particle of the Atonement can be useless, as the great compassion of God in providing an atonement and offering them mercy will forever exalt His character in the estimation of holy beings, greatly strengthen his government, and therefore benefit the whole universe.

3. If all men rejected the Atonement it would nevertheless be of infinite value to the universe, as it is the most glorious revelation of God that was ever made.

IX. To the general atonement it is objected, that it implies universal salvation.

Ans. It does indeed imply this, upon the supposition that

the atonement is the literal payment of a debt. It was upon this view of the atonement that Universalism first took its stand. Universalists taking it for granted that Christ had paid the debt of those for whom he died, and finding it fully revealed in the bible that he died for all mankind, naturally, and if this were correct, properly inferred the doctrine of universal salvation. But we have seen that this is not the nature of atonement. Therefore this inference falls to the ground.

X. It is objected that if the atonement was not a payment of the debt of sinners, but general in its nature, as we have mentioned, it secures the salvation of no one.

Ans. It is true that the atonement itself does not secure the salvation of any one; but the promise and oath of God that Christ shall have a seed to serve him does.

REMARKS ON THE ATONEMENT.

1. The execution of the law of God on rebel angels must have created great awe in heaven.

2. Its action may have tended too much to fear.

3. The forbearance of God toward men previous to the atonement of Christ may have been designed to counteract the superabundant tendency to fear, as it was the beginning of a revelation of compassion.

4. Sinners will not give up their enmity against God, nor believe that his is disinterested love, until they realize that he actually died as their substitute.

5. In this can be seen the exceeding strength of unbelief and of prejudice against God.

6. But faith in the atonement of Christ rolls a mountain weight of crushing considerations upon the heart of the sinner.

7. Thus the blood of Christ when apprehended and believed in, cleanses from all sin.

8. God's forbearance toward sinners must increase the wonder, admiration, love and happiness of the universe.

9. The means which he uses to save mankind must produce the same effect.

10. Beyond certain limits, forbearance is no virtue, but would be manifestly injurious, and therefore wrong. A degree of forbearance that might justly create the impression that God was not infinitely holy and opposed to sin, would work infinite mischief in the universe.

11. When the forbearance of God has fully demonstrated

his great love, and done all it can to sustain the moral government of God, without a fresh display of holiness and justice, He will no doubt come forth to execution, and make parallel displays of justice and mercy forever, by setting heaven and hell in eternal contrast.

12. Then the law and gospel will be seen to be one harmonious system of moral government, developing in the fullest manner the glorious character of God.

13. From this you can see the indispensable necessity of faith in the atonement of Christ, and why it is that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation only to every one that believeth. If the atonement is not believed in, it is to that mind no revelation at all, and with such a mind the gospel has no moral power.

14. But the Atonement tends in the highest manner to beget in the believer the spirit of entire and universal consecration to God.

15. The Atonement shows how solid a foundation the saints have for unbroken and eternal repose and confidence in God. If God could make an Atonement for men, surely it is infinitely unreasonable to suppose that he will withhold from those that believe any thing which could be to them a real good.

16. We see that selfishness is the great hindrance to the exercise of faith. A selfish mind finds it exceedingly difficult to understand the Atonement, inasmuch as it is an exhibition of a state of mind which is the direct opposite of all that the sinner has ever experienced. His experience being wholly selfish renders it difficult for him to conceive aright what true religion is, and heartily to believe in the infinitely great and disinterested love of God.

17. The Atonement renders pardon consistent with the perfect administration of justice.

18. The Atonement, as it was made by the lawgiver, magnifies the law, and renders it infinitely more honorable and influential than the execution of the penalty upon sinners would have done.

19. It is the highest and most glorious expedient of moral government. It is adding to the influence of law the whole weight of the most moving manifestation of God that men or angels ever saw or will see.

20. It completes the circle of governmental motives. It is a filling up of the revelation of God. It is a revealing of a department of his character, with which it would seem that

nothing else could have made his creatures acquainted. It is, therefore, the highest possible support of moral government.

21. It greatly glorifies God, far above all his other works and ways.

22. It must be to him a source of the purest, most exalted, and eternal happiness.

23. It opens the channels of divine benevolence to state criminals.

24. It has united God with human nature.

25. It has opened a way of access to God, never opened to any creatures before.

26. It has abolished natural death, by procuring a universal resurrection:

1 Cor. 15: 22, 'For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.'

27. It restores the life of God to the soul, by restoring to man the influence of the Holy Spirit.

28. It has introduced a new method of salvation, and made Christ the head of the New Covenant.

29. It has made Christ our surety:

Heb. 7: 22. 'By so much was Jesus made a surety of a better testament.'

30. It has arrayed such a public sentiment against rebellion, as to crush it whenever the Atonement is fairly understood and applied by the Holy Spirit.

31. It has procured the offer of pardon to all sinners of our race.

32. It has been the occasion of a new and most aggravated kind of sin.

33. It has, no doubt, added to the happiness of heaven.

34. It has more fully developed the nature and importance of the government of God.

35. It has more fully developed the nature of sin.

36. It has more fully developed the strength of sin.

37. It has more fully developed the total depravity and utter madness of sinners.

38. It has given scope to the long-suffering and forbearance of God.

39. It has formed a more intimate union between God and man, than between him and any other order of creatures.

40. It has elevated human nature, and the saints of God, into the stations of kings and priests to God.

41. It has opened new fields of usefulness, in which the

benevolence of God, angels, and men may luxuriate in doing good.

42. It has developed and fully revealed the doctrine of the Trinity.

43. It has revealed the most influential and only efficacious method of government.

44. It has more fully developed those laws of our being upon which the strength of moral government depends.

45. It has given a standing illustration of the true intent meaning, and excellency of the law of God. In the Atonement God has illustrated the meaning of his law by his own example.

46. The Atonement has fully illustrated the nature of virtue, and demonstrated that it consists in disinterested benevolence.

47. It has for ever condemned all selfishness, as entirely inconsistent with virtue.

48. It has established all the great principles and completed the power of moral government.

LECTURE XXXIII.

HUMAN GOVERNMENT.

HUMAN GOVERNMENTS A PART OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

In the discussion of this subject I will,

I. INQUIRE INTO THE ULTIMATE END OF GOD IN THE CREATION OF THE UNIVERSE.

II. SHOW THAT PROVIDENTIAL AND MORAL GOVERNMENT ARE INDISPENSABLE MEANS OF SECURING THIS END.

III. THAT CIVIL, AND FAMILY GOVERNMENTS ARE INDISPENSABLE TO THE SECURING OF THIS END, AND ARE THEREFORE TRULY A PART OF THE PROVIDENTIAL AND MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

IV. INQUIRE INTO THE FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT OF HUMAN GOVERNMENTS.

V. POINT OUT THE LIMITS OR BOUNDARIES OF THIS RIGHT.

VI. MAKE SEVERAL REMARKS RESPECTING THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF REVOLUTION, &c.

VII. APPLY THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES TO THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENTS AND SUBJECTS IN RELATION TO THE EXECUTION OF NECESSARY PENALTIES; THE SUPPRESSION OF MOBS, INSURRECTIONS, REBELLION; AND IN RELATION TO WAR, SLAVERY, SABBATH DESECRATION, &c.

I. The ultimate end of God in creation.

We have seen in former lectures that God is a moral agent and is, therefore, the subject of moral law. That is, His own infinite intelligence must affirm that a certain course of willing is suitable, fit, and right in Him. This idea or affirmation is law to Him, and to this His will must be conformed or He is not good. This is moral law, a law founded in the eternal and self-existent nature of God. This law does and must demand benevolence in God. Benevolence is good-willing. God's intelligence must affirm that He ought to will good for its own intrinsic value. It must affirm His obligation to choose the highest possible good as the great end of His being. If God is good, the highest good of himself and of the universe must have been the end which He had in view in the work of creation. This is of infinite value and ought to be willed by God. If God is good this must have been His end. We have also seen,

II. That Providential and Moral Governments are indispensable means of securing the highest good of the universe.

The highest good of moral agents is conditioned upon their holiness. Holiness consists in conformity to moral law. Moral law implies moral government. Moral government is a government of moral law and of motives. Motives are presented by Providential government, and Providential government is therefore a means of moral government. Providential and moral government must be indispensable to securing the highest good of the universe.

III. Civil and family governments are indispensable to the securing of this end, and are therefore really a part of the Providential and moral government of God.

In the discussion of this question I will show,

FIRST, That Human Governments are a necessity of human nature.

SECOND, That this necessity will continue as long as men exist in the present world.

THIRD, That Human Governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part of the government of God.

FOURTH, That it is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of Human Government.

FIFTH, It is absurd to suppose that Human Government can ever be dispensed with in this world.

SIXTH, I shall answer objections.

I. Human Governments are a necessity of human nature.

1. There must be real estate. Human beings have numerous physical and moral wants that can not possibly be supplied without the cultivation and improvement of the soil. Buildings must be erected, &c.

2. It must belong to somebody. Somebody must have the right, the care, the responsibility, and therefore the avails of real estate.

3. There must, therefore, be all the forms of conveyancing, registry, and in short, all the forms of legal government, to settle and manage the real estate affairs of men.

4. Moral beings will not agree in opinion on any subject without similar degrees of knowledge.

5. Hence, no human community exists or ever will exist, the members of which on all subjects will agree in opinion.

6. This creates a necessity for human legislation and adjudication, to apply the great principles of moral law to all human affairs.

7. There are multitudes of human wants and necessities that cannot properly be met, except through the instrumentality of human governments.

II. This necessity will continue as long as human beings exist in this world.

1. This is as certain as that the human body will always need sustenance, clothing, and that the human soul will always need instruction, and that the means of instruction will not grow spontaneously, without expense or labor.

2. It is as certain as that men of all ages and circumstances will never possess equal degrees of information on all subjects.

If all men were perfectly holy and disposed to do right, the necessity of human governments would not be set aside, because this necessity is *founded in the ignorance* of mankind, though aggravated by their wickedness.

3. The decisions of legislators and judges must be authoritative, so as to settle questions of disagreement in opinion, and bind and protect all parties.

4. The Bible represents human governments not only as existing, but as giving their authority and power to the support of the Church in its most prosperous state. This proves that human government will not be dispensed with when the world is holy:

Isa. 49: 22, 23, 'Thus saith the Lord God, Behold, I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people: and they shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders. And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee with their faces toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord: for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me.'

III. Human Governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part of the moral government of God.

1. Dan. 2: 21. 'He changeth the times and the seasons: he removeth kings, and setteth up kings: he giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding.'

Dan. 4: 17, 25. 'This matter is by the decree of the watchers, and the demand by the word of the holy ones; to the intent that the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.' 'They shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field, and they shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and they shall wet thee with the dew of heaven, and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the Most High ruleth

in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will.'

Dan. 5: 21. "He was driven from the sons of men; and his heart was made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses: they fed him with grass like oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven; till he knew that the Most High God ruleth in the kingdom of men, and that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will.'

Rom. 13: 1—7. 'Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath but also for conscience sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.'

Titus 3: 1. 'Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work.'

1 Peter 2: 13, 14. 'Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well.'

These passages prove conclusively, that God establishes human governments, as parts of moral government.

2. It is a matter of fact, that God does exert moral influences through the instrumentality of human governments.

3. It is a matter of fact, that he often executes his law, punishes vice, and rewards virtue, through the instrumentality of human governments.

4. Under the Jewish Theocracy, where God was King, it was found indispensable to have the forms of the executive department of government.

IV. It is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of Human Government.

1. Because human governments are plainly a necessity of human beings.

2. As all men are in some way dependent upon them, it is the duty of every man to aid in their establishment and support.

3. As the great law of benevolence, or universal good-willing, demands the existence of human governments, all men are under a perpetual and unalterable moral obligation to aid in their establishment and support.

4. In popular or elective governments, every man having a right to vote, and every human being who has moral influence, is bound to exert that influence, in the promotion of virtue and happiness. And as human governments are plainly indispensable to the highest good of man, they are bound to exert their influence to secure a legislation that is in accordance with the law of God.

5. The obligation of human beings to support and obey human governments, while they legislate upon the principles of the moral law, is as unalterable as the moral law itself.

V. It is absurd to suppose that human governments can ever be dispensed with in the present world.

1. Because such a supposition is entirely inconsistent with the nature of human beings.

2. It is equally inconsistent with their relations and circumstances.

3. Because it assumes that the necessity of government is founded alone in human depravity: whereas the foundation of this necessity is human ignorance, and human depravity is only an additional reason for the existence of human governments. The primary idea of law is to teach; hence law has a *precept*. It is authoritative, and therefore has a penalty.

4. Because it assumes that men would always agree in judgment, if their hearts were right, irrespective of their degrees of information. But this is as far as possible from the truth.

5. Because it sets aside one of the plainest and most unequivocal doctrines of revelation.

VI. I am to answer objections.

Obj. I. The kingdom of God is represented in the Bible as subverting all other kingdoms.

Ans. This is true, and all that can be meant by this is, that the time shall come when God shall be regarded as the supreme and universal sovereign of the universe, when his law shall be regarded as universally obligatory; when all Kings, Legislators, and Judges shall act as his servants, declaring,

applying, and administering the great principles of his law to all the affairs of human beings. Thus God will be the Supreme Sovereign, and earthly rulers will be Governors, Kings, and Judges under him, and acting by his authority as revealed in the Bible.

Obj. II. It is objected that God only providentially establishes human governments, and that he does not approve of their selfish and wicked administration; that he only uses them providentially as he does Satan for the promotion of his own designs.

Ans. 1. God no where commands mankind to obey Satan, but he does command them to obey magistrates and rulers.

Rom. 13: 1. "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers: for there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God."

1 Pet. 2: 13, 14. "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well."

2. He no where recognizes Satan as his servant, sent and set by him to administer justice and execute wrath upon the wicked; but he does this in respect to human governments.

Rom. 13: 2—6. "Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid: for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing."

3. It is true indeed that God approves of nothing that is ungodly and selfish in human governments. Neither did he approve of what was ungodly and selfish in the Scribes and Pharisees; and yet Christ said to his disciples, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat. Therefore whatsoever things they command you, that observe and do; but do ye not after their works, for they say, and do not." Here the plain common sense principle is recognized, that we are to obey when the requirement is not inconsistent with the moral law, what-

ever may be the character or the motive of the ruler. We are always to obey heartily as unto the Lord, and not unto men, and render obedience to magistrates for the honor and glory of God, and as doing service to him.

Obj. III. It is objected that Christians should leave human governments to the management of the ungodly, and not be diverted from the work of saving souls to intermeddle with human governments.

Ans. 1. This is not being diverted from the work of saving souls. The promotion of public and private order and happiness is one of the indispensable means of saving souls.

2. It is nonsense to admit that Christians are under an obligation to obey human government, and still have nothing to do with the choice of those who shall govern.

Obj. IV. It is objected that we are commanded not to avenge ourselves, that "Vengeance is mine, and I will repay saith the Lord." It is said, that if I may not avenge or redress my own wrongs in my own person, I may not do it through the instrumentality of human government.

Ans. 1. It does not follow that because you may not take it upon you to redress your own wrongs by a summary and personal infliction of punishment upon the transgressor, that human governments may not punish them.

2. Because all *private* wrongs are a *public* injury; and irrespective of any particular regard to your personal interest, magistrates are bound to punish crime for the public good.

3. It does not follow, because that while God has expressly forbidden you to redress your own wrongs by administering personal and private chastisement, he has expressly recognized the right and made it the duty of a public magistrate to punish crimes.

Obj. V. It is objected that love is so much better than law that where love reigns in the heart, law can be universally dispensed with.

Ans. 1. This supposes that if there is only love there need be no rule of duty.

2. This objection overlooks the fact that law is in all worlds the rule of duty, and that legal sanctions make up an indispensable part of that circle of motives that are suited to the nature, relations, and government of moral beings.

3. The law requires love; and nothing is law, either human or divine, that is inconsistent with universal benevolence. And to suppose that love is better than law, is to suppose that obedience to law sets aside the necessity of law.

Obj. VI. It is objected that Christians have something else to do besides meddle with politics.

Ans. 1. In a popular government, politics are an indispensable part of religion. No man can possibly be benevolent or religious without concerning himself to a greater or less extent with the affairs of human government.

2. It is true that Christians have something else to do than to go with a party to do evil, or to meddle with politics in a selfish or ungodly manner. But they are bound to meddle with politics in popular governments, for the same reason that they are bound to seek the universal good of all men.

Obj. VII. It is said that human governments are no where expressly authorized in the Bible.

Ans. 1. This is a mistake. Both their existence and lawfulness are as expressly recognized in the above quoted scriptures as they can be.

2. If God did not expressly authorize them, it would still be both the right and the duty of mankind to institute human governments, because they are plainly demanded by the necessities of human nature. It is a first truth, that whatever is essential to the highest good of moral beings in any world, they have a right and are bound to do. So far, therefore, are men from needing any express authority to establish human governments, that no possible prohibition could render their establishment unlawful. It has been shown, in these lectures on moral government, that moral law is a unit—that it is that rule of action which is in accordance with the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings—that whatever is in accordance with, and demanded by the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings, is obligatory on them. It is moral law, and no power in the universe can set it aside. Therefore, were the scriptures entirely silent on the subject of human governments, and on the subject of family government, as they actually are on a great many important subjects, this would be no objection to the lawfulness, and expediency, necessity, and duty of establishing human governments.

Obj. VIII. It is said that human governments are founded in and sustained by force, and that this is inconsistent with the spirit of the gospel.

Ans. 1. There cannot be a difference between the *spirit* of the Old and New Testaments, or between the *spirit* of the law and the gospel, unless God has changed, and unless Christ has undertaken to make void the law, through faith, which cannot be.

Rom. 3: 32. 'Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.'

2. Just human governments, and such governments only are contended for, will not exercise force unless it is demanded to promote the highest public good. If it be necessary to this end it can never be wrong. Nay, it must be the duty of human governments to inflict penalties, when their infliction is demanded by the public interest.

Obj. IX. It is said that there should be no laws with penalties.

Ans. This is the same as to say that there should be no law at all; for that is no law which has no penalty, but only advice.

Obj. X. It is said that Church government is sufficient to meet the necessities of the world, without secular or state governments.

Ans. What! Church governments regulate commerce, make internal improvements, and undertake to manage all the business affairs of the world!

Church government was never established for any such end; but simply to regulate the spiritual, in distinction from the secular concerns of men—to try offenders and inflict spiritual chastisement, and never to perplex and embarrass itself with managing the business and commercial operations of the world.

Obj. XI. It is said that were all the world holy, legal penalties would not be needed.

Ans. Were all men perfectly holy, the *execution* of penalties would not be needed; but still, if there were law, there would be penalties; and it would be both the right and the duty of magistrates to inflict them, should their execution be called for.

Obj. XII. It is asserted that family government is the only form of government approved of God.

Ans. This is a ridiculous assertion:

1. Because God as expressly commands obedience to magistrates as to parents.

2. He makes it as absolutely the duty of magistrates to punish crime, as of parents to punish their own disobedient children.

3. The right of family government is not founded in the arbitrary will of God, but in the highest good of human beings; so that family government would be both allowable and obligatory, had God said nothing about it.

4. So, the right of human government has not its founda-

tion in the arbitrary will of God, but in the necessities of human beings. The larger the community the more absolute the necessity of government. If, in the small circle of the family, laws and penalties are needed, how much more in the larger communities of states and nations. Now, neither the ruler of a family, nor of any other form of human government, has a right to legislate arbitrarily, or enact, or enforce any other laws, than those that are in accordance with the nature, relations, and circumstances of human beings. Nothing can be obligatory on moral beings, but that which is consistent with the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings. But human beings are bound to establish family governments, state governments, national governments, and, in short, whatever government may be requisite for the universal instruction, government, virtue, and happiness of the world.

5. All the reasons, therefore, for family government, hold equally in favor of the state and national governments.

6. There are vastly higher and weightier reasons for governments over states and nations, than in the small communities of families.

7. Therefore, neither family nor state governments need the express sanction of God, to render them obligatory; for both the right and duty of establishing and maintaining these governments would remain, had the bible been entirely silent on the subject. But on this, as on many other subjects, God has spoken and declared, what is the common and universal law, plainly recognizing both the right and duty of family and civil governments.

8. Christians, therefore, have something else to do, than to confound the right of government with the abuse of this right by the ungodly. Instead of destroying human governments, Christians are bound to reform them.

9. To attempt to destroy, rather than reform human governments, is the same in principle as is often plead for by those who are attempting to destroy, rather than reform the Church. There are those, who, disgusted with the abuses of Christianity practised in the Church, seem bent on destroying the Church altogether, as the means of saving the world. But what mad policy is this!

10. It is admitted that selfish men need and must have the restraints of law; but contended that Christians should have no part in restraining them by law. But suppose the wicked should agree among themselves to have no law, and therefore should not attempt to restrain themselves nor each other by

law; would it be neither the right nor the duty of Christians to attempt their restraint, through the influence of wholesome government?

11. It is strange that selfish men should need the restraints of law, and yet that Christians have no right to meet this necessity, by supporting governments that will restrain them. What is this but admitting, that the world really needs the restraints of governments—that the highest good of the universe demands their existence; and yet, that it is wicked for Christians to seek the highest good of the world, by meeting this necessity in the establishment and support of human governments! It is right and best that there should be law. It is necessary that there should be law. Therefore, universal benevolence demands it; but it is wicked in Christians, to have any thing to do with it! This is singular logic.

✓ IV. *Inquire into the foundation of the right of human governments.*

1. Men are moral agents, and are therefore subjects of moral government and of moral obligation.

2. They are bound to aim at the same end at which God ought to aim, to wit, the highest good of universal being.

3. Since human governments are the indispensable means of promoting the highest good of human beings, they have a right, and it is their duty to establish and maintain them. The right of human government must be *founded* in the intrinsic value of the good that is to be secured by them and conditioned upon the fact that they sustain to the highest good of human beings, and consequently to the glory of God, through them, the relation of a necessary means to this end.

V. *Point out the limits or boundary of this right.*

1. Observe, the end of government is the highest good of human beings, as a part of universal good. All valid human legislation must propose this as its end, and no legislation can have any authority that has not the highest good of the whole for its end.

✓ 2. Observe, *no being can create law*. All law for the government of moral agents must be *moral law*. That is, it must be that rule of action that is suited to their natures and relations. The moral law or the law of nature, in other words, the common law of the universe of moral agents, by which God and every moral being is or ought to be governed, is the only law that can be obligatory on human beings. All valid human legislation must be only declaratory of this one only law. Nothing else than this can by any possibility be law. God

puts forth no enactments but such as are declaratory of the common law of the universe, and should he do otherwise they would not be obligatory. Arbitrary legislation can never be obligatory.

3. Human governments may declare and apply the great principle of moral law to human conduct, and legislate in accordance with and in support of the divine government, so far as this is necessary, but no farther.

4. The right of human government is *founded* in the intrinsic value of the good of being and *conditionated* upon their necessity as a means to that end. They may therefore, and ought to extend their legislation and control just so far and no farther than this necessity goes. This end is the promotion of the highest good. So far as legislation and control are indispensable to this end, so far and no farther does the right to govern extend.

5. Human beings have no right to establish a government upon any other basis than the moral law. No human constitution or law can be obligatory upon human beings any farther than it is in accordance with and declaratory of moral law. All legislation and all constitutions not founded upon this basis and not recognizing the moral law as the only law of the universe are null and void, and all attempts to establish and enforce them are odious tyranny and usurpation. Human beings may form constitutions, establish governments and enact statutes for the purpose of promoting the highest virtue and happiness of the world, and for the declaration and enforcement of moral law, and in so far forth as human governments are essential to this end and absolutely no farther.

6. It follows that no government is lawful or innocent that does not recognize the moral law as the only universal law, and God as the Supreme Lawgiver and Judge to whom nations in their national capacity as well as all individuals are amenable. The moral law of God is the only law of individuals and of nations, and nothing can be rightful government but such as is founded and administered in its support.

LECTURE XXXIV.

HUMAN GOVERNMENT.

VI. I am to make several remarks respecting forms of government, the right and duty of Revolution &c.

In this lecture I shall show:

I. THE REASONS WHY GOD HAS MADE NO PARTICULAR FORM OF CHURCH OR CIVIL GOVERNMENTS UNIVERSALLY OBLIGATORY.

II. THE PARTICULAR FORMS OF CHURCH AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT MUST AND WILL DEPEND UPON THE INTELLIGENCE AND VIRTUE OF THE PEOPLE.

III. THAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGATORY, THAT IS BEST SUITED TO MEET THE NECESSITIES OF THE PEOPLE.

IV. REVOLUTIONS BECOME NECESSARY AND OBLIGATORY, WHEN THE VIRTUE AND INTELLIGENCE, OR THE VICE AND IGNORANCE OF THE PEOPLE DEMAND THEM.

V. IN WHAT CASES HUMAN LEGISLATION IS VALID, AND IN WHAT CASES IT IS NULL AND VOID.

VI. IN WHAT CASES WE ARE BOUND TO DISOBEY HUMAN GOVERNMENT.

I. The reasons why God has made no form of Church or civil Government universally obligatory.

1. That God has no where in the Bible given directions in regard to any particular form of church or secular government, is a matter of fact.

2. That he did not consider the then existing forms, either of church or state government, as of perpetual obligation, is also certain.

3. He did not give directions in regard to particular forms of government, either of church or state;

(1.) Because no such directions could be given, without producing great revolutions and governmental opposition to Christianity. The governments of the world are and always have been exceedingly various in form. To attempt, therefore, to insist upon any particular form, as being universally obligatory, would be calling out great national opposition to religion.

(2.) Because no particular form, of church or state government, either now is, or ever has been suited to all degrees of intelligence, and all states of society.

(3.) Because the forms of both church and state governments, need to be changed, with any great elevations or depressions of society in regard to their intelligence and virtue.

II. The particular forms of Church and State Government, must and will depend upon the virtue and intelligence of the people.

1. Democracy is self-government, and can never be safe or useful, except so far as there are sufficient intelligence and virtue in the community to impose, by mutual consent, salutary self-restraints, and to enforce by the power of public sentiment, and by the fear and love of God, the practice of those virtues which are indispensable to the highest good of any community.

2. Republics are another and less pure form of self-government.

3. When there are not sufficient intelligence and virtue among the people, to legislate in accordance with the highest good of the state or nation, then both democracies and republics are improper and impracticable, as forms of government.

4. When there is too little intelligence and virtue in the mass of the people, to legislate on correct principles, monarchies are better calculated to restrain vice and promote virtue.

5. In the worst states of society, despotisms, either civil or military, are the only proper and efficient forms of government. It is true indeed that a resort to despotic government is an evil, and all that can be truly said is, that in certain states of desperate anarchy, despotic government is the less of two evils.

6. When virtue and intelligence are nearly universal democratic forms of government are well suited to promote the public good.

7. In such a state of society, democracy is greatly conducive to the general diffusion of knowledge on governmental subjects.

8. Although in some respects less convenient and more expensive, yet in a suitable state of society, a democracy is in many respects the most desirable form, either of church or state government:

(1.) It is conducive, as has been already said, to general intelligence.

(2.) Under a democracy, the people are more generally acquainted with the laws.

(3.) They are more interested in them.

(4.) This form of government creates a more general feeling of individual responsibility.

(5.) Governmental questions are more apt to be thoroughly discussed and understood before they are adopted.

(6.) As the diffusion of knowledge is favorable to individual and public virtue, democracy is highly conducive to virtue and happiness.

9. God has always providentially given to mankind those forms of government that were suited to the degrees of virtue and intelligence among them.

10. If they have been extremely ignorant and vicious, he has restrained them by the iron rod of human despotism.

11. If more intelligent and virtuous, he has given them the milder forms of limited monarchies.

12. If still more intelligent and virtuous, he has given them still more liberty, and providentially established republics for their government.

13. Whenever the general state of intelligence has permitted it, he has put them to the test of self-government and self-restraint, by establishing democracies.

14. If the world ever becomes perfectly virtuous both church and state governments will be proportionally modified; and employed in expounding and applying the great principles of moral law to the spiritual and secular concerns of men.

15. The above principles are equally applicable to church and civil governments. Episcopacy is well suited to a state of general ignorance among the people. Presbyterianism, or Church Republicanism is better suited to a more advanced state of intelligence and the prevalence of Christian principle. While Congregationalism, or spiritual Democracy, is best suited and only suited to a state of general intelligence, and the prevalence of Christian principle.

16. God's providence has always modified both church and state governments, so as to suit the intelligence and virtue of the people. As churches and nations rise and fall in the scale of virtue and intelligence, these various forms of government naturally and necessarily give place to each other. So that ecclesiastical and state despotism or liberty, depend naturally, providentially, and necessarily upon the virtue and intelligence of the people.

17. God is infinitely benevolent, and from time to time, gives the people as much liberty as they can bear.

III. That form of Government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet the necessities of the people.

1. This follows as a self-evident truth, from the consideration, that necessity is the condition of the right of human government. To meet this necessity is the object of government;

and that government is obligatory and best, which is demanded by the circumstances, intelligence and morals of the people.

2. Consequently, in certain states of society, it would be a Christian's duty to pray for and sustain even a military despotism; in a certain other state of society, to pray for and sustain a monarchy; and in other states, to pray for and sustain a republic; and in a still more advanced stage of virtue and intelligence, to pray for and sustain a democracy; if indeed a democracy is the most wholesome form of self-government, which may admit a doubt. It is ridiculous to set up the claim of a Divine Right for any stereotyped form of government. That form of Government which is demanded by the state of society and the virtue and intelligence of the people, has, of necessity, the Divine right and sanction, and none other has or can have.

IV. Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue and intelligence or the vice and ignorance of the people demand them.

1. This is a thing of course. When one form of government fails to meet any longer the necessities of the people, it is the duty of the people to revolutionize.

2. In such cases it is in vain to oppose revolution; for in some way the benevolence of God will bring it about. Upon this principle alone, can what is generally termed the American Revolution be justified. The intelligence and virtue of our Puritan fore-fathers rendered a monarchy an unnecessary burden, and a republican form of government both appropriate and necessary; and God always allows his children as much liberty as they are prepared to enjoy.

3. The stability of our republican institutions must depend upon the progress of general intelligence and virtue. If in these respects the nation falls, if general intelligence, public and private virtue sink to that point below which self-control becomes impossible, we must fall back into monarchy, limited or absolute; or into civil or military despotism; just according to the national standard of intelligence and virtue. This is just as certain as that God governs the world, or that causes produce their effects.

4. Therefore, it is the maddest conceivable policy, for Christians to attempt to uproot human governments, while they ought to be engaged in sustaining them, upon the great principles of the moral law. It is certainly stark nonsense, if not abominable wickedness, to overlook either in theory or practice, these plain, common sense and universal truths.

V. *In what cases human legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null and void.*

1. Human legislation is valid, when called for by the necessities, that is, by the nature, relations and circumstances of the people.

2. Just that kind and degree of human legislation which are demanded by the necessities of the people are obligatory.

3. Human legislation is utterly null and void in all other cases whatsoever; and I may add, that divine legislation would be equally null and void; unless demanded by the nature, relations, and necessities of the universe. Consequently human beings can never legislate in opposition to the moral law. Whatever is inconsistent with supreme love to God and equal love to our neighbor, can, by no possibility, be obligatory.

VI. *In what cases we are bound to disobey human governments.*

1. We may yield obedience, when the thing required does not involve a violation of moral obligation.

2. We are bound to yield obedience, when legislation is in accordance with the law of nature.

3. We are bound to obey when the thing required has no moral character in itself; upon the principle, that obedience, in this case, is a less evil than revolution and misrule. But,

4. We are bound in all cases to disobey, when human legislation contravenes moral law, or invades the rights of conscience.

VII. *Apply the foregoing principles to the rights and duties of governments and subjects in relation to the execution of the necessary penalties of law:—the suppression of mobs, insurrections, rebellion; and also in relation to war, slavery, Sabbath desecration, &c.*

In discussing this branch of the subject I must,

1. Notice some principles that have been settled.

2. Apply these settled principles to the subjects first named.

1. Notice some principles that have been settled.

In the preceding lectures it has been shown,

1. That all government is a means to an end, and that the end of all righteous government is and must be the highest good of both the ruler and the ruled.

2. We have seen that all law is either moral or physical.

3. That all law for the government of free moral agents is and must be moral law.

4. That moral law is that rule of willing and acting that is suited to the natures, relations and circumstances of moral agents.

5. We have seen that the right to govern is founded in the value of the end to be secured by government, and conditioned,

(1.) Upon the necessity of government as a means to this end, and

(2.) Upon the natural and moral attributes of the ruler, and also upon his ability and willingness to so administer government as to secure the end of government.

6. We have seen that the right to govern implies:

[Let the reader here recur to what is written under this head on pages 21 and 22.]

7. We have seen that the right to govern is bounded only but absolutely by the necessity of government; that just that kind and degree of government is lawful which is necessary as a means of promoting the highest good of both ruler and ruled; that arbitrary legislation is invalid and tyrannical legislation, and that in no case can arbitrary enactments be *law*.

8. We have seen that no unequal or inequitable enactment can be law, and nothing can by any possibility be law but the rule "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

9. We have seen also that human rulers can justly legislate only in support of divine government but never against it. That no enactment can by any possibility be *law* that contravenes the moral law or law of God.

10. Let us now proceed to apply these immutable and well established principles.

1. To the rights and duties of government in relation to mobs, riots, &c. It is plain that the right and duty to govern for the security and promotion of the public interests implies the right and duty to use any means necessary to this result. It is absurd to say that the ruler has the right to govern, and yet that he has not a right to use the necessary means. Some have taken the ground of the inviolability of human life, and have insisted that to take life is wrong *per se*, and of course that governments are to be sustained without taking life. Others have gone so far as to assert that governments have no right to resort to physical force to sustain the authority of law. But this is a most absurd philosophy, and amounts to just this:—The ruler has a right to govern while the subject is pleased to obey; but if the subject refuse obedience, why then the right to govern ceases, for it is impossible that the right to govern should exist when the right to enforce obedience does not exist. This philosophy is in fact a denial

of the right to use the necessary means for the promotion of the great end for which all moral agents are bound to live. And yet strange to tell, this philosophy professes to deny the right to use force and to take life in support of government on the ground of benevolence, that is, that benevolence forbids it. What is this but maintaining that the law of benevolence demands that we should love others too much to use the indispensable means to secure their good? Or that we should love the whole too much to execute the law upon those who would destroy all good? Shame on such a philosophy. It overlooks the foundation of moral obligation and of all morality and religion. Just as if an enlightened benevolence could forbid the due, wholesome and necessary execution of law. This philosophy impertinently urges the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," as prohibiting all taking of human life. But it may be asked, why say *human* life. The commandment, so far as the letter is concerned, as fully prohibit the killing of animals or vegetables as it does of men. The question is what kind of killing does this commandment prohibit? Certainly not all killing of human beings, for in the next chapter we are commanded to kill human beings for certain crimes. The ten commandments are precepts, and the lawgiver, after laying down the precepts, goes on to specify the penalties that are to be inflicted by men for a violation of these precepts. Some of these penalties are death, and the penalty for the violation of the precept under consideration is death. It is certain that this precept was not intended to prohibit the taking of life for murder. A consideration of the law in its tenor and spirit renders it most evident that the precept in question prohibits murder, and the penalty of death is added by the lawgiver to the violation of this precept. Now how absurd and impertinent it is to quote this precept in prohibition of taking life under all circumstances!

Men have an undoubted right to do whatever is plainly indispensable to the highest good of man, and therefore nothing can by any possibility be law that should prohibit the taking of human life when it became indispensable to the great end of government. This right is every where recognized in the Bible, and if it were not, still the right would exist. This philosophy that I am opposing, assumes that the will of God creates law, and that we have no right to take life without an express warrant from him. But the facts are,

(1.) That God has given us an express warrant and injunction to take life for certain crimes, and,

(2.) If he had not, it would be duty to do so whenever the public good required it. Let it be remembered that the moral law is the law of nature, and that every thing is lawful and right that is plainly demanded for the promotion of the highest good of being.

The philosophy of which I am speaking lays much stress upon what it calls inalienable rights. It assumes that man has a title or right to life in such a sense that he can not forfeit it by crime. But the fact is, there are no rights inalienable in this sense. There can be no such rights. Whenever any individual, by the commission of crime, comes into such a relation to the public interest that his death is a necessary means of securing the highest public good, his life is forfeited, and to take the forfeiture at his hands is the duty of the government.

2. It will be seen that the same principles are equally applicable to insurrections, rebellion, &c. While government is right, it is duty, and while it is right and duty because necessary as a means to the great end upon which benevolence terminates, it must be both the right and the duty of government, and of all the subjects, to use any indispensable means for the suppression of insurrections, rebellion, &c., as also for the due administration of justice in the execution of law.

3. These principles will guide us in ascertaining the rights, and of course the duty of governments in relation to war.

War is one of the most heinous and horrible forms of sin unless it be evidently demanded by and prosecuted in obedience to the moral law. Observe, war to be in any case a virtue or to be less than a crime of infinite magnitude, must not only be honestly believed by those who engage in it, to be demanded by the law of benevolence, but it must also be engaged in by them with an eye single to the glory of God and the highest good of being. That war has been in some instances demanded by the spirit of the moral law there can be no reasonable doubt, since God has sometimes commanded them, which he could not have done had they not been demanded by the highest good of the universe. In those cases, if those who were commanded to engage in them had benevolent intentions in prosecuting them as God had in commanding them, it is absurd to say that they sinned. Rulers are represented as God's ministers to execute wrath upon the guilty. If in the Providence of God He should find it duty to destroy or to rebuke a nation for his own glory and the highest good of being, he may, beyond question, command that

they should be chastised by the hand of man. But in no case is war any thing else than a most horrible crime unless it is plainly the will of God that it should exist, and unless it be actually engaged in in obedience to his will. This is true of all, both of rulers and of subjects who engage in war. Selfish war is wholesale murder. For a nation to declare war or for persons to enlist or in any way to designedly aid or abet in the declaration or prosecution of war upon any other conditions than those just specified involves the guilt of murder.

There can scarcely be conceived a more abominable and fiendish maxim than "our country right or wrong." Recently this maxim seems to have been adopted and avowed in relation to the present war of the United States with Mexico.

It seems to be supposed by some that it is the duty of good subjects to sympathize with and support government in the prosecution of a war in which they have unjustly engaged, and to which they have committed themselves, upon the ground that since it is commenced it must be prosecuted as the less of two evils. The same class of men seem to have adopted the same philosophy in respect to slavery. Slavery, as it exists in this country, they acknowledge to be indefensible on the ground of right; that it is a great evil and a great sin, but it must be let alone as the less of two evils. It exists, say they, and it can not be abolished without disturbing the friendly relations and federal union of the States, therefore the institution must be sustained. The philosophy is this: war and slavery as they exist in this nation are unjust, but they exist, and to sustain them is duty, because their existence, under the circumstances, is the less of two evils. To this I answer:

1. That of moral evils or sins we can not know which is the least, that is, which involves the least or the greatest guilt.

2. I would ask, do these philosophers intend to admit that the prosecution of a war unjustly waged is sin, and that the support of slavery in this country is sin, but that the sin of supporting them is less than would be the sin of abandoning them under the circumstances? If they mean this, to be sure this were singular logic. To repent of a sin and forsake it were a greater sin than to persist in it! True and genuine repentance of a sin is sin, and even a greater sin than that repented of! Who does not know that it can never be sin to repent of sin? To repent and forsake all sin is always right

always duty and can in no case be sin. If war has been unjustly waged, if slavery or any thing else exists that involves injustice and oppression or sin in any form, it cannot be sin to abandon it. To abhor and reject it at once must be duty, and to persevere in it is only to add insult to injury.

Nothing can sanctify any crime but that which renders it no crime, but a virtue. But the philosophers whose views I am examining, must if consistent, take the ground that since war and slavery exist, although their commencement was unjust and sinful, yet since they exist, it is no crime but a virtue to sustain them as the least of two *natural* evils. But I would ask to whom are they the least of two evils? To ourselves or to being in general? The least of two present, or of two ultimate evils? Our duty is not to calculate the evils in respect merely to ourselves or to this nation and those immediately oppressed and injured, but to look abroad upon the world and the universe, and inquire what are the evils resulting and likely to result to the world, to the church, and to the universe from the declaration and prosecution of such a war, and from the support of slavery by a nation professing what we profess; a nation boasting of liberty; who have drawn the sword and bathed it in blood in defence of the principle that all men have an inalienable right to liberty; that they are born free and equal. Such a nation proclaiming such a principle and fighting in the defence of it, standing with its proud foot on the neck of three millions of crushed and prostrate slaves! O horrible! This a less evil to the world than emancipation or even than the dismemberment of our hypocritical union! "O shame, where is thy blush!" The prosecution of a war unjustly engaged in a less evil than repentance and restitution? It is impossible. Honesty is always and necessarily the best policy. Nations are bound by the same law as individuals. If they have done wrong it is always duty and honorable for them to repent, confess, and make restitution. To adopt the maxim, "Our country right or wrong," and to sympathise with the government 'in the prosecution of a war unrighteously waged must involve the guilt of murder. To adopt the maxim, "Our union even with perpetual slavery," is an abomination so execrable as not to be named by a just mind without indignation.

4. The same principles apply to governmental sabbath desecration. The Sabbath is plainly a Divine Institution founded in the necessities of human beings. The letter of the law of the Sabbath forbids all labor of every kind, and under all

circumstances on that day. But, as has been said in a former lecture, the spirit of the law of the Sabbath, being identical with the law of benevolence, sometimes requires the violation of the letter of the law. Both governments and individuals may, and it is their duty to do, on the Sabbath, whatever is plainly required by the great law of benevolence. But nothing more, absolutely. No human legislature can nullify the moral law. No human legislation can make it right or lawful to violate any command of God. All human enactments requiring or sanctioning the violation of any command of God are not only null and void, but they are a blasphemous usurpation and invasion of the prerogatives of God.

5. The same principles apply to slavery. No human constitution or enactment can, by any possibility, be *law* that recognizes the right of one human being to enslave another in a sense that implies selfishness on the part of the slaveholder. Selfishness is wrong *per se*. It is therefore always and unalterably wrong. No enactment, human or Divine, can *legalize* selfishness and make it right, under any conceivable circumstances. Slavery or any other evil, to be a crime, must imply selfishness. It must imply a violation of the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." If it implies a breach of this, it is wrong invariably and necessarily, and no legislation or any thing else can make it right. God can not authorize it. The Bible can not sanction it, and if both God and the Bible were to sanction it, it could not be *lawful*. God's arbitrary will is not law. The moral law, as we have seen, is as independent of his will as his own necessary existence is. He can not alter or repeal it. He could not sanctify selfishness and make it right. Nor can any book be received as of Divine authority that sanctions selfishness. God and the Bible quoted to sustain and sanctify slaveholding in a sense implying selfishness! 'Tis blasphemous! That slaveholding, as it exists in this country, implies selfishness at least, in almost all instances, is too plain to need proof. The sinfulness of slaveholding and war, in almost all cases, and in every case where the terms slaveholding and war are used in their popular signification, will appear irresistible, if we consider that sin is selfishness, and that all selfishness is necessarily sinful. Deprive a human being of liberty who has been guilty of no crime! Rob him of himself—his body—his soul—his time and his earnings to promote the interest of his master, and attempt to justify this on the principles of moral law! It is the greatest absurdity, and the most revolting wickedness.

LECTURE XXXV.

MORAL DEPRAVITY.

In discussing the subject of human depravity, I shall,

I. DEFINE THE TERM DEPRAVITY.

II. POINT OUT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND MORAL DEPRAVITY.

III. SHOW OF WHAT PHYSICAL DEPRAVITY CAN BE PREDICATED.

IV. OF WHAT MORAL DEPRAVITY CAN BE PREDICATED.

V. THAT MANKIND ARE BOTH PHYSICALLY AND MORALLY DEPRAVED.

VI. THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF MORAL AGENCY, AND PREVIOUS TO REGENERATION, THE MORAL DEPRAVITY OF MANKIND IS UNIVERSAL.

VII. THAT DURING THE ABOVE PERIOD THE MORAL DEPRAVITY OF MANKIND IS TOTAL.

VIII. THE PROPER METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNIVERSAL TOTAL MORAL DEPRAVITY OF THE UNREGENERATE MORAL AGENTS OF OUR RACE.

I. *Definition of the term Depravity.*

The word is derived from the Latin *de* and *pravus*. *Pravus* means crooked. *De* is intensive. *Depravo* literally and primarily means crooked, not in the sense of original or constitutional crookedness, but in the sense of having become crooked. The term does not imply original mal-conformation, but lapsed, fallen, departed from right or straight. It always implies deterioration, or fall from a former state of moral or physical perfection.

Depravity always implies a departure from a state of original integrity, or from conformity to the laws of the being who is the subject of depravity. Thus we should not call that being depraved who abode in a state of conformity to the original laws of his being, physical and moral. But we justly call a being depraved, who has departed from conformity to those laws, whether those laws be physical or moral.

II. *Point out the distinction between physical and moral depravity.*

Physical depravity, as the word denotes, is the depravity of constitution, or substance, as distinguished from depravity of free moral action. It may be predicated of body or of mind. Physical depravity, when predicated of the body, is

commonly and rightly termed disease. It consists in a physical departure from the laws of life and health, a lapsed, or fallen state of the constitution or physical organization, a state in which the bodily organization is imperfect and impaired, and in which healthy organic action is not sustained.

When physical depravity is predicated of mind, it is intended that the powers of the mind, either in substance, or in consequence of their connection with and dependence upon the body, are in a diseased, lapsed, fallen, degenerate state, so that the healthy action of those powers is not sustained.

Physical depravity, being depravity of substance as opposed to depravity of the actions of free will, can have no moral character. It may, as we shall see, be *caused* by moral depravity; and a moral agent may be blameworthy for having rendered himself physically depraved, either in body or mind. But physical depravity, whether of body or of mind, can have no moral character in itself, for the plain reason that it is involuntary, and in its nature disease, and not sin.

Moral depravity is the depravity of free will, not of the faculty itself, but of its free action. It consists in a violation of moral law. Depravity of the will, *as a faculty*, is, or would be physical, and not moral depravity. It would be depravity of substance, and not of free, responsible choice. Moral depravity is depravity of *choice*. It is a choice at variance with moral law, moral right. It is synonymous with sin or sinfulness. It is moral depravity, because it consists in a violation of moral law, and because it has moral character.

III. Of what physical depravity can be predicated.

1. It can be predicated of any organized substance. That is, every organized substance is liable to become depraved. Depravity is a possible state of every organized body or substance in existence.

2. Physical depravity may be predicated of *mind*, as has already been said, especially in its connection with an organized body. As mind in connection with body, manifests itself through it, acts by means of it, and is dependent upon it, it is plain, that if the body become diseased, or physically depraved, the mind can not but be affected by this state of the body, through and by means of which it acts. The normal manifestations of mind can not, in such case, be reasonably expected. Physical depravity may be predicated of all the powers and involuntary states of mind, of the intelligence, of the sensibility, and of the faculty of will. That is, the actings and states of the intelligence, may become disordered, de-

praved, deranged, or fallen from the state of integrity and healthiness. This, every one knows, as it is matter of daily experience and observation. Whether this in all cases is, and must be caused by the state of the bodily organization, that is, whether it is always and necessarily to be ascribed to the depraved state of the brain and nervous system, it is impossible for us to know. It may, for aught we know, in some instances at least, be a depravity or derangement of the substance of the mind itself.

The sensibility, or feeling department of the mind, may be sadly and physically depraved. This is a matter of common experience. The appetites and passions, the desires and cravings, the antipathies and repellencies of the feelings fall into great disorder and anarchy. Numerous artificial appetites are generated, and the whole sensibility becomes a wilderness, a chaos of conflicting and clamorous desires, emotions, and passions. That this state of the sensibility is often, and perhaps always, owing in some measure at least, to the state of the nervous system with which it is connected, through and by which it manifests itself, there can be but little room to doubt. But whether this is always and necessarily so, no one can tell. We know that the sensibility manifests great physical depravity. Whether this depravity belong exclusively to the body, or to the mind, or to both in connection, I will not venture to affirm. In the present state of our knowledge, or of *my* knowledge, I dare not hazard an affirmation upon the subject. The human body is certainly in a state of physical depravity. The human mind also certainly manifests physical depravity.

IV. Of what moral depravity can be predicated.

1. Not of substance; for over involuntary substance the moral law does not legislate.

2. Moral depravity can not be predicated of any involuntary acts or states of mind. These surely can not be violations of moral law, for moral law legislates only over free, intelligent choices.

3. Moral depravity can not be predicated of any unintelligent act of will, that is, of acts of will that are put forth in a state of idiocy, of intellectual derangement, or of sleep. Moral depravity implies moral obligation; moral obligation implies moral agency; and moral agency implies intelligence, or knowledge of moral relations. Moral agency implies moral law, or the development of the idea of duty, and a knowledge of what duty is.

✓ 4. Moral depravity can only be predicated of violations of moral law. Moral law, as we have seen, requires love, and only love to God and man, or to God and the universe. This love, as we have seen, is good will, choice, the choice of an end, the choice of the highest well being of God and of the universe of sentient existences.

Moral depravity is sin. Sin is a violation of moral law. We have seen that sin must consist in choice, in the choice of self-indulgence or self-gratification as an end.

5. Moral depravity can not consist in any attribute of nature or constitution, nor in any lapsed and fallen state of nature; for this is physical and not moral depravity.

2 6. It can not consist in any thing that is a part of mind or body. Nor in any involuntary action or state of either mind or body.

✓ 7. It can not consist in any thing back of choice, and that sustains to choice the relation of a cause. Whatever is back of choice, is without the pale of legislation. The law of God as has been said, requires good willing only, and sure it is, that nothing but acts of will can constitute a violation of moral law. Outward actions, and involuntary thoughts and feelings, may be said, in a certain sense, to possess moral character, because they are produced by the will. But strictly speaking, moral character belongs only to choice, or intention.

2 It was shown in a former lecture, that sin does not, and can not consist in malevolence, properly speaking, or in the choice of sin or misery as an end, or for its own sake. It was also shown, that all sin consists, and must consist in selfishness, or in the choice of self-gratification as an end.

Moral depravity, then, strictly speaking, can only be predicated of selfish ultimate intention.

V. Mankind are both physically and morally depraved.

1. There is, in all probability, no perfect health of body among all the ranks and classes of human beings that inhabit this world. The physical organization of the whole race has become impaired, and beyond all doubt has been becoming more and more so since intemperance of any kind was first introduced into our world. This is illustrated and confirmed by the comparative shortness of human life. This also is a physiological fact.

2. As the human mind, in this state of existence, is dependent upon the body for all its manifestations, and as the human body is universally in a state of greater or less physical depravity or disease, it follows that the manifestations of mind

thus dependent on a physically depraved organization, will be physically depraved manifestations. Especially is this true of the human sensibility. The appetites, passions, and propensities are in a state of most unhealthy development. This is too evident and too much a matter of universal notoriety to need proof or illustration. Every person of reflection has observed that the human mind is greatly out of balance in consequence of the monstrous development of the sensibility. The appetites, passions, and propensities have been indulged, and the intelligence and conscience stultified by selfishness. Selfishness, be it remembered, consists in a disposition or choice to gratify the propensities, desires and feelings. This, of course and of necessity, produces just the unhealthy and monstrous developments which we daily see: sometimes one ruling passion or appetite lording it not only over the intelligence and over the will, but also over all the other appetites and passions, crushing and sacrificing them all upon the altar of its own gratification. See that bloated wretch—an inebriate! His appetite for strong drink has played the despot. The whole mind and body, reputation, family, friends, health, time, eternity, all, all have been laid upon its filthy altar. There are the debauchee, and the glutton, and the gambler, and the miser, and a host of others each in his turn giving striking and melancholy proof of the monstrous development and physical depravity of the human sensibility.

3. That men are *morally* depraved is one of the most notorious facts of human experience, observation, and history.

Indeed I am not aware that it has ever been doubted when moral depravity has been understood to consist in selfishness.

The moral depravity of the race of man is every where assumed and declared in the Bible, and so universal and notorious is the fact of human selfishness that should any man practically call it in question—should he in his business transactions and in his intercourse with men assume the contrary, he would justly subject himself to the charge of insanity. Indeed there is not a fact in the world more notorious and undeniable than this. Human moral depravity is as palpably evident as human existence. It is a fact every where assumed in all governments, in all the arrangements of society, and has impressed its image and written its name upon every thing human.

VI. Subsequent to the commencement of moral agency and previous to regeneration the moral depravity of mankind is universal.

By this it is not intended to deny that in some instances the Spirit of God *may* from the first moment of moral agency have so enlightened the mind as to have secured conformity to moral law as the first moral act. This may or may not be true. It is not my present purpose to affirm or to deny this as a possibility or as a fact.

But by this is intended, that every moral agent of our race is from the dawn of moral agency to the moment of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, morally depraved, unless we except those possible cases just alluded to. The Bible exhibits proof of it in,

1. Those passages that represent all the unregenerate as possessing one common wicked heart or character. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually."—Gen. 6: 5. "This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead."—Eccl. 9: 3. "The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked: who can know it?"—Jer. 17: 9. "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be."—Ro. 8: 7.

2. Those passages that declare the universal necessity of regeneration. "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God."—John 3: 3.

3. Passages that expressly assert the universal moral depravity of all unregenerate moral agents of our race. "What then? are we better than they? No, in no wise: for we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin; As it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one: There is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no, not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips: Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness: Their feet are swift to shed blood: Destruction and misery are in their ways: And the way of peace have they not known: There is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law: that every mouth may be stop-

ped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin.—Ro. 3: 9—20.

4. Universal history proves it. What is this world's history but the shameless chronicle of human wickedness?

5. Universal observation attests it. Who ever saw one unregenerate human being that was not selfish, that did not obey his feelings rather than the law of his intelligence, that was not under some form or in some way living to please self? Such an unregenerate human being I may safely affirm was never seen since the fall of Adam.

6. I may also appeal to the universal consciousness of the unregenerate. They know themselves to be selfish, to be aiming to please themselves.

VII. The moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race, is total.

By this is intended, that the moral depravity of the unregenerate is without any mixture of moral goodness or virtue, that while they remain unregenerate, they never, in any instance, nor in any degree exercise true love to God and to man. It is not intended, that they may not perform many outward actions, and have many inward feelings, that are such as the regenerate perform and experience. But it is intended that virtue does not consist either in involuntary feelings or in outward actions, and that it consists alone in entire consecration of heart and life to God and the good of being, and that no unregenerate sinner previous to regeneration, is or can be for one moment in this state.

When virtue is clearly defined and apprehended, and when it is seen not to consist in any thing but the heart's entire consecration to God and the good of being, it must be seen, that the unregenerate are not, and that it is a contradiction to affirm that they are, or, remaining unregenerate, can be, for one moment in this state. It is amazing, that some philosophers and theologians have admitted and maintained, that the unregenerate do sometimes do that which is truly virtuous. But in these admissions they necessarily assume a false philosophy and overlook that in which all virtue does and must consist, namely, supreme ultimate intention. They speak of virtuous actions and of virtuous feelings, as if virtue consisted in them, and not in the intention.

Henry P. Tappan, for example, for the most part an able, truthful and beautiful writer, assumes, or rather affirms, that

volitions may be put forth inconsistent with, and contrary to the present choice of an end, and that consequently, unregenerate sinners, whom he admits to be in the exercise of a selfish choice of an end, may, and do sometimes put forth right volitions, and perform right actions, that is, right in the sense of virtuous actions. But let us examine this subject. We have seen that all choice and all volition must respect either an end or means, that is, that every thing willed or chosen, is willed or chosen for some reason. To deny this is the same as to deny that any thing is willed or chosen, because the reason for a choice and the thing chosen are identical. Therefore, it is plain, as was shown in a former lecture, 1, that the will cannot embrace at the same time, two opposite ends; and 2, that while but one end is chosen, the will cannot put forth volitions to secure some other end, which end is not yet chosen. In other words, it certainly is absurd to say, that the will, while maintaining the choice of one end, can use means for the accomplishment of another and opposite end.

Again. The choice of an end, or of means, when more than one end or means is known to the mind, implies *preference*. The choice of one end or means, implies the rejection of its opposite. If one of two opposing ends be chosen, the other is, and must be rejected. Therefore the choice of the two ends can never co-exist. And as was shown in a former lecture,

1. The mind cannot will at all without an end. As all choice and volition must respect ends, or means, and as means cannot be willed without the previous choice of an end, it follows, that the choice of an end is necessarily the first choice.

2. When an end is chosen, that choice confines all volition to securing its accomplishment, and for the time being, and until another end is chosen, and this one relinquished, it is impossible for the will to put forth any volition inconsistent with the present choice. It therefore follows, that while sinners are selfish, or unregenerate, it is impossible for them to put forth a holy volition.

They are under the necessity of first changing their hearts, or their choice of an end, before they can put forth any volitions to secure any other than a selfish end. And this is plainly the every where assumed philosophy of the Bible. That uniformly represents the unregenerate as totally depraved, and calls upon them to repent, to make to themselves a new heart, and never admits directly, or by way of implication, that they can do any thing good or accepta-

ble to God while in the exercise of a wicked or selfish heart.

When examining the attributes of selfishness, it was shown that total depravity was one of its essential attributes; or rather, that it was the moral attribute in these senses, to wit:

(1.) That selfishness did not, could not co-exist with virtue or benevolence.

(2.) That selfishness could admit of no volitions or actions inconsistent with it while it continued.

(3.) That selfishness was not only wholly inconsistent with any degree of love to God, but was enmity against God, the very opposite of his will, and constituted deep and entire opposition of will to God.

(4.) That selfishness was mortal enmity against God, as manifested in the murder of Christ:

(5.) That selfishness was *supreme* opposition to God.

(6.) That every selfish being is, and must be at every moment, just as wicked and blameworthy, as with his light he could be, that he at every moment violated all his moral obligations and rejected and trampled down all the light he had, and that whatever course of outward life any sinner pursues, it is all directed exclusively by selfishness, and whether he goes into the pulpit to preach the gospel, or becomes a pirate upon the high seas, he is actuated in either case solely by a regard to self-interest, and that, let him do one or the other, it is for the same reason, to wit, to please himself, so that it matters not, so far as his guilt is concerned, which he does. One course may, or it may not result in more or less evil than the other. But, as was then shown, the *tendency* of one course or the other, is not the criterion by which his guilt is to be measured, but his apprehension of the value of the interests rejected for the sake of securing his own gratification.

LECTURE XXXVI.

MORAL DEPRAVITY.

VIII. Proper method of accounting for the universal and total moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race.

In the discussion of this subject, I will,

1. Endeavor to show how it is not to be accounted for.
2. How it is to be accounted for.

1. How the moral depravity of mankind is not to be accounted for.

In examining this part of the subject, it is necessary to have distinctly in view, that which constitutes moral depravity. All the error that has existed upon this subject, has been founded in false assumptions in regard to the nature or essence of moral depravity. It has been almost universally true, that no distinction has been made between moral and physical depravity; and consequently physical depravity has been confounded with and treated of as moral depravity. This, of course, has led to vast confusion and nonsense upon this subject. Let the following facts, which have been shown in former lectures, be distinctly borne in mind.

1. That moral depravity consists in selfishness, or in the choice of self-interest, self-gratification, or self-indulgence, as an end. Consequently it can not consist,

1. *In a sinful constitution, or in a constitutional appetency or craving for sin.* This has been shown in a former lecture, on what is not implied in disobedience to the moral law.

2. Moral depravity is sin itself, and not the *cause* of sin. It is not something back of sin that sustains to it the relation of a cause, but it is the essence and the whole of sin.

3. It can not be an attribute of human nature, for this would be physical, and not moral depravity.

✓ 4. Moral depravity is not then to be accounted for by ascribing it to a nature or constitution sinful in itself. To talk of a sinful nature, or sinful constitution, in the sense of physical sinfulness, is to talk stark nonsense. It is to overlook the essential nature of sin, and to make sin a physical virus, instead of a voluntary and responsible choice. Both sound philosophy, and the Bible, make sin to consist in obeying the flesh, or in the spirit of self-pleasing, or self-indulgence, or which is the same thing, in selfishness—in a carnal mind, or in minding the flesh. But writers on moral depravity have assumed, that moral depravity was distinct from, and

the cause of sin, that is, of actual transgression. They call it *original sin, indwelling sin, a sinful nature, an appetite for sin, an attribute of human nature*, and the like. We shall soon see what has led to this view of the subject.

I will, in the next place, notice a modern, and perhaps the most popular view of this subject, which has been taken by any late writer who has fallen into the error of confounding physical and moral depravity. I refer to the prize essay of Dr. Woods, of Andover, Mass. A reward of \$300 was offered for the best treatise upon the subject of moral depravity. The prize was awarded to Dr. Leonard Woods. In his essay, he defines moral depravity to be the same as "sinfulness." He also, in one part of his essay, holds and maintains, that it is always and necessarily, voluntary. Still, his great effort is to prove that sinfulness or moral depravity, is an attribute of human nature. It is no part of my design to expose the inconsistency of holding moral depravity to be a voluntary state of mind, and yet a natural attribute, but only to examine the philosophy, the logic, and theology of his main argument. The following quotation will show the sense in which he holds moral depravity to belong to the nature of man. On page 54 he says:

"The word *depravity*, relating as it here does to man's moral character, means the same as *sinfulness*, being the opposite of moral purity or *holiness*. In this use of the word there is a general agreement. But what is the meaning of *native* or *natural*? Among the variety of meanings specified by Johnson, Webster, and others, I refer to the following, as relating particularly to the subject before us.

"*Native. Produced by nature. Natural, or such as is according to nature; belonging by birth; original. Natural* has substantially the same meaning: "produced by nature; not acquired."—So Crabbe. "Of a person we say, his worth is native, to designate it as some valuable property *born with him*, not foreign to him or ingrafted upon him; but we say of his disposition, that it is natural, as opposed to that which is acquired by habit." And Johnson defines *nature* to be "the *native state or properties of any thing, by which it is discriminated from others.*" He quotes the definition of Boyle; "Nature sometimes means what belongs to a living creature *at its nativity*, or accrues to it *by its birth*, as when we say a man is noble by nature, or a child is naturally forward. "This," he says, "may be expressed by saying, *the man was born so.*"

After these brief definitions, which come to nearly the same thing, I proceed to inquire, *what are the marks or evidences which show any thing in man to be natural or native; and how far these marks are found in relation to depravity.*

Again, page 66, he says:

"The evil then can not be supposed to originate in any unfavorable external circumstances, such as corrupting examples, or insinuating and strong temptations; for if we suppose these entirely removed, all human beings would still be sinners. With such a moral nature as they now have, they would not wait for strong temptations to sin. Nay, they would be sinners in opposition to the strongest motives to the contrary. Indeed we know that human beings will turn those very motives which most powerfully urge to holiness, into occa-

sions of sin. Now does not the confidence and certainty with which we foretell the commission of sin, and of sin unmixed with moral purity, presuppose a full conviction in us, and a conviction resting upon what we regard as satisfactory evidence, that sin, in all its visible actings, arises from that which is *within the mind itself*, and which belongs to our very nature as moral beings? Have we not as much evidence that this is the case with moral evil, as with any of our natural affections or bodily appetites?"

This quotation, together with the whole argument, shows that he considers moral depravity to be an attribute of human nature in the same sense that the appetites and passions are.

Before I proceed directly to the examination of his argument to establish the position that sinfulness, or moral depravity is an "*attribute of human nature*," I would premise, *that an argument, or fact, that may equally well consist with either of two opposing theories can prove neither.* The author of the treatise in question, presents the following facts and considerations in support of his great position, that moral depravity, or sinfulness, is an attribute of human nature; and three Presidents of colleges underwrite for the soundness and conclusiveness of the argument. He argues this,

1. From the "*universality of moral depravity.*" To this I answer, that this argument proves nothing to the purpose, unless it be true, and assumed as a major premise, that whatever is universal among mankind, must be a natural attribute of man as such; that whatever is common to all men, must be an attribute of human nature. If this be not assumed as a truth, and if it be not true in fact, it will not follow, that the universality of moral depravity, proves, or is any evidence, that it is an attribute of human nature. But do not all men breathe, and eat, and drink, and sleep, and wake, and think, and will, and perform various actions? These, and many other things, are universal, and common to all men. But are these—choices and volitions, for example—attributes of human nature? An attribute of a thing, is that which belongs to its essence, substance, nature. Volition, thought, feeling, &c.; are they natural attributes? Are they inherent in, and do they belong to the nature or substance of man? Who does not know, that they are not attributes of his nature, although common to all men. This argument, then, amounts to nothing.

Again. *Selfishness* is common to all unregenerate men. Is selfishness a natural attribute? We have seen, in a former lecture, that it consists in choice. Can choice be an attribute of human nature?

Again. This argument is just as consistent with the oppo-

site theory, to wit, that moral depravity is selfishness. The universality of selfishness is just what might be expected, if selfishness consists in the committal of the will to the gratification of self. This will be a thing of course, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, to greatly enlighten the intelligence, and break up the force of habit, and change the attitude of the will, already at the first dawn of reason, as has been shown, committed to the impulses of the sensibility. If moral depravity is to be accounted for, as I have endeavored to account for it in a former lecture, and shall hereafter more fully, by ascribing it to the influence of temptation, or to a physically depraved constitution, surrounded by the circumstances in which mankind first form their moral character, or put forth their first moral choices, universality might of course be expected to be one of its characteristics. This argument, then, agreeing equally well with either theory, proves neither.

2. His second argument is, that "Moral depravity develops itself in early life." Answer,

(1.) This is just what might be expected upon the opposite theory. If moral depravity consist in the choice of self-gratification, it would of course appear in early life. So this argument agrees quite as well with the opposing theory, and therefore proves nothing. But,

(2.) This argument is good for nothing, unless the following be assumed as a major premise, and unless the fact assumed, be indeed a truth, namely, "Whatever is developed in early life, must be an attribute of human nature." But is this true? Breathing, sleeping, eating, and such like things—are these attributes of nature? But unless it be true, that whatever is universally developed in early life, is an attribute of human nature, it will not of course follow, that moral depravity is.

3. His third argument is, that "Moral depravity is not owing to any change that occurs subsequent to birth." Answer:

Nor is choice or volition, thought or feeling, owing to any change in the constitution, that occurs subsequently to birth. What then: are they attributes of human nature? This argument proves nothing, unless it be true, that whatever is universally true of men that is not owing to any change of constitution that occurs after birth, must be an attribute of human nature. But who does not know, that this is not true. "What then, does this arguing prove?"

Again: this argument is just as consistent with the opposing theory, and therefore proves neither.

4. His fourth argument is, "That moral depravity acts

freely and spontaneously.” Answer: the *moral agent* acts freely, and acts *selfishly*, that is, *wickedly*. This argument assumes, that if a moral agent acts freely and wickedly, moral depravity, or sin, must be an attribute of his nature. Or more fairly, if mankind universally, in the exercise of their liberty, act sinfully, sinfulness must be an attribute of human nature.” But what is sin? Why sin is a voluntary transgression of law—Dr. Woods being judge. Can a voluntary transgression of law be an attribute of human nature?

But again: this argument is equally consistent with the opposite theory. If moral depravity consist in the choice of self-gratification as an end, it would of course freely and spontaneously manifest itself. This argument then, is good for nothing.

5. His fifth argument is, “That moral depravity is hard to overcome.” Answer,

1. If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be overcome at all without a change of the human constitution.

2. It is hard to overcome, just as selfishness naturally would be in beings of a physically depraved constitution, and in the presence of so many temptations to self-indulgence.

3. If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be overcome without a change of personal identity. But the fact that it can be overcome, and the consciousness of personal identity remain, proves that it is not an attribute of human nature.

6. His sixth argument is, that “We can predict with certainty, that in due time, it will act itself out.” Answer: Just as might be expected. If moral depravity consists in selfishness, we can predict with certainty, that the spirit of self-pleasing will, in due time, and at all times, act itself out. We can also predict, without the gift of prophesying, that with a constitution physically depraved, and surrounded with objects to awaken appetite, and with all the circumstances in which human beings first form their moral character, they will seek to gratify themselves universally, unless prevented by the Holy Spirit. This argument is just as consistent with the opposite theory, and therefore proves neither.

Again: this argument, like all the rest, is based upon the assumption of a false major premise, to wit, “That whatever we can predict with certainty, of human beings, must be an attribute of their nature.” But we can predict, that if they live, they will think and choose. Are these attributes of human nature?

It is unnecessary to occupy any more time with the treatise of Dr. Woods. I will now quote the standards of the Presbyterian church, which will possess you of their views upon this subject. On pages 30 and 31 of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, we have the following: "By this sin, they, (Adam and Eve,) fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions."

Again, pages 152—154, Shorter Catechism. Question 22. Did all mankind fall in that first transgression? Answer: The covenant being made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity; all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression.

Question 23. Into what estate did the fall bring mankind? Ans. The fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery.

Question 24. What is sin? Ans. Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature.

Question 25. Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell? Ans. The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of that righteousness wherein he was created, and the corruption of his nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually, which is commonly called original sin, and from which do proceed all actual transgressions.

Question 26. How is original sin conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity? Ans. Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so as all that proceed from them in that way, are conceived and born in sin."

These extracts show, that the framers and defenders of this Confession of Faith, account for the moral depravity of mankind, by making it to consist in a sinful nature, inherited by

natural generation from Adam. They regard the constitution inherited from Adam as in itself sinful, and the cause of all actual transgression. They make no distinction between physical and moral depravity. They also distinguish between original and actual sin. Original sin is the sinfulness of the constitution, in which Adam's posterity have no other hand than to inherit it by natural generation, or by birth. This original sin, or sinful nature, renders mankind utterly disabled from all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all that is evil. This is their account of moral depravity. This, it will be seen, is substantially the ground of Dr. Woods.

It has been common with those who confound physical with moral depravity, and who maintain that human nature is itself sinful, to quote certain passages of Scripture to sustain their position. An examination of these proof texts must, in the next place, occupy our attention. But before I enter upon this examination, I must first call your attention to certain well settled rules of biblical interpretation.

1. Different passages must be so interpreted, if they can be, as not to contradict each other.

2. Language is to be interpreted according to the subject matter of discourse.

3. Respect is always to be had to the general scope and design of the speaker or writer.

4. Texts that are consistent with either theory prove neither.

5. Language is to be so interpreted, if it can be, as not to conflict with sound philosophy, matters of fact, the nature of things, or immutable justice.

Let us now, remembering and applying these plain rules of sound interpretation, proceed to the examination of those passages that are supposed to establish the theory of depravity I am examining.

Gen. 5: 3. "Adam lived an hundred and thirty years and begat a son in his own likeness and after his own image, and called his name Seth." It is not very easy to see why this text should be pressed into the service of those who hold that human nature is in itself sinful. Why should it be assumed that the likeness and image here spoken of was a moral likeness or image? But unless this be assumed the text has nothing to do with the subject.

Again. It is generally admitted that in all probability Adam was a regenerate man at the time and before the birth of Seth. Is it intended that Adam begot a saint or a sinner? If, as is supposed, Adam was a saint of God, if this text is

any thing to the purpose it affirms that Adam begat a saint. But this is the opposite of that in proof of which the text is quoted.

Another text is, Job 14: 4. "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." This text is quoted in support of the position of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith that children inherit from their parents by natural generation, a sinful nature. Upon this text I remark,

1. That all that can be made of it, even if we read it without regard to the translation or the context, is that a physically depraved parent will produce a physically depraved offspring.

2. That this is its real meaning is quite evident when we look into the context. Job is treating of the frail and dying state of man, and manifestly has in the text and context his eye wholly on the physical state, and not on the moral character of man. What he intends is: Who can bring other than a frail, dying offspring from a frail, dying parent? Not one. This is substantially the view that Professor Stuart takes of this text. The utmost that can be made of it is, that as he belonged to a race of sinners, nothing else could be expected than that he should be a sinner without meaning to affirm any thing in regard to the *quo modo* of this result.

Again. Job 15: 14. "What is man that he should be clean, and he that is born of a woman that he should be righteous."

1. These are the words of Eliphaz, and it is improper to quote them as inspired truth. That Eliphaz uttered this sentiment, let what will be the meaning, there is no reason to doubt; and there is just as little reason to receive his doctrines as truth. For God himself testifies that Job's friends did not hold the truth. But,

2. Suppose we understand the text as true, what is its import? Why, it simply asserts, or rather implies the unrighteousness or sinfulness of the whole human race. He expresses the universality of depravity in the very common way of including all that are born of woman. This certainly says nothing and implies nothing respecting a sinful constitution. It is just as plain and just as warrantable to understand this passage as implying that mankind have become so *physically* depraved that *this fact* together with the circumstances under which they come into being and begin their moral career, will certainly, (not necessarily) result in *moral depravity*. I might use just such language as that found in this text and naturally enough express by it my own views of moral depravity;

to wit, that it results from a *physically depraved constitution* and the circumstances of temptation under which children come into this world and begin and prosecute their moral career; certainly this is the most that can be made of this text.

Again, Ps. 51: 5, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me." Upon this I remark,

1. It would seem, if this text is to be understood *literally*, that the Psalmist intended to affirm the sinful state of his mother at the time of his conception and during gestation. But,

2. I make a remark that is applicable to all the texts and arguments that are adduced in support of the theory in question; namely, that to take this view of the subject and to interpret these passages as teaching the *constitutional sinfulness* of man is to contradict God's own definition of sin and the only definition that human reason or common sense can receive, to wit, that "sin is a transgression of the law." This is no doubt the only correct definition of sin. But we have seen that the law does not legislate over *substance* requiring men to have a *certain nature*, but over voluntary action only. If the Psalmist really intended to affirm that the substance of his conceived foetus was sinful, then he not only arrays himself against God's own definition of sin, but he also affirms sheer nonsense. The substance of an unborn child sinful! It is impossible! But what did the Psalmist mean? I answer, this verse is found in David's penitential psalm. He was deeply convinced of sin and was, as he had good reason to be, much excited, and expressed himself, as we all do in similar circumstances, in strong language. His eye, as was natural and is common in such cases, had been directed back along the pathway of life up to the days of his earliest recollection. He remembered sins among the earliest acts of his recollected life. He broke out in the language of this text to express, not the anti-scriptural and nonsensical dogma of a *sinful constitution*, but to affirm in his strong, poetic language that he had always been a sinner from the commencement of his moral existence, or from the earliest moment of his capability of being a sinner. This language is the strong language of poetry. To press this and similar texts further than this, is to violate two sound rules of biblical interpretation, to wit:

1. That language is to be interpreted according to the subject matter of discourse. And,

2. That one passage is to be so interpreted as not to con-

tradict another. But to make this text state that sin belongs, or may belong to the substance of an unborn infant is to make it flatly contradict another passage that defines sin to be a transgression of the law of God.

Some suppose that in the passage in question the Psalmist referred to and meant to acknowledge and assert his low and despicable origin and to say, I was always a sinner, and my mother that conceived me was a sinner, and I am but the degenerate plant of a strange vine, without intending to affirm any thing in respect to the absolute sinfulness of his nature.

Again, Ps. 58: 3. "The wicked are estranged from the womb, they go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies."

Upon this text I remark,

1. That it has been quoted at one time to establish the doctrine of a *sinful nature*, and at another to prove that infants commit *actual sin* from the very day and hour of their birth. But certainly no such use can be legitimately made of this text. It does not affirm any thing of a *sinful nature*, but this has been inferred from what it does affirm, that the wicked are estranged from their birth. But does this mean that they are really and literally estranged from the day and hour of their birth and that they really "go astray the very day they are born, speaking lies?" This every one knows to be contrary to fact. The text cannot then be pressed to *the letter*. What then does it mean? It must mean like the text last examined, that the wicked are estranged and go astray from the commencement of their moral agency. If it means more than this, it is not and cannot be true. And besides, it would contradict other plain passages of scripture. It is affirming in strong, graphic, and poetic language the fact that the first moral conduct and character of children is sinful. This is all that in truth it can assert, and it doubtless dates the beginning of their moral depravity at a very early period, which it expresses in very strong language, as if it were literally from the hour of birth. But when it adds that they go astray speaking lies we know that this is not and cannot be to be literally taken, for, as every one knows children do not speak at all from their birth. Should we understand the Psalmist as affirming that children go astray as soon as they go at all, and speak lies as soon as they speak at all, this would not prove that their nature was in itself sinful, but might well consist with the theory that their physical depravity together with their circumstances of temptation led them into selfishness from the very first of their moral existence.

Again, John 3: 6. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."

Upon this I remark.

1. That it may, if literally taken, mean nothing more than this, that the body which is born of flesh is flesh, and that that which is born of the Spirit is spirit, that is that this birth of which he was speaking was of the soul, and not of the body. But,

2. It may be understood to mean that that which results from the influence of the flesh is flesh in the sense of sin, for this is a common sense of the term flesh in the New Testament, and that which results from the Spirit, is spirit or spiritual in the sense of holy. This I understand to be the true sense. The text when thus understood does not at all support the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution, but only this that the flesh tends to sin, that the appetites and passions are temptations to sin, so that when the will obeys them it sins. Whatever is born of the propensities, in the sense that the will yields to their control, is sinful. And on the other hand whatever is born of the Spirit, that is, whatever results from the agency of the Holy Spirit in the sense that the will yields to Him, is holy.

Again, Eph. 2: 3. "By nature children of wrath even as others." Upon this text I remark,

1. That it cannot consistently with natural justice, be understood to mean, that we are exposed to the wrath of God on account of our nature. It is a monstrous and blasphemous dogma, that a holy God is angry with any creature, for possessing a nature with which he was forced into being without his knowledge or consent. The Bible represents God as angry with men for their wicked deeds, and not for their nature.

2. It is common, and proper to speak of the *first* state in which men universally are as a natural state. Thus we speak of sinners *before regeneration*, as in a state of *nature*, as opposed to a *changed state*, a *regenerate state*, and a state of *grace*. But by this we do not necessarily mean, that they have a *nature sinful in itself*, but merely that before regeneration, they are universally and totally morally depraved, that this is their *natural*, as opposed to their *regenerate* state. Total moral depravity is the state that follows, *and results from their first birth*, and is in this sense *natural*, and in this sense alone, can it truly be said, that they are "by nature children of wrath." Against the use that is made of this, and all this class of texts, may be arrayed the whole scope of scripture that represents

man as to blame, and to be judged and punished only for his deeds. But I forbear, as it cannot be necessary. The subject matter of discourse in these texts is such as demands that we should understand them as not implying or asserting that sin is a part of our nature.

LECTURE XXXVII.

MORAL DEPRAVITY.

I. FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT HUMAN NATURE IS IN ITSELF SINFUL.

The defenders of the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness or moral depravity urge as a farther argument,

2. That sin is a universal effect of human nature, and therefore, human nature must be itself sinful.

Answer. This argument proceeds upon the two false assumptions,

1. That an *effect* must have the same character as its cause. This assumption, that an effect must have the same character with its cause, is a false assumption. God's will caused the material universe but it does not follow that the effect is holy as the will of God is holy. God's intention, which was the cause, is holy. But the effect, the material universe, simply because it is an *effect*, has no character at all. Nothing that is properly an effect can ever, by any possibility, possess a moral character. The universe of mind, also, is an effect of the Divine intention. These minds are not in their substance, and so far as they are *effects*, holy or sinful. That is, they have in their essence or substance, no moral character whatever, simply because they are *effects*.

Their moral character is of their own forming. Moral character, universally and necessarily, belongs to *intelligent, voluntary cause* and never to an *effect*. All responsible causality resides in free will. Praise or blameworthiness is strictly predicable only of the agent, never strictly of his actions. The agent who causes his own actions is holy or sinful; is praise or blameworthy, for his intentions or actions. It is not the intention or action that is praise or blameworthy, but the cause or agent that acts. When we say that moral character belongs to the intention, we do not mean that it is the intention itself that deserves praise or blame, but that the agent deserves praise or blame only for his intentions. If, then, choice or intention be regarded as an effect of free will, its cause, let it be understood that the effect strictly speaking is neither praise or blameworthy, but that the agent is alone responsible for the choice of which he is the cause. The argument we are examining is this: "Sin is an effect of human nature; therefore human nature is in its essence and substance sinful."

This statement is false; but state it thus, and it is true: Sin is an attribute of selfish intention; selfish intention is an effect of free responsible will; therefore, the free responsible cause of this effect is blameworthy for this effect, this sin.

2. The second false assumption upon which the argument we are examining is based, is this, namely, that sin as a universal effect of human nature proves that the substance of human nature must be in itself sinful. This is a *non sequitur*. Sin may be, and must be an abuse of free agency, and this may be accounted for, as we shall see, by ascribing it to the universality of temptation and does not at all imply a sinful constitution. But if sin implies a sinful nature, how did Adam and Eve sin? Had they a sinful nature to account for and to cause their first sin? How did angels sin? Had they also a sinful nature? Either sin does not imply a sinful nature, or a nature in itself sinful, or Adam and angels must have had sinful natures before their fall.

Again: Suppose we regard sin as an event or effect. An effect only implies an adequate cause. Free, responsible will is an adequate cause, in the presence of temptation, without the supposition of a sinful constitution, as has been demonstrated in the case of Adam and of angels. When we have found an adequate cause, it is unphilosophical to look for and assign another.

Again: It is said that no motive to sin could be a motive or a temptation, if there were not a sinful taste, relish or appetite inherent in the constitution to which the temptation or motive is addressed. For example, the presence of food, it is said, would be no temptation to eat, were there not a constitutional appetency terminating on food. So the presence of any object could be no inducement to sin, were there not a constitutional appetency or craving for sin. So that in fact, sin in action were impossible unless there were sin in the nature. To this I reply:

Suppose this objection be applied to the sin of Adam and of angels. Can we not account for Eve's eating the forbidden fruit without supposing that she had a craving for *sin*? The Bible informs us that her craving was for the *fruit*, for *knowledge*, and not for *sin*. The words are: "And when the woman saw that the tree was *good for food* and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree *to be desired to make one wise*, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat." Here is nothing of a craving for sin. Eating this fruit was indeed sinful, but the sin

consisted in consenting to gratify, in a prohibited manner, the appetites, not for sin, but for food and knowledge. But the advocates for this theory say that there must be an adaptedness in the constitution, a something within answering to the outward motive or temptation, and sin were impossible. This is true. But the question is, what is that something within, which responds to the outward motive? Is it a craving for sin? We have just seen what it was in the case of Adam and Eve. It was simply the correlation that existed between the fruit and their constitution, its presence exciting the desires for food and knowledge. This led to prohibited indulgence. This is a short history of the origin of all sin in mankind, as we shall see. That is, all men sin in precisely the same way. They consent to gratify, not a craving for sin, but a craving for other things, and the consent to make self-gratification an end is the whole of sin.

This argument assumes as true, what we, on a former occasion, have seen to be false, namely, that sinners love sin for its own sake. If it could be true, total depravity would of necessity secure perfect blessedness. It would be the very state which the mind supremely loves for its own sake. The sinner could then say, not merely in the language of poetry, but in sober prose and fact, "Evil, be thou my good."

The Theologians whose views we are canvassing, maintain that the appetites, passions, desires, and propensities which are constitutional and entirely involuntary, are in themselves sinful. To this I reply, that Adam and Eve possessed them before they fell. Christ possessed them or he was not a man, nor in any proper sense a human being. No, these appetites, passions, and propensities are not sinful, though they are the occasions of sin. They are a temptation to the will to seek their unlawful indulgence. When these lusts or appetites are spoken of as the "passions of sin" or as "sinful lusts or passions," it is not because they are sinful in themselves, but because they are the occasions of sin.

Again: The death and suffering of infants previous to actual transgression is adduced as an argument to prove that infants have a sinful nature. To this I reply,

1. That this argument must assume that there must be sin wherever there is suffering and death. But this assumption proves too much, as it would prove that mere animals have a sinful nature or have committed actual sin. An argument that proves too much proves nothing.

2. Physical sufferings prove only physical, and not moral depravity. Previous to moral agency, infants are no more subjects of moral government than brutes are; therefore their sufferings and death are to be accounted for as are those of brutes, namely, by ascribing them to violations of the laws of life and health.

Another argument for a sinful constitution is, that unless infants have a sinful nature, they do not need sanctification to fit them for heaven. Answer:

1. This argument assumes that if they are not sinful they must be holy, whereas they are neither sinful nor holy until they are moral agents and render themselves so by obedience or disobedience to the moral law. If they are to go to heaven, they must be made holy or must be sanctified.

2. This objection assumes that previous sinfulness is a condition of the necessity of being holy. This is contrary to fact. Were Adam and angels first sinful before they were sanctified? But it is assumed that unless moral agents are at first sinners they do not need the Holy Spirit to induce them to be holy. That is, unless their nature is sinful, they would become holy without the Holy Spirit. But where do we ascertain this? Suppose that they have no moral character, and that their nature is neither holy nor sinful. Will they become holy without being enlightened by the Holy Spirit? Who will assert that they will?

3. That infants have a sinful nature has been inferred from the institution of circumcision so early as the eighth day after birth. Circumcision, it is truly urged, was designed to teach the necessity of regeneration, and by way of implication, the doctrine of moral depravity. It is claimed that its being enjoined as obligatory upon the eighth day after birth, was requiring it at the earliest period at which it could be safely performed. From this it is inferred that infants are to be regarded as morally depraved from their birth.

In answer to this I would say, that infant circumcision was doubtless designed to teach the necessity of their being saved by the Holy Spirit from the dominion of the flesh, that the influence of the flesh must be restrained, and the flesh circumcised, or the soul would be lost. This truth needed to be impressed on the parents from the birth of their children. This very significant and bloody and painful rite was well calculated to impress this truth upon parents, and to lead them from their birth to watch over the development and indulgence of their propensities, and to pray for their sanctification.

Requiring it at so early a day was no doubt designed to indicate that they are from the first under the dominion of their flesh, without however affording any inference in favor of the idea that their flesh was in itself sinful, or that the subjection of their will, at that early age, was sinful. If reason was not developed, the subjection of the will to appetite could not be sinful. But whether this subjection of the will to the gratification of the appetite was sinful or not, the child must be delivered from it or it could never be fitted for heaven any more than a mere brute can be fitted for heaven. The fact that circumcision was required on the eighth day and not before, seems to indicate, not that they are sinners absolutely from birth, but that they very early become so, even from the commencement of moral agency.

Again: The rite must be performed at some time. Unless a particular day were appointed it would be very apt to be deferred, and finally not performed at all. It is probable that God commanded that it should be done at the earliest period at which it could be safely done, not only for the reasons already assigned, but to prevent its being neglected too long and perhaps altogether, and perhaps, also, because it would be less painful and dangerous at that early age when the infant slept most of the time and was not able to exercise and endanger life, and also because it is well known that parents are more attached to their children as they grow older, and it would be less painful to the parent to perform the rite when the child was very young than afterwards when it had entwined itself around the parental heart. The longer it was neglected the greater would be the temptation to neglect it altogether. So painful a rite needed to be enjoined by positive statute at some particular time, and it was desirable on all accounts that it should be done as early as it safely could be. This argument for native constitutional moral depravity amounts really to nothing.

Again: It is urged that unless infants have a sinful nature, should they die in infancy, they could not be saved by the grace of Christ.

To this I answer, that in this case they would not go, of course, to hell.

But what grace could there be in saving them from a sinful constitution that is not exercised in saving them from circumstances that would certainly result in their becoming sinners, if not snatched from them? In neither case do they need pardon for sin. Grace is unearned favor, a gratuity. If the

child has a sinful nature it is his *misfortune*, and not *crime*. To save him from this nature is to save him from those circumstances that will certainly result in actual transgression unless he is rescued by death and by the Holy Spirit. So if his nature is not *sinful*, yet it is certain that his nature and circumstances are such that he will surely sin unless rescued by death and by the Holy Spirit before he is capable of sinning. It certainly must be an infinite favor to be rescued from such circumstances, and especially to have eternal life conferred as a mere gratuity. This surely is grace. And as they belong to a race of sinners who are all, as it were, turned over into the hands of Christ, they doubtless will ascribe their salvation to the infinite grace of Christ.

Again: Is it not grace that saves us from sinning? What then is it but grace that saves infants from sinning by snatching them away from circumstances of temptation? In what way does grace save adults from sinning but by keeping them from temptation, or by giving grace to overcome temptation? And is there no grace in rescuing infants from circumstances that are certain, if they are left in them, to lead them into sin.

All that can be justly said in either case is that if infants are saved at all, (which I suppose they are,) they are rescued by the benevolence of God from circumstances that would result in certain and eternal death, and made heirs of eternal life. But after all it is useless to speculate about the character and destiny of those who are confessedly not moral agents. The benevolence of God will take care of them. It is nonsensical to insist upon their moral depravity before they are moral agents, and it is equally frivolous to assert that they must be morally depraved as a condition of their being saved by grace.

We deny that the human constitution is morally depraved,

1. Because there is no proof of it.
2. Because it is impossible that sin should be an attribute of the substance of soul or body. It is and must be an attribute of choice or intention and not of substance.
3. To make sin an attribute or quality of substance is contrary to God's definition of sin. "Sin," says the apostle, "is anomia" a "transgression of, or a want of conformity to the moral law." That is, it consists in a refusal to love God and our neighbor, or, which is the same thing, in loving ourselves supremely.

4. To represent the constitution as sinful is to represent God, who is the author of the constitution, as the author of

sin. To say that God is not the direct former of the constitution, but that sin is conveyed by natural generation from Adam who made himself sinful, is only to remove the objection one step farther back, but not to obviate it; for God established the physical laws that of necessity bring about this result.

5. But how came Adam by a sinful nature? Did his first sin change his nature? or did God change it as a penalty for sin? What ground is there for the assertion that Adam's nature became in itself sinful by the fall? This is a groundless, not to say ridiculous assumption and a flat absurdity. Sin an attribute of nature! A sinful substance! Sin a substance! Is it a solid, a fluid, a material or a spiritual substance?

I have received the following note from a brother on this subject:

"The orthodox creeds are in some cases careful to say that original sin consists in the substance of neither soul nor body. Thus Bretschneider, who is reckoned among the rationalists in Germany, says: "The Symbolical Books very rightly maintained that original sin is not in any sense the substance of man, his body or soul, as Flacius taught,—but that it has been infused into human nature by Satan, and mixed with it, as poison and wine are mixed."

They rather expressly guard against the idea that they mean by the phrase "man's nature," his substance, but somewhat which is fixed in the substance. They explain original sin, therefore, not as an essential attribute of man, that is, a necessary and essential part of his being, but as an accident, that is, somewhat which does not subsist in itself, but, as something accidental, has come into human nature. He quotes the Formula Concordantiæ as saying: "Nature does not denote the substance itself of man, but something which inheres fixed in the nature or substance." Accident is defined "what does not subsist by itself, but is in some substance and can be distinguished from it."

Here, it seems, is sin by itself, and yet not a substance or subsistence—not a part or attribute of soul or body. What can it be? Does it consist in wrong action? No, not in action, but is an accident which inheres fixed in the nature of substance. But what can it be? Not substance, nor yet action. But if it be any thing it must be either substance or action. If it be a state of substance, what is this but substance in a particular state? What a wonder it must be! Who ever saw it? But it is invisible, for it is something nei-

ther matter nor spirit—a virus, a poison mixed with, yet distinct from the constitution. Do these writers think by this subtlety to relieve the subject of constitutional moral depravity of its intrinsic absurdity? If so, they are greatly mistaken, for really they only render it more absurd and ridiculous. I fear that christian men, even doctors of divinity will never be ashamed to vindicate this ridiculous absurdity, until some master hand shall so expose it as to make a man blush at the folly of asserting it.

6. I object to the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness that it makes all sin, original and actual, a mere calamity, and not a crime. To call it a crime is to talk nonsense. What! a sinful nature the crime of him upon whom it is entailed without his knowledge or consent? If the nature is sinful in such a sense that action must be, which is the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, then sin in action must be a calamity, and can be no crime? It is the necessary effect of a sinful nature. This can not be a crime.

7. This doctrine represents sin as a disease, and obedience to law impossible until the nature is changed by a sovereign and physical agency of the Holy Spirit, in which the subject is passive.

8. Of course it must render repentance, either with or without the grace of God impossible unless grace set aside our reason. If repentance implies self-condemnation we can never repent in the exercise of our reason. Constituted as we are, it is impossible that we should condemn ourselves for a sinful nature or for sinful actions that are unavoidable. The doctrine of original sin, or of a sinful constitution and of necessary sinful actions, represents the whole moral government of God, the plan of salvation by Christ, and indeed every doctrine of the gospel as a mere farce, and as the veriest humbug that ever insulted and mocked the intelligence of man. Upon this supposition the law is tyranny, and the gospel an insult to the unfortunate.

9. This doctrine represents sin as being of two kinds: original or constitutional and actual—sin of substance and sin of action; whereas neither the bible nor common sense acknowledges but one kind of sin, and that consists in disobedience to the law.

10. This doctrine represents a sinful nature as the physical cause of actual sin.

11. It acknowledges a kind of sin of which no notice will be taken at the judgment. The bible every where represents

the deeds done in the body, and not the constitution itself, as the only things to be brought into judgment.

12. It necessarily begets a self-justifying and God-condemning spirit. Man must cease to be a reasonable being, and give himself up to the most ridiculous imaginations before he can blame himself for Adam's sin, as some have professed to do, or before he can blame himself for possessing a sinful nature, or for sins that unavoidably resulted from a sinful nature.

13. This doctrine necessarily leads its advocates rather to pity and excuse sinners than unqualifiedly to blame them.

14. It is difficult and indeed impossible for those who really believe this doctrine to urge immediate repentance and submission on the sinner, feeling that he is infinitely to blame unless he instantly comply. It is a contradiction to affirm that a man can heartily believe in the doctrine in question and yet truly and heartily blame sinners for not doing what is naturally impossible to them. The secret conviction must be in the mind of such an one that the sinner is not really to blame for being a sinner. For in fact if this doctrine is true he is not to blame for being a sinner any more than he is to blame for being a human being. This the advocate of this doctrine must know. It is vain for him to set up the pretence that he truly blames sinners for their nature, or for their conduct, that was unavoidable. He can not do it any more than he can honestly deny the necessary affirmations of his own reason. Therefore the advocates of this theory must merely hold it as a theory without believing it, or they must in their secret conviction excuse the sinner.

15. This doctrine naturally and necessarily leads its advocates, secretly at least, to ascribe the atonement of Christ rather to justice than to grace—to regard it rather as an expedient to relieve the unfortunate than to render the forgiveness of the excuseless sinner possible. The advocates of the theory in question can not but regard the case of the sinner as rather a hard one, and God as under an obligation to provide a way for him to escape from a sinful nature entailed upon him in spite of himself, and from actual transgressions which resulted from his nature by a law of necessity. If all this is true, the sinner's case is infinitely hard, and God would be the most unreasonable and cruel of beings if he did not provide for their escape. These convictions will and must lodge in the mind of him who really believes the dogma of a sinful nature. This in substance is sometimes affirmed by the defenders of the doctrine of original sin.

16. This doctrine is a stumbling block both to the church and the world—infininitely dishonorable to God, and an abomination alike to God and the human intelligence, and should be banished from every pulpit and from every formula of doctrine, and from the world. It is a relict of heathen philosophy, and was foisted in among the doctrines of Christianity by Augustine, as every one may know who will take the trouble to examine for himself. Who does not know that this view of moral depravity that I am opposing, has long been the strong hold of Universalism? From it the Universalists inveighed with resistless force against the idea that sinners would be sent to an eternal hell. Assuming the long-defended doctrine of original or constitutional sinfulness, they proceed to show that it were infinitely unreasonable and unjust in God to send them to hell. What! create them with a sinful nature from which proceed by a law of necessity actual transgressions, and then send them to an eternal hell for having this nature, and for transgressions that are unavoidable? Impossible! they say; and the human intelligence responds Amen.

From the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution also has naturally and irresistibly flowed the doctrine of inability to repent, and the necessity of a physical regeneration. These too have been a sad stumbling-block to Universalists as every one knows who is at all acquainted with the history of Universalism. They infer the salvation of all men from the fact of God's benevolence and physical omnipotence! God is Almighty, and he is love. Men are constitutionally depraved, and are unable to repent. God will not, can not send them to hell. They do not deserve it. Sin is a calamity, and God can save them, and he ought to do so. This is the substance of their argument. And, assuming the truth of their premises, there is no evading their conclusion. But the whole argument is built on "such stuff as dreams are made of." Strike out the ridiculous dogma of a sinful nature, and their whole edifice comes to the ground in a moment.

LECTURE XXXVIII.

MORAL DEPRAVITY.

II. The proper method of accounting for moral depravity.

The term "moral" is from the Latin *mos*—manners. The term "depravity," as has been shown, is from *de* and *pravius*—crooked. The terms united, signify crooked manners, or bad morals. In this discussion I must,

1. *Remind you of some positions that have been settled respecting moral depravity.*

2. *Consult the oracles of God respecting the nature of moral depravity, or sin.*

3. *Consult the oracles of God in respect to the proper method of accounting for the existence of sin.*

4. *Show the manner in which it is to be accounted for as an ultimate fact.*

1. Some positions that have been settled.

(1.) It has been shown that moral depravity resolves itself into selfishness.

(2.) That selfishness consists in the supreme choice of self-indulgence.

(3.) That self-indulgence consists in the committal of the will to the gratification of the sensibility, as opposed to obeying the law of the reason.

(4.) That sin or moral depravity is a unit, and always consists in this committed state of the will to self-gratification, irrespective of the particular form or means of self-gratification.

(5.) It has also been shown that moral depravity does not consist in a sinful nature.

(6.) And also that actual transgression can not justly be ascribed to a sinful constitution.

(7.) We have also seen that all sin is actual, and that no other than actual transgression can justly be called sin.

2. I am to consult the oracles of God respecting the nature of moral depravity or sin.

Reference has often been made to the teachings of inspiration upon this subject. But it is important to review our ground in this place, that we may ascertain what are the teachings, and what are the assumptions of the bible in regard to the nature of sin? Does it assume that as truth, which natural theology teaches upon the subject? What is taught in the bible, either expressly, or by way of inference and implication upon this subject?

(1.) The bible gives a formal definition of sin. 1Jno.3: 4, Sin is a transgression of the law, and 5: 17, All unrighteousness is sin. As was remarked on a former occasion, this definition is not only an accurate one, but it is the only one that can possibly be true.

(2.) The bible every where makes *the law* the only standard of right and wrong, and obedience to it to be the whole of virtue, and disobedience to it to be the whole of sin. This truth lies every where upon the face of the Bible. It is taught, assumed, implied or expressed on every page of the Bible.

(3.) It holds men responsible for their voluntary actions alone, or more strictly for their choices alone, and expressly affirms that "if there be a willing mind, it is accepted according to what a man hath, and not according to what he hath not." That is, willing as God directs is accepted as obedience, whether we are able to execute our choices or not.

(4.) The Bible always represents sin as something done or committed or wilfully omitted, and never as a part or attribute of soul or body. We have seen that the texts that have been relied on as teaching the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, when rightly understood, mean no such thing.

(5.) The Bible assures us that all sin shall pass in review at the solemn judgment, and always represents all sin then to be recognized, as consisting in "the deeds done in the body." Texts that support these assertions are too numerous to need to be quoted, as every reader of the Bible knows.

3. I am to consult the Bible in respect to the proper method of accounting for moral depravity, or sin.

(1.) We have more than once seen that the Bible has given us the history of the introduction of sin into our world, and that from the narrative, it is plain that the first sin consisted in *selfishness*, or in consenting to indulge the excited constitutional propensities in a prohibited manner. In other words, it consisted in yielding the will to the impulses of the sensibility, instead of abiding by the law of God as revealed in the intelligence. Thus the bible ascribes the first sin of our race to the influence of temptation.

(2.) The bible once, and only once, incidentally intimates that Adam's first sin has in some way been the *occasion* (not the cause) of all the sins of men. Rom. 5: 12—19.

(3.) It neither says nor intimates any thing in relation to *the manner* in which Adam's sin has occasioned this result. It only incidentally recognizes the fact, and then leaves it just as if the *quo modo* was too obvious to need explanation.

(4.) In other parts of the bible we are informed how we are to account for the existence of sin among men. For example, James 1: 15. When lust (desire, *epithumia*) has conceived, it bringeth forth sin. Here sin is represented, not as desire, but as consisting in the consent of the will to gratify desire.

James says again that a man is tempted when he is drawn aside of his own lusts, (*epithumiai* desires) and enticed. That is, his lusts or the impulses of his sensibility are his tempters. When he is overcome of these, he sins.

(5.) Paul and other inspired writers represent sin as consisting in a carnal or fleshly mind, in the mind of the flesh, or in minding the flesh. It is plain that by the term flesh they mean what we understand by the sensibility as opposed to the intelligence, and that they represent sin as consisting in *obeying, minding* the impulses of the *sensibility*. They represent the world and the flesh and Satan as the three great sources of temptation. It is plain that the world and Satan tempt by appeals to the flesh or to the sensibility. Hence the apostles have much to say of the necessity of the destruction of the flesh, of the members, of putting off the old man with his deeds &c. Now, it is worthy of remark that all this painstaking on the part of inspiration to intimate the source from whence our sin proceeds, and to apprise us of the proper method of accounting for it, and also of avoiding it, has led certain philosophers and theologians to take a view of it which is directly opposed to the truth. Because so much is said of the influence of the flesh, they have inferred that the nature and physical constitution of man is *itself sinful*. But the representations of Scripture are that the body is the *occasion of sin*. The law in his members, that warred against the law of his mind, of which Paul speaks, is manifestly the impulses of the sensibility opposed to the law of the reason. This law, that is, the impulses of his sensibility, bring him into captivity, that is, influence his will, in spite of all his resolutions to the contrary.

In short, the Bible rightly interpreted, every where assumes and implies that sin consists in selfishness. It is remarkable, if the Bible be read with an eye to its teachings and assumptions on this point. to what an extent this truth will appear.

4. How moral depravity is to be accounted for.

(1.) It consists, remember, in the committal of the will to the gratification or indulgence of self—in the will's following or submitting itself to be governed by the impulses and de-

sires of the sensibility instead of submitting itself to the law of the intelligence.

(2.) This definition of the *thing* shows how it is to be accounted for, namely: The sensibility acts as a powerful impulse to the will from the moment of birth, and secures the consent and activity of the will to procure its gratification, before the reason is at all developed. The will is thus committed to the gratification of feeling and appetite, when first the idea of moral obligation is developed. This committed state of the will is not moral depravity, and has no moral character until the idea of moral obligation is developed. The moment this idea is developed, this committal of the will to self-indulgence must be abandoned or it becomes selfishness, or moral depravity. But as the will is already in a state of committal, and has to some extent already formed the habit of seeking to gratify feeling, and as the idea of moral obligation is at first but feebly developed, unless the Holy Spirit interferes to shed light on the soul, the will, as might be expected, retains its hold on self-gratification. Here moral character does and must commence. Let it be remembered that selfishness consists in the supreme and ultimate *choice*, or in the preference of self-gratification as an end, or for its own sake, over all other interests. Now, as the choice of an end implies and includes the choice of the means, Selfishness of course, causes all that outward life and activity that makes up the entire history of sinners.

This selfish choice is the wicked heart—the sinful nature—the propensity to sin—the sinful appetite—the craving for sin, and all that causes what is generally termed actual transgression. This sinful choice, is properly enough called indwelling sin. It is the latent, standing, controlling preference of the mind, and the cause of all the outward and active life. It is not the choice of sin, but the choice of self-gratification, which choice is sin.

Again. It should be remembered that the physical depravity of our race has much to do with our moral depravity. A diseased physical system renders the appetites, passions, temper, and propensities more clamorous and despotic in their demands, and of course confirms and strengthens selfishness. It should be distinctly understood that physical depravity has no moral character in itself. But yet it is a source of fierce temptation to selfishness. The human sensibility is, manifestly, deeply physically depraved, and as sin or moral depravity consists in committing the will to the gratification of the sen-

sibility, its physical depravity will mightily strengthen moral depravity. Moral depravity is then universally owing to temptation. That is, the soul is tempted to *self-indulgence*, and yields to the temptation, and this yielding, and not the temptation, is sin or moral depravity. This is manifestly the way in which Adam and Eve became morally depraved. They were tempted, even by undepraved appetite, to prohibited indulgence, and were overcome. The sin did not lie in the constitutional desire of food, or of knowledge, nor in the excited state of these appetites or desires, but in the consent of the will to prohibited indulgence.

✓ Just in the same way all sinners become such, that is, they become morally depraved by yielding to temptation to self-gratification under some form. Indeed it is impossible that they should become morally depraved in any other way. To deny this were to overlook the very nature of moral depravity. It is remarkable that President Edwards, after writing five hundred pages, in which he confounds physical and moral depravity, in answer to an objection of Dr. Taylor of England, that his view made God, the author of the constitution, the author also of sin, turns immediately around, and without seeming to see his own inconsistency, ascribes all sin to temptation, and makes it consist altogether in obeying the propensities, just as I have done. His words are.

“One argument against a supposed native, sinful depravity, which Dr. Taylor greatly insists upon, is, “that this does in effect charge Him who is the *author of our nature, who formed us in the womb, with being the author of a sinful corruption of nature*; and that it is *highly injurious* to the God of our nature, whose hands have formed and fashioned us, to believe our nature to be *originally corrupted* and that in the worst sense of corruption.”

With respect to this, I would observe, in the first place, that this writer, in handling this grand objection, supposes something to belong to the doctrine objected against, as maintained by the divines whom he is opposing, which does not belong to it, nor follow from it. As particularly, he supposes the doctrine of original sin to imply, that nature must be corrupted by some positive influence; “something, by some means or other, infused into the human nature; some quality or other, not from the choice of our minds, but like a taint, tincture, or infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions of our souls! That sin and evil dispositions are implanted in the fœtus in the womb.” Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing. In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality infused, implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing that man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart such as is any thing properly positive. I think a little attention to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial, considerate inquirer that the absence of positive good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine influence to impart and maintain those good principles—leaving the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c. to themselves, without the government of superior

divine principles will certainly be followed with the corruption; yea, the total corruption of the heart, without occasion for any positive influence at all. And that it was thus in fact that corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity as sinning in him and falling with him.

The case with man was plainly this: When God made man at first he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind which may be natural, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor and pleasure were exercised: These, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the scriptures sometimes call flesh. Besides these, there were superior principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which are called in scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called supernatural, being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, mere human nature: and being such as immediately depend on man's union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God's spirit, which though withdrawn, and man's nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still; man's nature, as such, being entire without these divine principles, which the scripture sometimes calls spirit, in contradistinction to flesh. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect state. These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man's nature. When man sinned and broke God's covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: For indeed God then left him, that communion with God on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit that divine inhabitant, forsook the house; because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the constitution God had established, that he should still maintain communion with man, and continue by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel and had incurred God's wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption and ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, of course became reigning principles: having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became the absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme and so they took the place of God. These inferior principles were like fire in a house; which we say is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man's love to his own honor, separate interests, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to God and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects, without regard to God's honor, or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when against God's honor and law, as when agreeable to them. God still continuing strictly to require supreme regard to himself, and forbidding all undue gratification of these inferior passions—but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and agreeable to the rules and limits, which his holiness, honor, and law prescribe—hence immediately arises enmity in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but war ensues, in a course against God. As when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a

pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to show, how every lust, and depraved disposition of man's heart, would naturally arise from this privative original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, without God putting any evil into his heart, or implanting any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt taint, and so becoming the author of depravity.—Only God's withdrawing, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel man, and his natural principles being left to themselves, is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God.

And as Adam's nature became corrupt, without God's implanting or infusing of any evil thing into it; so does the nature of his posterity. God dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity, [as has been shown,] and treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having all sinned in him. And therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion, and his vital, gracious influence from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they come into the world mere flesh, and entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt, as Adam did."—*Edwards' Works*, pp 532—538.

To sum up the truth upon this subject in few words, I would say,

1. Moral depravity in our first parents was induced by temptation addressed to the unperverted susceptibilities of their nature. When these susceptibilities became strongly excited, they overcame the will; that is, the human pair were overpersuaded and fell under the temptation. This has been repeatedly said, but needs repetition in a summing up.

2. All moral depravity commences in substantially the same way. Proof,

(1.) The impulses of the sensibility are developed at birth.

(2.) The first acts of will are in obedience to these.

(3.) Self-gratification is the rule of action previous to the development of reason.

(4.) No resistance is offered to the will's indulging appetite until a habit of self-indulgence is formed.

(5.) When reason affirms moral obligation, it finds the will in a state of habitual and constant committal to the impulses of the sensibility.

(6.) The demands of the sensibility have become more and more despotic every hour of indulgence.

(7.) In this state of things, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, the idea of moral obligation will be but dimly developed.

(8.) The will of course rejects the bidding of reason and cleaves to self-indulgence.

(9.) This is the settling of a fundamental question. It is deciding in favor of appetite against the claims of conscience and of God.

(10.) Light once rejected can be thereafter more easily resisted.

(11.) Selfishness confirms and strengthens and perpetuates itself by a natural process. It grows with the sinner's growth and strengthens with his strength, and will do so forever unless overcome by the Holy Spirit through the truth.

REMARKS.

1. Adam, being the natural head of the race, would naturally, by the wisest constitution of things, greatly affect for good or evil his whole posterity.

2. His sin in many ways exposed his posterity to aggravated temptation. Not only the physical constitution of all men, but all the influences under which they first form their moral character are widely different from what they would have been, if sin had never been introduced.

3. When selfishness is understood to be the whole of moral depravity, its *quo modo* is manifest. Clear conceptions of the thing will instantly reveal the occasion and manner.

4. The only difficulty in accounting for it has been the false assumption that there must be and is something back of the free actions of the will, and sustaining to those actions the relation of a cause that is itself sinful.

5. If holy Adam and holy angels could fall under temptations addressed to their undepraved sensibility, how absurd it is to conclude that sin in infants who are born with a physically depraved constitution, can not be accounted for, without ascribing it to original sin, or to a nature that is in itself sinful.

6. Without divine illumination the moral character will of course be formed under the influence of the flesh. That is, the lower propensities will of course influence the will, unless the intelligence be developed by the Holy Spirit, as was said by President Edwards in the extract just quoted.

7. The dogma of constitutional moral depravity is a part and parcel of the doctrine of a necessitated will. It is a branch of a grossly false and heathenish philosophy. How infinitely absurd, dangerous, and unjust, then, to embody it in a standard of christian doctrine, to give it the place of an indispensable article of faith, and denounce all who will not swallow its absurdities, as heretics. O, Shame!

8. We are unable to say precisely at what age infants become moral agents, and, of course, how early they become sinners. Doubtless there is much difference among children in

this respect. Reason is developed in one earlier than in another, according to the constitution.

A thorough consideration of the subject will doubtless lead to the conviction that children become moral agents much earlier than is generally supposed. The conditions of moral agency are, as has been repeatedly said in former lectures, the possession of the powers of moral agency, together with the development of the ideas of the good or valuable, of moral obligation or oughtness—of right and wrong—of praise and blameworthiness. I have endeavored to show in former lectures, that mental satisfaction, blessedness or happiness, is the ultimate good. Satisfaction arising from the gratification of the appetites is one of the earliest experiences of human beings. This no doubt suggests or develops at a very early period the idea of the good or the valuable. The idea is doubtless developed long before the word that expresses it is understood. The child knows that happiness is good, and seeks it in the form of self-gratification long before the terms that designate this state of mind are at all understood. It knows that its own enjoyment is worth seeking, and doubtless very early has the idea that the enjoyment of others is worth seeking, and affirms to itself, not in words but in idea, that it ought to please its parents and those around it. It knows in fact, though language is as yet unknown, that it loves to be gratified and to be happy, that it loves and seeks enjoyment for itself, and doubtless has the idea that it ought not to displease and distress those around it, but that it ought to endeavor to please and gratify them. This is probably among the first ideas, if not the very first idea of the pure reason that is developed, that is, the idea of the good, the valuable, the desirable; and the next must be that of oughtness, or of moral obligation, the next of right and wrong, &c. I say again, these ideas are and must be developed before the signs or words that express them are at all understood, and the words would never be understood except the idea were first developed. We always find at the earliest period at which children can understand words that they have the idea of obligation, of right and wrong. As soon as these words are understood by them, they recognize them as expressing ideas already in their own minds, and which ideas they have had, further back than they can remember. Some and indeed most persons seem to have the idea that children affirm themselves to be under moral obligation before they have the idea of the good; that they affirm their obligation to obey their parents

before they know or have the idea of the good or of the valuable. But this is and must be a mistake. They may and do affirm obligation to obey their parents before they can express in language and before they would understand a philosophical statement of the grounds of their obligation. The idea however they do and must have or they could not affirm obligation. It is agreed and cannot be denied that moral obligation respects acts of will and not strictly outward action. It is agreed and can not be denied that obligation respects intelligent actions of will. It is also agreed and can not be denied that all intelligent acts of will and such as those to which moral obligation belongs must respect ends or means. If therefore one has any true idea of moral obligation it must respect acts of will or intentions. It must respect the choice of an end or of means. If it respect the choice of a means the idea of the end must exist. It can not justly affirm obligation of any thing but choice or intention for as a matter of fact obligation belongs to nothing else. The fact is the child knows that it ought to please its parent and seek to make its parent happy. This it knows that it ought to intend long before it knows what the word intention means. Upon this assumption it bases all its affirmations in respect to its obligation to obey its parents and others that are around it. It regards its own satisfaction or enjoyment as a good and seeks it before it knows what the words mean that express this state of mind. It also knows that the enjoyment of others is a good, and affirms not in word but in idea that it ought to seek the enjoyment of all. This idea is the basis upon which all affirmations of obligation rest, and if it be truly an idea of real obligation it is impossible that the idea of the good or of the value of enjoyment should not be its base. To assert the contrary is to overlook the admitted fact that moral obligation must respect choice and the choice of an end; that it must respect intention. It is absurd to suppose that a being can truly affirm moral obligation in respect to outward action before it has the *idea* of the obligation to will or intend an end. The idea of an end may not be developed in words, that is, the word expressive of the idea may not be understood, but the idea must be in the mind in a state of developement or there can be no affirmation of obligation. The fact is there is a logical connection between the idea of the good and the idea of moral obligation, of right and wrong, of praise and blame worthiness. These latter ideas can not exist without the first, and the existence of that necessitates the developement of

these. These are first truths of reason. In other words these ideas are universally and necessarily developed in the minds of moral agents and indeed their development is the condition of moral agency. Most of the first truths are developed in idea long before the language in which they are expressed is or can be understood. Thus the ideas of space, of time, of causality, of liberty of will, or ability, of the good, of oughtness or obligation to will it, of right and wrong, of praise or blameworthiness and many others are developed before the meaning of those words is at all understood. Human beings come gradually to understand the words or signs that represent their ideas, and afterwards so often express their ideas in words that they finally get the impression that they got the idea from the word, whereas in every instance in respect to the first truths of reason they had the idea long before they understood or perhaps ever heard the word that represents it and was coined to express it.

9. They who maintain the sinfulness of the constitutional appetites, must of course deny that men can ever be entirely sanctified in this life, and must maintain, as they do, that death must complete the work of sanctification.

10. False notions of moral depravity lie at the foundation of all the objections I have seen to the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life.

11. A diseased nervous system is a fierce temptation. Some forms of disease expose the soul to much trial. Dyspeptic and nervous persons need superabounding grace.

12. Why sin is so natural to mankind. Not because their nature is itself sinful, but because the appetites and passions tend so strongly to self-indulgence. Besides, selfishness being the ruling passion of the soul, its manifestations are spontaneous.

13. The doctrine of original sin as held by its advocates must essentially modify the whole system of practical theology. This will be seen as we proceed in our investigations.

14. The constitution of a moral being as a whole when all the powers are developed, does not tend to sin, but strongly in an opposite direction, as is manifest from the fact that when reason is thoroughly developed by the Holy Spirit, it is more than a match for the sensibility and turns the heart to God.

15. The difficulty is that the sensibility gets the start of reason and engages the attention in devising means of self-gratification, and thus retards, and in a great measure pre-

vents the development of the ideas of the reason which were designed to control the will.

16. It is this morbid development that the Holy Spirit is given to rectify, by so forcing truth upon the attention, as to secure the development of the intelligence. By doing this He brings the will under the influence of truth. Our senses reveal to us the objects correlated to our animal nature and propensities. The Holy Spirit reveals God and the spiritual world, and all that class of objects that are so correlated to our higher nature as to give Reason the control of the will. This is regeneration and sanctification as we shall see in its proper place.

LECTURE XXXIX.

REGENERATION.

In the examination of this subject I will,

I. POINT OUT THE COMMON DISTINCTION BETWEEN REGENERATION AND CONVERSION.

II. STATE THE ASSIGNED REASONS FOR THIS DISTINCTION.

III. STATE OBJECTIONS TO THIS DISTINCTION.

IV. SHOW WHAT REGENERATION IS NOT.

V. WHAT IT IS.

VI. ITS UNIVERSAL NECESSITY.

VII. AGENCIES EMPLOYED IN IT.

VIII. INSTRUMENTALITIES EMPLOYED IN IT.

IX. THAT IN REGENERATION THE SUBJECT IS BOTH ACTIVE AND PASSIVE.

X. WHAT IS IMPLIED IN REGENERATION.

XI. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF REGENERATION.

XII. EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.

I. I am to point out the common distinction between Regeneration and Conversion.

1. Regeneration is the term used by many theologians to express the Divine agency in changing the heart.

2. With them regeneration does not include and imply the activity of the subject, but rather excludes it. These theologians, as will be seen in its place, hold that a change of heart is first effected by the Holy Spirit, while the subject is passive, which change lays a foundation for the exercise, by the subject, of repentance, faith, and love.

3. *Conversion* with them expresses the activity and turning of the subject, after regeneration is effected by the Holy Spirit. Conversion with them does not include or imply the agency of the Holy Spirit, but expresses only the activity of the subject. With them the Holy Spirit first regenerates or changes the heart, after which the sinner turns or converts himself. So that God and the subject work each in turn. God first changes the heart, and as a consequence, the subject afterwards converts himself or turns to God. Thus the subject is passive in regeneration, but active in conversion.

When we come to the examination of the philosophical theories of regeneration, we shall see that the views of these theologians respecting regeneration result naturally and necessarily from their holding the dogma of constitutional moral depravity, which we have recently examined. Until their

views on that subject are corrected, no change can be expected in their views of this subject. I said in a concluding remark, when upon the subject of moral depravity, that erroneous views upon that subject must necessarily materially affect and modify one's views upon most of the questions in practical theology. Let us bear this remark in mind as we proceed, not only in the discussions immediately before us, but also in all our future investigations, that we may duly appreciate the importance of clear and correct views on the subject of practical theology.

II. I am to state the assigned reasons for this distinction.

1. The original term plainly expresses and implies other than the agency of the subject.

2. We need and must adopt a term that will express the Divine agency.

3. Regeneration is expressly ascribed to the Holy Spirit.

4. Conversion, as it implies and expresses the activity and turning of the subject, does not include and imply any Divine agency, and therefore does not imply or express what is intended by regeneration.

5. As two agencies are actually employed in the regeneration and conversion of a sinner, it is necessary to adopt terms that will clearly teach this fact and clearly distinguish between the agency of God and of the creature.

6. The terms regeneration and conversion aptly express this distinction, and therefore should be theologically employed.

III. I am to state the objections to this distinction.

1. The original term *gennao* with its derivatives may be rendered, (1.) To beget. (2.) To bear or bring forth. (3.) To be begotten. (4.) To be born or brought forth.

2. Regeneration is in the Bible the same as the new birth.

3. To be born again is the same thing, as the Bible uses the terms, as to have a new heart, to be a new creature, to pass from death unto life. In other words, to be born again is to have a new moral character, to become holy. To regenerate is to make holy. To be born of God, no doubt, expresses and includes the Divine agency, but it also includes and expresses that which the Divine agency is employed in effecting, namely, making the sinner holy. Certainly a sinner is not regenerated whose moral character is unchanged. If he were, how could it be truly said that whosoever is born of God overcometh the world, doth not commit sin, can not sin, &c.? If regeneration does not imply and include a change

of moral character in the subject, how can regeneration be made the condition of salvation? The fact is, the term regeneration, or the being born of God, is designed to express primarily and principally the thing done, that is, the making of a sinner holy, and expresses also the fact that God's agency induces the change. Throw out the idea of what is done, that is, the change of moral character in the subject, and he would not be born again, he would not be regenerated, and it could not be truly said in such a case that God had regenerated him.

It has been objected that the term really means and expresses only the Divine agency, and only by way of implication embraces the idea of a change of moral character, and of course of activity in the subject. To this I reply,

(1.) That if it really expresses only the Divine agency, it leaves out of view the thing effected by Divine agency.

(2.) That it really and fully expresses not only the Divine agency, but also that which this agency accomplishes.

(3.) This thing which the agency of God brings about is a new or spiritual birth, a resurrection from spiritual death, the inducing of a new and holy life. The thing done is the prominent idea expressed or intended by the term.

(4.) The thing done implies the turning or activity of the subject. It is nonsense to affirm that his moral character is changed without any activity or agency of his own. Passive holiness is impossible. Holiness is obedience to the law of God, the law of love, and of course consists in the activity of the creature.

(5.) We have said that regeneration is synonymous in the bible with a new heart. But sinners are required to make to themselves a new heart, which they could not do if they were not active in this change. If the work is a work of God in such a sense that He must first regenerate the heart or soul before the agency of the sinner begins, it were absurd and unjust to require him to make to himself a new heart until he is first regenerated.

Regeneration is ascribed to man in the gospel, which it could not be if the term were designed to express only the agency of the Holy Spirit. "For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers; for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel."—I Cor. 4: 15.

6. Conversion is spoken of in the Bible as the work of another than the subject of it, and can not therefore have

been designed to express only the activity of the subject of it. (1.) It is ascribed to the word of God.—“The law of the LORD is perfect, converting the soul: the testimony of the LORD is sure, making wise the simple.”—Ps. 19: 7. (2.) To man. “Brethren, if any of you do err from the truth, and one convert him; let him know, that he which converteth the sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a multitude of sins.”—James 5: 19, 20.

7. Both conversion and regeneration are sometimes in the Bible ascribed to God, sometimes to man, and sometimes to the subject; which shows clearly that the distinction under examination is arbitrary and theological rather than biblical.

8. The fact is that both terms imply the simultaneous exercise of both human and divine agency. The fact that a new heart is the thing done, demonstrates the activity of the subject, and the word regeneration, or the expression “born of the Holy Spirit” asserts the divine agency. The same is true of conversion, or the turning of the sinner to God. God is said to turn him and he is said to turn himself. God draws him, and he follows. In both alike God and man are both active, and their activity is simultaneous. God works or draws, and the sinner yields or turns, or which is the same thing, changes his heart, or, in other words, is born again. The sinner is dead in trespasses and sins. God calls on him, “Awake thou that sleepest, arise from the dead that Christ may give thee light.” God calls; the sinner hears and answers, Here am I. God says, Arise from the dead. The sinner puts forth his activity, and God draws him into life; or rather God draws, and the sinner comes forth to life.

9. The distinction is not only not recognized in the Bible, but is plainly of most injurious tendency for two reasons:]

(1.) It assumes and inculcates a false philosophy of depravity and regeneration.

(2.) It leads the sinner to wait to be regenerated before he repents or turns to God. It is of most fatal tendency to represent the sinner as under a necessity of waiting to be passively regenerated before he gives himself to God.

As the distinction is not only arbitrary but anti-scriptural and injurious, and inasmuch as it is founded in, and is designed to teach a philosophy false and pernicious on the subject of depravity and regeneration, I shall drop and discard the distinction, and in our investigations henceforth, let it be

understood that I use regeneration and conversion as synonymous terms.

IV. I am to show what regeneration is not.

It is not a change in the substance of soul or body. If it were, sinners could not be required to effect it. Such a change would not constitute a change of moral character. No such change is needed, as the sinner has all the faculties and natural attributes requisite to render perfect obedience to God. All he needs is to be induced to use these powers and attributes as he ought. The words conversion and regeneration do not imply any change of substance but only a change of moral state or of moral character. The terms are not used to express a physical, but a moral change. Regeneration does not express or imply the creation of any new faculties or attributes of nature, nor any change whatever in the constitution of body or mind. I shall remark further upon this point when we come to the examination of the philosophical theories of regeneration before alluded to.

V. What regeneration is.

It has been said that regeneration and a change of heart are identical. It is important to inquire into the scriptural use of the term heart. The term like most others is used in the bible in various senses. The heart is often spoken of in the bible, not only as possessing moral character, but as being the source of moral action or as the fountain from which good and evil actions flow, and of course as constituting the fountain of holiness or of sin, or in other words still, as comprehending strictly speaking the whole of moral character. "But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies."—Mat. 15: 18, 19. "O generation of vipers, how can ye, being evil, speak good things? for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things."—Mat. 12: 34, 35. When the heart is thus represented as possessing moral character and as the fountain of good and evil, it can not mean,

- (1.) The bodily organ that propels the blood.
- (2.) It can not mean the substance of the soul or mind itself: substance can not in itself possess moral character.
- (3.) It is not any faculty or natural attribute.

(4.) It can not consist in any constitutional taste, relish or appetite, for these can not in themselves have moral character.

(5.) It is not the sensibility or feeling faculty of the mind, for we have seen that moral character can not be predicated of it. It is true, and let it be understood, that the term heart is used in the bible in these senses, but not when the heart is spoken of as the fountain of moral action. When the heart is represented as possessing moral character, the word can not be meant to designate any involuntary state of mind. For neither the substance of soul or body, nor any involuntary state of mind can by any possibility possess moral character in itself. And if the bible assumed or asserted that they could it could not be received as true by the human intelligence. The very idea of moral character implies and is an idea of a free action or intention. To deny this, were to deny a first truth.

(6.) The term heart when applied to mind is figurative, and means something in the mind that has some point of resemblance to the bodily organ of that name, and a consideration of the function of the bodily organ will suggest the true idea of the heart of the mind. The heart of the body propels the vital current and sustains organic life. It is the fountain from which the vital fluid flows, from which either life or death may flow according to the state of the blood. The mind as well as the body has a heart which, as we have seen, is represented as a fountain or as an efficient propelling influence out of which flow good or evil according as the heart is good or evil. This heart is represented not only as the source or fountain of good and evil, but as being either good or evil in itself, as constituting the character of man and not merely as being capable of moral character.

It is also represented as something over which we have control, for which we are responsible, and which, in case it is wicked, we are bound to change on pain of death. Again: the heart in the sense in which we are considering it, is that, the radical change of which constitutes a radical change of moral character. This is plain from Matthew 12: 34, 35, and 15: 18, 19, already considered.

(7.) Our own consciousness then must inform us that the heart of the mind that possesses these characteristics can be nothing else than the supreme ultimate intention of the soul. Regeneration is represented in the bible as constituting a radical change of character, as the resurrection from a death in sin, as the beginning of a new and spiritual life, as constitu-

ting a new creature, as a new creation, not a physical, but a moral or spiritual creation, as conversion or turning to God, as giving God the heart, as loving God with all our heart and our neighbor as ourselves. Now we have seen abundantly that moral character belongs to or is an attribute of the ultimate choice or intention of the soul.

Regeneration then is a radical change of the ultimate intention, end or object of life. We have seen that the choice of an end is efficient in producing executive volitions or the use of means to obtain its end. A selfish ultimate choice is therefore a wicked heart out of which flows every evil, and a benevolent ultimate choice is a good heart out of which flows every good and commendable deed.

Regeneration, to have the characteristics ascribed to it in the bible, must consist in a change in the attitude of the will, or a change in its ultimate choice, intention, or preference; a change from selfishness to benevolence; from choosing self-gratification as the supreme and ultimate end of life to the supreme and ultimate choice of the highest well-being of God and of the universe; from a state of entire consecration to self-interest, self-indulgence self-gratification for its own sake or as an end, and as the supreme end of life to a state of entire consecration to God and to the interests of his kingdom as the supreme and ultimate end of life.

VI. The universal necessity of regeneration.

1. The necessity of regeneration as a condition of salvation must be coextensive with moral depravity. This has been shown to be universal among the unregenerate moral agents of our race. It surely is impossible that a world or a universe of unholy or selfish beings should be happy. It is impossible that heaven should be made up of selfish beings. It is intuitively certain that without benevolence or holiness no moral being can be ultimately happy. Without regeneration a selfish soul can by no possibility be fitted either for the employments or for the enjoyments of heaven.

2. The scriptures expressly teach the universal necessity of regeneration. "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."—Jno. 3: 3. "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature."—Gal. 6: 15.

VII. Agencies employed in regeneration.

1. The scriptures often ascribe regeneration to the Spirit of God. "Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Ex-

cept a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."—John 3: 5, 6. "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."—Jno. 1: 15.

2. We have seen that the subject is active in regeneration, that regeneration consists in the sinner changing his ultimate choice, intention, preference; or in changing from selfishness to love or benevolence; or in other words in turning from the supreme choice of self-gratification to the supreme love of God and the equal love of his neighbor. Of course the subject of regeneration must be an agent in the work.

3. There are generally other agents, one or more human beings concerned in persuading the sinner to turn. The bible recognizes both the subject and the preacher as agents in the work. Thus Paul says: "I have begotten you through the gospel." Here the same word is used which is used in another case where regeneration is ascribed to God.

Again: An Apostle says, "Ye have purified your souls by obeying the truth." Here the work is ascribed to the subject. There are then always two and generally more than two agents employed in effecting the work. Several theologians have held that regeneration is the work of the Holy Spirit alone. In proof of this they cite those passages that ascribe it to God. But I might just as lawfully insist that it is the work of man alone and quote those passages that ascribe it to man, to substantiate my position. Or I might assert that it is alone the work of the subject and in proof of this position quote those passages that ascribe it to the subject. Or again, I might assert that it is effected by the truth alone and quote such passages as the following to substantiate my position: "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures."—James 1: 18. "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever."—1. Peter 1: 23. The fact is, when Dr. Woods and others insist that Regeneration is the work or a work of God, they tell the truth but not the whole truth. For it is also the work of man and of the subject. Their course is precisely like that of the Unitarian, who when he would prove that Christ is not God, merely proves that he was a man. Now we admit that he was a man, but we hold that he is more, that he is also God. Just so we hold that God is ac-

tive in promoting regeneration, and we hold also that the subject always and necessarily is active in the work and that generally some other human agency is employed in the work in presenting and urging the claims of God.

It has been common to regard the third person as a mere instrument in the work. But the fact is he is a willing, designing, responsible agent, as really so as God or the subject is.

If it be inquired how the bible can consistently ascribe regeneration at one time to God, at another to the subject, at another to the truth, at another to a third person; the answer is to be sought in the nature of the work. The work accomplished is a change of choice in respect to an end or the end of life. The sinner whose choice is changed must of course act. The end to be chosen must be clearly and forcibly presented: this is the work of the third person, and of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit takes the things of Christ and shows them to the soul. The truth is employed, or it is truth which must necessarily be employed, as an instrument to induce a change of choice. See this illustrated in sermons on Important Subjects, Sermon I. on Regeneration.

VIII. Instrumentalities employed in the work.

1. Truth. This must from the nature of regeneration be employed in effecting it, for regeneration is nothing else than the will being duly influenced by truth

2. There may be and often are many providences concerned in enlightening the mind and in inducing regeneration. These are instrumentalities. They are means or instruments of presenting the truth. Mercies, judgments, men, measures and in short all those things that conduce to enlightening the mind, are instrumentalities employed in affecting it.

Those who hold to physical or constitutional moral depravity must hold of course to constitutional regeneration, and of course consistency compels them to maintain that there is but one agent employed in regeneration, and that is the Holy Spirit, and that no instrument whatever is employed, because the work is according to them an act of creative power; that the very nature is changed and of course no instrument can be employed, any more than in the creation of the world. These theologians have affirmed over and over again that regeneration is a miracle; that there is no tendency whatever in the gospel however presented, and whether presented by God or man, to regenerate the heart. Dr. Griffin in his Park Street Lectures maintains that the gospel in its natural and necessa-

ry tendency creates and perpetuates only opposition to and hatred of God until the heart is changed by the Holy Spirit. He understands the carnal mind to be not a voluntary state, not a minding of the flesh, but the very nature and constitution of the mind, and that enmity against God is a part, attribute, or appetite of the nature itself. Consequently he must deny the adaptability of the gospel to regenerate the soul. It has been proclaimed by this class of theologians times without number that there is no philosophical connexion between the preaching of the gospel and the regeneration of sinners, no adaptedness in the gospel to produce that result; but on the contrary that it is adapted to produce an opposite result. The favorite illustrations of their views have been Ezekiel's prophesying over the dry bones and Christ's restoring sight to the blind man by putting clay on his eyes. Ezekiel's prophesying over the dry bones had no tendency to quicken them, they say. And the clay used by the Savior was calculated rather to destroy than to restore sight. This shows how easy it is for men to adopt a pernicious and absurd philosophy and then find or think they find it supported by the bible. What must be the effect of inculcating the dogma that the gospel has nothing to do with regenerating the sinner? Instead of telling him that regeneration is nothing else than his embracing the gospel, to tell him that he must wait and first have his constitution recreated before he can possibly do any thing but oppose God? This is to tell him the greatest and most abominable and ruinous of falsehoods. It is to mock his intelligence. What! call on him on pain of eternal death to believe; to embrace the gospel; to love God with all his heart and at the same time, represent him as entirely helpless and constitutionally the enemy of God and of the gospel and as being under the necessity of waiting for God to regenerate his nature before it is possible for him to do otherwise than to hate God with all his heart? O Orthodoxy, falsely so called, how absurd and false thou art! What an enemy of God; what a stumbling block to man; what a leaven of unrighteousness and of hell is such a dogma as this! But a few years have elapsed since almost the entire church were settled down in the delusion of a passive regeneration.

IX. In regeneration the subject is both passive and active.

1. That he is active is plain from what has been said and from the nature of the change.

2. That he is at the same time passive is plain from the fact that he acts only when and as he is acted upon. That is,

he is passive in the perception of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit. I know that this preception is no part of regeneration. But it is simultaneous with regeneration. It induces regeneration. It is the condition and the occasion of regeneration. Therefore the subject of regeneration must be a passive recipient or percipient of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit at the moment and during the act of regeneration. The Spirit acts upon him through or by the truth. Thus far he is passive. He closes with the truth. Thus far he is active. What a mistake those theologians have fallen into who represent the subject as altogether passive in regeneration! This rids the sinner at once of the conviction of any duty or responsibility about it. It is wonderful that such an absurdity should have been so long maintained in the church. But while it is maintained, it is no wonder that sinners are not converted to God. Why, while the sinner believes this, it is impossible if he has it in mind that he should be regenerated. He stands and waits for God to do what God requires him to do, and which no one can do for him. Neither God nor any other being can regenerate him if he will not turn. If he will not change his choice, it is impossible that it should be changed. Sinners who have been taught thus and have believed what they have been taught, would never have been regenerated had not the Holy Spirit drawn off their attention from this error, and ere they were aware, induced them to close in with the offer of life.

X. What is implied in regeneration.

1. The nature of the change shows that it must be *instantaneous*. It is a change of choice or of intention. This must be instantaneous. The preparatory work of conviction and enlightening the mind may have been gradual and progressive. But when regeneration occurs, it must be instantaneous.

2. It implies an entire present change of moral character, that is, a change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness. We have seen that it consists in a change from selfishness to benevolence. We have also seen that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist in the same mind; that selfishness is a state of supreme and entire consecration to self; that benevolence is a state of entire and supreme consecration to God and the good of the universe. Regeneration then surely implies an entire change of moral character.

Again: The bible represents regeneration as a dying to sin and becoming alive to God. Death *in sin* is total depravity.

This is generally admitted. Death to *sin* and becoming alive to God, must imply entire present holiness.

3. The scriptures represent regeneration as the condition of salvation in such a sense that if the subject should die immediately after regeneration and without any further change, he would go immediately to heaven.

Again: The scripture requires only perseverance in the first love as the condition of salvation, in case the regenerate soul should live long in the world subsequent to regeneration.

4. When the scriptures require us to grow in grace and in the knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, this does not imply that there is yet sin remaining in the regenerate heart which we are required to put away only by degrees. But the spirit of the requirement must be that we should acquire as much knowledge as we can of our moral relations, and continue to conform to all truth as fast we know it. This and nothing else is implied in abiding in our first love, or abiding in Christ, living and walking in the Spirit &c.

LECTURE XL.

REGENERATION.

XI. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF REGENERATION.

Different classes of Theologians have held very different theories in regard to the philosophy of regeneration, in accordance with their views of moral depravity, of intellectual philosophy, moral government, and of the freedom of the human will. In discussing this subject I will,

I. State the different theories of regeneration that have been held by different classes of theologians, as I understand them, and.

II. Examine them in their order.

The principal theories that have been advocated, so far as my knowledge extends, are the following:

1. The Taste Scheme. 2. The Divine Efficiency Scheme. 3. The Susceptibility Scheme. 4. The Divine Moral Suasion Scheme.

II. I will examine them in their order.

I. The Taste Scheme.

1. This theory is based upon that view of mental philosophy which regards the mental heart as identical with the sensibility. Moral depravity, according to this school, consists in a constitutional relish, taste, or craving for sin. They hold the doctrine of original sin—of a sinful nature or constitution, as was shown in my lectures on moral depravity. The heart of the mind, in the estimation of this school, is not identical with choice or intention. They hold that it does not consist in any voluntary state of mind, but that it lives back of and controls voluntary action or the actions of the will. The wicked heart, according to them, consists in an appetency or constitutional taste for sin, and with them the appetites, passions, and propensities of human nature in its fallen state, are in themselves sinful. They often illustrate their ideas of the sinful taste, craving, or appetite for sin, by reference to the craving of carnivorous animals for flesh. Of course,

2. A change of heart, in the view of this philosophy, must consist in a change of constitution. It must be a physical change, and wrought by a physical, as distinguished from a moral agency. It is a change wrought by the direct and physical power of the Holy Spirit in the constitution of the soul, changing its susceptibilities, implanting, or creating a new taste, relish, appetite, craving for or love of holiness. It

is, as they express it, the implantation of a new principle of holiness. It is described as a creation of a new taste or principle, as an infusion of a holy principle, &c. This scheme, of course, holds, and teaches that in regeneration the subject is entirely passive. With this school regeneration is exclusively the work of the Holy Spirit, the subject having no agency in it. It is an operation performed upon him, may be, while he is asleep or in a fit of derangement, while he is entirely passive, or perhaps when at the moment he is engaged in flagrant rebellion against God. The agency by which this work is wrought, according to them, is sovereign, irresistible, and creative. They hold that there are no means of regeneration of course as it is a direct act of creation. They hold the distinction already referred to and examined between regeneration and conversion; that when the Holy Spirit has performed the sovereign operation, and implanted the new principle, then the subject is active in conversion or in turning to God.

They hold that the soul in its very nature is enmity against God; that therefore the gospel has no tendency to regenerate or convert the soul to God; but on the contrary that previous to regeneration by the sovereign and physical agency of the Holy Spirit, every exhibition of God made in the Gospel, tends only to inflame and provoke this constitutional enmity.

They hold that when the sinful taste, relish, or craving for sin is weakened, (for they deny that it is ever wholly destroyed in this life, or while the soul continues connected with the body,) and a holy taste, relish, or craving is implanted or infused by the Holy Spirit into the constitution of the soul, then, and not till then, the gospel has a tendency to turn or convert the sinner from the error of his ways.

As I have said, their philosophy of moral depravity is the basis of their philosophy of regeneration. It assumes the dogma of original sin as taught in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, and attempts to harmonize the philosophy of regeneration with that philosophy of sin or moral depravity.

Upon this scheme or theory of regeneration I remark,

1. That it has been sufficiently refuted in the lectures on moral depravity. If, as was then shown, moral depravity is altogether voluntary, and consists in selfishness, or in a voluntary state of mind, this philosophy of regeneration is of course without foundation.

2. It was shown in the lectures on moral depravity that sin is not chosen for its own sake—that there is no constitutional

relish, taste, or craving for sin—that in sinful choice, sin is not the end or object chosen, but that self-gratification is chosen, and that this choice is sinful. If this is so, (and who may not know that it is?) then the whole philosophy of the taste scheme turns out to be “such stuff as dreams are made of.”

3. The taste, relish, or craving, of which this philosophy speaks, is not a taste, relish, or craving for sin, but for certain things and objects, the enjoyment of which is, to a certain extent, and upon certain conditions, lawful. But when the will prefers the gratification of taste or appetite to higher interests, this choice or act of will is sin. The sin never lies in the appetite, but in the will's consent to unlawful indulgence.

4. This philosophy confounds appetite or temptation to unlawful indulgence, with sin. Nay, it represents sin as consisting mostly, if not altogether, in temptation.

5. It is, as we have seen, inconsistent with both the Bible definition of sin and of regeneration.

6. It is also inconsistent with the justice of the command so solemnly given to sinners, “Make you a new heart and a new spirit, for why will ye die.”

7. It also contradicts the Bible representation that men regenerate each other: “For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers; for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel.”—1 Cor. 4: 15.

8. It throws the blame of unregeneracy upon God. If the sinner is passive and has no agency in it; if it consists in what this philosophy teaches, and is accomplished in the manner which this theory represents, it is self-evident that God alone is responsible for the fact that any sinner is unregenerate.

9. It represents regeneration as a miracle.

10. It renders holiness after regeneration physically necessary, just as sin was before, and perseverance also as physically necessary, and falling from grace as a natural impossibility. In this case holy exercises and living are only the gratification of a constitutional appetite.

11. It renders perseverance in holiness no virtue, as it is only self-gratification, or the gratification of appetite.

12. It is the assumption of a philosophy at war with the Bible.

13. Upon this theory regeneration would destroy personal identity.

2. The Divine Efficiency Scheme or Theory.

This scheme is based upon, or rather is only a carrying out

of an ancient heathen philosophy, bearing the same name. This ancient philosophy denies second causes, and teaches that what we call laws of nature are nothing else than the mode of Divine operation. It denies that the universe would even exist for a moment if the Divine upholding were withdrawn. It maintains that the universe exists only by an act of present and perpetual creation. It denies that matter or mind has in itself any inherent properties that can originate laws or motions; that all action, whether of matter or mind, is the necessary result of direct Divine irresistible efficiency or power; that this is not only true of the natural universe, but also of all the exercises and actions of moral agents in all worlds.

The abettors of the Divine efficiency scheme of regeneration apply this philosophy especially to moral agents. They hold that all the exercises and actions of moral agents in all worlds, and whether those exercises be holy or sinful, are produced by a Divine efficiency, or by a direct act of Omnipotence; that holy and sinful acts are alike effects of an irresistible cause, and that this cause is the power and agency or efficiency of God.

This philosophy denies constitutional moral depravity or original sin, and maintains that moral character belongs alone to the exercises or choices of the will; that regeneration does not consist in the creation of any new taste, relish, or craving, nor in the implantation or infusion of any new principles in the soul: but that it consists in a choice conformed to the law of God, or in a change from selfishness to disinterested benevolence; that this change is effected by a direct act of Divine power or efficiency as irresistible as any creative act whatever. This philosophy teaches that the moral character of every moral agent whether holy or sinful, is formed by an agency as direct, as sovereign and as irresistible as that which first gave existence to the universe; that true submission to God implies the hearty consent of the will to have the character thus formed, and then to be treated accordingly, for the glory of God. The principal arguments by which this theory is supported so far as I am acquainted with them, are as follows:

(1.) The bible, its advocates say, teaches it in those texts that teach the doctrine of a universal and particular Providence, and that God is present in all events; such for example as the following: "The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord."—Prov. 16: 33. "Lord,

thou wilt ordain peace for us; for thou also hast wrought all our works in us.”—Isaiah 26: 12. “I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil. I the Lord do all these *things*.”—Isaiah 45: 7. “And all the inhabitants of the earth *are* reputed as nothing: and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and *among* the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?”—Daniel 4: 35. “Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be afraid? shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done *it*?”—Amos 3: 6. “For of him, and through him, and to him, *are* all things; to whom *be* glory for ever. Amen.”—Romans 11: 36. “In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.”—Ephesians 1: 11. “For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of *his* good pleasure.”—Philippians 2: 13. “Now the God of peace, that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great Shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well-pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ; to whom *be* glory for ever and ever. Amen.”—Hebrews 13: 20, 21. “Blessed *be* the Lord God of our fathers, which hath put *such a thing* as this in the king’s heart, to beautify the house of the Lord which is in Jerusalem.”—Ezra 7: 27. “The preparation of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, *is* from the Lord. A man’s heart deviseth his way: but the Lord directeth his steps.”—Proverbs 16: 1, 9. “The king’s heart *is* in the hands of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will.”—Proverbs 21: 1. “But now, O Lord, thou *art* our Father: we *are* the clay, and thou our potter; and we all *are* the work of thy hand.”—Isaiah 64: 8. “And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard *us*: whose heart the Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul.”—Acts 16: 14. “Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?”—Romans 9: 20, 21. “And I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt.”—Exodus 7: 3. “And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not

unto them; as the Lord had spoken unto Moses.”—Ex. 9: 12. “And the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh: for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might shew these my signs before him.”—Ex. 10: 1. “And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh king of Egypt, and he pursued after the children of Israel: and the children of Israel went out with an high hand. And I, behold I will harden the hearts of the Egyptians, and they shall follow them: and I will get me honor upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host, upon his chariots, and upon his horsemen.”—Ex. 14: 8, 17. “But Sihon king of Heshbon would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand, as *appear-eth* this day.”—Deuteronomy 2: 30. “There was not a city that made peace with the children of Israel, save the Hivites, the inhabitants of Gibeon: all *other* they took in battle. For it was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour, but that he might destroy them as the Lord commanded Moses.”—Joshua 11: 19, 20. “And the three hundred blew the trumpets, and the Lord set every man’s sword against his fellow, even throughout all the host: and the host fled to Beth-shittah in Zererath, and to the border of Abel-meholah, unto Tabbath.”—Judges 7: 22. “And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them to say, Go, number Israel and Judah.”—2 Samuel 24: 1. “Now therefore, behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee.”—1 Kings 22: 23. “For thou hast hid their hearts from understanding: therefore shalt thou not exalt *them*.”—Job 17: 4. “He turned their hearts to hate his people, to deal subtilly with his servants.”—Psalms 105: 25. “For the Lord hath poured out upon you the spirit of deep sleep, and hath closed your eyes: the prophets and your rulers, the seers hath he covered.”—Isaiah 29: 10. “They have not known nor understood, for he hath shut their eyes, that they can not see; and their hearts that they can not understand.”—Isaiah 44: 18. “I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace and create evil. I the Lord do all these *things*.”—Isaiah 45: 7. “And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet, and I will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel.”—Ezek. 14: 9. “The people an-

swered him, We have heard out of the law that Christ abideth for ever; and how sayest thou, The Son of man must be lifted up? who is this son of man? Then Jesus said unto them, Yet a little while is the light with you: walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you: for he that walketh in darkness knoweth not whither he goeth. While ye have light, believe in the light that ye may be the children of light. These things spake Jesus and departed, and did hide himself from them. But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him: That the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed? Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again: He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts; that they should not see with *their* eyes, nor understand with *their* heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. "These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory, and spake of him."—John 12: 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41. "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will *have mercy*, and whom he will he hardeneth."—Romans 9: 18. "And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. And for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."—2 Thessalonians 2: 10, 11, 12. "For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled."—Revelation 17: 17.

I have quoted the passages upon which the defenders of this scheme lay the principal stress and would remark respecting them and all such like passages,

[1.] That they prove nothing to the point. The question in debate is not whether God is or is not in some sense present in every event, or whether there be not some sense in which every thing may be ascribed to the Providence and agency of God, for this their opponents admit and maintain. But the true question at issue respects only the *quo modo* of the Divine agency of which these passages say nothing. It is neither affirmed or implied in these passages, nor in any other that God is the direct, efficient, irresistible agent in all those cases.

[2.] Other passages abundantly imply and affirm that he is not the direct, efficient, and irresistible agent in the production

of moral evil. Example: "Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know not; and come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations?"—Jer. 7: 14. "For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace, as in all churches of the saints."—1 Cor. 14: 33. "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God can not be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not err my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning."—James 1: 13—17. "But if ye have bitter envying and strife in your hearts, glory not, and lie not against the truth. This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. For where envying and strife is, there is confusion and every evil work. But the wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy."—James 3: 14—17. "These things have I written unto you concerning them that seduce you."—1 John 2: 26. "And they said one to another, We are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear, therefore is this distress come upon us."—Gen. 42: 21. "And Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time also, neither would he let the people go."—Ex. 8: 32. "And Pharaoh sent and called for Moses and Aaron, and said unto them, I have sinned this time: the Lord is righteous, and I and my people are wicked."—Ex. 9: 27. "Then Pharaoh called for Moses and Aaron in haste; and he said, I have sinned against the Lord your God, and against you. Now therefore, forgive, I pray thee, my sin only this once, and entreat the Lord your God that he may take away from me this death only."—Ex. 10: 16, 17. "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life that both thou and thy seed may live."—Deut. 30: 19. "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them to say, Go number Israel and Judah. And David's heart smote him after that he had numbered the people. And

David said unto the Lord, I have sinned greatly in that I have done: and now, I beseech thee, O Lord, take away the iniquity of thy servant, for I have done very foolishly."—2 Sam. 24: 9, 10. "For this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them."—Mat. 13: 15.

These passages plainly teach and imply that God's agency, to say the least, in the production of sin, is not direct, efficient, irresistible. Their Scripture argument then proves nothing to the purpose of this philosophy.

(2.) Another argument by which the Divine efficiency scheme has been sustained is that Divine foreknowledge implies it.

This is an assumption without the shadow of proof.

(3.) Third argument: The Divine purposes imply it.

This also is a sheer assumption.

(4.) Fourth argument: Prophecy or the foretelling of future events implies it.

This again is assumption without proof. These arguments assume that God could not know what future events would be, especially what the free actions of men would be unless he produces and controls them by a direct and irresistible efficiency.

(5.) Fifth argument: The bible ascribes both the holy and sinful actions of man to God, and in equally unqualified terms.

This settles nothing of the *quo modo* in either case.

(6.) It is admitted, say some, that holy actions are produced by a direct divine efficiency; and as the bible ascribes the sinful actions of men to God in as unqualified terms as holy ones we have no right to infer a difference in the *quo modo* of his doing it.

We are not only allowed, but are bound to infer that his agency is different in the one case from what it is in the other. The bible has, as we shall see, settled the philosophy, or the manner in which he produces holy exercises in moral agents. It also every where assumes or affirms that he is concerned only providentially in the production of sin; that sin is an abuse of his providence and of the liberty of moral agents.

(7.) It has been assumed that it is naturally impossible for God to create a being that should have the power of originating his own actions.

This is purely an assumption, and of no weight whatever. It certainly is not an affirmation of reason; and I can not see any ground for such an affirmation.

(8.) It has been asserted that if such a creature existed, he would be independent of God in such a sense that God could neither certainly control him, nor know what he would do.

This is a mere begging of the question. How can this be known? This argument assumes that even Omniscience can not know how a free moral agent would act upon condition of his originating his own choices, intentions and actions. But why this assumption?

OBJECTIONS TO THIS THEORY.

1. It is mere philosophy, and that falsely so called.
2. It is supported, so far as I can sec, only by the most unwarrantable assumptions.

3. Its tendency condemns it. It tends,

(1.) To beget and perpetuate a sense of divine injustice. To create a character by an agency as direct and irresistible as that of the creation of the world itself, and then treat moral beings according to that character so formed, is wholly inconsistent with all our ideas of justice.

(2.) It destroys a sense of accountability, or tends to destroy it.

(3.) It contradicts human consciousness. I know it is said that consciousness only gives our mental actions and states, but not the cause of them. This I deny, and affirm that consciousness not only gives us our mental actions and states, but it also gives us the cause of them, especially it gives the fact that we ourselves are the sovereign and efficient causes of the choices and actions of our will. In our passive states we can almost always recognize the cause of these phenomena. At least we can very often do so. I am as conscious of originating in a sovereign manner my choices as I am of the choices themselves.

4. This theory virtually denies, or rather stultifies the eternal distinction between liberty and necessity.

5. If this theory were true, with our present consciousness we can not believe it. We can not but affirm to ourselves that we are the efficient causes of our choices and volitions.

6. The philosophy in question really represents God as the only agent, in any proper sense of that term, in the universe. If God produces the exercises of moral beings in the manner

represented by this philosophy, they are in fact no more agents than the planets are agents. If their exercises are all directly created by the power of God, it is ridiculous to call them agents.

7. If this theory is true, what we generally call moral beings and moral agents, are no more so than the winds and the waves or any other substance or thing in the universe.

8. Again: if this theory be true, no being but God has or can have moral character. No other being is the author of his own actions. He is the subject, but not the author of his actions. He is the passive subject, but not the active efficient cause of his own exercises. To affirm moral character of such a passive subject is truly ridiculous.

9. This theory obliges its advocates, together with all other necessitarians, to give a false and nonsensical definition of free agency. Free agency, according to them, consists in *doing as we will*, while their theory denies the power to will except as our willings are necessitated by God. But as we have seen in former lectures, this is no true account of freedom, or liberty. Liberty to execute my choices is no liberty at all. Choice is connected with its sequents by a law of necessity; and if an effect follow my volitions, that effect follows by necessity and not freely. All freedom of will must, as was formerly shown, consist in the sovereign power to originate our own choices. If I am unable to will I am unable to do any thing, and it is absurd and ridiculous to affirm that a being is a moral or a free agent who has not power to originate his own choices.

10. If this theory is true, God is more than the accomplice of the devil; for

(1.) Satan can not tempt us according to this theory, unless God by a direct divine efficiency moves him and compels him to do so.

(2.) We can not possibly yield to his temptation except as God compels us to yield or creates the yielding within us. This is a blasphemous theory surely that represents God as doing such things. That a philosophy like this could ever have been taught will appear incredible to many, I doubt not. But such is the fact, and such the true statement of the views of this class of theologians, if I can understand them.

11. But this theory is inconsistent with the bible, as we have seen.

12. It is also inconsistent with itself, for it both affirms and denies natural ability. Its advocates admit that we can not

act except as we will, and affirm that we can not will except as our willings are created by a direct divine efficiency. How absurd then it is to maintain that we have natural ability to do any thing. All that can truly be said of us upon the principles of this theory is that we have a susceptibility to be acted upon, and to be rendered the subjects of certain states immediately and irresistibly created by the power of God. But it is absurd to call this a natural ability to do our duty.

13. If this theory is true, the whole moral government of God is the merest farce and humbug that ever existed. The gospel is an insult to men in two respects at least:

(1.) Upon this theory men do not, can not deserve punishment.

(2.) If they do, the gospel is presented and urged upon their acceptance, when in fact they have no more power to accept it than they have to create a world.

14. Again: this theory overlooks and virtually denies the fundamentally important distinction between moral and physical power and moral and physical government. All power and all government upon this theory are physical.

15. Again: this theory renders repentance and self-condemnation impossible as a rational exercise.

16. This theory involves the delusion of all moral beings. God not only creates our volitions, but also creates the persuasion and affirmation that we are responsible for them. O, shame on such a theory as this!

III. The Susceptibility Scheme is next to be considered.

1. I shall state what this scheme is.

2. In what this theory agrees with the theory of Divine Moral Suasion.

3. In what those theories differ.

4. State the arguments by which this theory is defended.

5. State the difficulties with which it is encumbered

1. What this theory is.

This theory represents that the Holy Spirit's influences are both physical and moral; that He by a direct and physical influence excites the susceptibilities of the soul and prepares them to be affected by the truth; that He thereupon exerts a moral or persuasive influence by presenting the truth, which moral influence induces regeneration.

2. Wherein this and the Divine Moral Suasion theory agree.

(1.) In rejecting the Taste and Divine Efficiency Schemes

(2.) In rejecting the dogma of constitutional moral depravity.

(3.) In rejecting the dogma of physical regeneration; for be it remembered that this theory teaches that the physical influence exerted in exciting the susceptibilities is no part of regeneration.

(4.) They agree in maintainnig the natural ability or liberty of all moral agents.

(5.) That the constitutional appetites and passions have no moral character in themselves.

(6.) That when strongly excited they are the occasions of sin.

(7.) That sin and moral depravity are identical, and that they consist in a violation of the moral law.

(8.) That the moral heart is the ruling preference or ultimate intention of the mind.

(9.) That the carnal mind or heart is selfishness.

(10.) That the new or regenerate heart is benevolence.

(11.) That regeneration consists in a change from selfishness to benevolence, or from the supreme love of self to the supreme love of God and the equal love of our neighbor.

(12.) That this change is effected by the truth presented by the Holy Spirit or by a Divine moral persuasion.

3. Wherein they differ.

This philosophy maintains the necessity and the fact of a physical influence superadded to the moral or persuasive influence of the Holy Spirit as a *sine qua non* of regeneration. The Divine moral suasion theory regards regeneration as being induced alone by a moral influence. This theory also admits and maintains that regeneration is effected solely by a moral influence, but also that a work preparatory to the efficiency of the moral influence and indispensable to its efficiency in producing regeneration is performed by a direct and physical agency of the Holy Spirit upon the constitutional susceptibilities of the soul to quicken and wake it up and predispose it to be deeply and duly affected by the truth. The arguments by which that part of this theory which relates to a physical influence of the Holy Spirit is supported are, so far as I am acquainted with them, as follows:

(1.) It is maintained by the defenders of this scheme that the representations of the bible upon the subject of the Holy Spirit's agency in regeneration are such as to forbid the supposition that His influence is altogether moral or persuasive, and such as plainly to indicate that He also exerts a physical

agency in preparing the mind to be duly effected by the truth. In reply to this argument I observe,

[1.] That I fear greatly to disparage the work and agency of the Holy Spirit in the work of man's redemption from sin, and would by no means resist or deny, or so much as call in question any thing that is plainly taught or implied in the bible upon this subject.

[2.] I admit and maintain that regeneration is always induced and effected by the personal agency of the Holy Spirit. The question now before us relates *wholly to the mode and not at all to the fact of the Divine agency in regeneration*. Let this be distinctly understood for it has been common for theologians of the old school, as soon as the dogma of a physical regeneration and of a physical influence in regeneration has been called in question, to cry out and insist that this is Pelagianism, and that it is a denial of divine influence altogether, and that it is teaching a self-regeneration independent of any divine influence. I have been ashamed of such representations as these on the part of christian divines and have been distressed by their want of candor. It should, however, be distinctly stated that, so far as I know, the defenders of the theory now under consideration have never manifested this want of candor towards those who have called in question that part of their theory that relates to a physical influence.

[3.] Since the advocates of this theory admit that the Bible teaches that regeneration is induced by a Divine moral suasion, the point of debate is simply whether the Bible teaches that there is also a physical influence exerted by the Holy Spirit in exciting the constitutional susceptibilities. We will now attend to their proof texts. "Then opened he their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures."—Luke 24: 45. It is affirmed that this text seems to teach or imply a physical influence in opening their understandings. But what do we mean by such language as this in common life? Language is to be understood according to the subject matter of discourse. Here the subject of discourse is the understanding. But what can be intended by opening it? Can this be a physical prying, pulling, or forcing open any department of the constitution? Such language in common life would be understood only to mean that such instruction was imparted as to secure a right understanding of the Scriptures. Every one knows this, and why should we suppose and assume that any thing more is intended here? The context plainly indicates that this was the thing and the only

thing done in this case. "Then he said unto them, O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself. And said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day."—Luke 24: 25—27, 46. From these verses it appears that he expounded the Scriptures to them, when in the light of what had passed, and in the light of that measure of Divine illumination which was then imparted to them, they understood the things which He explained to them. It does not seem to me that this passage warrants the inference that there was a physical influence exerted. It certainly affirms no such thing. "And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us; whose heart the Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul."—Acts 16: 14. Here is an expression similar to that just examined. Here it is said that the Lord opened the heart of Lydia so that she attended, &c.; that is, the Lord inclined her to attend. But how? Why, say the advocates of this scheme, by a physical influence. But how does this appear? What is her heart that it should be pried, or pulled, or forced open? and what can be intended by the assertion that the Lord opened her heart? All that can be meant is that the Lord secured her attention and disposed her to attend, and so enlightened her when she did attend that she believed. Surely here is no assertion of a physical influence, nor, so far as I can see, any just ground for the inference that such an influence was exerted. A moral influence can sufficiently explain all the phenomena; and any text that can equally well consist with either of two opposing theories can prove neither.

Again, there are many passages that represent God as opening the spiritual eyes, and passages in which petitions are offered to God to do this. It is by this theory assumed that such passages strongly imply a physical influence. But this assumption appears to me unwarrantable. We are in the habit of using just such language and speak of opening each other's eyes when no such thing is intended or implied as a physical influence, and when nothing more than a moral or persuasive influence is so much as thought of. Why then resort to such an assumption here? Does the nature of the case demand it? This I know is contended by those who

maintain a constitutional moral depravity. But this dogma has been shown to be false, and it is admitted to be so by those who maintain the theory now under consideration. Admitting, then, that the constitution is not morally depraved, should it be inferred that any constitutional change or physical influence is needed to produce regeneration? I can see no sufficient reason for believing or affirming that a physical influence is either demanded or exerted. This much I freely admit, that we can not affirm the impossibility of such an influence, nor the impossibility of the necessity of such an influence. The only question with me is, does the bible plainly teach or imply such an influence? Hitherto I have been unable to see that it does. The passages already quoted are of a piece with all that are relied upon in support of this theory, and as the same answer is a sufficient reply to them all I will not spend time in citing and remarking upon them.

(2.) Again: A physical influence has been inferred from the fact that sinners are represented as dead in trespasses and sins, as asleep, &c. &c. But all such representations are only declaratory of a moral state, a state of voluntary alienation from God. If the death is moral and the sleep moral, why suppose that a physical influence is needed to correct a moral evil? Can not truth when urged and pressed by the Holy Spirit effect the requisite change?

(3.) But a physical influence is also inferred from the fact that truth makes so different an impression at one time from what it does at another. Answer: This can well enough be accounted for by the fact that sometimes the Holy Spirit so presents the truth that the mind apprehends it and feels its power, whereas at another time he does not.

(4.) But it is said that there sometimes appears to have been a preparatory work performed by a physical influence predisposing the mind to attend to and be affected by the truth. Answer: There often is no doubt a preparatory work predisposing the mind to attend to and be affected by truth. But why assume that this is a physical influence? Providential occurrences may have had much to do with it. The Holy Spirit may have been directing the thoughts and communicating instructions in various ways and preparing the mind to attend and obey. Who then is warranted in the affirmation that this preparatory influence is physical? I admit that it *may* be, but I can not see either that it must be, or that there is any good ground for the assumption that it is.

IV. The last theory to be examined is that of a Divine Moral Suasion.

This theory teaches,

1. That regeneration consists in a change in the ultimate intention or preference of the mind, or in a change from selfishness to disinterested benevolence, and,

2. That this change is induced and effected by a Divine moral influence; that is, that the Holy Spirit effects it with, through, or by the truth. The advocates of this theory assign the following as the principal reasons in support of it.

(1.) The bible expressly affirms it. "Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."—John 3: 5, 6. "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever."—1 Peter 1: 23. "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures."—James 1: 18. "For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ yet *have ye* not many fathers: for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel."—Corinthians 4: 15.

(2.) Men are represented as being sanctified by and through the truth. "Sanctify them through the truth: thy word is truth."—John 17: 17. "Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you."—John 15: 3.

(3.) The nature of regeneration decides the philosophy of it so far as this, that it must be effected by truth addressed to the heart through the intelligence.

(4.) Unless it is so effected it has no moral character.

(5.) The regenerate are conscious of having been influenced by the truth in turning to God.

(6.) They are conscious of no other influence than light poured upon the intelligence or truth presented to the mind.

(7.) When God affirms that he regenerates the soul with or by the truth we have no right to infer that he does it in some other way. This he does affirm; therefore the bible has settled the philosophy of regeneration. That he exerts any other than a moral influence or the influence of Divine teaching and illumination is sheer assumption.

OBJECTIONS.

1. To represent sinners as regenerated by the influence of truth although presented and urged by the Holy Spirit is virtually to deny total depravity. To this it is answered,

(1.) It does indeed deny constitutional moral depravity and constitutional or physical regeneration.

(2.) Adam and the sinning angels were changed or regenerated from perfect holiness to perfect sinfulness by motives presented to them, at least Adam was. Now if they could be regenerated from entire holiness to entire sinfulness by a moral influence or by means of a lie, is it impossible that God should convert sinners by means of truth? Has God so much less moral power than Satan has?

(3.) To this it may be replied that it is much easier to convert or regenerate men from holiness to sin, than from sin to holiness.

[1.] This, I answer, seems to reflect upon the wisdom and goodness of God in forming the human constitution.

[2.] Should the fact be granted, still it may truly be urged that the motives to holiness are infinitely greater than those to sin, so that the Holy Spirit has altogether the advantage in this respect.

2. If sinners are regenerated by the light of the truth, they may be regenerated in hell as they will there know the truth.

(1.) The bible I answer, represents the wicked in hell as being in darkness and not in the light of the truth.

(2.) The truth will not be presented and urged home there by the persuasive Spirit of God.

(3.) The gospel motives will be wanting there. The offer of pardon and acceptance, which is indispensable to induce repentance and obedience, will not be made then. Therefore sinners will not be converted in hell.

REMARKS.

1. This scheme honors the Holy Spirit without disparaging the truth of God.

2. Regeneration by the Holy Spirit through the truth illustrates the wisdom of God. There is a deep and Divine philosophy in regeneration.

3. This theory is of great practical importance. For if sinners are to be regenerated by the influence of truth, argument, and persuasion, then ministers can see what they have to do, and how it is that they are to be "workers together with God."

4. So also sinners may see that they are not to wait for a physical regeneration or influence, but must submit to, and embrace the truth if they ever expect to be saved.

5. If this scheme is true, we can see that when truth is made clear to the mind and is resisted, the Holy Spirit is resisted, for this is his work to make the mind clearly to apprehend the truth.

6. If this theory is true, sinners are most likely to be regenerated while sitting under the sound of the gospel, while listening to the clear exhibition of truth.

7. Ministers should lay themselves out and press every consideration upon the attention of sinners just as heartily and as freely as if they expected to convert them themselves. They should aim at and expect the regeneration of sinners upon the spot and before they leave the house of God.

8. Sinners must not wait for and expect physical omnipotence to regenerate them.

9. The physical omnipotence of God affords no presumption that all men will be converted; for regeneration is not effected by physical power.

10. To neglect and resist the truth is fatal to salvation.

11. Sinners are not regenerated because they neglect and resist the truth.

12. God can not do the sinner's duty and regenerate him without the right exercise of the sinner's own agency.

13. This view of regeneration shows that the sinner's dependence upon the Holy Spirit arises entirely out of his own voluntary stubbornness, and that his guilt is all the greater by how much the more perfect this kind of dependence is.

14. This view of regeneration shows the adaptedness of the Law and Gospel of God to regenerate, sanctify and save the souls of men.

15. It also demonstrates the wisdom of appointing such means and instrumentalities to accomplish their salvation.

16. Physical regeneration under every modification of it is a stumbling block.

17. Original or constitutional sinfulness, physical regeneration, and all their kindred and resulting dogmas are alike subversive of the gospel and repulsive to the human intelligence, and should be laid aside as relicts of a most nonsensical philosophy.

LECTURE XLI.

REGENERATION.

XII. EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.

In the discussion of this subject I will,

I. MAKE SEVERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

II. SHOW WHEREIN THE EXPERIENCE AND OUTWARD LIFE
SAINTS AND SINNERS MAY AGREE.

III. WHEREIN THEY MUST DIFFER.

I. *Introductory Remarks.*

1. In ascertaining what are and what are not evidences of regeneration, we must constantly keep in mind what is not and what is regeneration, what is not and what is implied in it.

2. We must constantly recognize the fact that saints and sinners have precisely similar constitutions and constitutional susceptibilities and that therefore many things are common to both.

3. What is common to both can not of course be an evidence of regeneration.

4. That no state of the sensibility has any moral character in itself. That regeneration does not consist in or imply any physical change whatever either of the intellect, sensibility, or the faculty of will.

5. That the sensibility of the sinner is susceptible of every kind and degree of *feeling* that is possible to saints.

6. The same is true of the consciences of both saints and sinners. and of the intelligence generally.

7. That moral character belongs to the ultimate intention.

8. That regeneration consists in a change of the ultimate intention.

9. That the moral character is as the ultimate intention is.

10. The enquiry is, what are evidences of a change in the ultimate intention? What is evidence that benevolence is the ruling choice, preference, intention of the soul?

This, it would seem, must be a plain question and must admit of a very easy and satisfactory answer.

It is a plain question, and demands and may have a plain answer. But so much error has prevailed as to the nature of regeneration and consequently as to what are evidences of regeneration that we need patience, discrimination, and perseverance and withal candor to get at the truth upon this subject.

II. Wherein the experience and outward life of saints and sinners may agree.

It is plain that they may be alike in whatever does not consist in or necessarily proceed from the attitude of their will, that is, in whatever is constitutional or involuntary. For example,

1. They may both desire their own happiness. This desire is constitutional, and of course common to both saints and sinners.

2. They may both desire the happiness of others. This also is constitutional and of course common to both saints and sinners. There is no moral character in these desires any more than there is in the desire for food and drink. That men have a natural desire for the happiness of others is evident from the fact that they manifest pleasure when others are happy unless they have some selfish reason for envy, or unless the happiness of others is in some way inconsistent with their own. They also manifest uneasiness and pain when they see others in misery, unless they have some selfish reason for desiring their misery.

3. Saints and sinners may alike dread their own misery and the misery of others. This is strictly constitutional, and has therefore no moral character. I have known that very wicked men and men who had been infidels when they were convinced of the truths of Christianity, manifested great concern about their families and about their neighbors, and in one instance I heard of an aged man of this description who when convinced of the truth, went and warned his neighbors to flee from the wrath to come, avowing at the same time his conviction that there was no mercy for him, though he felt deeply concerned for others. Such like cases have repeatedly been witnessed. The case of the rich man in hell seems to have been one of this description or to have illustrated the same truth. Although he knew his own case to be hopeless, yet he desired that Lazarus should be sent to warn his five brethren lest they also should come to that place of torment. In this case and in the case of the aged man just named it appears that they not only desired that others should avoid misery, but they actually tried to prevent it and used the means that were within their reach to save them. Now it is plain that this *desire* took control of their will and of course the state of the will was selfish. It sought to gratify desire. It was the pain and dread of seeing their misery and of having them miserable that led them to use means to prevent it. This

was not benevolence, but selfishness. It no doubt increases the misery of sinners in hell to have their number multiplied, that is, they being moral agents can not but be unutterably pained to behold the wretchedness around them. This may and doubtless will make up a great part of the misery of devils and of wicked men, the beholding to all eternity the misery which they have occasioned. They will not only be filled with remorse; but undoubtedly their souls will be unutterably agonized with the misery they will behold around them.

Let it be understood then that as both saints and sinners constitutionally desire, not only their own happiness, but also the happiness of others, they may alike rejoice in the happiness and safety of others and in converts to christianity, and may alike grieve at the danger and misery of those who are unconverted. I well recollect when far from home and while an impenitent sinner I received a letter from my youngest brother informing me that he was converted to God. He, if he was converted, was, as I supposed, the first and the only member of the family who then had a hope of salvation. I was at the time and both before and after one of the most careless sinners, and yet on receiving this intelligence, I actually wept for joy and gratitude that one of so prayerless a family was likely to be saved.

Indeed I have repeatedly known sinners to manifest much interest in the conversion of their friends and express gratitude for their conversion although they had no religion themselves. These desires have no moral character in themselves. In as far as they control the will, the will yielding to impulse instead of the law of the intelligence then is selfishness.

4. Saints and sinners may agree in desiring their own sanctification and the sanctification of others. They may both desire their own sanctification as the condition of their salvation. They may also desire the sanctification of others as the condition of their salvation.

5. Saints and sinners may both desire to be useful as a condition of their own salvation.

6. They may also desire that others should be useful as a condition of their salvation.

7. They may both desire to glorify God as a means or condition of their own salvation.

8. They may also desire to have others glorify God as a means of their salvation. These desires are natural and constitutional when the salvation either of ourselves or others is

desired and when these things are seen to be conditions of salvation.

9. They may both desire and strongly desire a revival of religion and the prosperity of Zion as a means of promoting their own salvation or the salvation of their friends. Sinners have often been known to desire revivals of religion.

10. They may agree in desiring the triumph of truth and righteousness and the suppression of vice and error for the sake of the bearings of these things on self and friends. These desires are constitutional and natural to both under certain circumstances. When they do not influence the will they have in themselves no moral character. But when they influence the will, their selfishness takes on this type. It then manifests zeal in promoting religion. But if desire and not the intelligence, controls the will, it is selfishness notwithstanding.

11. Moral agents constitutionally approve of what is right and disapprove of what is wrong. Of course both saints and sinners may both approve of and delight in goodness. I can recollect weeping at an instance of what at the time I supposed to be goodness, while at the same time I was not religious myself. I have no doubt that wicked men not only often are conscious of strongly approving the goodness of God, but that they also often take delight in contemplating it. This is constitutional both as it respects the intellectual approbation and also as it respects the feeling of delight. It is a great mistake to suppose that sinners never are conscious of feelings of complacency and delight in the goodness of God. The Bible represents sinners as taking delight in drawing near to him. "Yet they seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and forsook not the ordinance of their God: they ask of me the ordinances of justice; they take delight in approaching to God.—Isa. 58: 2. "And lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument: for they hear thy words, but they do them not."—Ezek. 33: 32. "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man."—Romans 7: 22.

12. Saints and sinners may alike not only intellectually approve, but have feelings of deep complacency in the characters of good men, sometimes good men of their own time and of their acquaintance, but more frequently good men either of a former age, or if of their own age, of a distant country. The reason is this: Good men of their own day and neighbor-

hood are very apt to render them uneasy in their sins, to annoy them by their faithful reproofs and rebukes. This offends them and overcomes their natural respect for goodness. But who has not observed the fact that good and bad men unite in praising, admiring, and loving so far as feeling is concerned, good men of by-gone days, or good men at a distance whose life and rebukes have annoyed the wicked in their own neighborhood? The fact is, that moral agents from the laws of their being, necessarily intellectually approve of goodness wherever they witness it. And when not annoyed by it, when left to contemplate it in the abstract or at a distance, they cannot but feel a complacency in it. Multitudes of sinners are conscious of this and suppose that this is a virtuous feeling in them. It is of no use to deny that they sometimes have *feelings of love* and gratitude to God, and of respect for and complacency in good men. They often have these feelings and to represent them as always having feelings of hatred and of opposition to God and to good men, is sure either to offend them or to lead them to deny the truths of religion; if they are told that the Bible teaches this. Or again it may lead them to think themselves Christians because they are conscious of such feelings as they are taught to believe are peculiar to Christians. Or again, they may think that although they are not Christians, yet they are far from being totally depraved, inasmuch as they have so many good desires and feelings. It should never be forgotten that saints and sinners may agree in their opinions and intellectual views and judgments. Many professors of religion, it is to be feared, have supposed religion to consist in desires and feelings and have entirely mistaken their own character. Indeed nothing is more common than to hear religion spoken of as consisting altogether in mere feelings, desires and emotions. Professors relate their feelings and suppose themselves to be giving an account of their religion. It is infinitely important that both professors of religion and non-professors should understand more than most of them do of their mental constitution and of the true nature of religion. Multitudes of professors of religion have, it is to be feared, a hope founded altogether upon desires and feelings that are purely constitutional, and therefore common to both saints and sinners.

13. Saints and sinners agree in this that they both disapprove of and are often disgusted with and deeply abhor sin. They can not but disapprove of sin. Necessity is laid upon every moral agent, whatever his character may be, by the law

of his being, to condemn and disapprove of sin. And often the sensibility of sinners as well as saints is filled with deep disgust and loathing in view of sin. I know that representations the direct opposite of these are often made. Sinners are represented as universally having complacency in sin, as having a constitutional craving for sin as they do for food and drink. But such representations are false and most injurious. They contradict the sinner's consciousness, and lead him either to deny his total depravity, or to deny the Bible, or to think himself regenerate. As was shown when upon the subject of moral depravity, sinners do not love *sin for its own sake*; but they crave other things, and this leads to prohibited indulgence, which indulgence is sin. But it is not the sinfulness of the indulgence that was desired. That might have produced disgust and loathing in the sensibility if it had been considered even at the moment of the indulgence. For example: Suppose a licentious man, a drunkard, a gambler, or any other wicked man, engaged in his favorite indulgence, and suppose that the sinfulness of this indulgence should be strongly set before his mind by the Holy Spirit. He might be deeply ashamed and disgusted with himself, and so much so as to feel a great contempt for himself, and feel almost ready, were it possible, to spit in his own face. And yet unless this feeling becomes more powerful than the desire and feeling which the will is seeking to indulge, the indulgence will be persevered in notwithstanding this disgust. If the feeling of disgust should, for the time, overmatch the opposing desire, the indulgence will be, for the time being, abandoned for the sake of gratifying or appeasing the feeling of disgust. But this is not virtue. It is only a change in the form of selfishness. Feeling still governs, and not the law of the intelligence. The indulgence is only abandoned for the time being to gratify a stronger impulse of the sensibility. The will, will of course return to the indulgence again, when the feelings of fear, disgust, or loathing subside. This no doubt accounts for the multitudes of spurious conversions sometimes witnessed. Sinners are convicted, and their fears, and disgust, and loathing excited. These feelings, for the time, become stronger than their desires for their former indulgences, and consequently they abandon them for a time, in obedience, not to the law of God or of their intelligence, but in obedience to their fears, disgust and shame. But when conviction subsides, and the consequent feelings are no more, these spurious converts "return like a dog to his vomit, and like a sow

that was washed to her wallowing in the mire." It should be distinctly understood that all these feelings of which I have spoken, and indeed any class or degree of mere feelings may exist in the sensibility; and further that these or any other feelings may in their turns control the will, and produce of course a corresponding outward life, and yet the heart be and remain all the while in a selfish state, or in a state of total depravity. Indeed it is perfectly common to see the impenitent sinner manifest much disgust and opposition to sin in himself and in others, yet this is not principle in him; it is only the effect of present feeling. The next day, or perhaps hour, he will repeat his sin, or do that which when beheld in others enkindled his indignation.

14. Both saints and sinners approve of and often delight in justice. It is common to see in courts of justice and on various occasions impenitent sinners manifest great complacency in the administration of justice and the greatest indignation at and abhorrence of injustice. So strong is this feeling sometimes that it can not be restrained, but will burst forth like a smothered volcano and carry desolation before it. It is this natural love of justice and abhorrence of injustice common alike to saints and sinners, to which popular tumults and bloodshed are often to be ascribed. This, to be sure, is not virtue, but selfishness. It is the will giving itself up to the gratification of a constitutional impulse. But such feelings and such conduct are often supposed to be virtuous. It should always be borne in mind that the love of justice and the sense of delight in it, and the feeling of opposition to injustice is not only not peculiar to good men, but that such feelings are no evidence whatever of a regenerate heart. Thousands of instances might be adduced as proofs and illustrations of this position. But such manifestations are too common to need to be cited to remind any one of their existence.

15. The same remarks may be made in regard to *truth*. Both saints and sinners have a constitutional respect for, approbation of, and delight in truth. Whoever knew a sinner to approve of the character of a liar? What sinner will not resent it to be accused or even suspected of lying? All men spontaneously manifest their respect for, complacency in, and approbation of truth. This is constitutional; so that even the greatest liars do not and can not love lying for its own sake. They lie to gratify, not a love for falsehood on its own account, but to obtain some object which they desire more strongly than they hate falsehood. Sinners,

in spite of themselves venerate, respect and fear a man of truth. They just as necessarily despise a liar. If they are liars they despise themselves for it just as drunkards and debauchees despise themselves for indulging their filthy lusts, and yet continue in them.

16. Both saints and sinners not only approve of and delight in good men, when, as I have said, wicked men are not annoyed by them, but they agree in reprobating, disapproving and abhorring wicked men and devils. Whoever heard of any other sentiment and feeling expressed either by good or bad men, than of abhorrence and indignation toward the devil? Nobody ever approved or can approve of his character; sinners can no more approve of it than holy angels can. If he could approve of and delight in his own character hell would cease to be hell and evil would become his good. But no moral agent can by any possibility *know* wickedness and approve it. No man, saint or sinner, can entertain any other sentiment and feeling toward the devil or wicked men than those of disapprobation, distrust, disrespect, and often of loathing and abhorrence. The intellectual sentiment will be uniform. Disapprobation, distrust, condemnation will always necessarily possess the minds of all who know wicked men and devils. And often, as occasions arise wherein their characters are clearly revealed, and under circumstances favorable to such a result, the deepest *feelings* of disgust, of loathing, of indignation and abhorrence of their wickedness, will manifest themselves alike among saints and sinners.

17. Saints and sinners may be equally honorable and fair in business transactions so far as the outward act is concerned. To be sure they have different reasons for their conduct, but outwardly it may be the same. This leads to the remark,

18. That selfishness in the sinner and benevolence in the saint may and often do produce, in many respects, the same results or manifestations. For example: benevolence in the saint and selfishness in the sinner may beget the same class of desires, to wit, as we have seen, desire for their own sanctification, and for that of others, to be useful and have others so, desires for the conversion of sinners, and many such like desires.

19. This leads to the remark that when the desires of an impenitent person for these objects become strong enough to influence the will, he may take the same outward course substantially that the saint takes in obedience to his intelligence. That is, the sinner is constrained by his *feelings* to do what

the saint does from *principle* or from obedience to the law of his intelligence. In this however, although the outward manifestations be the same for the time being, yet the sinner is entirely selfish and the saint benevolent. The saint is controlled by principle and the sinner by impulse. In this case time is needed to distinguish between them. The sinner not having the root of the matter in him, will return to his former course of life in proportion as his convictions of the truth and importance of religion subside, and his former *feelings* return; while the saint will evince his heavenly birth by manifesting his sympathy with God and the strength of principle that has taken possession of his heart. That is, he will manifest that his intelligence, and not his feelings, controls his will.

20. Saints and sinners may both love and hate the same things, but for different and opposite reasons. For example: They may both love the Bible; the saint benevolently and the sinner selfishly; that is, the saint loves the Bible for benevolent, and the sinner for selfish reasons. They may love Christians for opposite reasons, the saint for their likeness to Christ, the sinner because he considers them the favorites of heaven, as *his* particular friends, or because he in some way hopes to be benefitted by them, or from a mere constitutional complacency in goodness. Now observe: the Christian may have the same constitutional feelings as the sinner, and besides these, he may have reasons for his love and conduct peculiar to the saint. The saint and sinner may, for different and opposite reasons, be interested in, and deeply affected with the character of God, with the truth, the sanctuary, and in all the duties of religion, and all the means of grace. They may alike, but for different reasons, hate infidelity, error, sin, sinners, selfishness. A selfish sinner may deeply abhor selfishness in others, and even in himself, and still persevere in it.

21. Again: Selfishness in the sinner and benevolence in the saint may lead them to form similar resolutions and purposes; for example: to serve God—to avoid all sin—to do all duty—to do right—to be useful—to persevere in well-doing—to live for eternity—to set a good example—to pay the strictest regard to the Sabbath and to all the institutions of religion—to do all that in them lies to support religious institutions.

22. Saints and sinners may agree in their views of doctrine and of measures, may be equally zealous in the cause of God and religion; may be equally enlightened; may experience

delight in prayer, and in religious meetings, and in religious exercises generally.

23. Both may be greatly changed in feeling and in life.

24. They may both give all their goods to feed the poor, or to support the gospel and send it to the heathen.

25. They may both go as missionaries to the heathen, but for entirely different reasons.

26. They may have equal convictions of sin, and their sensibilities may be similarly affected by these convictions.

27. They may both have great sorrow for sin, and great loathing of self on account of it.

28. They may have equal feelings of gratitude to God.

29. They may both appear to manifest all the graces of true saints.

30. They may both be very confident of their good estate.

31. They may both have new hopes and new fears, new joys and new sorrows, new friends and new enemies, new habits of life.

32. They may both be comforted by the promises and awed by the threatenings.

33. They may both appear to have answers to prayer.

34. They may both appear and really suppose themselves to renounce the world. They may really both renounce this world, the saint for the glory of God, the sinner that he may win heaven.

35. They may both practice many forms of self-denial. The christian really denies himself and the sinner may appear to by denying certain forms of self-seeking for the securing of a selfish interest in another direction.

36. They may both have the faith of miracles: "And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains and have not charity, I am nothing."—1 Cor. 13: 2.

37. They may both suffer martyrdom for entirely opposite reasons. "And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."—1 Cor. 13: 3.

38. They may be confident of their good estate, and may both die in triumph and carry their hope to the bar of God. "Then shall ye begin to say, We have eaten and drunk in thy presence, and thou hast taught in our streets. But he shall say, I tell you, I know you not whence ye are: de-

part from me all ye workers of iniquity."—Luke 13: 26, 27.

REMARKS.

1. For want of these and such like discriminations many have stumbled. Hypocrites have held on to a false hope and lived upon mere constitutional desires, and spasmodic turns of giving up the will, during seasons of special excitement, to the control of these desires and feelings. These spasms they call their waking up. But no sooner does their excitement subside than selfishness again assumes its wonted forms. It is truly wonderful and appalling to see to what an extent this is true. Because in seasons of special excitement they feel deeply and are conscious of feeling, as they say, and acting and of being entirely sincere in following their impulses, they have the fullest confidence in their good estate. They say they can not doubt their conversion. They felt so and so and gave themselves up to their feelings, and gave much time and money to promote the cause of Christ. Now this is a deep delusion and one of the most common in Christendom or at least one of the most common that is to be found among what are called revival christians. This class of deluded souls do not see that they are in such cases, governed by their feelings, and that if their feelings were changed, their conduct would be of course; that as soon as the excitement subsides they will go back to their former ways as a thing of course. When the present state of feeling that now controls them has given place to their former feelings, they will of course appear as they used to do. This in few words is the history of thousands of professors of religion.

2. This has greatly stumbled the openly impenitent. Not knowing how to account for what they often witness of this kind among professors of religion, they are led to doubt whether there is any such thing as true religion.

Again: Many sinners have been deceived just in the way I have pointed out, and have afterwards discovered that they had been deluded, but could not understand how. They have come to the conclusion that every body is deluded, and that all professors are as much deceived as they are. This leads them to reject and despise all religion.

3. A want of discrimination between what is constitutional and what belongs to a regenerate state of mind has stumbled many. Impenitent sinners finding themselves to have what they call certain good desires and feelings, have either come to the conclusion that they were born again or that the unre-

generate have at least a spark of holiness in them that only needs to be cherished and cultivated to fit them for heaven.

4. Some exercises of impenitent sinners, and of which they are conscious, have been denied for fear of denying total depravity. They have been represented as necessarily hating God and all good men; and this hatred has been represented as a *feeling of malice and enmity* towards God. Many impenitent sinners are conscious of having no such feelings; but on the contrary they are conscious of having at times feelings of respect, veneration, awe, gratitude and affection towards God and for good men. They are also conscious that they are often influenced by these feelings; that in obedience to them they sometimes pray and sing praises to God; that they sometimes manifest a deep veneration and respect for good men and show them favor and do many things for them which they would not do did they not feel so deep a respect, veneration and affection for them. Of these and many like things many impenitent sinners are often conscious. They are also often conscious of feeling no opposition to revivals, but on the contrary that they rejoice in them and feel desirous that they should prosper and hope that they shall be themselves converted. They are conscious of feeling deep veneration and respect and even affection for those ministers who are the agents in the hand of God of carrying them forward. To this class of sinners it is a snare and a stumbling block to tell them and insist that they only hate God and christians and ministers and revivals, and to represent their moral depravity to be such that they crave sin as they crave food, and that they necessarily have none but *feelings* of mortal enmity against God. None of these things are true, and *this class of sinners* know that they are not true. Such representations either drive them into infidelity on the one hand or to think themselves christians on the other. But those theologians who hold the views of constitutional depravity of which we have spoken, can not consistently with their theory admit to these sinners the real truth, and then show them conclusively that in all their feelings which they call good, and in all their yielding to be influenced by them there is no virtue; that their desires and feelings have in themselves no moral character, and that when they yield the will to their control, it is only selfishness.

The thing needed is a philosophy and a theology that will admit and explain all the phenomena of experience and not deny human consciousness. A theology that denies human

consciousness is only a curse and a stumbling block. But such is the doctrine of universal constitutional moral depravity.

It is frequently true that the feelings of sinners become exceedingly rebellious and exasperated, and they feel the most intense opposition of feeling toward God and Christ and ministers and revivals and toward every thing of good report. If this class of sinners are converted they are very apt to suppose and to represent all sinners as having just such feelings as they had. But this is a mistake, for many sinners never had those feelings. Nevertheless they are no less selfish and guilty than the class who have the rebellious and blasphemous feelings which I have mentioned. This is what they need to know. They need to understand definitely what sin is and what it is not; that sin is selfishness; that selfishness is the yielding of the will to the control of feeling, and that it matters not at all what the particular class of feelings is, if feelings and not intelligence controls the will. Admit their good feelings as they call them and take pains to show them that these feelings are merely constitutional and have in themselves no moral character. If they plead, as they often will, that they not only feel but that they act out their feelings and give themselves up to be controlled by them, then show them that this is only selfishness changing its form, and the will consenting for the time to seek the gratification of this class of feelings because they are for the time being, the most importunate and influential with the will; that as soon as another class of feelings come in play they will go over to their indulgence and leave God and religion uncared for.

The ideas of depravity and of regeneration to which I have often alluded are fraught with great mischief in another respect. Great numbers, it is to be feared, both of private professors of religion and of ministers have mistaken the class of feelings of which I have spoken as common among certain impenitent sinners, for religion. They have heard the usual representations of the natural depravity of sinners and also have heard certain desires and feelings represented as religion. They are conscious of these desires and feelings, and also, sometimes when they are very strong, of being influenced in their conduct by them. They assume, therefore, that they are regenerate, and elected, and heirs of salvation. To be sure they are conscious that they often have feelings of great attachment to the world and various classes of feeling very inconsistent with their religious feelings as they call

them; and that when these feelings are in exercise they also yield to them and give themselves up to their control. But this they are taught to think is common to all christians; that all christians have much indwelling sin, are much of their time entirely out of the way and never altogether right even for a moment, that they never feel so much as they are capable of feeling and often feel the opposite of what they ought to feel. These views lull them asleep. The philosophy and theology that misrepresents moral depravity and regeneration must, if consistent, also misrepresent true religion; and O, the many thousands that have mistaken the mere constitutional desires and feelings and the selfish yielding of the will to their control, for true religion, and have gone to the bar of God with a lie in their right hand.

It is a mournful and even a heart rending fact that very much that passes current for christian experience is not and can not be an experience peculiar at all to christians. It is common to both saints and sinners. It is merely the natural and necessary result of the human constitution under certain circumstances. Let no man deceive himself and think more highly of himself than he ought to think.

5. Another great evil has arisen out of the false views. I have been exposing, namely:

Many true christians have been much stumbled and kept in bondage, and their comfort and their usefulness much abridged by finding themselves from time to time very languid and unfeeling. Supposing religion to consist in feeling, if at any time the excitability of the sensibility becomes exhausted and their feelings subside, they are immediately thrown into unbelief and bondage. Satan reproaches them for their want of feeling and they have nothing to say only to admit the truth of his accusations. Having a false philosophy of religion they judge of the state of their hearts by the state of their feelings. They confound their hearts with their feelings and are in almost constant perplexity to keep their hearts right; by which they mean, their feelings in a state of great excitement.

Again. They are not only sometimes languid and have no sensible sensations and desires, but at others they are conscious of classes of emotions which they call sin. These they resist, but still blame themselves for having them in their hearts, as they say. Thus they are brought into bondage again, although they are certain that these feelings are hated and not at all indulged by them.

Oh, how much all classes of persons need to have clearly defined ideas of what really constitutes sin and holiness. A false philosophy of the mind, and especially of the will and of moral depravity, has covered the world with gross darkness on the subject of sin and holiness, of regeneration, and of the evidences of regeneration, until the true saints on the one hand are kept in a continual bondage to their false notions, and on the other the church swarms with unconverted professors, and is cursed with many deceived ministers.

LECTURE XLII.

REGENERATION.

III. WHEREIN SAINTS AND SINNERS OR DECEIVED PROFESSORS MUST DIFFER.

In discussing this branch of the subject, I will,

I. Make several prefatory remarks.

II. Point out the prominent characteristics of both.

1. Prefatory remarks.

(1.) The Bible represents all mankind as belonging to two and but two great classes, saints and sinners. All regenerate souls, whatever their attainments are, it includes in the first class. All unregenerate persons, whatever be their profession, possessions, gifts or station, it includes among sinners.

(2.) The Bible represents the difference between these two classes as radical, fundamental and complete. The Bible does not recognize the impenitent as having any goodness in them, but uniformly as being dead in trespasses and in sins. It represents the saints as being dead to sin, and alive to God, as sanctified persons, and often speaks in so strong language as almost compels us to understand it as denying that the saints sin at all, or to conclude that sinning at all proves that one is not a saint. It does take the unqualified ground that no one is a saint who lives in or indulges any sin.

(3.) The Bible represents the difference between saints and sinners as very manifest and as appearing abundantly in their lives. It requires us to judge all men by their fruits. It gives us both the fruits of regeneration and of an unregenerate state, and is exceedingly specific and plain upon this subject.

(4.) In treating this question I shall endeavor not to forget that I am inquiring after the *evidences of regeneration*, and that I am to speak not of high and rare attainments in piety, but of its beginnings, and of those things that must exist and appear where there is even the commencement of true holiness.

2. I will point out the prominent characteristics of both saints and sinners.

(1.) Let it be distinctly remembered that unregenerate persons all without exception have one heart, that is, they are selfish. This is their whole character. They are universally and only devoted to self-interest or self-gratification. Their unregenerate heart consists in this selfish disposition, or in

this selfish choice. This choice is the foundation of, and the reason for all their activity. They do all that they do and omit all that they omit, for one and the same reason, and that is to gratify either directly or indirectly, either presently or remotely, themselves.

The regenerate heart is disinterested benevolence. In other words it is love to God and our neighbor. All regenerate hearts are precisely similar. All true saints, whenever they have truly the heart of saints of God, are actuated by one and the same motive. They have only one ultimate reason for all they do, and are, and suffer, or omit. They have one ultimate intention, one end. They live for one and the same object, and that is the same end for which God lives.

Now the thing after which we are inquiring is what must be the necessary developments and manifestations of these opposite states of mind. These opposite states are supreme and opposite and ultimate choices. They are states of supreme devotion to ultimate and opposite ends. In whatever they do, the saint, if he acts as a saint, and the sinner, have directly opposite ends in view. They do, or omit what they do, for entirely different and opposite ultimate reasons. Although, as we have seen, in many things their opposite ends may lead them to attempt to secure them by similar means, and may therefore often lead to the same outward life in many respects, yet it is always true that even when they act outwardly alike, they have inwardly entirely different ultimate reasons for their conduct. As it often happens that the saint in pursuing the highest good of being in general as an end, finds it necessary to do many things which the sinner may do to secure his selfish end; and as it often happens that the sinner in his endeavors to compass his selfish end, finds it necessary to use the same outward means that the saint does in his efforts to secure his end, it requires not unfrequently a good degree of candor and of discrimination to distinguish between them. And as saints and sinners possess the same or similar constitutions and constitutional propensities, their desires and feelings are often so much alike as to embarrass the superficial inquirer after their true spiritual state. As has been said, the sinner often in seasons of strong religious excitement, not only has desires and feelings resulting from the laws of his constitution similar to those that are experienced by the saints, but he also for the time being gives up his will to follow these impulses. In this case it requires the nicest discrimination to distinguish between the saint and the sinner; for at such

times they not only feel alike but they also act alike. The difficulty in such cases is to distinguish between the action of a will that obeys the intelligence and one that obeys a class of feelings that are so nearly in harmony with the dictates of the intelligence. To distinguish in such cases between that which proceeds from feeling and that which proceeds from the intelligence requires no slight degree of attention and discrimination. One needs to be a close observer and no tyro in mental philosophy to make just discriminations in cases of this kind.

Let it be understood that the fundamental difference between saints and sinners does not consist in the fact that one has a sinful nature and the other has not, for neither of them has a sinful nature.

(2.) Nor does it consist in the fact that the saint has had a physical regeneration and therefore possesses some element of constitution which the sinner has not.

(3.) Nor does it consist in this, that saints are aiming or intending to do right while sinners are aiming and intending to do wrong. The saint loves God and his neighbor, that is, chooses or intends their highest good for its own sake. This choice or intention is *right*, though *right is not the thing intended*. The good, that is, the valuable to being, and not the right, is that upon which the intention terminates. The sinner chooses his own gratification as an end. This choice or intention is wrong, but wrong is not the end chosen or the thing upon which the intention terminates. They are both choosing what they regard as valuable. The saint chooses the good of being *impartially*. That is, he chooses the highest good of being in general for its own sake and lays no greater stress upon his own than is dictated by the law of his own intelligence. His duty is to will the greatest amount of good to being in general, and promote the greatest amount of good within his power. From the relation of things every one's own highest well-being is committed to his particular keeping and promotion in a higher sense than that of his neighbor is. Next to his own well-being that of his own family and kindred is committed to his particular keeping and promotion in a higher sense than that of his neighbor's family and kindred. Next the interest and well-being of his immediate neighborhood and of those more immediately within the sphere of his influence, is committed to his keeping and promotion. Thus while all interests are to be esteemed according to their intrinsic and relative value, the law of God re-

quires that we should lay ourselves out more particularly for the promotion of those interests that lie so much within our reach that we can accomplish and secure a greater amount of good by giving our principal attention and efforts to them than could be secured by our practically treating the interests of every individual, of every family and of every neighborhood as of equal value with our own. The practical judgment of all men always was, and necessarily must be that the law of God demands that every one should see to his own soul and should provide for his own household, and that the highest good of the whole universe can best be promoted only by each individual, each family, each neighborhood, and each nation taking care to secure those interests more immediately committed to them, because more immediately within their reach. This is not selfishness if the intention is to secure the highest good of being in general, and of these particular interests as a part of the general good, and because it falls particularly to us to promote these particular interests inasmuch as their promotion is particularly within our reach. The law of God, while it demands that I should will the highest good of being in general for its own sake, and esteem every interest known to me according to its intrinsic and relative value, demands also, that as a pastor of a church, I should give my time and influence and energies more particularly to the promotion of the good of the people of my own charge. More good will upon the whole result to the world from pastors taking this course than any other. The same is true of the family relation and of all the relations of life. Our relations give us peculiar facilities for securing good, and impose on us peculiar responsibilities. Our relation to our own highest well-being imposes peculiar responsibilities on us in regard to our own souls. So of our families, neighborhoods, &c. It should be well considered then, that the precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," does not require every one to pay just the attention to his neighbor's soul that he does to his own, nor the same attention to his neighbor's children and family that he does to his own. He is bound to *esteem* his neighbor's interest according to its relative value, and to pursue his own interest and the interest of his family and neighborhood and nation in a manner not inconsistent with the interests of others, but in a manner as highly conducive to the promotion of their interests as in his judgment will upon the whole secure the greatest amount of good. If I have a life to live, and a certain amount of time

and talent and money and influence to lay out for God and souls, I am bound to use all in that manner that in my honest judgment will upon the whole secure the greatest amount of good to being. I am not, certainly, to divide the pittance of my possessions among all men of present and coming generations. Nor am I to scatter my time and talents over the face of the whole globe. But on the contrary, benevolence dictates that I should lay out my time and talents and influence and possessions where and when and in a way, in my honest estimation calculated to secure to being the greatest amount of good.

I have said thus much, as might seem, by way of episode; but in fact it is necessary for us to have these thoughts in mind when we enter upon the discussion of the question before us; to wit: What are evidences of a truly benevolent state of mind? For example; suppose we should enter upon the inquiry in question, taking along with us the assumption that true benevolence, that is, the disinterested love of God and our neighbor, implies that we should not only *esteem* but also *treat* all other interests of equal intrinsic value with our own, according to their intrinsic and relative value. I say, should we in searching after evidence of disinterested benevolence, take along with us this false assumption, where should we find any evidence of benevolence on earth? No man does or can act upon such a principle. God has never acted upon it. Christ never acted upon it. Why did God select the particular nation of the Jews and confine His revelations to them? Why did Christ preach the gospel to the Jews only, and say that he was not sent, save to the lost sheep of the house of Israel? Why has God always acted upon this principle of accomplishing the greatest practicable good? He esteems the good of all and of each of his creatures according to its intrinsic and relative value, but does good when and as He best can. If the greatest amount of ultimate good can be secured by choosing Abraham from all other men, and making him and his posterity the objects of peculiar effort and spiritual cultivation, and the depositories of the holy oracles which He intended should ultimately bless all nations, why, He does it. He exercises His own discretion in His efforts to accomplish the greatest amount of good. Good is his end and He does all the good He can. In securing this He does many things that might appear partial to those who take but a limited view of things. Just so with all truly benevolent creatures. Good is their end. In promoting it, their intelli-

gence and the law of God dictate that they should bestow their particular efforts, attention, influence, and possessions upon those particular interests and persons that will, in their judgment, result in the highest good of being in general as a whole. The whole Bible every where assumes this as the correct rule of duty. Hence it recognizes all the relations of life, and the peculiar responsibilities and duties that grow out of them, and enjoins the observance of those duties. The relation of husband and wife, of parent and child, of ruler and subject, and indeed all the relations incident to our highest well-being in this life, are expressly recognized and their corresponding obligations assumed by the inspired writers; which shows clearly that they understood the law of supreme love to God and equal love to our neighbor to imply an obligation to give particular attention to those interests which God had placed more particularly within the reach of our influence; always remembering that those interests are to be pursued impartially; that is, in consistency with the promotion of all other interests, by those to whom their promotion is particularly committed. For example: I am not to pursue my own good and that of my family or my neighborhood or my nation, in a manner inconsistent with the interests of my neighbor or his family or neighborhood or nation. But I am to seek the promotion of all the interests particularly committed to me, in harmony with, and only as making a part of the general interests of being.

Now let it be remembered that the saint is benevolent, and all his life as a saint is only the development of this one principle; or his outward and inward activity is only an effort to secure the end upon which benevolence fastens, to wit, the highest good of God and of being in general.

The sinner is selfish, all his activity is to be ascribed to an intention to secure his own gratification. Self-interest is his end. It is easy to see from what has been said that to an outward observer a benevolent saint may and often must appear to be selfish, and the selfish sinner may and will appear to be disinterested. The saint pursues his own good and the happiness and well-being of his family as a part of universal good and does it disinterestedly. The sinner pursues his own gratification, and that of his family, not as parts of universal good and disinterestedly, but as his own and as the interest of those who are regarded as parts of himself and whose interest he regards as identified with his own.

They are both busy in promoting the interests of self and

family and neighborhood &c. And the difference between them lies in their ultimate intentions or the reasons for what they do.

There is, as I have intimated, special difficulty in ascertaining, for certainty, which is the saint and which the sinner, when the sinners selfishness is directed to the securing of a heavenly and eternal interest instead of a worldly and temporal one. He may and often does aim at securing a heavenly and an eternal interest both for himself, and family, and friends. When he does this his outward manifestations are so very like those of the true saint as to render it difficult if not impossible for an observer for the time being to distinguish accurately between them.

I have *compared* the saint and the sinner in my last lecture for the purpose of showing in what respect they may be alike.

I will now in a few particulars proceed to *contrast* them that it may appear in what they differ.

1. And fundamentally they are radically opposite to each other in their ultimate choice or intention. They are supremely devoted to different and opposite ends. They live to promote those opposite ends.

2. The saint is governed by reason, the law of God or the moral law; in other words still, the law of disinterested and universal benevolence is his law. This law is not only revealed and developed in his intelligence, but it is written in his heart. So that the law of his intellect is the law of his heart. He not only sees and acknowledges what he ought to do and be, but he is conscious to himself and gives evidence to others, whether they receive it and are convinced by it or not, that his heart, his will or intention, is conformed to his convictions of duty. He sees the path of duty and follows it. He knows what he ought to will, intend and do, and does it. Of this he is conscious. And of this others may be satisfied if they are observing, charitable, and candid.

3. The sinner is right over against this in the most important and fundamental respects. He is not governed by reason and principle, but by feeling, desire, and impulse. Sometimes his feelings coincide with the intelligence, and sometimes they do not. But when they do so coincide, the will does not pursue the course it does out of respect or in obedience to the law of the intelligence, but in obedience to the impulse of the sensibility which for the time being impels in the same direction as does the law of the reason. But for the

most part the impulses of the sensibility incline him to worldly gratifications and in an opposite direction to that which the intelligence points out. This leads him to a course of life that is too manifestly the opposite of reason to leave any room for doubt as to what his true character is.

But he also has the law revealed in his intelligence. His head is right, but his heart is wrong. He knows what he ought to do and will and be, but he is conscious that his heart does not obey his reason. He is conscious that the law is in his intelligence but is not written in his heart. He knows that he is not in heart what he necessarily affirms that he ought to be. He knows that he is *habitually* selfish and not disinterestedly benevolent. Sometimes, as has been said, during seasons of special religious excitement when his sensibility and intelligence impel in the same direction, he thinks his heart and his head agree; that he is what he knows he ought to be; that the law is written in his heart. But as soon as this excitement subsides he sees or may see that it was not his intelligence but his sensibility that governed his will; that in the absence of religious excitement his intelligence has no control of his will; that he is governed by impulse and not by principle. This will also be manifest to others. If during religious excitement they have hoped too well of him, as soon as and in proportion as excitement ceases, they will clearly see that it was the impulse of feeling and not the law of the intelligence that governed him. They will soon clearly see that he has not and had not the root of the matter in him; that his religion was founded in the effervescence of the ever varying sensibility and not in the stable demands of his reason and conscience. As excitement waxes and wanes he will be ever fluctuating. Sometimes quite zealous and active and talkative, full of feeling, he will have the appearance of possessing most of the phases of christian character in a state of freshness and beauty. And anon his religious excitement ceases. His tongue is silent on religious subjects. His zeal abates apace. His attendance at the prayer and conference meeting is interrupted and finally ceases. A worldly excitement takes possession of his sensibility. His will is carried of course. Politics, business, amusement, no matter what, is for the time being his exciting topic, he is carried away with it, and remains in this state carried hither and thither by worldly engrossments until another religious excitement renews and confirms his delusion and that of his friends, who look upon him as a real christian but prone to backsliding.

4. The true saint is distinguished by his firm adherence to all the principles and rules of the Divine government. He is a reformer from principle, and needs not the gale of popular excitement or of popular applause to put and keep him in motion. His intellect and conscience have taken the control of his will, or the will has renounced the impulses of the sensibility as its law, and voluntarily committed itself to the demands of the reason. This fact must appear both on the field of his own consciousness, and also in most instances be very manifest to others. His zeal does not wax and wane with every breeze of excitement. He is not carried away by every change in the effervescing sensibility. The law of reason being written in his heart, he does not at one time appear reasonable and to be influenced by conscience and a regard to the law of love, and at another to be infinitely unreasonable and to have little or no regard to God or his laws. He fears and shuns popular excitements as he does all other temptations. He loaths and resists them. The excitements of politics and business and amusements, are regarded by him with a jealous eye. He dreads their influence on his sensibility, and when he feels them, it causes a deep struggle and groaning of spirit, because the will, adhering to the law of conscience, steadfastly resists them. Such like excitements instead of being his element and the aliment of his life, are a grief and a vexation to him. Instead of living, and moving, and having his being as it were in the midst of them and by them, he is only annoyed by them. They are not the moving spring of his activity, but only embarrass his spiritual life. His spiritual life is founded in the law of the intelligence, and supported by the light of the Holy Spirit poured upon his intellect through the truth. He steadily resists the flood tides of mere feeling on every subject and abides by truth and principle and moral law whatever may be the circumstances of worldly or religious excitement around him. Be it ever remembered, it is moral law, moral principle, the law of love, and not mere feeling, that governs him.

5. The sinner or deceived professor, for they are one, is right over against this. Excitement is his element and his life. He has truly no moral principle except in theory. He is never truly influenced by truth, law, reason, but always by excitement of some kind. His activity is based on this; hence he is not disturbed and embarrassed in his movements by excitements of any kind, any longer than it takes to put down one form of excitement and take on another. If when

he is much interested and excited and carried away in one direction, a counter influence or excitement comes in his way, he is taken aback for the time being. He is disconcerted and embarrassed, perhaps displeased. But you will soon see him go about and fill away to the new excitement. Excitement is his life, and although like a ship at sea, he is thrown into temporary confusion by a sudden change of the winds and waves, so, like her whose life and activity are the breezes and the gale and the ocean wave, he readily accommodates his sails and his course to the ever changing breeze and currents of excitement in the midst of which he loves to live, and on the foaming surface of which he is borne along. If you wish to move him, you must strongly appeal to his *feelings*. Reason does not, can not govern him. 'Tis not enough to say to him, Thus saith the Lord. He will admit the right, but surely will not do it. He will not *go that way*, unless you can first make his feelings move in that direction. He holds the truth only in theory and in unrighteousness. It is not the law of his life, his heart, his warmest affections and sympathies. Present considerations to his intelligence: unless they excite his sensibility, and arouse his hopes, or fears, or feelings in some direction, you might as well attempt to change the course of the winds by your words. His imagination must be aroused and set on fire. His sensibility must be reached, enkindled. The gales of excitement must be awaked, and the mainspring of his action must be touched and directed to impel his will, before you can quicken him into life. His feelings are his law.

6. *The saint is justified*, and he has the evidence of it in the peace of his own mind. He is conscious of obeying the law of reason and of love. Consequently he naturally has that kind and degree of peace that flows from the harmony of his will with the law of his intelligence. He sometimes has conflicts with the impulses of feeling and desire. But unless he is overcome, these conflicts, though they may cause him inwardly and perhaps audibly to groan, do not interrupt his peace. There are still the elements of peace within him. His heart and conscience are at one, and while this is so, he has thus far the evidence of justification in himself. That is, he knows that God can not condemn his present state. Conscious as he is of conformity of heart to the moral law he can not but affirm to himself that the lawgiver is pleased with his present attitude. But further, he has also within the Spirit of God witnessing with his spirit that he is a child of God,

forgiven, accepted, adopted. He feels the filial spirit drawing his heart to exclaim, Father, Father. He is conscious that he pleases God and has God's smile of approbation.

He is at peace with himself because he affirms his heart to be in unison with the law of love. His conscience does not upbraid, but smile. The harmony of his own being is a witness to himself that this is the state in which he was made to exist. He is at peace with God, because he and God are pursuing precisely the same end and by the same means. There can be no collision, no controversy between them. He is at peace with the universe in the sense that he has no ill-will and no malicious feelings or wish to gratify in the injury of any one of all the creatures of God. He has no fear but to sin against God. He is not influenced on the one hand by the fear of hell, nor on the other by the hope of reward. He is not anxious about his own salvation, but prayerfully and calmly leaves that question in the hands of God and concerns himself only to promote the highest glory of God and the good of being. "Being justified by faith he has peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ." "There is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."

7. The sinner's experience is the opposite of this. He is under condemnation, and seldom can so far deceive himself, even in his most religious moods, as to imagine that he has a consciousness of acceptance either with his own conscience or with God. There is almost never a time in which he has not a greater or less degree of restlessness and misgiving within. Even when he is most engaged in religion as he supposes, he finds himself dissatisfied with himself. Something is wrong. There is a struggle and a pang. He may not exactly see where and what the difficulty is. He does not after all obey reason and conscience, and is not governed by the law and will of God. Not having the consciousness of this obedience, his conscience does not smile. He sometimes feels deeply, and acts as he feels, and is conscious of being sincere in the sense of feeling what he says and acting in obedience to deep feeling. But this does not satisfy conscience. He is more or less wretched after all. He has not true peace. Sometimes he has a self-righteous quiet and enjoyment. But this is neither peace of conscience nor peace with God. He after all feels uneasy and condemned, notwithstanding all his feeling and zeal and activity. They are not of the right kind. Hence they do not satisfy the conscience. They do not meet

the demands of his intelligence. Conscience does not approve. He has not after all true peace. He is not justified; he can not be fully and permanently satisfied that he is. He is not for any length of time satisfied with his best performance. He is conscious after all of sinning in all his holiest duties, and he is the more sure of this in proportion as he is more enlightened. He thinks to be sure that this is the universal experience of all true saints; that although neither conscience nor God is satisfied with his obedience, not even in his best frames and states, yet he thinks to be sure he has some degree of holiness and conformity to the will of God, although not enough to bring out the approbation of conscience and the smile of God upon his soul. He imagines that he has some true religion; some half-way obedience. He is a true though an imperfect saint, whose best obedience can and does satisfy neither his own sense of duty nor his God. With him, justification is a mere theory, a doctrine, an opinion, an article of faith and not a living felt reality; not an experience, but an idea, a notion, and at best a pleasing and dreamy delusion.

8. The saint has made the will of God his law, and asks for no other reason to influence his decisions and actions than that such is the will of God. He has received the will of God as the unfailing index pointing always to the path of duty. His intelligence affirms that God's will is and ought to be law or perfect evidence of what law is; and therefore he has received it as such. He therefore expects to obey it always and in all things. He makes no calculations to sin in any thing; nor in one thing more than another. He does not cast about and pick and choose among the commandments of God; professing obedience to those that are the least offensive to him, and trampling on those that call to a sterner morality and to harder self-denial. With him there are no little sins in which he expects to indulge. He no more expects to eat too much than he expects to be a drunkard; and gluttony is as much a sin as drunkenness. He no more expects to take an advantage of his neighbor than he expects to rob him on the highway. He no more designs and expects to indulge in secret than in open uncleanness. He no more expects to indulge a wanton eye than to commit adultery with his brother's wife. He no more expects to exaggerate and give a false coloring to truth than he expects and intends to commit perjury. All sin is an abomination to him. He has renounced it *ex animo*. His heart has rejected sin as sin. His heart has

embraced the will of God as his law. It has embraced the whole will of God. He waits only for a knowledge of what the will of God is. He needs not, he seeks not excitement to determine or to strengthen his will. The law of his being has come to be the will of God. A thus saith the Lord, immediately awakens from the depths of his soul the whole-hearted amen. He does not go about to plead for sin, to trim his ways so as to serve two masters. To serve God and Mammon is no part of his policy and no part of his wish. No: he is God's man, God's subject, God's child. All his sympathies are with God; and surely "his fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ." What Christ wills, he wills; what Christ rejects, he rejects.

9. But right over against this you will find the sinner or deceived professor. God's will is not his law; but his own sensibility is his law. With him it is not enough to know the will of God; he must also have his sensibility excited in that direction before he goes. He does not mean nor expect to avoid every form and degree of iniquity. His heart has not renounced sin as sin. It has not embraced the will of God from principle, and of course has not embraced the whole will of God. With him it is a small thing to commit what he calls little sins. This shows conclusively where he is. If the will of God were his law—as this is as really opposed to what he calls little as to what he calls great sins, he would not expect and intend to disobey God in one thing more than in another. He could know no little sins, since they conflict with the will of God. He goes about to pick and choose among the commandments of God, sometimes yielding an outward obedience to those that conflict least with his inclinations, and which therefore will cost him the least self-denial, but evading and disregarding those that lay the ax to the root of the tree and prohibit all selfishness. The sinner or deceived professor does not in fact seriously mean or expect wholly to obey God. He thinks that this is common to all christians. He as much expects to sin every day against God as he expects to live, and does not think this at all inconsistent with his being a real though imperfect christian. He is conscious of indulging in some sins, and that he has never repented of them and put them away, but he thinks that this also is common to all christians, and therefore it does not slay his false hope. He would much sooner indulge in gluttony than in drunkenness because the latter would more seriously affect his reputation. He would not hesitate to indulge wanton thoughts and imagina-

tions when he would not allow himself in outward licentiousness because of its bearing upon his character, and as he says, upon the cause of God. He will not hesitate to take little advantages of his neighbor, to amass a fortune in this way while he would recoil from robbing on the highway or on the high seas; for this would injure his reputation with man, and as he thinks, more surely destroy his soul. Sinners sometimes become exceedingly self-righteous and aim at what they call perfection. But unless they are very ignorant they soon become discouraged and cry out, O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? They, however, almost always satisfy themselves with a mere outward morality and that, as I have said, not descending to what they call little sins.

LECTURE XLIII.

REGENERATION.

IN WHAT SAINTS AND SINNERS DIFFER.

10. *Saints are interested in and sympathize with every effort to reform mankind and promote the interests of truth and righteousness in the earth.*

The good of being is the end for which the saint really and truly lives. This is not merely held by him as a theory, as an opinion, as a philosophical speculation. It is in his heart, and precisely for this reason he is a saint. He is a saint just because the theory which is lodged in the head of both saint and sinner has also a lodgment and a reigning power in his heart, and consequently in his life. The fact is that saints as such have no longer a wicked heart. They are "born again," "born of God," and "they can not sin, for his seed remaineth in them, so that they can not sin because they are born of God." "They have a new heart," "are new creatures," "old things are passed away, and behold all things are become new." They are holy or sanctified persons. The bible representations of the new birth forbid us to suppose that the truly regenerate have still a wicked heart. The nature of regeneration also renders it certain that the regenerate heart can not be a wicked heart. His heart or choice is fixed upon the highest good of God and the universe as an end. Moral agents are so constituted that they necessarily regard truth and righteousness as conditions of the highest good of moral agents. These being necessarily regarded by them as indispensable to the end, will and must be considered as important as the end to which they sustain the relation of indispensable conditions. As they supremely value the highest good of being, they will and must take a deep interest in whatever is promotive of that end. Hence their spirit is necessarily that of the reformer. For the universal reformation of the world they stand committed. To this end they are devoted. For this end they live and move and have their being. Every proposed reform interests them and naturally leads them to examine its claims. The fact is they are studying and devising ways and means to convert, sanctify, reform mankind. Being in this state of mind they are predisposed to lay hold on whatever gives promise of good to man. A close examination will show a remarkable difference between saints and sinners in this respect. True saints love

reform. It is their business, their profession, their life to promote it; consequently they are ready to examine the claims of any proposed reform; candid and self-denying and ready to be convinced however much self-denial it may call them to. They have actually rejected self-indulgence as the end for which they live and are ready to sacrifice any form of self-indulgence for the sake of promoting the good of men and the glory of God. It is not and can not be natural to them to be prejudiced against reform, to be apt to array themselves against or speak lightly of any proposed reform until they have thoroughly examined its claims and found it wanting in the essential attributes of true reform. The natural bearing or bias of the saint's mind is in favor of whatever proposes to do good, and instead of ridiculing reform in general or speaking lightly or censoriously of reform the exact opposite is natural to him. It is natural to him to revere reformers and to honor those who have introduced even what proved in the end not to be wholesome reforms if so be there is evidence that they were sincere and self-denying in their efforts to benefit mankind. The saint is truly and greatly desirous and in earnest to reform all sin out of the world, and just for this reason is ready to hail with joy and to try whatever reform seems, from the best light he can get, to bid fair to put down sin and the evils that are in the world. Even mistaken men who are honestly endeavoring to reform mankind, and denying their appetites, as many have done in dietetic reform, are deserving of the respect of their fellow men. Suppose their philosophy to be incorrect, yet they have intended well. They have manifested a disposition to deny themselves for the purpose of promoting the good of others. They have been honest and zealous in this. Now no true saint can feel or express contempt for such reformers however much mistaken they may be. No; his natural sentiments and feelings will be and must be the reverse of contempt or censoriousness in respect to them. If their mistake has been injurious, he may mourn over the evil, but will not, can not severely judge the honest reformer. War, slavery, licentiousness, and all such like evils and abominations are necessarily regarded by the saint as great and sore evils, and he longs for their complete and final overthrow. It is impossible that a truly benevolent mind should not thus regard these abominations of desolation. The cause of peace, the cause of anti-slavery, and that of the overthrow of licentiousness, must lie near the heart of every truly benevolent mind. I know that often sinners have a certain kind of in-

terest in these and other reforms. This will be noticed and explained in the proper place. But whatever is true of sinners under certain circumstances, it must be always true of Christians that they hail the cause of peace, of the abolition of slavery, and of the abolition of every form of sin, and of every evil, moral and physical, with joy, and can not but give them a hearty God-speed. If they see that they are advocated on wrong principles, or with a bad spirit, or by bad men, and that injurious measures are used to promote them, the saints will mourn, will be faithful in trying to find out and to proclaim a more excellent way. Do but keep in mind the fact that saints are truly benevolent, and are really and heartily consecrated to the highest good of being, and then it will surely be seen that these things must be true of real saints.

The saints in all ages have been reformers. I know it is said that neither Prophets, Christ, nor Apostles, nor primitive saints and martyrs declaimed against war and slavery, &c. But they did. The entire instructions of Christ, and of Apostles, and Prophets were directly opposed to these and all other evils. If they did not come out against certain legalized forms of sin, and denounce them by name, and endeavor to array public sentiment against them, it is plainly because they were, for the most part, employed in a preliminary work. To introduce the gospel as a Divine revelation; to set up and organize the visible kingdom of God on earth; to lay a foundation for universal reform, was rather their business than the pushing of particular branches of reform. The overthrow of state idolatry, the great and universal sin of the world in that age; the labor of getting the world and the governments of earth to tolerate and receive the gospel as a revelation from the one Only Living and True God; the controversy with the Jews to overthrow their objections to Christianity; in short the great and indispensable and preliminary work of gaining for Christ and his gospel a hearing, and an acknowledgment of its divinity, was rather their work than the pushing of particular precepts and doctrines of the gospel to their legitimate results and logical consequences. This work once done has left it for later saints to bring the particular truths, precepts, and doctrines of the blessed gospel to bear down every form of sin. Prophets, Christ, and his Apostles have left on the pages of inspiration no dubious testimony against every form of sin. The spirit of the whole Bible breathes from every page blasting and annihilation upon every unholy abomination, while it smiles upon every thing of good report

that promises blessings to man and glory to God. The saint is not merely sometimes a reformer; he is always so. He is necessarily so if he abide a saint. It is a contradiction to say that a true saint is not devoted to reform; for, as I have said, he is a true saint just because he is devoted, heart and soul and life and all, to the promotion of the good of universal being.

11. *The sinner is never a reformer in any proper sense of the word.*

He is selfish and never opposed to sin, or to any evil whatever from any such motive as renders him worthy the name of reformer. He sometimes selfishly advocates and pushes certain outward reforms; but as certain as it is that he is an unregenerate sinner, so certain is it that he is not endeavoring to reform sin out of the world from any disinterested love to God or to man. Many considerations of a selfish nature may engage him at times in certain branches of reform. Regard to his reputation may excite his zeal in such an enterprize. Self-righteous considerations may also lead him to enlist in the army of reformers. His relation to particular forms of vice may influence him to set his face against them. Constitutional temperament and tendencies may lead to his engaging in certain reforms. For example, his constitutional benevolence, as phrenologists call it, may be such that from natural compassion he may engage in reforms. But this is only giving way to an impulse of the sensibility, and it is not principle that governs him. His natural conscientiousness may modify his outward character and lead him to take hold of some branches of reform. But whatever other motives he may have, sure it is that he is not a reformer; for he is a sinner, and it is absurd to say that a sinner is truly engaged in opposing sin as sin. No, it is not *sin* that he is opposing, but he is seeking to gratify an ambitious, a self-righteous, or some other spirit, the gratification of which is selfishness.

But as a general thing it is easy to distinguish sinners, or deceived professors from saints by looking steadfastly at their temper and deportment in their relations to reform. They are self-indulgent, and sinners just for the reason that they are devoted to self-indulgence. Some times their self-indulgent spirit takes on one type and sometimes another. Of course they need not be expected to ridicule or oppose every branch of reform, just because it is not every reformer that will rebuke their favorite indulgences and call them to reform their lives. But as every sinner has one or more particular form of indul-

gence to which he is wedded, and as saints are devising and pushing reforms in all directions, it is natural that some sinners should manifest particular hostility to one reform and some to another. Whenever a reform is proposed that would reform them out of their favorite indulgences, they will either ridicule it and those that propose it, or storm and rail, or in some way oppose or wholly neglect it. Not so, and so it can not be with a true saint. He has no indulgence that he values when put in competition with the good of being. Nay, he holds his all and his life at the disposal of the highest good. Has he in ignorance of the evils growing out of his course, used ardent spirits, wine, tobacco, tea, coffee? Has he held slaves; been engaged in any traffic that is found to be injurious; has he favored war through ignorance; or in short has he committed any mistake whatever? let but a reformer come forth and propose to discuss the tendency of such things; let the reformer bring forth his strong reasons; and from the very nature of true religion, the saint will listen with attention, weigh with candor, and suffer himself to be carried by truth, heart and hand and influence with the proposed reform, if it be worthy of support, how much soever it conflict with his former habits. This must be true if he has a single eye to the good of being, which is the very characteristic of a saint.

But the sinner or deceived professor is naturally a conservative as opposed to a reformer. He says, Let *me* alone in *my* indulgences and I will let you alone in yours provided they in no way interfere with my own. Consequently he is in general disposed to distrust, to discountenance, and to ridicule reforms and those that advocate them. He is uncandid and hard to convince; will demand an express, thus saith the Lord, or what is equivalent to a demonstration of the wisdom and utility and practicability of a proposed reform. He will evince in many ways that his heart is not predisposed to reforms. He will be eagle-eyed in respect to any faults in the character or measures of the reformers; he will be eager to detect and seize upon any error in their logic and is easily displeased and repelled with their measures.

In short sinners will be almost sure to manifest a latent dislike to reforms. They will dwell much and almost exclusively upon the evils of *revivals of religion for example*; the danger of spurious excitements; of promoting fanaticism, and misrule; of encouraging false hopes; and they will in various ways manifest a disrelish for revivals of religion, but always under the pretence of a concern for the purity of the church

and the honor of God. They will be too much taken up with the evils and dangers to ever give themselves heartily to the promotion of pure revivals. They act on the defensive. They have enough to do to resist and oppose what they call evils without even trying to show a more excellent way. They in general take substantially the same course in respect to almost every branch of reformation, and especially to every reform that can touch their idols. They are so much afraid of mistakes and evils that they withhold their influence when in fact the difficulty is they have no heart to the work. The fact is, benevolence has been for thousands of years endeavoring to reform the world, and selfishness is opposing it. And often very often, under the sanctimonious garb of a concern for the honor of religion, selfishness utters its sighs and lamentations over the supposed ignorance, mistakes, fanaticism and injurious measures of those whose hearts and hands and entire being are devoted to the work.

12. Christians overcome the world. I will here introduce an extract from a discourse of my own upon this text *reported in the Oberlin Evangelist*:

“For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.”—John 5: 4.

I. What is it to overcome the world?

1. It is to get above the spirit of covetousness which possesses the men of the world. The spirit of the world is eminently the spirit of covetousness. It is a greediness after the things of the world. Some worldly men covet one thing and some another; but all classes of worldly men are living in the spirit of covetousness in some of its forms. This spirit has supreme possession of their minds.

Now the first thing in overcoming the world is, that the spirit of covetousness in respect to worldly things and objects, be overcome. The man who does not overcome this spirit of bustling and scrambling after the good which this world proffers has by no means overcome it.

2. Overcoming the world implies rising above its engrossments. When a man has overcome the world, his thoughts are no longer engrossed and swallowed up with worldly things. A man certainly does not overcome the world unless he gets above being engrossed and absorbed with its concerns.

Now we all know how exceedingly engrossed worldly men are with some form of worldly good. One is swallowed up with study; another with politics; a third with money-getting;

and a fourth perhaps with fashion and pleasure; but each in his chosen way makes earthly good the all engrossing object.

The man who gains the victory over the world must overcome not one form only of its pursuits, but every form—must overcome the world itself and all that it has to present as an allurement to the human heart.

3. Overcoming the world implies overcoming the fear of the world.

It is a mournful fact that most men, and indeed all men of worldly character have so much regard to public opinion that they dare not act according to the dictates of their consciences when acting thus would incur the popular frown. One is afraid lest his business should suffer if his course runs counter to public opinion; another fears lest if he stand up for the truth it will injure his reputation, and curiously imagines and tries to believe that advocating an unpopular truth will diminish and perhaps destroy his good influence—as if a man could exert a good influence in any possible way besides maintaining the *truth*.

Great multitudes, it must be admitted, are under this influence of fearing the world; yet some of them and perhaps many of them are not aware of this fact. If you or if they could thoroughly sound the reasons of their backwardness in duty, fear of the world would be among the chief. Their fear of the world's displeasure is so much stronger than their fear of God's displeasure that they are completely enslaved by it. Who does not know that some ministers dare not preach what they know is true, and even what they know is *important* truth, lest they should offend some whose good opinion they seek to retain? The society is weak perhaps, and the favor of some rich man in it seems indispensable to its very existence. Hence the terror of this rich man is continually before their eyes when they write a sermon, or preach, or are called to stand up in favor of any truth or cause which may be unpopular with men of more wealth than piety or conscience. Alas! this bondage to man! Too many gospel ministers are so troubled by it that their time-serving policy is virtually renouncing Christ and serving the world.

Overcoming the world is thoroughly subduing this servility to men.

4. Overcoming the world implies overcoming a state of *worldly anxiety*. You know there is a state of great carefulness and anxiety which is common and almost universal among worldly men. It is perfectly natural if the heart is set upon

securing worldly good, and has not learned to receive all good from the hand of a great Father and trust him to give or withhold with his own unerring wisdom. But he who loves the world is the enemy of God and hence can never have this filial trust in a parental Benefactor, nor the peace of soul which it imparts. Hence worldly men are almost incessantly in a fever of anxiety lest their worldly schemes should fail. They sometimes get a momentary relief when all things seem to go well: but some mishap is sure to befall them at some point soon, so that scarce a day passes that brings not with it some corroding anxiety. Their bosoms are like the troubled sea which can not rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt.

But the man who gets above the world gets above this state of ceaseless and corroding anxiety.

5. The victory under consideration implies that we cease to be enslaved and in bondage by the world in any of its forms.

There is a worldly spirit, and there is also a heavenly spirit; and one or the other exists in the heart of every man and controls his whole being. Those who are under the control of the world, of course have not overcome the world. No man overcomes the world till his heart is imbued with the spirit of heaven.

One form which the spirit of the world assumes is, being enslaved to the customs and fashions of the day.

It is marvelous to see what a goddess Fashion becomes. No heathen goddess was ever worshipped with costlier offerings, or more devout homage, or more implicit subjection. And surely no heathen deity since the world began has ever had more universal patronage. Where will you go to find the man of the world or the woman of the world who does not hasten to worship at her shrine?

But overcoming the world implies that the spirit of this goddess-worship is broken.

They who have overcome the world are no longer careful either to secure its favor or avert its frown, and the good or the ill opinion of the world is to them a small matter. "To me," said Paul, "it is a small thing to be judged of man's judgment." So of every real Christian; his care is to secure the approbation of God; this is his chief concern, to commend himself to God and to his own conscience. No man has overcome the world unless he has attained this state of mind.

Almost no feature of Christian character is more striking or more decisive than this,—*indifference to the opinions of the world.*

Since I have been in the ministry I have been blessed with the acquaintance of some men who were peculiarly distinguished by this quality of character. Some of you may have known Rev. James Patterson, late of Philadelphia. If so, you know him to have been eminently distinguished in this respect. He seemed to have the least possible disposition to secure the applause of men or to avoid their censure. It seemed to be of no consequence to him to commend himself to men. For him it was enough if he might please God.

Hence you were sure to find him in everlasting war against sin, all sin, however popular, however entrenched by custom or sustained by wealth, or public opinion. Yet he always opposed sin with a most remarkable spirit—a spirit of inflexible decision and yet of great mellowness and tenderness. While he was saying the most severe things in the most severe language you might see the big tears rolling down his cheeks.

It is wonderful that most men never complained of his having a bad spirit. Much as they dreaded his rebuke and writhed under his strong and daring exposures of wickedness, they could never say that Father Patterson had any other than a good spirit. This was a most beautiful and striking exemplification of having overcome the world.

Men who are not thus dead to the world have not escaped its bondage. The victorious Christian is in a state where he is no longer in bondage to man. He is *bound* only to serve God.

II. We must enquire *Who are those that overcome the world?*

Our text gives the ready answer. "Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world." You cannot fail to observe that this is a universal proposition,—all who are born of God overcome the world—all these, and it is obviously implied—none others. You may know who are born of God by this characteristic—they overcome the world. Of course the second question is answered.

III. Our next question is, *Why do believers overcome the world? On what principle is this result effected?*

I answer, this victory over the world results as naturally from the spiritual or heavenly birth as coming into bondage to the world results from the natural birth.

It may be well to revert a moment to the law of connection in the latter case, namely: between coming into the world by natural birth and bondage to the world. This law obviously admits of a philosophical explanation, at once simple and pal-

pable to every one's observation. Natural birth reveals to the mind objects of sense and these only. It brings the mind into contact with worldly things. Of course it is natural that the mind should become deeply interested in these objects thus presented through its external senses, especially as most of them sustain so intimate a relation to our sentient nature and become the first and chief sources of our happiness.

Hence our affections are gradually entwined around these objects and we become thoroughly lovers of this world ere our eyes have been opened upon it many months.

Now alongside of this universal fact let another be placed of equal importance and not less universal, namely, that those intuitive powers of the mind which were created to take cognizance of our moral relations, and hence to counteract the too great influence of worldly objects, come into action very slowly, and are not developed so as to act vigorously until years are numbered as months are in the case of the external organs of sense. The very early and vigorous development of the latter brings the soul so entirely under the control of worldly objects that when the reason and the conscience come to speak, their voice is little heeded. As a matter of fact we find it universally true that unless divine power interpose, the bondage to the world thus induced upon the soul is never broken.

But the point which I particularly desired to elucidate was simply this, that natural birth with its attendant laws of physical and mental development becomes the occasion of bondage to this world.

Right over against this, lies the birth into the kingdom of God by the Spirit. By this the soul is brought into new relations, we might rather say, into intimate contact with spiritual things. The Spirit of God seems to usher the soul into the spiritual world, in a manner strictly analogous to the result of the natural birth upon our physical being. The great truths of the spiritual world are opened to our view through the illumination of the Spirit of God; we seem to see with new eyes, and to have a new world of spiritual objects around us.

As in regard to natural objects, men not only speculate about them, but *realize* them; so in the case of spiritual children do spiritual things become not merely matters of speculation, but of full and practical *realization* also. When God reveals himself to the mind, spiritual things are seen in their real light, and make the impression of realities.

Consequently, when spiritual objects are thus revealed to the mind, and thus apprehended, they will supremely interest that mind. Such is our mental constitution that the truth of God when thoroughly apprehended cannot fail to interest us. If these truths were clearly revealed to the wickedest man on earth, so that he should apprehend them as realities, it could not fail to rouse up his soul to most intense action. He might hate the light, and might stubbornly resist the claims of God upon his heart, but he could not fail to feel a thrilling interest in truths that so take hold of the great and vital things of human well being.

Let me ask, Is there a sinner in this house, or can there be a sinner on this wide earth, who does not see that if God's presence were made as manifest and as real to his mind as the presence of his fellow men, it would supremely engross his soul even though it might not subdue his heart?

This revelation of God's presence and character might not convert him, but it would, at least for the time being, kill his attention to the world.

You often see this in the case of persons deeply convicted; you have doubtless seen persons so fearfully convicted of sin, that they cared nothing at all for their food nor their dress. O, they cried out in the agony of their souls, what matter all these things to us, if we even get them all, and then must lie down in hell!

But these thrilling and all-absorbing convictions do not necessarily convert the soul, and I have alluded to them here only to show the controlling power of realizing views of divine truth.

When regeneration has taken place, and the soul is born of God, then realizing views of truth not only awaken interest, as they might do in an unrenewed mind, but they also tend to excite a deep and ardent love for these truths. They draw out the heart. Spiritual truth now takes possession of his mind, and draws him into its warm and life-giving embrace. Before, error, falsehood, death, had drawn him under their power; now the Spirit of God draws him into the very embrace of God. Now he is begotten of God, and breathes the spirit of sonship. Now, according to the Bible, "the seed of God remaineth in him," that very truth, and those movings of the spirit which gave him birth into the kingdom of God, continue still in power upon his mind, and hence he continues a Christian, and as the Bible states it, "he cannot sin, because he is born of God." The seed of God is in him, and the fruit

of it brings his soul deeply into sympathy with his own Father in heaven.

Again, the first birth makes us acquainted with earthly things, the second with God; the first with the finite, and the second with the infinite; the first with things correlated with our animal nature, the second with those great things which stand connected with our spiritual nature, things so lovely, and so glorious as to overcome all the ensnarements of the world.

Again, the first begets a worldly, and the second a heavenly temper; under the first, the mind is brought into a snare—under the second, it is delivered from that snare. Under the first, the conversation is earthly—under the second “our conversation is in heaven.” * * * *

He who does not habitually overcome the world, is not born of God. In saying this I do not intend to affirm that a true Christian may not sometimes be overcome by sin; but I do affirm that overcoming the world is the general rule, and falling into sin is only the exception. This is the least that can be meant by the language of our text, and by similar declarations which often occur in the bible. Just as in the passage—“He that is born of God doth not commit sin, and he can not sin because he is born of God;”—nothing less can be meant than this,—that he can not sin uniformly—can not make sinning his business, and can sin, if at all, only occasionally and aside from the general current of his life. In the same manner we should say of a man who is in general truthful that he is not a liar.

I will not contend for more than this respecting either of these passages; but for so much as this I must contend, that the new-born souls here spoken of *do in general overcome* the world. The general fact respecting them is that they do not sin and are not in bondage to Satan. The affirmations of Scripture respecting them, must at least embrace their general character.

What is a religion good for that does not overcome the world? What is the benefit of being born into such a religion, if it leave the world still swaying its dominion over our hearts? What avails a new birth which after all fails to bring us into a likeness to God, into the sympathies of his family and of his kingdom, which leaves us still in bondage to the world and to Satan? What can there be of such a religion more than the name? With what reason can any man suppose that such a religion fits his soul for heaven, supposing it leaves him earthly-minded, sensual and selfish?

We see why it is that infidels have proclaimed the gospel of Christ to be a failure. You may not be aware that of late infidels have taken the ground that the gospel of Christ is a failure. They maintain that it professes to bring men out from the world, but fails to do so; and hence is manifestly a failure. Now you must observe that the bible does indeed affirm, as infidels say, that those who are truly born of God do overcome the world. This we can not deny and we should not wish to deny it. Now if the infidel can show that the new birth fails to produce this result, he has carried his point, and we must yield ours. This is perfectly plain, and there can be no escape for us.

But the infidel is in fault in his premises. He assumes the current christianity of the age as a specimen of real religion, and builds his estimate upon this. He proves, as he thinks, and perhaps truly proves that the current christianity does not overcome the world.

We must demur to his assuming this current christianity as real religion. For this religion of the mass of nominal professors does not answer the descriptions given of true piety in the word of God. And moreover, if this current type of religion were all that the gospel and the Divine Spirit can do for lost man, then we might as well give up the point in controversy with the infidel; for such a religion could not give us much evidence of having come from God, and would be of very little value to man;—so little as scarcely to be worth contending for. Truly if we must take the professedly christian world as bible christians, who would not be ashamed and confounded in attempting to confront the infidel? We know but too well that the great mass of professed christians do not overcome the world, and we should be confounded quickly if we were to maintain that they do. Those professed christians themselves know that they do not overcome the world. Of course they could not testify concerning themselves that in their own case the power of the gospel is exemplified.

In view of facts like these, I have often been astonished to see ministers setting themselves to persuade their people that they are truly converted, trying to lull their fears and sustain their tottering hopes. Vain effort! Those same ministers, it would seem, must know that they themselves do not overcome the world, and equally well must they know that their people do not. How fatal then to the soul must be such efforts to “heal the hurt of God’s professed people slightly; crying peace, peace, when there is no peace!”

Let us sift this matter to the bottom, pushing the inquiry—Do the great mass of professed christians really overcome the world? It is a fact beyond question that with them the things of the world are realities, and the things of God are mere theories. Who does not know that this is the real state of great multitudes in the nominal church?

Let the searching inquiry run through this congregation—What are those things that set your soul on fire—that stir up your warmest emotions and deeply agitate your nervous system? Are these the things of earth, or the things of heaven? the things of time, or the things of eternity? the things of self, or the things of God?

How is it when you go into your closets?—do you go there to seek and to find God? Do you in fact find there a present God, and do you hold communion there as friend with friend? How is this?

Now you certainly should know that if your state is such that spiritual things are mere theories and speculations, you are altogether worldly and nothing more. It would be egregious folly and falsehood to call you spiritual-minded, and for you to think yourselves spiritual would be the most fatal and foolish self-deception. You give none of the appropriate proofs of being born of God. Your state is not that of one who is personally acquainted with God, and who loves him personally with supreme affection.

Until we can put away from the minds of men the common error that the current Christianity of the church is true Christianity, we can make but little progress in converting the world. For in the first place we can not save the church itself from bondage to the world in this life, nor from the direst doom of the hypocrite in the next. We can not unite and arm the church in vigorous onset upon Satan's kingdom so that the world may be converted to God. We cannot even convince intelligent men of the world that our religion is from God, and brings to fallen men a remedy for their depravity. For if the common Christianity of the age is the best that can be, and this does not give men the victory over the world, what is it good for? And if it is really of little worth or none, how can we hope to make thinking men prize it as of great value?

There are but very few infidels who are as much in the dark as they profess to be on these points. There are very few of that class of men who are not acquainted with some humble Christians, whose lives commend Christianity and

condemn their own ungodliness. Of course they know the truth, that there is a reality in the religion of the Bible, and they blind their own eyes selfishly and most foolishly when they try to believe that the religion of the Bible is a failure and that the Bible is therefore a fabrication. Deep in their heart lies the conviction that here and there are men who are real Christians, who overcome the world and live by a faith unknown to themselves. In how many cases does God set some burning examples of Christian life before those wicked, skeptical men, to rebuke them for their sin and their scepticism—perhaps their own wife or their children—their neighbors or their servants. By such means the truth is lodged in their mind, and God has a witness for himself in their consciences.”

13. But the sinner does not overcome the world. The world in some form overcomes him. Its cares engrossments, pleasures, business, politics influence, in some form are his master. Nor does he escape from its dominion over his heart if he resorts to a nunnery or a monastery, or betakes himself to the life of an ascetic or of a recluse and shuts himself out from human society. The world is still his master and holds him in a state of banishment from its domain. Many think they have overcome the world merely because the world has so completely overcome them. It is so completely their master as to force them to back out of it, to hide themselves from it. They have not got the world under their feet, but it has got them into banishment from that field of labor and of usefulness where God and reason called them to labor. The world has prevailed to rout them from their strong hold in Christ and drive them to take refuge in monasteries, nunneries, and in caves and dens of the earth. What an infinite mistake to suppose that this is overcoming the world! To forsake our field of labor, to give over our work, to let the world of sinners go down to hell and go ourselves into exile from the world, or at the bidding of the world, be driven completely from the battle field and hide in caves and dens and proclaim ourselves the victors when in fact we have fled before and unbelievably succumbed to the enemy instead of subduing and overcoming him by faith.

But in general. Sinners do not betake themselves to flight in this way, but abide in the world and tamely submit to wear its chains. Let it be distinctly understood that the true difference between saints and sinners is that while they both live in the world, both mingle in its scenes and engage in its af-

fairs, both have families or not, as the case may be, both provide for the body, cultivate the soil, or follow some occupation the saint has not a worldly selfish end in view. He is not enslaved by the world, but his heart is steadfast serving the Lord. Whatever he does he does it, not for some selfish end, but for God. Does he provide for himself and his family; he does it as a service rendered to God. He regards himself as the the Lord's and not his own. He regards himself as the Lord's steward and in whatever employment he is engaged, he accounts it the Lord's business and himself as the Lord's servant in transacting it. He is not his own. He has no business of his own. The world is not his. Nor is he the world's. He does not bow down to it nor serve it. He has been chosen out of the world, and therefore while employed by his master in it, he does all, not for self, but for God.

Not so with the sinner. He counts his business his own. Hence he is full of cares and anxieties. The losses in business are his losses, and the profits are his profits. Living and transacting business for the Lord is only a theory with him. The practical fact with him is that he is in bondage to the world. He serves the world or rather he serves himself of the world. The world he serves as a means of self-gratification. The saint serves God of or with the world; the sinner, himself. The saint uses the world as not abusing it. The sinner abuses it and uses it to gratify his own lusts. The saint overcomes the world because he uses it for God. The sinner is overcome by the world because he uses it for himself.

12. *The true saint overcomes the flesh.* This term is sometimes used in the gospel to signify the sensibility as distinguished from the intelligence, and at other times in a more literal sense and signifies the bodily appetites and passions. The true saint is represented in the Bible as one who overcomes both his bodily appetites and passions, and also as overcoming the flesh in the still wider sense of the sensibility. "*This I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye can not do the things that ye would. But if ye be led by the Spirit ye are not under the law. Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like: of the which I tell you before as I have also told you in time past*"

that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God. But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance: against such there is no law. And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts."—Gal. 5: 16—24. "What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we should walk in newness of life."—Ro. 6: 1—4. "There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit. For to be carnally minded *is* death; but to be spiritually minded *is* life and peace. Because the carnal mind *is* enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh can not please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body ye shall live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God."—Ro. 8: 1—14. With the saint it is not merely acknowledged to be a duty to overcome the flesh, but he actually does overcome, and he is a saint just because he is delivered from the bondage of the flesh and introduced into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Saints no longer mind or obey the flesh. Their God is not their

belly nor do they mind earthly things. This is the uniform representation of scripture respecting them. They are not the slaves of appetite, or passion, or lust, under any form, but they are the Lord's freemen. This is not only the representation of scripture but must of course be true from the nature of regeneration. Regeneration consists, let it be remembered, in the will's ceasing to be governed by the propensities of the flesh and committing itself to the good of being. If the Bible did not represent the regenerate as overcoming the world and the flesh, it would not only be inconsistent with itself, but also with matter of fact. It would not in such case recognize the nature of regeneration. We are now considering, not what is true of the mass of *professing* Christians, but what is and must be true of real saints. Of them it must be true that they do overcome the world and the flesh. While they live in the flesh they walk not after the flesh, for if they did they would not be saints. What is a religion worth that does not as a matter of fact overcome the flesh? The dominion of the flesh is sin, and does not the new birth imply a turning away from sin? Let it be forever understood that regeneration implies, not merely the conviction and the theory that the flesh ought to be overcome, but that it actually is overcome. The regenerate "do not sow to the flesh;" "do not live after the flesh;" "do not mind the flesh;" "do not war after the flesh;" "have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts;" "through the Spirit do mortify, (kill) the deeds of the body;" "keep under their bodies and bring them into subjection." This not only ought to be, but it must be the character of a true saint.

13. The sinner is overcome by the flesh. Self-indulgence is his law. Some one, or more, of the phrenological or constitutional impulses always controls his will. He not only "lives in the flesh, but walks after the flesh." He "fulfils the desires of the flesh and of the mind." He is "carried away with his own lusts and enticed." "His god is his belly" and "he minds earthly things." He "is in bondage to the flesh." This is his unfailing characteristic, that he is governed, not by the law of God, but by his own desires. He is the creature of impulse, and a sinner just because he is so. With him to conquer the flesh is matter of duty, of opinion, of theory, and not of actual performance and experience. He holds that he ought to overcome, but knows that he does not. He acknowledges the obligation in theory, but denies it in practice. He knows what he ought to do, but does it not. He knows what

a christian ought to be, but is aware that he is not what a christian ought to be. There seems to be an infatuation among sinners, those especially that profess to be christians. They can profess to be christians and yet know and acknowledge that they are not what christians ought to be, strangely assuming that a man can be and is a christian who is not what a christian ought to be: in other words that he can be a christian without possessing just that which constitutes a christian, to wit: a heart conformed to the intellect's apprehension of duty. This is just what makes a christian; not his seeing and acknowledging what he ought to be, but his actually doing his duty, his actually embracing and conforming to the truth. The deceived professor knows that he is not free, that he is in bondage to his flesh and his desires, but hopes on because he thinks that this is common to all christians. He sees and approves the truth and often resolves to overcome his flesh, but as in the seventh of Romans he "finds a law in his members warring against the law of his mind and bringing him into captivity to the law of sin in his members." He can resolve but does not carry out his resolves. When he resolves to do good evil is present with him and conquers him. Of all this he is conscious, but he has taken up the fatal delusion that this was Paul's experience at the time he wrote this chapter and consequently that it must be the experience of all christians. He does not run his eye along into the eighth chapter and see the contrast between the experience there portrayed and affirmed to be the experience of all christians. He does not observe that the apostle is designing in these two chapters to contrast a christian with a legal and self-righteous experience, but holds on to his delusion and observes not that the apostle begins the eighth chapter by the affirmation that all who are in Christ Jesus are delivered from the bondage of which he was speaking in the seventh chapter and no longer walk after the flesh but after the Spirit; that the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has actually made them free from the law of sin and death which is in their members. How infinitely strange that these chapters are so misunderstood and perverted. And how monstrous and how melancholy the fact that the great mass of professing christians to this day recognize the seventh and not the eighth chapter of Romans as their own experience! According to this the new birth or regeneration does not break the power of the propensities over the will. The truth is and must not be disguised that they have not any just idea

of regeneration. They mistake conviction for regeneration. They are so enlightened as to perceive and affirm their obligation to deny the flesh, and often resolve to do it, but in fact do it not. They only struggle with the flesh, but are continually worsted and brought into bondage; and this they call a regenerate state. O sad. What then is regeneration good for? What does it avail? The bible represents regeneration as a "being born from above," "being born of God," and expressly affirms that "whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world," and affirms that "whosoever is born of God does not commit sin and can not sin because his seed (God's seed) remaineth in him so that he can not sin because he is born of God;" "that he is a new creature, that old things are passed away and that all things are become new;" "that he is alive from the dead;" that he has "crucified the flesh with its affections and lust;" that "he is dead to sin and alive unto God," and many such like representations: and yet infinitely strange to tell, the seventh chapter of Romans is recognized as a christian experience in the face of the whole bible and in opposition to the very nature of regeneration and the experience of every true saint. The sinner is a sinner just and only because he knows his duty and does it not. He apprehends the law of the intelligence, but minds the impulses of his sensibility. This is the very character which the apostle is so graphically portraying in the seventh chapter of Romans. He could not possibly have given a more graphic picture of a sinner when he is enlightened and yet enslaved by his propensities. It is a full length portrait of a sinner enlightened and struggling for liberty, and yet continually falling and floundering under the galling bondage of his own lusts. And that this should be considered the experience of a regenerate heart! O horrible! How many thousands of souls have been blinded by this delusion and gone down to hell! And what is worse still, commentators and many ministers, because this is their own experience, are still holding fast to and inculcating this delusion.

Now let it be remembered that just the difference between saints and sinners, and especially deceived professors, is expressed and clearly illustrated in the seventh and eighth chapters of Romans; and to do this was the very design of the writer of this epistle. The difference consists in just this: They both see what they ought to do; the one does it in fact, while the other only resolves to do it but does it not. They both have bodies and both have all the constitutional propen-

sities. But the saint overcomes them all. He has the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Through him he is delivered from the body of sin and of death and made free from the law of sin in his members. He is a conqueror and more than a conqueror. The sinner only cries out, O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? But he can not add, "I thank God through Jesus Christ my Lord," I am delivered, which is the evident meaning of the apostle, as appears from what immediately follows in the beginning of the eighth chapter. The sinner sees his captivity and groans under it, but does not escape. They are both tempted. The saint overcomes through Christ. The sinner is overcome. The sinner is conquered instead of being like the saint a conqueror. He can not exultingly say with the saint. "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death," but still complains with the captive, "I see a law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am!"

LECTURE XLIV.

REGENERATION.

WHEREIN SAINTS AND SINNERS DIFFER.

15. *The saints overcome Satan.*

This is expressly taught in the scriptures. "I write unto you fathers, because ye have known him *that is* from the beginning. I write unto you young men, because ye have overcome the wicked one. I write unto you, little children, because ye have known the Father."—1 John 2: 13. The wicked are characterized as the "children of the devil;" "as led by him captive at his will," "as being the subjects of Satan, the god of this world," and as having Satan ruling in their hearts.

But the saints are represented as being set at liberty from his power, as being delivered, not from his temptations, but actually saved from his dominion. The difference between the saint and the sinner in this respect is represented in the scriptures as consisting, not in the fact that sinners are tempted while saints are not, but in this, that while Satan tempts both the saint and the sinner, he actually overcomes the sinner and the deceived professor and leads him captive at his will. The true saint through faith and strength in Christ overcomes and is more than a conqueror. The saint through Christ triumphs while the sinner yields to his infernal influence and is bound fast in his infernal chain.

16. *The true saint denies himself.* Self-denial must be his characteristic just for the reason that regeneration implies this. Regeneration, as we have seen, consists in turning away the heart or will from the supreme choice of self-gratification to a choice of the highest well-being of God and of the universe. This is denying self. This is abandoning self-indulgence and pursuing or committing the will and the whole being to an opposite end. This is the dethroning of self and the enthroning of God in the heart. Self-denial does not consist, as some seem to imagine, in acts of outward austerity, in an ascetic and penance-doing course of starvation and mere legal and outward retrenchment, in wearing plain clothes and using plain language, or in wearing a coat with one button, and in similar acts of "will worship and voluntary humility and neglecting the body;" but self-denial consists in the actual and total renunciation of selfishness in the heart. It consists in ceasing wholly to live for self, and can

be exercised just as truly upon a throne surrounded with the paraphernalia of royalty as in a cottage of logs, or as in rags, and in caves and dens of the earth. The king upon his throne may live and reign to please himself. He may surround himself with all that can minister to his pleasure, his ambition, his pride, his lusts, and his power. He may live to and for himself. Self-pleasing, self-gratification, self-aggrandizement may be the end for which he lives. This is selfishness. But he may also live and reign for God and for his people. He may be just as really self-denying on his throne and surrounded by the trappings of state and of royalty as in any other station of life. That is, he may be as really devoted to God, and render this as a service to God as well as any thing else. To be sure his temptation is great; but nevertheless he may in fact be perfectly self-denying in all this. He may not do what he does for his own sake, nor be what he is, nor possess what he possesses for his own sake, but accommodating his state and equipage to his relations, he may be as truly self-denying as others in the humble walks of life. This is not an impossible, though in all probability a rare case. A man may as truly be rich for God as poor for him if his relations and circumstances make it essential to his highest usefulness that he should possess a large capital. He, to be sure, is in the way of great temptation, but if this is plainly his duty and submitted to for God and the world, he may have grace to be entirely self-denying in these circumstances, and all the more commendable for standing fast under these circumstances. So a poor man may be poor from principle or from necessity. He may be submissive and happy in his poverty. He may deny himself even the comforts of life and do all this to promote the good of being, or he may do it to promote his own interest temporal or eternal, to secure a reputation for piety, to appease a morbid conscience, to appease his fears or to secure the favor of God. In all things he may be selfish. He may be happy in this because it may be real self-denial; or he may be murmuring at his poverty, may complain and be envious at others who are not poor. He may be censorious and think every body proud and selfish who dresses better or possesses a better house or equipage than he does. He may set up his views as a standard and denounce as proud and selfish all who do not square their lives by his rule. This is selfishness and these manifestations demonstrate the fact. A man may forego the use of a coat, or a cloak, or a horse, or a carriage, or any and every comfort and convenience of life. And all

this may proceed from either a benevolent or a selfish state of mind. If it be benevolence and true self-denial, it will be cheerfully and happily submitted to without murmuring and repining, without censoriousness and without envy towards others, without insisting that others shall do and be just what and as he is. He will allow the judge his ermine, the king his robes of state, and the merchant his capital, and the husbandman his fields and his flocks, and will see the reasonableness and propriety of all this.

But if it be selfishness and the spirit of self-gratification instead of self-denial, he will be ascetic, caustic, sour, ill-natured, unhappy, severe, censorious, envious and disposed to complain of and pick at the extravagance and self-indulgence of others.

The true saint, in whatever relation of life, is truly self-denying. Whether on a throne or on the dunghill, he neither lives, nor moves, nor breathes, nor eats, nor drinks, nor has his being for himself. Self is dethroned. God is enthroned in his heart. He lives to please God and not to please himself. And whether he wears the crown and the purple, the ermine of the judge or the gown of the counsellor, whether he cultivates the field or occupies the pulpit, whether he is engaged in merchandize, or whether he opens the ditch or plies a handicraft, whether in affluence or poverty, it matters not how circumstanced or how employed, as certainly as he is a true saint, just so certainly he does not live to or for himself. Of this he is as conscious as he is of living at all. He may be mistaken by others, and selfish ones may suppose him to be actuated by selfishness as they are; but in this they are deceived. The true saint will be sure to be found self-denying when observed and judged by the law of love. Love would readily perceive that those things which a censorious and selfish spirit ascribe to selfishness are to be accounted for in another way; that they are really consistent with and indeed instances of self-denial. The spirit of self-pleasing and of accommodating ourselves to our circumstances and relations for benevolent reasons, may by a candid mind be generally readily distinguished from each other. The selfish will naturally confound them and stumble at them simply because they have only the experience of selfishness and judge others by themselves. A truly self-denying mind will naturally also judge others by itself in such a sense as to take it for granted that others are self-denying unless the manifest indications strongly urge to an opposite opinion.

A man of truth is not wont to suspect others of lying with-

out strong evidence of the fact, and then although he may be sure that he tells a falsehood, the man of truth is ready rather to ascribe the falsehood to mistake than to call it a lie. So the truly benevolent man is not wont to suspect others of selfishness without strong evidence. Nor will the truly self-denying man readily suspect his brother of selfishness even in things that *prima facie* have that appearance. He will rather naturally infer that his health or circumstances or something consistent with self-denial accounts for what he does.

Especially does the true saint deny his appetites and passions. His artificial appetites he denies absolutely whenever his attention is called to the fact and the nature of the indulgence. The christian is such just because he has become the master of his appetites and passions, has denied *them* and consecrated himself to God. The sinner is a sinner just because his appetites and passions and the impulses of his desires are *his masters* and he bows down to them and serves them. They are his masters instead of his servants as they are made to be. He is consecrated to them and not to God. But the saint has ceased to live to gratify his lusts. Has he been a drunkard, a rake, a tobacco user; has he been in self-indulgent habits of any kind: he is reformed; old things are past away and behold all things are become new. Has he still any habit the character of which he has either mistaken or not considered; such as smoking, chewing or snuffing tobacco, using injurious stimulants of any kind, high and unwholesome living, extravagant dressing, or equipage, retiring late at night and rising late in the morning, eating too much, or between meals, or in short, has there been any form of self-indulgence about him whatever:—only let his attention be called to it, he will listen with candor, be convinced by reasonable evidence and renounce his evil habits without conferring with flesh and blood. All this is implied in regeneration and must follow from its very nature. This also the bible everywhere affirms to be true of the saints. “*They have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts.*” It should be forever remembered that a self-indulgent christian is a contradiction. Self-indulgence and christianity are terms of opposition. The states of mind designated by these two words are opposite states of mind. This is precisely the difference between a saint and a sinner, that the saint is *self-denying* and the sinner *self-indulgent*. The saint is the lord and master of all his appetites and passions. He rules *them* and not they *him*. Whether he eats or drinks or whatever he does, he does all

for God and not to gratify himself. The sinner is the slave of his appetites and passions. It is not in his heart to deny them. Some appetite or propensity always rules over him. He complains that he can not abandon certain indulgences. He is in bondage to his own lusts and led captive by them. Seest thou then a self-indulgent professor of religion? If he be really so, imagine not that you have found a christian but know assuredly that you behold a hypocrite; for this is as certain as that he is alive. The true saint does not complain that he can not give up any self-indulgent habit whatever. He can and must and does if he be truly regenerate, give up and forsake every species of mere self-indulgence. Grace has obtained for him a victory and instead of his complaining that he can not conquer his propensities, he knows that he is more than a conqueror through our Lord Jesus Christ.

16. *The sinner does not deny himself.* He may not gratify all his desires because the desires are often contradictory, and he must deny one for the sake of indulging another. Avarice may be so strong as to forbid his indulging in extravagance in eating, drinking, dressing or equipage. His love of reputation may be so strong as to prevent his engaging in any thing disgraceful and so on. But self-indulgence is his law notwithstanding. The fear of hell or his desire to be saved may forbid his outward indulgence in any known sin. But still he lives and moves and has his being only for the sake of indulging himself. He may be a miser, and starve and freeze himself and deny himself the necessities of life, yet self-indulgence is his law. One propensity may lord it over and starve the rest; but it is only self-indulgence after all. The nun may take the veil; the monk may retire to the cloister; the miser take his rags; the harlot seek the brothel; the debauchee his indulgences; the king his throne; the priest his desk, all for the same ultimate reason, to wit, to gratify self, to indulge each one his reigning lust. But in every possible case every sinner, whatever may be his station, his habits or pursuits, is self-indulgent and only self-indulgent and that continually. Some lusts he may and must control as they may be inconsistent with others. But others he knows and it will be seen that he does not control. He is a slave. He bows down to his lusts and serves them. He is enslaved by his propensities so that he can not overcome them. This demonstrates that he is a sinner and unregenerate whatever his station and professions may be. One who can not conquer himself and his lusts; this is the definition of an unregenerate sinner. He is

one over whom some form of desire or lust or appetite or passion has *dominion*. He can not, or rather *will not* overcome it. This one is just as certainly in sin as that sin is sin. Do you hear that professor of religion? He says he knows that he ought to give up such a lust or habit, but he can not give it up. Why, in thus saying, he gives higher evidence of being an unregenerate sinner or a loathsome backslider than if he should take his oath of it. O that it were known and constantly borne in mind what regeneration is. How many thousands of deceived professors would it undeceive! A self-indulgent regenerate soul is a perfect contradiction, as much so as to speak of a disinterestedly benevolent selfishness, or of a self-indulgent self-denial, or an unregenerate regeneration, a sinful holiness or a holy sinfulness. These things are eternal and necessary opposites. They never do or can by any possibility be reconciled or dwell together in the same heart. With the sinner or selfish professor, self-denial is a theory, an opinion, an article of faith. But he knows if he will but admit the conviction, that he does not live for God; that he does not eat and drink and dress and sleep and wake and do whatever he does for God. He knows he ought to do so and *hopes he does in some measure*, but he knows all the while that the preponderance of his life is self-indulgent. When this is so, nothing but infatuation can cause him to cling to his delusion.

17. *The truly regenerate soul overcomes sin.*

Let the Bible be heard upon this subject. "And hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments. He that saith I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him."—1 John 2: 3, 4. "And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure. Whosoever committeth sin transgresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law. And ye know that he was manifested to take away our sins: and in him is no sin. Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not: whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither known him. Little children, let no man deceive you: he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous. He that committeth sin is of the devil; for the devil sinneth from the beginning. For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil. Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he can not sin, because he is born of God. In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil; whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth

not his brother.”—1 John 3—10. “Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God, and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him. By this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God, and keep his commandments. For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments; and his commandments are not grievous. For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.”—1 John 5: 1—4. These passages, understood and pressed to the letter, would not only teach that all regenerate souls overcome and live without sin, but also that sin is impossible to them. This last circumstance, as well as other parts of Scripture, forbid us to press this strong language to the letter. But this much must be understood and admitted, that to overcome sin is the *rule* with every one who is born of God, and that sin is only the exception; that the regenerate habitually live without sin, and fall into sin only at intervals so few and far between that in strong language it may be said in truth they do not sin. This is surely the least which can be meant by the *spirit* of these texts, not to press them to the letter. And this is precisely consistent with many other passages of Scripture, several of which I have quoted; such as this: “Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.”—2 Cor. 5: 17. “For in Jesus Christ neither circumcision availeth any thing nor uncircumcision; but faith which worketh by love.”—Gal. 5: 6. “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.”—Galatians. 6: 15. “There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.”—Romans 8: 1—4. “What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the

glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection: knowing this that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once: but in that he liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin: but yield yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God. For sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law but under grace.”—Ro. 6: 1—14.

There is not a greater heresy and a more dangerous dogma than that true Christians actually live a great majority of their days in sin. Such an opinion is in palpable contradiction of the Bible, and absurd in principle. Many persons seem to have the idea, and this idea is often dropped directly, or indirectly implied from the pulpit, that truly regenerate souls may and do often live mostly in sin; that they live by far the greater part of their time in a backslidden state, so far at least as their heart is concerned; that they seldom or never truly and fully obey God and live up to their duty. Now such representations are not only flatly contrary to the Bible, but they are a greater snare and stumbling block than Universalism or almost any form of heresy that can be named. The fact is, if God is true, and the Bible is true, the truly regenerate soul has overcome the world, the flesh, and Satan, and sin, and is a conqueror and more than a conqueror. He triumphs over temptation as a general thing, and the triumphs of temptation over him are so far between that it is said of him in the living oracles that he does not, can not sin. He is not a sinner but a saint. He is sanctified; a holy person; a child and son of God. If at any time he is overcome, it is only to rise again, and soon return like the weeping prodigal. “The steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord: and he delighteth in his way. Though he fall he shall not be utterly cast down: for the Lord upholdeth him with his hand.”—Psalms 37: 23, 24.

I know that it is natural and common to appeal to experience and observation in support of the dogma I am opposing. But how infinitely dangerous and wicked this is! What! appeal to supposed facts in history and christian experience to confront and withstand the express assertions of inspiration? When God expressly tells us who are christians and what is true of them, does it become us to turn round and say, Nay, Lord, for we and our neighbors are christians, and this is not true of us. Who does not see the guilt and danger of this? And yet it seems to be common for professors of religion to tacitly assume, if not openly to avow, that true christians may and do live for the greater part of their lives in sin.

This persuasion seems to be strengthened by the *supposed* fact that David and Solomon lived a greater part of their time in sin. But this is an unwarrantable assumption. The psalms of David, taking their subject and spirit and dates into view as well as many other considerations, render it evident that he was a highly spiritual man and that his backslidings were few and far between and of but short duration.

The Proverbs, the Song and the Ecclesiastes of Solomon are sufficient proof that most of his days were not spent in sin. Some have supposed that inasmuch as the high places were not removed and that idolatry was openly practised under a great part of his reign, that therefore he must all this time have been away from God. But this may be accounted for if we consider that the high places and idolatry continued through the reigns of some of the pious kings who succeeded him, doubtless for the reason that neither he nor they had political power and influence enough to suppress it. The book of Ecclesiastes gives on the face of it the highest evidence of having been written after his return from a season of backsliding and skepticism, for very much of it is only a statement of his skeptical views at that time. But really there is no sufficient proof that Solomon, who was manifestly a type of Christ, lived a majority or any thing like a majority of his days in sin.

But whatever may have been true of Solomon and of the saints of those comparatively dark days, the New Testament has settled the question that now under the dispensation of the Holy Spirit whoever is born of God doth not commit sin. The passages that I have quoted must settle this point. The sixth and eighth of Romans is the experience of the regenerate soul.

In considering the attributes of benevolence I have shown that *stability* is one of its attributes, to which I would here

refer the reader (pages 262 and 263.) In respect to the *philosophy* of christians overcoming sin I would observe that the bible assures us that "whosoever is born of God does not, can not sin because his seed remaineth in him," that is, God's seed remaineth in him. "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he can not sin, because he is born of God." In 1 Peter 1: 23 we are informed that this seed is the word of God.—"Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." God has *begotten* him (for so the word should be rendered in 1 John 3: 9) by his word and this seed remaineth in him. The truth that overcame his will and subdued or regenerated him remains in him in such a sense that it is said he can not sin. It is so lodged in his memory and so pressed upon him by the indwelling Spirit of Christ as to secure his habitual obedience, and he is only sometimes overcome by force of strong temptation, when for the time his attention is drawn away from the truth or seed of God, which after all is lodged within him. It has a permanent lodgment in his memory although it may not be attended to in some moments of strong temptation. Now whatever the philosophy of this fact may be, it is a declared fact of inspiration that "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his seed remaineth in him and he can not sin because he is born of God." The connection in which these words are found as well as other parts of scripture, shows that this must respect the general character of regenerate souls; that having been subdued by the word and Spirit of God and the seed remaining in them, they can not consent to live in sin; that they love God and hate sin so much by virtue of their new and heavenly birth that they will not sin, unless it may possibly be that by force of great temptation they may fall into occasional sins and those so seldom that it can be said in general language that they do not, can not sin.

18. The sinner and the deceived professor is the slave of sin. The seventh of Romans is his experience in his best estate. When he has the most hope of himself and others have the most hope of his good estate he goes no farther than to make and break resolutions. His life is but a death in sin. He has not the victory. He sees the right but does it not. Sin is his master to whom he yields himself a servant to obey. He only tries as he says to forsake sin, but does not in fact forsake it in his heart. And yet because he is convicted and has desires and forms resolutions of amendment he hopes he

is regenerated. O, what a horrible delusion! Stop short with conviction with the hope that he is already a christian! Alas! how many are already in hell who have stumbled at this stumbling stone!

19. *The Christian is charitable in his judgments.*

This is natural to him by reason of his regeneration. He now loves every body and seeks their good. "Love hopeth all things and believeth all things." It is natural to us to judge charitably of those whom we love and whose virtue and happiness we greatly desire. It is also natural for us to interpret the conduct of others by reference to our own consciousness. If we are conscious of uprightness of intention, it is natural to ascribe the conduct of others to upright intentions unless it be manifest that it is not so. Not only the Bible forbids rash and censorious judging of the motives or character of others, but it every where assumes and implies and teaches that truly regenerate persons are charitable in their judgments. This is an attribute of true religion, and there is scarcely any thing in which the difference between saints and sinners is more manifest than in regard to this feature of their characters. A truly benevolent mind can not be censorious. It is a contradiction to say that one who is benevolent can judge and think and speak censoriously of any one. Charity is kind, is courteous, is forbearing. A ruling disposition to promote the good of any one can not lead or allow us to rashly impeach his motives, to judge him in a manner more severe than the circumstances of the case compel us to do.

Again. As a regenerate state consists in benevolence or good-will to all beings, it implies as sacred a regard to the feelings and reputation of our neighbor as we have to our own. Therefore a regenerate soul can not be a slanderer, a tale-bearer or a busy-body in other men's matters. A regenerate soul will not, and remaining regenerate, can not take up an evil report of a neighbor and believe it but upon the strongest evidence. And when compelled to believe an evil report, he will not give any greater publicity to it than to him the interests of religion seem imperiously to demand. This must be universally true of a truly benevolent mind. A disposition to believe evil and to report it of any one is totally incompatible with good will to universal being, so that if we see this disposition in a professor of religion toward any one we may know that his profession of religion is vain. "If any man seemeth to be religious and bridleth not his tongue but deceiveth his own heart, that man's religion is vain."

The saint loves his enemies. The things commanded in the gospel are really true of the saints. They are not only required of all men, but they are facts in the life and experience of the saints. The saints really love their enemies, bless them that curse them, do good to those that hate them and pray for them that spitefully use and persecute them.

20. The impenitent, whether professors of religion or not, are censorious in their judgments and slanderous in their conversation. They are selfish and of course have ambitious projects and envious feelings, and these petty interests and projects are continually interfered with by the interests and projects of others around them. They judge others by themselves. They know themselves to be hypocritical in their professions, selfish in their aims, false in their pretences, ambitious in their schemes, envious in their spirit; and in short they are conscious of so much that is wrong that they naturally interpret the motives and character of others by their own. They do not realize that their censorious speeches and rash and uncharitable judgments are but a result and a revelation of their hypocrisy. But their own oath that they are hypocrites could not add to the weight of evidence afforded by their manifest want of charity as revealed in their taking up a suspicion, a rumor, and giving it publicity to the dishonor and injury of their neighbor. I have learned never to confide in a censorious man or woman. "O my soul come not thou into their secret! unto their assembly, mine honor be not thou united." They are false and will betray Christ to justify self.

21. Christians or truly regenerate souls, experience great and present blessedness in their religion. They do not seek their own happiness as the supreme good, but find it in their disinterested efforts to promote the well-being of others. Their state of mind is itself the harmony of the soul. Happiness is both a natural result of virtue and also its governmental reward. Christians enjoy religion just for the reason that they are disinterested in it, that is, precisely for the reason that their own enjoyment is not the end which they seek. And selfish professors do not enjoy their religion just for the reason that their own enjoyment is the end at which they aim. If I seek the good of being as an end, I am happy for three reasons:

- (1.) It results from the approbation of my own conscience.
- (2.) From the smile of God upon my soul and the conscious communion and fellowship I have with him; and,

(3.) I gain my end upon which my heart is set, and this is a sweet gratification. Thus I am triply blessed. But if I seek my own happiness as an end I fail to obtain it for three reasons:

(1.) My conscience instead of approving, upbraids me.

(2.) God instead of smiling either withholds his face altogether from or frowns upon me. He withdraws communion and fellowship from me.

(3.) I do not secure my end, and therefore I am not gratified but disappointed. Suppose I seek the conversion of a sinner, not from disinterested love to his soul, but from a desire to promote my own happiness. Now if he is converted, I am not made happy thereby, for three reasons;

(1.) My conscience is not satisfied with my motives.

(2.) God is not; therefore he does not smile upon me.

(3.) His conversion was not the end I sought, and therefore in his conversion I am not gratified, that is, I have not attained my end, which was not the salvation of that soul, but my own happiness. But if I seek his salvation disinterestedly I am *doubly* blessed if he is not converted, and *triply* blessed if he is:—

(1.) Whether he is saved or not, my conscience approves my intentions and efforts, and smiles upon my soul.

(2.) God accepts the will for the deed and blesses me as if I had succeeded. Thus I am doubly blessed.

(3.) But if he is saved, I have gained my end, and thus am gratified. So I am triply blessed. A saint is and must be happy in his religion. He has his temptations but the Lord delivers him and makes him blessed.

22. The selfish professor,

(1.) Has not true peace of conscience.

(2.) He has not the smile, communion and fellowship of God.

(3.) He is not disinterested and cannot rejoice in the glory of God and the advancement of his kingdom for its own sake, and therefore his soul is not filled with peace and joy in believing. His religion is rather his task than his life and his joy. He is rather religious because he must be than because he may be. He prays because he must rather than because he may. With him, religion is rather what it will not do to neglect than what he delights in for its own sake. His enjoyment such as it is, is only a self-righteous enjoyment. It is not the soul's harmony with itself, with God, and with all the holy, and with the eternal laws of order. He knows that his

religion is not soul-satisfying, but sees so many professors around him manifesting the same state of mind in which he knows himself to be, that he thinks that all Christians find religion in this world rather a task and a burden than a delight, and therefore he is not disposed to relinquish his hope. He anticipates happiness in future, but at present he knows he is not happy.

23. True saints rejoice to see souls converted and God glorified by any instrumentality. But hypocrites do not rejoice in this for its own sake, and are apt to be envious and jealous unless they or their friends or denomination are the instruments.

24. Christians would do all they could for God's glory and the world's conversion, whether it was ever known or rewarded or not. But sinners would do little or nothing except out of respect to applause and reward.

25. Christians have the Spirit of Christ.

(1.) Their bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit. "What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost *which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?*"—1 Cor. 6: 19. "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you."—Ro. 8: 9—11.

(2.) Their bodies are the temple of Christ. "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness."—Ro. 8: 9—10. "Examine yourselves, whether ye be in the faith; prove your own selves. Know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in you except ye be reprobates."—2 Cor. 13: 5. "To whom God would make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the gentiles; which is Christ in you, the hope of glory."—Col. 1: 27. "Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him."—John 14: 23. "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life

which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me.”—Gal. 2: 20.

“That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love.”—Eph. 3: 17.

26. Christians have the Spirit of adoption. “For ye have not received the Spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.”—Ro. 8: 15. “And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.”—Gal. 4: 6.

27. They have the fruits of the Spirit. “But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance: against such there is no law. And they that are Christ’s have crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts.”—Gal. 5: 22—24.

28. Christians are led by the Spirit. “For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.—Ro. 8: 14. “But if ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law. If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.”—Gal. 5: 18, 25.

29. They have the Spirit of prayer. “Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which can not be uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints; according to the will of God.”—Ro. 8: 26, 27.

30. They have the law written in their hearts. “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they brake although I was a husband unto them, saith the Lord: but this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; after those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord: for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.”—Jer. 31: 31—34. This passage the Apostle quotes in Heb. 8: 8—12, and applies to Christians under the new dispensation.

The law that was written upon the tables of stone is written by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of Christians. That is, the spirit or love demanded by the law is begotten in their hearts. In other words, they are truly regenerated, and love God with all their hearts and their neighbor as themselves.

I might notice many other particulars in which saints and sinners differ but perhaps I have said enough for this course of study. If you return to the attributes of selfishness and benevolence you will there find a fuller development of this subject. Of course the manifestation of the attributes of benevolence is conclusive proof of a regenerate state, for all those attributes are only so many modifications of true religion and their manifestation is proof of its existence.


So on the other hand the attributes of selfishness are only so many modifications of sin, and their manifestation is proof positive of an unholy and unregenerate state of mind.


There are many other things that might be said, indeed volumes might be written upon this subject in addition to what has appeared. But one thing is worthy of special remark. Mistaken notions in regard to the nature of regeneration have led to false methods of estimating the evidences of regeneration. Most persons and most writers seem to appeal almost exclusively, or at least in a great measure, to the feelings or states of the sensibility for evidence of regeneration. Nothing can be more dangerous and deceptive than this. They, regarding regeneration as a change in or of the sensibility, look thither of course for the evidences of the change. The bible appeals to the life instead of the feelings for evidence of regeneration. It assumes the true philosophy of regeneration, that it belongs to the will and that it must of course and of necessity appear directly and uniformly in the life. So many circumstances influence the feelings that they can not be depended on. They will effervesce or be calm as circumstances change. But the outward life must by a law of necessity always obey the will. Therefore the appeal can more safely be made to it than to any thing else that lies open to the inspection of human eyes.

The *subject* of regeneration may know, and if honest, he must know for what end he lives. There is perhaps nothing of which he may be more certain than of his regenerate or unregenerate state; and if he will keep in mind what regeneration is, it would seem that he can hardly mistake his own character so far as to imagine himself to be regenerate, when he is not. The great difficulty that has been in the way of

the regenerate soul's knowing his regeneration and has led to so much doubt and embarrassment upon this subject, is that regeneration has been regarded as belonging to the sensibility, and hence the attention has been directed to the ever fluctuating feelings for evidence of the change. No wonder that this has led conscientious souls into doubt and embarrassment. But let the subject of regeneration be disenthralled from a false philosophy, and let it be known that the new heart consists in supreme disinterested benevolence or in entire consecration to God, and then who can not know for what end he lives or what is the supreme preference or intention of his soul? If men can settle any question whatever beyond all doubt by an appeal to consciousness, it would seem that this must be the question. Hence the bible enjoins it as an imperative duty to know ourselves whether we are christians. We are to know each other by our fruits. This is expressly given in the bible as the rule of judgment in the case. The question is not so much what are the man's opinions as what does he live for? Does he endeavor to promote true religion, love to God and man? Does he manifest a charitable state of mind? Does he manifest the attributes of benevolence in the various circumstances in which he is placed? O when shall the folly of judging men more by their opinions and feelings than by the tenor of their lives cease? It seems difficult to rid men of the prejudice that religion consists in feelings and in experiences, in which they are altogether passive. Hence they are continually prone to delusion upon the most momentous of all questions. Nothing can break this spell but the steady and thorough inculcation of the truth in regard to the *nature of regeneration.*







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
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